This post is from May 2017. Facts and links may have changed since. See more from that month

Article1 min read

Korea and the Limits of Coercive Ambiguity

(With apologies to Alexander George.)

North Korea and the Trump Administration turn out to be a pretty heady mix. That blend has been driving Americans to distraction for weeks, and keeping the natsec Twittersphere continuously busy.

With North Korea in mind, I dashed off a thread on some of the basics of nuclear deterrence and the non-use of nuclear weapons. You can find it here:

Now I’d like to offer some observations on Washington’s use of ambiguous threats of force to coerce North Korea. Say what you like about the credibility of such threats; Pyongyang finds them strongly objectionable, and is determined to shut them down.

Here’s the thread, curated a bit for what I hope is coherence.

Something from Storify was embedded here. Storify has since shut down.

Joshua Pollack

Writing on ACW 2008–2025

Joshua Pollack used to be a consultant to the U.S. government on arms control, nonproliferation, deterrence, and the like. Now he's the editor of the Nonproliferation Review and a Senior Research Associate at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS), Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey (MIIS), based in Washington, DC.

All posts by Joshua Pollack