Don’t Say JCPOA

Jeffrey Lewis 0:09

You are listening to the Arms Control Wonk podcast, a podcast on arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation. I'm Dr. Jeffrey Lewis, a professor at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey.

Aaron Stein 0:23

And I am Dr. Aaron Stein, president of the Foreign Policy Research Institute. And if you notice a little tint in Jeffrey's voice, it's because you needed three times to nail that intro.

Jeffrey 0:33

I am. It's, you know, like nonproliferation agreements, You do it really well the first time, you walk away. You do it not quite as well the second time, you walk away. And then, you know, you settle for the lousy compromise fourth version.

Aaron 0:49

You know, people think we've been doing this for a decade. We would have our feces together, but no, no. They're getting to see the full Monty right now. We're on video now. We're on YouTube. So, you know, they get to see where you work. That's where I used to work when I was a graduate research assistant at the esteemed, at that time, Monterey Institute of International Studies.

Jeffrey 1:07

Yeah, this is one of the two rooms assigned to the open source team. Upstairs, we have a briefing going on in Dino, the Dino Brugioni room. So I'm down here in Babs, the Constance Babington Smith room.

Aaron 1:23

And I'm in our podcast studio at FPRI. And I'm trying to come up with a segue to talk about doing things over and over and over again with the same outcome. But that's where we're at with Iran.

Jeffrey 1:34

Slightly worse outcomes, Aaron.

Aaron 1:37

That's slightly worse outcomes. But Donald Trump. And his specially appointed envoy for everything, Steve Witkoff, looks like they're trying to do the light-water version of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action with our good friends across, I guess, the Atlantic and the Persian Gulf, Iran.

Jeffrey 1:55

I mean, this deal will be to the JCPOA what Trump University was to Harvard University.

Aaron 2:05

I could make a joke about what Trump is currently doing at Harvard University, but I don't want to get FPRI in trouble. But we were around for the first JCPOA. I was actually in Geneva and managed to finagle myself a press pass. They must have been giving them out to everybody. And got to watch journalists cover the JCPOA and learn how the news is made.

And this time around feels a little bit different, don't you think?

Jeffrey 2:36

Well, you know, there are multiple conversations we could have. I will tell you what this time feels like to me more than anything else.

Aaron 2:43

I know what you're going to say, but go for it.

Jeffrey 2:46

Right. It doesn't feel like the JCPOA negotiations under Obama. It feels like the six party talks with North Korea under Bush because... That is a case where a Democrat had negotiated a perfectly fine agreement. Not, not perfect, but fine. Perfectly fine. Yeah.

Aaron 3:07

The ad, the adverb of, of, of perfect, I guess.

Jeffrey 3:11

Well, you know, it was an agreement that solved the immediate problem that was in front of one and created diplomatic space to solve the additional problems that would continue to arise. Yeah. And then a Republican president, because the agreement had Democrat on it, decided to walk away in search of a better deal, which in part I think reflects the internal politics of Republican administrations.

The hawks prevail at the beginning and then everything goes terribly. The hawks always promise that there will be a better deal to be had. And invariably, the president discovers later on that there is no better deal to be had. This, by the way, is Bolton strikes twice, right? Like Bolton kills the North Korean nuclear deal, promising that they're going to get a better deal, which, of course, they don't.

He kills the Iran deal, promising, of course, that they're going to get a better deal. They won't. But it feels like the six-party talks where the Bush administration, to their credit – I think, recognized, even if they would never say it out loud, that they had made a mistake and they tried to put Humpty Dumpty back together.

And so I do, as scathing as I want to be about the decision to consistently relearn the mistakes of the past, that's no insult to Chris Hill, who negotiated the six-party agreement, and no insult to the current Trump people who were trying to do this. But y'all are screwed.

Aaron 4:47

Most certainly. The JCPOA, because if somebody were to look back in our archives, we were big fans of the JCPOA. Did we think it was perfect? No, but it was really good. And it was really good because it did recognize implicitly, not overtly, Iran's right to enrichment. It capped it. It capped the amount of enriched uranium that Iran could keep.

And I think most importantly, what we have talked about in this podcast forever is It's not breakout. It's sneak out. I think that's a James Acton thing. And so it put in place monitoring and verification mechanisms above and beyond Iran's enrichment facilities to ensure that Iran couldn't go build something in the desert or on the side of a mountain that nobody would be able to find.

Go ahead. Well, you know why I liked it? Why?

Jeffrey 5:39

Because it met what I like to call the Witkoff criteria. Yeah.

Aaron 5:44

Steve Witkoff, real estate developer turned special envoy?

Jeffrey 5:47

Yes. Who was not wrong? I mean, he got beaten up and he had to reverse himself because he, I don't think, realized what was in the JCPOA. But yeah, his original formulation, which he articulated and then had to walk back from was Iran should be limited to enriching only to LEU for reactor fuel, so less than 5%.

Yeah, 3.67 to be exact. And there should be clear limits on weaponization activities. You know, Steve? I agree.

Aaron 6:19

You get it, Steve. You got it. You are 100% right. You are right.

Jeffrey 6:24

I'm saying it with a smile because I understand that you've had to eat a little crow because – But but you're right, man. That was the right. That's yes. That's why we like the JCPOA. And and that's why I I sincerely not sarcastically wish him the best, even if I think it's probably too little too late.

Aaron 6:50

Well, so what we said basically is that he was open to Iran. Enriching up to the level specified in the JCPOA, which was 3.67%. Let's say it's less than 5%. The actual number, so long as it's less than five, doesn't matter. When that leaked out, or not leaked out, when he said it and it got reported accurately, he then had to walk it back, but not because of the Iranian enrichment thing, but because it was the number specified in the JCPOA.

It goes back to the politics Of our current moment, which is that even if we like sort of the basic formulation, cap enrichment, cap the amount of LEU one can keep on hand to keep the quote unquote breakout time As drawn out as possible. It just can't be what Barack Obama negotiated because that's the step too far, right?

Jeffrey 7:47

Well, I mean, he said it in the ex-post. A deal with Iran will only be completed if it is a Trump deal. It's like the plane. It's got to have the name on it.

Aaron 7:59

It's got to have the name on it. But subsequent reporting have suggested that the administration is divided about this between the so-and-so hawks versus, I don't know what you call them in the Trump administration. Let's call it the Witkoff wing that says, you know, you got to make some compromises here. One is on Iran's ability to enrich.

And it goes back to sort of the challenges that the JCPOA faced afterwards, which is, well, you can't let them do this because they could do that down the line. And it doesn't address the other issues, terrorism or missiles.

Jeffrey 8:29

I mean, I think what we're going to discover, which is what I took from the six-party experience, is that there are a number of people who are just against any agreement whatsoever. And they will tell you that they are for a better agreement, but that is not an argument made in good faith. They are actually just against any agreement.

Aaron 8:47

Yeah.

Jeffrey 8:49

And and then there are people who are against any agreement that is signed by a Democrat and they will sign and support vociferously any agreement signed by a Republican, whether it's worse or not.

Aaron 9:02

I think that's the majority, by the way.

Jeffrey 9:04

I do too. And, you know, like, sure, are the fact that partisan politics stupid? Does that irritate me as a professional? Of course. But the reality is, if you had an agreement with Iran that the Iranians were happy with and therefore abiding by, even if it was not the greatest agreement, if it has buy-in from Republicans, even if that's for the worst reason, I mean, a solution is a solution.

Aaron 9:36

Well, let's talk about where we're at because the situation that the Trump administration is walking into, by the way, largely self-inflicted.

Jeffrey 9:47

Largely? Largely implies there's some portion of this that is not self-inflicted. Last I checked, the Iranians were complying with the agreement.

Aaron 10:00

I will say that...

Jeffrey 10:01

Unlike the North Koreans, by the way, who were genuinely jackasses.

Aaron 10:07

That is true.

Jeffrey 10:07

The North Koreans made it hard. I kind of feel bad for George W. Bush. He literally had an intelligence-related quandary that complicated his decision. Piece of paper had some stuff on it, but what I will say, that's right, when the North Koreans in the sixth party process coughed up the documents and they were drenched in rich uranium, it was incredible, incredible work by the North Koreans.

Oh, God. I'm sorry.

Aaron 10:44

Please. That's okay. We will say – I will say that we had – I don't even remember if it was a disagreement. But we were encouraging the Biden administration to go faster in doing exactly what the Trump administration is doing now, which is that you probably got 100 days or so to where you can dive head back into this thing like you're down into the deep end of the pool.

And really go after a return to the JCPOA. The Biden administration didn't. They will say that they did, but they didn't pursue it with as much vigor as Steve Woodcoff has been given. And so maybe we should be saying – and so the Trump administration is doing what we were asking the Biden administration to do, which is you guys tore up a deal, the Trump administration.

There is a pathway to go back to the thing, which will look a lot like the JCPOA. So go take the W. Not in George W. Bush, but the win. Maybe we should give them credit. I don't know. Credit's too strong because they destroyed the agreement in the first place. I guess we should just sign one round of applause.

Jeffrey 11:45

The thing they will have to accept is whatever deal they get is not in reality going to be as good as the old deal.

Aaron 11:54

Why do you say that? What do you think that they're going to have to give on? Because I have my own personal thoughts. I agree with you. But – What they're talking about is essentially limits on the amount of uranium and the total number of uranium Iran can stockpile.

Jeffrey 12:07

Look, maybe I'm wrong. Maybe they will get some improvements. And if they get those improvements, I'll be the first to compliment them, right? So the things – and I was talking to Rob Goldstone at Princeton about this. You would want – Real-time monitoring if you could get it, and you would want a deal that doesn't sunset. Yeah.

But the problem with a better deal, and again, if they get a better deal, that's amazing, is that we're coming to this a decade later. Right, exactly. And just the Iranians have so much more technical experience, and I think it's going to be really hard to account for all the stuff that they've done in the interim.

Aaron 13:00

And they've done a lot of stuff.

Jeffrey 13:02

Yeah. Well, and they've had 60% uranium in Fordow, right? So- How are you ever going to know? I mean, like your environmental sampling is going to be kind of a challenge.

Aaron 13:16

Unless they send the wrong letter, like Kim Il-sung.

Jeffrey 13:20

Yeah. Like I just, I don't know. Again, I think it's just, Technically going to be very hard to imagine a deal that is better because even if you got better terms, the Iranians are just so much further conceptually in terms of things that they have done and opportunities for things to be outside the count. I'm not sure that even with better monitoring, you would get to the level of confidence you had in the past.

That said... If they can get a deal that sticks politically, that to me is most important of all because ultimately, they're no cops, right? The point of making a deal is that you are creating a constituency inside Iran for complying. These are people who are getting sanctions relief and technical assistance and are getting rich because of the deal who won't want to give it up.

And we're counting on those people to internally police it. Of course. We're not really – I mean like yes, there has to be a monitoring function but also there is an intelligence monitoring function. So the point of the deal is I think to structure the incentives for the Iranians first and foremost and like the verification is – has to be done intelligently but it's fundamentally a bonus.

Aaron 14:46

And this is where politics matter, whereas at the time, the Obama administration was navigating against a Senate that was unwilling to accept anything that they would have put forward. And that includes at least one Democratic member, I believe it was Chuck Schumer at the time, who's still around, of course.

Jeffrey 15:04

Oh, well, and gosh.

Aaron 15:07

It's dusting our memories.

Jeffrey 15:08

No, no. Gold bars. Gold bars. Oh, Menendez. Gold bars.

Aaron 15:16

He's behind bars. Oh, and Cardin. Remember Ben Cardin? Oh, yeah. The point is that there was democratic resistance to a democratic president negotiated agreement. And it wasn't just Mr. Goldbars himself. It was Chuck Schumer. And as you said, it was Cardin.

Jeffrey 15:41

Although I will say, again, this is one of my things that I think people outside Washington don't understand. All those people voted against the deal because they wanted the ability to vote against it. But they created the congressional mechanism to allow the deal to happen. Of course. So I once got Bob Corker His office really pissed at me because I pointed out that they were instrumental in the passage of the agreement, even though he voted against it.

And they're like, no, no, no, we're Republicans. We're against it. We voted against it. Sure, but you created the – you could actually have blocked it in the way senators can block things and you chose not to do that.

Aaron 16:21

Completely agree. Yes. Real profiles of courage there.

Jeffrey 16:27

No. Schumer and Cardin and Corker.

Aaron 16:31

But – One potential advantage, Mr. Cyprus himself, Mr. Egypt himself. But one thing that could be better this time around is that when it has the gold Trump stamp of approval, particularly on the verification mechanisms, whatever it is, there will immediately be Be a larger constituency on the Republican side that says, like, that's great. Dealmaker of the century.

Art of the deal. He wrote a book about it in – what was it, 1988 or whatever. And there will be Democrats who, because they are – they approach these things, let's say, a little bit different way. Who – I'm speaking artfully here.

Jeffrey 17:23

Some aesthetic differences between the two parties.

Aaron 17:29

We'll be like, you know, it's a return to the JCPOA, and that was what our guy Barry did. And so perhaps we could get a little bit forward so people like you and I can actually honestly look at the deal and sort of say like, well, this is good, this is not so good, but okay, or this is bad.

Jeffrey 17:45

Well, I mean, I think any deal ultimately is going to be good because if we don't get a deal like this story ends like North Korea.

Aaron 17:53

Well, either ends like North Korea. Where they get the bomb or we are subjected to another sort of series of New York Times leaks about we're really going to do it this time. The Israelis are going to bomb them or at least launch a commando raid. And Donald Trump is going to say yes to it, which I still remain inherently skeptical about.

Jeffrey 18:10

I cannot. I mean – I'm very skeptical about this. I would not. I mean – I kind of want to see it. I can't imagine the commando raid is going to go well, but it's going to be a hell of a made-for-TV movie, man.

Aaron 18:27

Maybe they already sold the rights. They can sell it to Arms Control 1 Productions. Oh, my God. They give me their production partner.

Jeffrey 18:33

You know, it's funny. The Taiwanese in the 60s made the same argument that they wanted to commando raid Chinese nuclear facilities. Yeah.

Aaron 18:43

I didn't know this. Okay. I did. Who were the commandos?

Jeffrey 18:46

It was just, it was, it was, you know, I think that was like a hold me back kind of thing. Yeah. But like, God, that would have been a, that would have been a short and one way trip. Good God.

Aaron 19:03

I mean, I do think one way – so I guess we should talk about the Israelis. Netanyahu, I think, was kind of blindsided about this.

Jeffrey 19:11

Yeah, he seemed real unhappy.

Aaron 19:13

And he returned to de facto mode, which is the Libya deal.

Jeffrey 19:17

Yeah.

Aaron 19:17

Which is complete dismantlement. Which is, again, like a journey through time. And two, one of the major points of contention, at least through leaks within the administration, besides the idea of negotiating with Iran itself, is about what to do about their missile program. These are both things that we have talked about a long time on the Air Patrol podcast.

The Libya deal, the Iranians were just not going to accept it.

Jeffrey 19:43

Yeah, I think, you know, I always forget with the passage of time, you know, we get new listeners. If people are new to this, in the Bush administration, which is now like 20 years ago, Aaron.

Aaron 19:55

Oh, I was just talking about my experiences traveling abroad in 2003 at lunch about an hour ago.

Jeffrey 20:02

So people may forget that Muammar Gaddafi- Now dead. Gave up his- Very nascent nuclear and missile program, which was like... And chemical program. The starter kit, you know, from AQ Khan and others.

Aaron 20:21

Mr. Khan. Yep.

Jeffrey 20:22

Dr. Khan, I should say.

Aaron 20:24

Which, you know, is...

Jeffrey 20:28

You know, like the Libyans had imported some toys, but they had no capacity to make these things or, you know, it was pretty limited. And he gave it up for, you know, a sack of beans, right, for promises of better relations with the United States. And he got a security assurance from the U.K., And then the minute there was an uprising in Libya, there were storm shadow cruise missiles slamming into targets in Libya.

And eventually, given the NATO air campaign, his convoys forced off the road and he meets a very unpleasant end.

Aaron 21:10

Very unpleasant. Certainly was documented by the world's worst, Vladimir Putin, about how it goes if you let things go too far.

Jeffrey 21:17

And it's important for listeners who don't remember that because it's important to understand the Bush administration had this argument at the end of the – Gaddafi regime, or at the end of their... The Bush people had an argument at the end of their time saying that the North Koreans should call Gaddafi, that Kim Jong-il should call Gaddafi and see how great the US is and how we always keep our end of the bargain.

And so obviously the Obama people felt differently. I was not super pleased. But then the consequence of that is Bolton during the Trump administration would talk about the Libya deal with regard to North Korea to frighten the North Koreans. It sounded like he was saying, I want a deal, but actually he was saying, I want a deal that results in your collapse.

And so now when Netanyahu or any of these hawks says they want the Libya deal, they're doing it so that they sound like they say they want a deal. But they are actually conveying to the Iranians and the North Koreans that this is a deal that will result in your death and it's a poison pill and you should definitely not take it.

Aaron 22:29

Yeah.

Jeffrey 22:30

Again, for younger – And it's annoying that they can do this and reporters are like, oh, they just want a stronger deal. Or I guess Benjamin Netanyahu. Was there a Libya deal? How do you spell Libya? Wait, Gaddafi, is that with a G, H, or a Q? Nobody remembers anything, God damn it.

Aaron 22:52

Gaddafi's demise has been taught in many classes about what happens if you give up. Your ostensible WMD programs because you could end up at the other end of a NATO air campaign and then the other end of a knife in a part of your body that will get us a parental warning on our YouTube channel. We're not going to go that far.

Jeffrey 23:20

Suffice to say, the Supreme Leader – In Iran knows how Gaddafi's life ended and is not looking to repeat that experience.

Aaron 23:32

Most certainly he is not. Whether he's – most certainly he is not. And so it is a poison pill. And to Witkoff's – I don't know if credit is the thing. He's not even entertaining the Libya deal. I mean his revealed preference is the JCPOA, not the Libya deal. So it's actually going back to Barry Obama.

Jeffrey 23:55

Yeah. Look, I think – like a lot of people who are not experts, I think he's a smart guy in his universe, right? Yeah, totally. Yeah. Made a lot of money, totally. I would not wish to be on the other side of a real estate or development deal from him. I'm sure he's quite competent.

Aaron 24:23

Absolutely.

Jeffrey 24:24

What? Oh, absolutely. Yeah. But he doesn't know anything about this area. Yeah. Completely agree. I think he probably has very general senses that Republicans are tougher than Democrats. Totally. He doesn't know why he thinks that. That's just a thing you say.

Aaron 24:39

That's just part of the heuristic. Totally.

Jeffrey 24:43

And he's getting dropped into this and he's reaching a reasonable conclusion and it's going to be news to him.

Aaron 24:51

It's already was news to him. You know, my dude, that is the agreement.

Jeffrey 24:56

And he is, I bet you if you like sat him down and you were like, oh, that's the JCPOA. He'd be like, no, no, no, no. And then he'd repeat like all the false shit that Republicans said. Like, no, no, the JCPOA required us to defend Iran if Israel attacked it. And we had to send them, you know, pallets of cash.

And, you know, like he would just repeat all of those old talking points, probably in good faith.

Aaron 25:19

Totally.

Jeffrey 25:19

And then proceed to negotiate exactly the same deal.

Aaron 25:23

A slightly worse one because the Iranians have a stronger hand. Yeah.

Jeffrey 25:25

A worse one because he's in a worse position.

Aaron 25:29

But his negotiating prowess wouldn't be any different. It's just that he has dealt a worse hand. Yeah. I mean, I think – yeah. I mean – Totally. My guess is Bill Burns is –

Jeffrey 25:42

You know, probably a little better just because he's more familiar with the substantive issues. But like, I don't, you know, I think properly staffed Witkoff was fine. Like, I don't, I don't, you know, you can build a skyscraper, man.

Aaron 26:00

You can figure this out. Seriously. And what about missiles? Because missiles are always the thing. And we've talked about this forever. Missiles just – that is something I would never want to touch as a negotiator.

Jeffrey 26:13

The Iranians are never giving up those missiles. They've got so many now. And it's not – Somebody once said, if you're really worried about nuclear-armed Iranian missiles, the solution is not to let them have a nuclear weapon.

Aaron 26:29

Right. What's funny is- The missile thing is much too late. In a way, Netanyahu has made that a non-issue because they were able to withstand the two missile barrages from Iran?

Jeffrey 26:44

Yeah. Conventional missiles are just not that awesome unless you can make them really, really precise. Right.

Aaron 26:51

Right. And Iran to this point cannot. And of course, if you're living at the other end of this stuff, it's a terrifying prospect. But sort of analytically, the missile issue isn't all that – So long as you don't have anything to put on in front of them other than a couple of hundred kilograms of conventional explosive that will land mostly in the desert, you should be able to get around that.

And the other thing is that the last time, it wasn't just the Israelis. It was the Saudis. It was the Emiratis who were just vicious in going after Obama because they didn't like him.

Jeffrey 27:25

Yeah, that's right.

Aaron 27:26

This time around, you know – Mohammed bin Salman and Trump are like this. And so the idea that they could launch a concerted campaign against the Trump administration is fundamentally different. And beyond that, the Saudis lost their war in Yemen. I'm whispering. But they lost the war in Yemen. And so their position vis-a-vis Iran, even with Iran weakened, is fundamentally different than it was in 2015-16 when the GCPOA was being negotiated.

Jeffrey 28:01

Well, and I think you overlay on top of all of this a filter that we haven't really had a chance to think through very clearly, but which I think Trump brings to the fore, which is a lot of countries hated Obama because what they really didn't like was the Obama administration's insistence on human rights measures and anti-corruption measures.

Aaron 28:27

They thought he was weak.

Jeffrey 28:29

Yeah.

Aaron 28:29

Yeah.

Jeffrey 28:30

But on top of that, his interests were contrary to theirs. Yeah. That's no longer the case. Now, I prefer the Obama era in this regard.

Aaron 28:41

But if you're Saudis, you can do whatever you feel like now.

Jeffrey 28:47

It's not going to be an issue. And that, I think, makes it easier for them to want to strike a deal.

Aaron 28:54

I totally agree. I think if we had to choose between the two eras, I'm not going to speak for you, Jeffrey. I will just simply suggest that we probably share an affinity for who we would like to be ruled by. We do.

Jeffrey 29:06

But at the same time, we can recognize that my affinity is not the same as the affinity of the leadership of Saudi Arabia.

Aaron 29:15

They have a different set of dynamics and interests at play here, which honestly may make this one work. It's just going to be a worse deal. We'll see. We'll see. We'll see. We'll see.

Jeffrey 29:26

I mean, look, if they can get real-time monitoring or if they can get – A no-sunsetting deal. Those would be real accomplishments that exceed the terms of the original. And I will be the first one to suggest we put a beautiful painted portrait of Special Envoy Witkoff in some nice conference room. I'll put him right here. You can go right here.

Aaron 29:52

If Donald Trump wants to sponsor it, we do take sponsors. It'll be a nice gold plaque in honorarium of Steve Witkoff and his service to the nation. And remember, the last thing I'll leave everybody with is don't focus on breakout. Focus on sneak out. Yeah. But that is discussion. Do you know where that discussion takes place, Jeffrey?

I do. I just logged in the other day. It takes place in the super secret, the ultra exclusive. It is the American Express Platinum Lounge equivalent of Slack channels, where all of the arms patrol wonk. Posse gathers daily at patreon.com slash acwpodcast. $3 if you're a student, $5 if you're not. That is far less than the lounge in Qatar.

If you are transiting there, you get to join our private Slack channel and get to support this show. Patreon.com slash acwpodcast. As you now see, we are on YouTube. If you are listening to this, you can see our beautiful faces and where I used to work as a GRA. About the time that Barry Obama was being elected.

St. Barry of Prague. God, those were the days. With that, Jeffrey, it is good to see you and good luck to our boy Steve as he executes the deal of the century.