Decertification Day

Jeffrey Lewis 0:02

I see the sh** rising toward the fan. You are listening to the Arms Control Wonk Podcast, the leading podcast on arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation. I'm Jeffrey Lewis, the founding publisher of the Arms Control Wonk blog, and a scholar at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey.

Aaron Stein 0:26

And I'm Aaron Stein, a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council's Rapid Career Center for the Middle East. We're closer to one another, Aaron. We are. You're on the East Coast. We're only a couple states away this time. Just a couple.

Jeffrey 0:39

I'm in New York City. I got a beautiful view out my window of, I don't know, buildings.

Aaron 0:46

It is New York. I mean, what else is there besides building? And I doubt you have a view of Central Park.

Jeffrey 0:51

No, no, I don't. Although we do have a nice rooftop that sort of overlooks. You can see the river. It's pretty lovely. It's starting to feel like fall on the East Coast. It is. It's a little chilly. I'm here for this meeting that the Norman Lear Center is putting together. It's a talk at the Writers Guild. We're trying to get TV writers to write better stories about nuclear weapons.

Aaron 1:16

Well, that's noble. That's noble. Like our last podcast, you're trying to start a conversation.

Jeffrey 1:21

Yeah, I'm trying to see if they can get, you know, maybe a television pilot off the ground about two brave nonproliferation experts who host a podcast.

Aaron 1:35

I like that. I like that.

Jeffrey 1:36

As long as I get residuals and they can talk to my SAG rep. Who do you want to play you, Aaron? I don't know. Maybe Matthew McConaughey? I don't know. So the big question is, which of these international crises are our fictional alter egos going to have to solve? Because there are a lot of them. Well, it could be North Korea.

Why not? Hey, we've got a sponsor. We do. You know, speaking of North Korea, the Cato Institute invites you to participate in a half-day conference. What are we going to do about North Korea? What the hell are we going to do about North Korea, Aaron? I have no idea. Why you have to go to the conference. That's right.

It's going to be held on Monday, November 6th at the Cato Institute in Washington, D.C. With the North Korean crisis now one of America's top foreign policy priorities and no immediate answer in sight, this free conference, including a keynote address by former governor and North Korean negotiator Bill Richardson, brings together experts who will be discussing what approaches should be taken, the state of North Korea's nuclear capabilities, how to maneuver through the escalating war of rhetoric and provocative actions, and more.

Attend in person or watch the conference live online. For all of the details, go to Cato.org forward slash North Korea.

Aaron 2:46

Looks like a pretty good lineup, Aaron. Yeah, yeah. You know, your colleague, our friend, Josh Pollack, also a friend of their podcast over there, Power Problems, will be talking as well as Joe Cirincione.

Jeffrey 2:58

Joe Cirincione and I are going to be on a panel here in New York put on by the Norman Lear Center, the one I mentioned at the beginning.

Aaron 3:05

He's a good speaker. So, I mean, it's always worth it to go check him out. He's engaging. Joe's great. He introduced me to my wife. So, you know, what can I say? What can you say?

Jeffrey 3:15

But North Korea's not the only problem, Aaron. We got another problem.

Aaron 3:19

That's right.

Jeffrey 3:21

President Trump, not knowing quite what to do about North Korea, has decided to start a second nuclear crisis with another country.

Aaron 3:29

That's right. It's October 13th, 2017 at 9.13 a.m. when we're recording this, and today is decertification day.

Jeffrey 3:37

I see the shit rising toward the fan.

Aaron 3:43

Ready to waft the stench and blow us all and cover us in fecal material? Yeah. But is that BS or real shit? Fecal material.

Jeffrey 3:54

Yeah. Well, well, well, well, well, bulls produce real fecal material. But it is it's it's a really interesting question. I think both you and I have the have the White House policy fact sheet. That has been distributed. I guess the embargo lifted at 5 a.m. Eastern time, so everybody can see it.

Aaron 4:15

Yeah, and they gave a background call yesterday, and so they put this one out, embargoed, and so it's flying around on listservs, but nobody could talk about it.

Jeffrey 4:23

Yeah, and the president's going to give a talk at 1245, which means by the time you hear this, the president will have given his talk. Lord knows what he's going to say. That's right. We don't know. We don't know. But it's allegedly, or at least it's titled, A New Strategy on Iran.

Aaron 4:43

Do you know, having read it, what the new strategy is, Aaron? No. They want us to know that they've been working on it for nine months to imply that it's very serious, but no, I don't see a strategy in here.

Jeffrey 4:59

So what I love, and there are different sections, and so I'm just picking one of them as an example. The thing is titled A New Strategy on Iran, and so you sort of get to the end, right? Yeah. Yeah. And there's this – the last bullet point in one section is the Trump administration will accomplish these objectives through a strategy that neutralizes and counters Iranian threats.

Aaron 5:23

What? So your strategy is that you're going to have a strategy? It's a strategy to come up with a strategy to figure out the strategy later. And so now they're going to strategize.

Jeffrey 5:35

I'm surprised they didn't leave in the brackets that said, and then a miracle occurs.

Aaron 5:42

Yeah, I mean, we're sort of making fun of it because a lot of it in here is just boilerplate thing that people talk about Iran a lot. Strengthening alliances with traditional American allies in the region. Target with sanctions members of the IRGC. Members, not the whole group. And rollback Iranian influence in the region, whatever that means. But I think we're most looking at the nuclear and missile stuff.

Yeah.

Jeffrey 6:15

Well, I mean, I think the reason I wanted to start with the big picture is because in many ways, the way that the document is written perfectly illustrates the dilemma we're in at the moment, which is to say that for a document that allegedly describes a strategy... You know, it mostly... In fact, there is no strategy, right?

There's literally no description of any steps. The closest they ever get are saying things like, well, we will work with allies. Right. But it doesn't really, like... I mean, you wouldn't write a strategy where you said, we will not work with allies, right? Like, you actually have to sort of explain how it is you are going to work with allies in a way that is different from the way we're doing now, right?

For that to have any semantic meaning. Right. But I don't think this strategy is about policy. I think this strategy is about allowing the president to make a speech in which he says really mean things about Iran. And that's what he cares about. And so my sense is that what this strategy really is, is it's a songbook for the president.

So he can say all these horrible and inflammatory things. While allowing the bureaucracy to go on as though none of this is happening.

Aaron 7:34

Yeah, you know, Jeremy Shapiro wrote a good piece over at War on the Rocks, you know, about the Mad King, where you try and isolate him, and therefore then let the underlings of the bureaucracy run the state. And You see that in this JCPOA argument. It's that all the leaked reporting that we read suggests that all of the top-level people in the president's orbit – Favor taking a tougher line with Iran, but want to keep the JCPOA in place for a number of non-proliferation reasons, alliance management reasons, but that Trump does not like to certify every 90 days because it makes him at least personally feel humiliated.

And therefore, it looks like they have concocted a way for him to decertify the deal under the Iran Nuclear Review Act as it not being in the interests of the United States. But not actually doing anything beyond that to try and keep the deal in place. And so it's a lot of political theater without a strategy.

Jeffrey 8:43

Yeah, you know, it led me to think the opening line in the new strategy is this quote from the United Nations General Assembly address where Trump says, it is time for the entire world to join us in demanding that Iran's government end its pursuit of death and destruction. I kind of wonder what would happen if the Iranians just sent a diplomatic note that said, oh, we're sorry about that.

We're officially ending our pursuit of death and destruction.

Aaron 9:08

It's so hollow. I mean... We were joking off pod about how strategy is the most overused word in Washington to the point where it's become meaningless. Everybody starts their op-ed with, we need a strategy. We need a strategy. Well, we need a strategy. Yeah.

Jeffrey 9:25

So what's your strategy? Well, our strategy is to get a strategy. And that strategy will provide a strategic approach, thinking about the problem strategically and engaging in a number of ways with strategic allies. That's our strategy.

Aaron 9:35

And then we'll strategize.

Jeffrey 9:37

Yeah. I remember, oh, God, love him, Dave Abshire, who I adored. When he was the president of CSIS, strategy was absolutely his favorite word. And he really wanted to change the name of CSIS to the Strategy Center. Like, he had to be talked out of it. Okay.

Aaron 10:02

That would not have been a wise idea.

Jeffrey 10:05

No, no. Dave was a wonderful, wonderful man who had many, many wise ideas, but that particular one, I think that was a bad one.

Aaron 10:15

We've said this before. Well, this is a debate about nothing. It's like a Seinfeld episode. I mean, right? The debate is not what it seems. The episode is starting, and we don't know quite how it's going to end up, but we know that it's all going to come full circle, if that makes sense.

Jeffrey 10:33

Yeah, it does. I mean, in a really sad, pathetic way.

Aaron 10:36

So he'll decertify today in about three hours from when we record this. And then we're going to kick it to Congress, we being the United States. And this was for review about how to respond. And this was not how this process was supposed to work. No, not at all.

Jeffrey 11:03

This process was supposed to allow Congress to not bear any responsibility.

Aaron 11:08

Right. And I think when the Corker, I mean, what becomes the Iran, it's the Iran Agreement Review Act.

Jeffrey 11:16

The Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act. Sorry, I always leave that out.

Aaron 11:19

The Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act in NARA. Right. Was supposed to absolve Congress of any real responsibility and kick it to the executive to reassure Congress every 90 days that, A, Iran was in compliance with the limits set out in the JPOA, those limits are verified by the IAEA, and that the deal was in the national interest of the United States.

Jeffrey 11:53

Yeah, I mean, I think it's probably worth explaining if people didn't follow the ins and outs of the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act. Although we did several emergency podcasts.

Aaron 12:04

We did, we did.

Jeffrey 12:05

And we actually, you know, we concluded— Hated this particular piece of legislation? We hated it, but as it— In real time.

Aaron 12:12

We hated it in real time, but as it moved forward, we eventually made our peace with it because— Because they were absolving themselves of responsibility and weren't going to try and kill the deal.

Jeffrey 12:22

Yeah, right. So to sort of go back to 10,000 feet, right, what President Trump is going to do today is give a barn burner of a speech about how terrible Iran is. And in doing so, he is going to announce that he has a strategy to think strategically about the strategic problem of Iran. Right. And then what's crucial is he will not do something, right?

He will refuse to provide a routine certification to Congress that Iran is implementing its commitments and that the deal is in the best interest of the United States. And by failing to provide that certification, which the president is obligated to do every 90 days... That will trigger, under the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act, a process by which Congress can relatively easily reimpose sanctions on Iran.

Now, Congress is not obligated to impose those sanctions on Iran. The president could choose to veto sanctions. Those sanctions – or Congress could, by the way, and this is the thing I think that truly illustrates what cowards Congress are. Congress could amend the JCPOA to remove the reporting requirement.

Aaron 13:43

And that's what you keep – and then let me back up even to keep it at the 10,000-foot level for a second. Some of the sanctions that were waived as part of implementation day for the JCPOA were critical for allowing it to come into force. And so that if they reimpose certain sanctions, they would try and trigger Iran either to withdraw because they would say that the U.S. is not holding up its commitments or cause a general crisis within the JCPOA about implementation.

That's right.

Jeffrey 14:14

And, you know, it may be, by the way, that Congress only imposes some sanctions. Right. And it further may be that the... Europeans, looking at Trump like he has an arm growing out of his head, may choose to impose no additional sanctions or may choose not to reimpose them. And the Russians and the Chinese certainly will not.

Right. And so it is possible that the Iranians, while they will be angry, will not withdraw from the deal. Although I do expect them to take some symbolic steps that will make us upset.

Aaron 14:51

Yes. Yes, I think that's right. Yeah.

Jeffrey 14:54

They may, they probably won't openly breach limits, but I'm guessing they will insist on very favorable interpretations in the event of any ambiguities. I mean, favorable interpretations that probably go beyond, you know, the natural tendentiousness of any diplomat. And I think, you know, the thing is, having engaged in a transparent and cynical effort to destroy the deal, our allies are like not going to be super interested, I think, in holding the line.

Aaron 15:24

Yeah, and I think this is important because some of those definitions are still being worked out, you know, within... Amongst the parties, I should say. They're still being worked out. And so this is my ultimate problem with Crying Wolf over and over again, is that you want to have terms that are more favorable to American interpretations than you do towards Iranian interpretations.

And so you're Your weight of effort should be on galvanizing within the P5 plus one, most of which are American allies, consensus on your terms, not theirs. And this is why I think this thing is so stupid, in addition to all the other stuff.

Jeffrey 16:03

I mean, you know, I still have some modest hopes, because really it does seem like the administration is desperately trying, or the staff in the administration is desperately trying to allow Trump to have his speech And do what he feels like he needs to do to look awesome on cable TV, while at the same time not fundamentally damaging the agreement.

And I will be very careful about how I say this, but you and I have both privately discussed about steps they could take That would in fact sabotage the agreement, that would be legal and relatively easy to do.

Aaron 16:46

Yes, but nobody has made that argument in the public space, choosing instead to focus on canards like Section T. There are much smarter ways to do this, but the other people have to figure them out.

Jeffrey 16:58

There's a beautiful irony that one of the deal's greatest opponents is really ideally positioned to destroy this deal, but said opponent appears to be... Too inexperienced to understand the giant pile of TNT. No comment. Yeah. It's like, okay. No comment. Okay. Hey, I'm not going to point that out to you.

Aaron 17:23

No comment. But we should go back to this. One of the things that you read is that in order for the administration to save face – Is that as part of their amendments to the JCPOA is that they remove this reporting restriction every 90 days so Trump will no longer have to certify it. And so the issue can then fade away.

He gives a speech. The issue then sort of gets kicked to Congress. Congress then absolves itself of its role that it imposed, that it sought to impose on the executive back when this thing was being negotiated. And then both sides absolve themselves of political responsibility.

Jeffrey 17:57

Yeah. I mean, I think the important thing to say here is that the president is going to trigger a serious crisis with Iran, not because there is any desire to destroy the deal, but because he has a fragile ego and he doesn't like having to certify every 90 days that Barack Obama is a better president than he is.

Yeah.

Aaron 18:20

Or at least that the deal is not the worst deal in American history, as he said over and over again on the campaign trail.

Jeffrey 18:26

Right. I mean, look, they are ultimately doing this for the same reason that he allegedly hired two hookers to pee in Barack Obama's bed. It's the same visceral, emotional reaction. And the thing that terrifies me, I think we will probably get through it. I think the Europeans are not going along, and I think the Iranians are too smart To let themselves get drawn into this nonsense because they've got, their hand is about to get really, really strong, right?

Because if they take the high road in response to this nonsense, I mean, they can practically build a bomb and nobody is going to go complain about it.

Aaron 19:05

Right, and that's ultimately the problem, right?

Jeffrey 19:08

Yeah. Well, and so, you know, I don't want this situation... I mean, we might get lucky, and they stay in the agreement, but we should, I think, always be absolutely clear that if we get unlucky, right, if politics and Iran turn, you know, they could do everything that North Korea is doing and more fast.

Aaron 19:31

Yeah, and that's something that we talk about all the time, you know, and... Is that they've made the political decision not to build the bomb. The JCPOA piles on extra verification mechanisms in addition to the comprehensive safeguard arrangement that they already have with the IAEA, and they're abiding by the additional protocol as part of the implementation of the JCPOA.

There is nothing, if they pull back out, That those excess verification mechanisms go away. And so why would you want to test or at least risk excess verification that sunset – I mean, and there are some sunsets that do come off, but like really for quite a long time that would give you extra assurances that they are not building a bomb.

This is where I can't wrap my head around. This is why the JCPOA is in the United States' best interest and why Trump's advisors have concocted this elaborate scheme to basically keep the U.S. in. But it will be damaging.

Jeffrey 20:43

Hey, Aaron. Yeah? If you want to know how bad things with Iran could get, you know what you could do.

Aaron 20:50

I think there's a half-day conference coming up.

Jeffrey 20:53

The Cato Institute is hosting a half-day conference called What Are We Going to Do About North Korea? It's going to be held on Monday, November 6th at the Cato Institute in Washington, D.C. Their invite says, with the North Korean crisis, now one of America's top foreign policy priorities and no immediate answer in sight.

Aaron 21:15

It might not even be by Monday, November 6th. There could be a lot of things that happened in this country by Monday, November 6th.

Jeffrey 21:25

Yeah. But, you know, it has a keynote addressed by Bill Richardson, former New Mexico governor who was also the North Korean negotiator. I would be fascinated to see how much he thinks this Iran situation looks like the collapse of the agreed framework with North Korea.

Aaron 21:39

That's right. And Pollack will be speaking, our buddy. It's always good to hear Pollack speak about North Korea. Yeah.

Jeffrey 21:44

Yeah, so they're going to discuss what approaches should be taken, the state of North Korea's nuclear capabilities, how to maneuver through the escalating war of rhetoric and provocative actions. If you can't attend in person, you can watch the conference live online. For all of the details, go to Cato.org forward slash North Korea. Ah, that's our future on Iran.

The reason maybe it's only a half-day conference is the next half the day will be like, Iran, what the f***?

Aaron 22:10

No, I'll meet you at the bar because this is the state of affairs we're in, and you might as well be buzzed for the rest of your life.

Jeffrey 22:17

Oh, I think it's worth talking about how we find ourselves in this ridiculous state of affairs. Because, you know, Rex Tillerson, according to a senior official who was quoted in CNN, has privately admitted that the problem is not the agreement. The problem is the reporting requirement. That it created a political crisis every 90 days in the White House and drew the president's attention to the Iran nuclear agreement when all of the staff was trying to get him to focus on the nice puppy.

And they were trying to put the nuclear agreement over in the corner where the president wasn't going to even notice that it existed. Right. And so I think maybe we should talk a little bit about why we hated the Iran nuclear agreement Agreement Review Act. And even though I hate the act, and even though I hate what the president's about to do, there is a kind of beautiful symmetry in the absurd theater playing out in Washington, D.C. right now.

Aaron 23:19

Yeah, I mean, I think we should go back as it was coming down the pike, you know, the JCPOA, Congress tried to assert a role. This was not a... Yeah I mean this conversation just started from the most absurd place.

Jeffrey 23:47

You know, we make nonproliferation agreements all the time. Right. It's true. We do. And they're never, ever, ever, ever, ever, ever submitted to Congress. You know, the agreed framework was not submitted to Congress. Congress had to act to appropriate some money, but they did not get to say whether the agreement was a good or a bad one.

Right. The Libya deal that the Bush administration negotiated had no involvement with Congress whatsoever other than a few codels that came after the fact. I mean... People really tendentiously pointed to some of the laws involving arms control agreements, saying that they need to be treated as treaties, kind of conveniently ignoring the fact that this is not an arms control agreement.

It does not limit the number of weapons the Iranians have. They have a commitment to have no nuclear weapons. That's a commitment under the NPT. This is about... Relieving sanctions on the Iranians for better safeguards and limitations on their nuclear energy program so that we have some confidence that they aren't resuming the nuclear weapons program they had before 2003.

But whatever, you know, Republicans had this story about how Barack Obama was using executive orders to undermine the Constitution. And so they had to stick their nose in it. But what really was annoying is they wanted to stick their nose in it, but only so they could say bad things about it and then not have to really vote on it.

Aaron 25:21

I think that's important, you know, is that as what became the Iran, I can never pronounce it, I can never say it, the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act was coming down. They negotiated in such a way that it allowed largely Republicans to grandstand publicly about the usurping of the Constitution and sort of Obama's executive tyranny. But then created a mechanism to where none of them actually had to vote.

None of them could actually kill it.

Jeffrey 25:54

Right, right. Because, you know, Congress had a narrow period of time. And any time Congress gives itself a narrow period of time, that's a, you know.

Aaron 26:04

It was 30 days, wasn't it?

Jeffrey 26:05

Yeah, right. You know, I'd have to go back and look at the exact time reporting requirements. But they were short enough that, you know. Bob Corker can't wipe his butt in 30 days.

Aaron 26:15

Right. So Corker is at the center of this. Right. Corker was at the center of this effort to get a congressional role. And then he's often put out there because he voted against the agreement. Right.

Jeffrey 26:25

Well, so and I think this is true also, though, of Ben Cardin and Chuck Schumer, Democrats who opposed the agreement, who did. I think Corker, Cardin and Schumer all wanted to be opposed to the agreement for political reasons. They didn't want to have to defend it to their constituents. And yet they wanted to put in place a structure that would allow the agreement to go through.

Right. So they wanted the classic congressional free vote, which is. I get the treaty that I know is a good thing, but I also get to vote against the treaty so I can say it's a bad thing and therefore don't pay any political costs. Like we get the treaty, but Barack Obama picks up the check. Right. I call this the hold me back policy.

Aaron 27:07

Hold me back.

Jeffrey 27:08

Yeah, that's right. And, you know, it's funny because at the time, everyone understood that.

Aaron 27:15

You know, I mean, well, there was some time where there was concerns that they would try and kill it, you know, and that then we actually I remember this clearly on the podcast said that they weren't trying to kill it, you know, but they were trying to do this. And then ultimately we could live with it so long as the JCPOA came into force.

Jeffrey 27:33

Yeah, I really thought that there was a period in which. They were going to screw it up.

Aaron 27:40

Yeah, we couldn't foresee the Mango Mussolini. I think that is the issue.

Jeffrey 27:45

Well, there's that, too. But, you know, I mean, I think the important thing is and I'm going to give the Mango Mussolini, a.k.a. Il Duce, his due here. Right. Because in the childish spat he's having with Bob Corker. You know, in which he's calling Bob Corker little Bob Corker with two Ds.

Aaron 28:07

Two Ds. Jesus Christ.

Jeffrey 28:10

Two Ds and apostrophe after the E. Yeah. In the spat that Trump is having with Corker, he went ahead and argued that Corker had paved the way for the Iran nuclear deal, which is true. Yes, it is. Right. He didn't get that one wrong. So he's been briefed. Right. And, and like, like I'm staring at it right now, you know, 2015, there is a political article titled how Cardin and Corker clinched the Iran deal.

Yeah. You know, at the time we all understood that Corker and Cardin were going to vote against any agreement, but they were working out a way that would allow that to happen. Just without their votes, right? So you know, exactly classic DC trick, right? Mitch McConnell, by the way, did the same thing with the New START Treaty. You know, as the Senate Minority Leader at the time, he voted against the New START Treaty, but did none of the procedural things that he might have done that would have blocked it, right? Because instinctively, these guys, I think, are of two minds: one in front of the camera and one behind the camera. Yeah.

But what's really interesting to me about this current spat with Corker and I think Congress in general is all – so when Trump made the statement that Corker had paved the way for the Iran nuclear deal, every single fact checker said Trump was wrong. And one of them even said, and Corker has the votes to prove it.

It's like that is so naive. Yeah.

Aaron 29:55

Yeah, I saw that.

Jeffrey 29:56

That is literally, like, Congress's business is creating votes that confuse voters. That is literally what they do, right? That's where the whole John Kerry, I voted for it before I voted against it line came from, is Kerry was, in his inelegant Kerry-like way, trying to explain that there are, you know, often... Some distance. There is often some distance, right, between what the president, what there is often some distance between what is being voted on and what is actually trying to be accomplished. Yeah, I think that's right. I think that's right. And this is what I was talking about earlier, like it's a Seinfeld episode. It all comes full circle because this is exactly what Trump is doing.

I know. I mean, there is actually a certain beauty to this, which is Congress is like, we really hate the Iran nuclear deal. We really hate the Iran nuclear deal. Hold me back. Hold me back. And so Trump's like, I really hate it, too. Why don't you impose some more sanctions?

Aaron 30:59

Like, whoa, whoa, slow down, buddy. Slow down. Let's talk about this one, right?

Jeffrey 31:03

Let's talk about it. Slow it down, Donald. What happens when there are two people screaming, hold me back, and then no one holds them back?

Aaron 31:14

Well, they just run into each other and fall over.

Jeffrey 31:19

You know, I mean, I actually – like, no kidding. I mean, I do think that one of the reasons Corker was so incensed in that New York Times interview is – I mean, sure, he can say he thinks Trump is unfit, but he backed him, right?

Aaron 31:36

Oh, God, yes. I mean – I mean, look, he enabled him early on. He was in discussions to be Secretary of State, we're told. Not much has changed in Trump's temperament or demeanor from a year and a half ago to a year ago to a week ago. You know, Corker's change of heart comes a little late in the game, if you ask me.

Jeffrey 32:01

Yeah. I mean, it came after his boy got elected and after he didn't get appointed secretary of state and right before he decided to leave the Senate, presumably to run for governor or maybe president.

Aaron 32:15

Right. Exactly. And so he's positioning himself opposite or get a lucrative book deal. I mean, there's all sorts of things going on here. But I mean, within this thing, within this, do you think and let me ask you this. That Trump's belligerence actually gives political cover to people in Congress, leaving Tom Cotton aside, not to reimpose sanctions?

Does it give them actually an easier out than if he was actually saying and laid out a cogent and implementable strategy that they had strategized for and come up with a strategy for nine months?

Jeffrey 32:53

Yeah, I mean, I think there are probably some off-ramps here if people want to take them. You know, the problem... The problem is not could smart people find a way... To avoid blowing things up because of course they could, you know, I mean, Congress could do a limited reimposition of sanctions on, on a number of entities where the Iranians would be pissed about it, but they would sort of have to admit like, yeah, okay, well, whatever.

Right. But I think the danger here and, and this kind of gets us a little bit conceptual is, Is that when we have this conversation, we are replicating the process that delivered the Republican Party into the hands of Trump and then delivered the Republic into the hands of Trump, which is all along people are trying to find some way in which they can avoid taking any political risk themselves.

Right? And then they maybe look at some small way that they can make the problem better, you know? And I think Corker is a perfect example of this, both in the way that he approached the Iran nuclear deal and the way that he approached Trump, which is that privately he thought one thing, he realized that it was in his public interest to say the opposite, And so he tried to have his cake and eat it too, right?

He tried to be critical of Trump without being too critical of Trump. He tried to be critical of the Iran nuclear deal without actually killing the Iran nuclear deal.

Aaron 34:39

But the problem is, this is how we got Trump, right?

Jeffrey 34:45

All these people enabled him, you know, and they convinced themselves that they could manage the president, you know, and I'm always deeply suspicious of this argument that like, Look, I'm not doing this for the wealth and power. But if you give me the wealth and power, trust me, I'll babysit the crazy man.

Aaron 35:07

Yeah, but this argument breaks down for me because the crazy man is the president of the United States. And when he says something, it's not as if you can say, no, sir. You have to then begin to put in place an actual policy strategy, policy to match his words with action. And so you get this debilitating process, right?

This gut-wrenching nonsense for the past however months, op-ed after op-ed, will he or won't he decertify? And he will decertify, but it will ultimately be a... There's nothing behind it, there's no meat, and that will ultimately end up in both the executive and Congress absolving itself of any responsibility for the JCPOA. At a time when you want somebody, it's the executive you would want in real life American political history, maybe not now, but in real life you would want the executive.

To be keenly interested in the things that are still going on in order to get a full picture to, you know, in order to get a full picture of Iran's nuclear history.

Jeffrey 36:18

Yes, but this is a particular case where we don't want the executive to be interested in anything that matters.

Aaron 36:29

Right, but isn't this the damaging, doesn't this go back to the Mad King thing and the Jeremy Shapiro argument?

Jeffrey 36:33

Yeah, it's what happens when you elect someone who's unfit.

Aaron 36:36

Yeah, so you try and wall off the Mad King. So, I mean, Tillerson, I believe, in one of the leaks was saying that this could result in Congress just simply getting rid of the 90-day. I think you and I in a normal thing would say that's great. You know, and this will ultimately be to the benefit to the JCPOA if it goes the way the leaks say it will go.

But it didn't have to be this tortured.

Jeffrey 36:58

Well, and also, I mean, I want to make, I think, the more direct... Objection. Because while I understand, like, I lived in Washington for 16 years, I get it, right? I know the politicians do this. I know that they create free votes. Like, I know why they created this legislation, right? I understand all of the interests that were at play, and I understand this is how they do things.

And I get that staff in the White House does the same thing. That they flatter the boss, appeal to his ego, say yes to his face, and then go turn around and do what they're going to do. I understand all those classical games that politicians and bureaucrats play. But I do think that when we live in Washington for so long, we forget that sometimes we're not as smart as we think we are.

And sometimes the clever little games backfire. And I would just observe that those clever little games are how we got Trump. Like Trump got through the Republican primary process because no one wanted to drop out in order to let someone take over. No one wanted to really confront him directly. You know, everybody was making their own calculation for like how Trump is going to fall and then they're going to be positioned.

And now that Trump is in power, people have, I think, fooled themselves into believing that they can manage this person. And so you've created this system where if he were an alcoholic, we would say, you people are enabling him. And what we really need is an intervention. And the problem is it takes courage. And the only time you see someone frontally assaulting Trump Are either when somebody is leaving office like Bob Corker is, or someone feels like their political future is being damaged by the association.

And my sense is, whether he's going to run for something or he's just worried about his legacy, Corker knows that his rep is going to be stained by not opposing Trump strongly in the primaries and by considering that Secretary of State gig. And I think he's trying to wash the stink off.

Aaron 39:22

Let me ask you, before I wrap up, a devil's advocate question. I mean, he did win, and one centerpiece of his foreign policy sort of ramblings was that he was going to rip up this deal. How do you stand up to them when you sign up to do this? I mean, but to be honest, every Republican ran on some variation of ripping this up.

Jeffrey 39:43

Well, that's ultimately the problem, right? And there's an echo... Back to North Korea on this, which we'll come to in a second, but most Republicans know this is a good agreement. Most Republicans know that they would have negotiated the same agreement had they been given the chance. They did try to negotiate with the Iranians. It's just they were up against Ahmadinejad, and that was not happening, right?

Obama got to negotiate with Hassan Rouhani. And to his credit, they got the deal. That's not to diminish what the Obama people did. It's one of the few things they did that I actually have genuine respect for. But the... The reality is the deal looks the way it does because of the relative power of the two parties.

And Republicans would have negotiated the same deal. They would have been happy with it. And I think they know that. But none of them are willing to stand up and say that because they're afraid that it risks ostracism from the party. So they all engage in this stupid, stupid dance. I shouldn't say none of them. There actually are Republicans who are willing to do it.

But they get ostracized from the party. ... But certainly people like Tillerson, you see it on display with Tillerson, where privately he's arguing to keep the deal, but publicly he's saying, but it's a terrible deal and the Iranians are horrible. And it's really hard to square these two things, the public rhetoric about how the president is right that this is the worst deal ever, but we should keep it.

And I think that we've, you know, in a way, right, Republican leaders have enabled that kind of attitude on their side of things. And, you know, I often find that because, you know, those of us who are supporters of the deal because we like some of the opponents or because we know that privately they agree with us and that they're trying to help, you know, we don't call bullshit quite enough.

Aaron 41:36

Yeah, I mean, strategy is ways, you know, ways, you know, it's ways and means to get to an end, right? It's basic, you know, definition of strategy. Looks like what this administration's Iran strategy is, is basic ways and means to get to an objective, which is keeping the Iran nuclear agreement while trying to push the president out.

Would you agree with that?

Jeffrey 41:58

Yes.

Aaron 41:58

That is the strategy. I mean, every leak suggests that the strategy is to sideline the president to keep the JCPOA.

Jeffrey 42:06

By the way, I think this is important to say because there's this kind of silly debate about compliance.

Aaron 42:14

Oh, Jesus.

Jeffrey 42:16

Well, but not just Section T, but literally the word compliance. There are a whole bunch of Republicans who object to using the word that Iran is complying with the agreement. All right. And so I just want to read two things. Okay, here's what the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act said. Section 6, compliance certification. After the review period provided in subsection B, the president shall not less than every 90 calendar days determine whether the president is able to certify that, and this is how it defines compliance, Iran is transparently, verifiably, and fully implementing the agreement, including all related technical or additional agreements.

And then there are other things about not violating the agreement, right? But the first and most important requirement for the term compliance is that Iran is implementing the agreement, right? Yes. Okay. Here's what Yukio Amano has said about Iran's The nuclear-related commitments undertaken by Iran under the JCPOA are being implemented. There is no question that the Iranians are meeting their obligations.

The IAEA is crystal clear about that. There is a little debate in Washington about, like, well, you can't say that the IAEA is saying they're compliant because the IAEA doesn't use compliance or compliance is a broader concept. You know, this is a classic Washington language game where people try to position themselves. Like, it's nonsense. The simple definition of compliance is are you implementing your agreements?

And can we verify that? And Amano's view is, yes, they are implementing their agreements and we can verify that. Yes, Amano would like more authority. I would like Amano to have more authority. But I already see this in our own discussions where nobody wants to be seen as weak or naive and nobody wants to look like they like the Iranians.

And so people won't say the simplest straightforward thing, which is, yes, the Iranians are complying with the agreement. Amano has said they are implementing the agreement. The compliance certification asks, are they implementing the agreement? The answer is yes. Sorry, I'm frustrated because even people who want to save the deal don't want to say quite that Iran is complying because, you know, that makes you look like you're a... You're a...

I don't know. What's the Iranian version of a panda hugger?

Aaron 45:01

A Rohani hugger a Rohani hugger I was about to say like you know a Zarif lover you know avid reader of Zarif's op-eds I don't know Yeah, no, I think that's right. And I would, do you want to talk before we wrap up here? I mean, there is also a debate in Washington, you know, because now they're trying to attach it to anti-Russia stuff.

Jeffrey 45:21

Have you picked up on this one too? No, I was going to talk about how this is also what undid the agreement with North Korea, but that would have been a lead in.

Aaron 45:32

I mean, I just think it bears mentioning because people don't understand it. People don't understand what Russia is trying to do and why Amano is actually acting in sort of broad... Amano is acting closer to the U.S. position, if the U.S. actually had a position. Amano wants more authority to be able to inspect sites in Iran. Russia is trying to...

I guess, draw distinctions about how the IAEA can use information from member states to look into and ask questions about specific military sites, which is a throwback to how we got the PMD issue on the table. And so don't you want to empower Amano in this situation?

Jeffrey 46:21

Yeah, I mean, this is really frustrating. People forget that the IAEA has a circumscribed mandate. And when Iran's Weapons activities became public, one of the defenses mounted by the Iranians and their friends was that the NPT only prohibits the manufacture of nuclear weapons, not their research, and that regardless of what the NPT does or does not prohibit, that's none of the IAEA business.

Right. And so it was incredibly important for the JCPOA to prohibit those activities and And say that it's absolutely some of the IAEA's business, even if it's very difficult to verify. And what's happening is Amano is trying to use this experience to strengthen the IAEA's mandate. By the way, something that I support, and something that I wish the opponents, instead of using this as a reason to attack the IAEA and the JCPOA, would use it to... That's why they're stupid, Jeffrey!

Aaron 47:18

I mean, I'm sorry, now we're going to be blunt. That's why they're being stupid. The IAEA is trying to do what they want.

Jeffrey 47:24

I know. Well, it's not because they don't care about non-proliferation, right? The people who are attacking the JCPOA would prefer to have a nuclear-armed pariah in Tehran rather than a non-nuclear Iran that's at peace with Europe. They're interested in isolating Iran because they don't like the government. It's not a non-proliferation thing. But if you did sincerely care about non-proliferation, you would want to strengthen Amano.

And the people who are opposing Amano are the Russians. And the Russians are doing so because they are currying favor or With those countries around the world that want the IAEA to have a circumscribed mandate. And so, yeah, this is a fight where traditional conservatives should be lining up with Amano But in fact, Amano is caught in the crossfire because those people are firing at the Iranians and they don't care about the IAEA or the Iran nuclear deal.

Yeah, that's right. So that's bad. And, you know, the reality is, though, that this is what happens all the time. You know, Corey Shockey, another person I adore, professor of mine, you know, who's significantly more conservative than I am, although one of the things I love about Corey is she actually never engages in these games, as far as I can tell.

Right. What you see is what you get with Corey. She used to joke, and I think this is very true that all foreign policy issues end up kind of like a beauty contest. Okay. You know, and I, and, and I'm, I mean, I've taken this and done my own thing with it. So she's not to blame for the rest of it.

But I, I think, you know, this ends up like, do you think Iran is scary? Do you think North Korea is scary? And if the answer to that is yes, then, then, then any agreement with them, no matter how favorable is bad.

Aaron 49:21

Yeah, I mean, I think that's right. And I think this is exactly what happened in the mid-2000s. Go ahead, sorry. No, I was teeing you up, because this is exactly what happened in the mid-2000s.

Jeffrey 49:32

Right, which is, we had a deal with North Korea. It was a pretty good deal. It had some problems, but, like, it was way better than the alternatives. The Bush administration walked away from it and regretted it, you know? I mean, they tried to renegotiate that agreement, but... A couple years after they left it, because they knew it was a mistake.

But they couldn't admit it, you know? They couldn't admit that the deal was good because Clinton had done it, and partisanship required them to say it was bad. And, you know, they had... It's like a dog peeing on a fire hydrant. Like, they had to negotiate their own version. Yeah. And we ended up with nothing, right? We walked away...

And we got nothing. And I worry that if we walk away from this and try to get a better deal with the Iranians, we're going to get nothing. And the situation with Iran, we're going to be having conferences like the one the Cato Institute is hosting.

Aaron 50:25

That's right.

Jeffrey 50:26

That's right. And they're a nice building. And they're a nice building.

Aaron 50:30

They have a nice building.

Jeffrey 50:31

They do. They do. They do. They do. They do. They do. But yeah, if we walk away from this agreement, you know, you can just mentally fill in Iran for North Korea. And you will be able to go To a half-day conference? What are we going to do about North Korea being held Monday, November 6th at the Cato Institute in Washington, D.C.?

Seriously, just substitute Iran for North Korea. With the North Korean crisis now one of America's top foreign policy priorities and no immediate answer in sight, this free conference, including a keynote address by former governor and North Korean negotiator Bill Richardson, brings together experts who will be discussing what approaches should be taken, the state of North Korea's nuclear capabilities, how to maneuver through the escalating war of rhetoric and provocative actions, and more.

Attend in person or watch the conference live online. It's free. It's free. It's free. Stream it. For all the details, go to Cato.org forward slash North Korea. Now, who would give the keynote for the half-day conference, what the hell are we going to do about Iran?

Aaron 51:41

I don't want to name names on the podcast. I don't think we'd be invited. No.

Jeffrey 51:51

Well, maybe if Kato was hosting it. Well, maybe if Kato.

Aaron 51:54

You're right. Kato?

Jeffrey 51:55

Yeah, we could go there. I think Josh Pollock would still be doing the technical update on where they are. That would still be Josh Pollock.

Aaron 52:02

Yeah, absolutely.

Jeffrey 52:05

It's not a happy note, Aaron, but it's not a happy day.

Aaron 52:08

It's slightly cloudy and overcast on the East Coast. Although still warm. I can go up to my deck when this is over and work outside. Yeah.

Jeffrey 52:15

Although we've got exciting things. You know, we don't have Scott here to talk about the Slack channel.

Aaron 52:19

Yeah, and so the responsibility falls to me. As always, the Slack channel is fun, robust, lots of conversations, numerous threads going on, one of which is about the Iran nuclear agreement, and always talk about the DPRK. For $5 a month, if you become our patron, you can get access to the Slack channel. And if you are a student with a .edu address, it's just $3 a month.

I always learn a lot in there. It's just a lot of fun to hang out and watch what other people say.

Jeffrey 52:46

It's incredible. And maybe we should show a little leg. You may be seeing our ugly mugs on TV pretty soon. Are we allowed to talk about this? I don't think so. I think we should just show a little leg.

Aaron 52:57

Okay. Yeah, we might. We might. Keep an eye out. There could be some announcements coming. Yeah, it could be fun.

Jeffrey 53:03

All right, Aaron. Hey, thanks for joining me.

Aaron 53:05

Always a pleasure. Enjoy the East Coast. And thank you for listening.