Joshua Pollack
Joshua Pollack used to be a consultant to the U.S. government on arms control, nonproliferation, deterrence, and the like. Now he's the editor of the Nonproliferation Review and a Senior Research Associate at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS), Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey (MIIS), based in Washington, DC.
All Posts
Berlin Games: A Tale of Hughes Helicopters, Diplomats, and North Korea’s Arms-trading Networks
Peeking under the shroud of North Korea’s Monster Missile
China’s DF-26: A Hot-Swappable Missile?
Hypersonic Glide Vehicles: What are They Good for?
Guest Post: the Odds of Simultaneous Multiple Independent Detector Failures
What sort of deal does North Korea expect?
Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula: Reviewing the Precedents
Friendship without Benefits: North Korea Doesn’t Want Uncle Sam’s Dollars
North Korea, the CTBT, and (maybe?) the end of the nuclear-testing era
Brazil’s Nuclear Program: Perceptions and Realities
Guest post: Halloween comes early for the Iran Deal
Guest Post: Consequences of Testing an H-Bomb in the Pacific
Nuclear Deterrence and the Revenge of Geography
Brixey-Williams on the legal implications of the nuclear ban
North Korean WMD: A Guide to Online Resources
Daniel Salisbury: A Malaysian Shipyard with North Korean Connections?
Korea and the Limits of Coercive Ambiguity
Skin in the Game: Why Worry about North Korean ICBMs?
The Great North Korea War Scare
Putting the North Korean Threat into Perspective
Guest Post: The Prague Agenda in a Post-Truth World
Thomas Schelling: Compellence in Asia
Thomas Schelling: Deterrence in Europe
Presidential Command and Control in the Age of Trump
The Range of North Korean ICBMs
Lessons Learned from Eliminating WMD
North Korean Flow-Forming Machines, Ctd.
North Korea and the United States: Diplomacy at an Impasse
North Korean Flow-Forming Lathes
GMD vs. North Korean ICBMs, Ctd.
Iranian HEU Traces: Don’t Panic
Iran’s Neutron Initiator Test at Parchin?
Can GMD Stop North Korea’s ICBMs?
Special Delivery from North Korea
Preview of a Coming Attraction
Reverse-Engineering the Grimmett Reports
Rethinking Multinational Consortia
Syria’s Tibnah Salt Mine Revisited
Korea: Instability Within Stability
Что прописано в резолюции сената США по СНВ-3
Another North Korea Reading Comprehension Test
North Korean-Iranian Cooperation
Another North Korean Missile First
North Korea’s Carrot and Stick
Kim Jong Il and the Grim Reaper
Finding Iran’s Next Centrifuge Site
The Great North Korea Reading Comprehension Challenge
Burma, North Korea, and the WSJ
The Ayatollah Shuts the Door, Again
Did Syria Admit to Bio-Weapons?
Does Jordan Want It If Vietnam Has It?
The Logic of a Silo Conversion Ban
North Korea’s Nuclear Test That Wasn’t
Why Iran Sanctions, Diplomacy Are Hard
Lee Myung-bak's Line Drawn in the Water
Avner Cohen on Israel and South Africa
An Alternative View of the ZFS
Israel: Between Dimona and Democracy
"Become the Sun": NK Nuclear (Con)fusion
North Korea's Indigenous Bomb Design
Where the NPR Meets in the Middle
The "Lego Block" Nuclear Reactor
The Media, Generals, & Passion of AQ Khan
Closing the Books on TRR Diplomacy
Consensus Emerges on Iran's Centrifuges
N. Korea: Deadly in a Snowball Fight
IC Threat Report on Iran: Sifting Tea Leaves
Hints From Pyongyang: No 3rd Nuclear Test
How Not To Secure the Internet
When Disaster Strikes the Capital
Declaratory Policy: An Amplification
Estimating SWU with Expert Opinion
Modified Limited Hangout @ Qom, MNSR
Fuel Swaps v Escrow: Compromise Possible?
America's Role in the LEU-TRR Deal
Reading Mark Hibbs in Washington
Why Does North Korea Have a Gas-Graphite Reactor?
France's Role in the LEU-TRR Deal
Parallel Fuel Cycles, Revisited
Testing European Missile Defense
Pief Panofsky on Missile Defense
Parsing Enrichment in North Korea
Why Iran's Clock Keeps Resetting
Playing Peek-A-Boo With Nuclear Opacity
Reasons Not To Underestimate North Korea
What Is North Korea Capable Of?
Joint Statement on Missile Defense Issues
What To Expect From North Korea
Russia's EW Is Worse Than You Thought
Iran's Equinox: FMP Comes Online
Libya's Theory of the Hard Cases
How Much Respect Does A Nuclear Arsenal Get?
Most Recent Comments
- Your last assertion here is mistaken. New START imposes the same limits on the US and Russia.
- I don’t know about Putin, but Trump and Kim have used interpreters.
In: Hypersonic Glide Vehicles: What are They Good for?
That's fair - Avangard is a payload and not a missile. Still, the point remains. Russia could have maintained, as…January 9, 2020 4:44 pm