Iranian Space Launch and the JCPOA

Jeffrey Lewis 0:02

And we were like, no, we don't like that. We're taking our ball and going home. You are listening to the Arms Control Wonk podcast, the leading podcast on arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation. I'm Jeffrey Lewis, the founding publisher of the Arms Control Wonk blog and a scholar at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey.

Aaron Stein 0:25

And I'm Aaron Stein, a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council's Refugee Career Center for the Middle East. How's it going, Jeffrey? It's okay. It's, you know, launch a missile. Not a missile. Get a pod. It's been a lot of those recently. I think when we made that rule, we didn't expect it to be the, you know, 2017 to be the year of the missile launch.

The question is, is the offer redeemable for space launches?

Jeffrey 0:51

No, according to the JCPOA. Okay.

Aaron 0:55

Not a missile. It's a space launch. But don't tell the Wall Street Journal op-ed page that.

Jeffrey 0:59

Right. So, listeners, what you are hearing is our beginning discussion of Iran's launch of the Simorgh space launcher a couple of days ago. We were expecting July 27th to be the day of a North Korean missile launch, but instead Iran launched the Simorgh.

Aaron 1:19

Do you think that they were trolling us? They felt left out because they haven't had a pod in a while?

Jeffrey 1:24

Well, the Simorgh was kind of a North Korean missile. Kind of, sort of, right? But not really, and that's what we're going to talk about today.

Aaron 1:32

And, you know, when I saw my Twitter feed light up with the announcements, I think, from the Iranian state news agencies, I was crossing my fingers for Tehran Timmy and his hipster glasses, but I haven't seen it yet.

Jeffrey 1:47

I think Tehran Timmy, they only trot him out for incinerating infidels. Or if it works, right? So we'll get to that. I think the thing that we need to start by saying is we know there was a launch this time because the Iranians released video and images and it was confirmed that By U.S. officials. So not only did they release images and videos saying they did it, we saw them do it.

Because you don't necessarily get that. There was a launch in April 2016 That we were prepped for and ready for and waiting for, and the Iranians didn't announce it. And it leaked in like Bill Gertz a couple of days later. And, you know, we've never been sure that there was a launch. I think Tal Inbar at one point saw some grainy video from a conference in Iran where there was a screen showing a rocket launch.

And if you looked at it carefully, it really looked like it was a Simorgh launch. But, you know, we didn't have great open source on the April launch. We know the Iranians launched something. And now the question is, did it work or not? Right.

Aaron 2:53

And so they did put out a video and they have put out pictures. And you can clearly tell that it's the Simorgh because, among other things, you guys over at NTI have modeled it.

Jeffrey 3:07

Yeah. Well, so, you know, we, well, we model everything, right? At this point, we're practically, I mean, we're weirdos. But yes, when they released pictures, the only difference was this had, like, this wild floral livery. It was good. So, which was, it was a little... It was a little weird. But, you know, like, yeah, it's the Simorgh.

But there is this kind of interesting discussion right now. And by the way, I will direct readers, if people don't know who Jonathan McDowell is and you don't read Jonathan's space report, Jonathan is the great keeper of all this data. It also is slightly terrifying because he's a single point of failure. Like, he single-handedly makes this thing called Jonathan's space report, which is an essential...

Free resource on every space launch in the world. And if Jonathan gets hit by a bus, we just lose it.

Aaron 4:03

It's true. I'm a fan. Follow him on Twitter. Most of the times, it's not of interest because not every space launch vehicle gets a pod. But in this case, obviously, it comes in handy.

Jeffrey 4:16

Well, this is my pitch for some funder to hire Jonathan, a research assistant, so that one, that, you know, Jonathan gets a little help for this, but two, we need to think about transitioning this. I mean, like, Will Marshall, actually, yeah, this is good for Will Marshall, right, the co-founder of Planet Labs, once upon a time, you know, talked about how, like, Jonathan was a single point of failure for the community.

So, like, we really need this. But he... Is collecting all of the data. And the spot he's at, which I think we're all at, is there's nothing in orbit. So either it was a suborbital test of the launcher, which is possible, Or it is a failed attempt. And there are some news reports, including our friend Ankit Panda.

He says U.S. government officials think it was a failure. But Jonathan, for the moment, is cataloging it as a successful suborbital mission. And I think, you know, we may not get a definitive answer to that.

Aaron 5:19

Right. Well, let's talk about the missile. Because, I mean, long-time listeners of the pod will remember that we... We have talked about Dudes from the Shig multiple times, and this plays into this story and what exactly the Simorgh is and what it resembles.

Jeffrey 5:35

Right. So it is a two-stage rocket. And here I will direct us in the show notes to the model that the CNS crack modeling team led by Dave Schmerler made. The first stage is a lot like North Korea's Unha. You know, it is a cluster of what in North Korea are called Nodong engines. In Iran, they are Shahab-3 engines, but those are basically North Korean engines that That the Iranians acquired and then make their own version of.

And it's, you know, the dudes at the shed, right, who do it. Exactly. And there are four of them. Right. So it's a cluster of four. You know, the stage itself is not exactly the same size. And the engines are, while, you know, any cluster of four is the same pattern, they're spaced a little differently. So, you know, I'm not sure that that, it's not that that really results in any significant difference in performance, but you can tell that this is like an Iranian execution of a North Korean concept, not a sheer copy.

Aaron 6:43

Yeah, they didn't just take it and co-produce it or get a fully assembled missile. They're making design choices and decisions based upon probably the plans.

Jeffrey 6:54

Right. They probably got the, well, we know they got the Nodong engines or initially from the North Koreans. But then, you know, the Shahab-3 is a much better missile than the Nodong. Yes, it is. And that's because the Iranians sort of took it apart, put it back together, made some changes to it. And so I think the North Koreans said, oh, you know, we could put a cluster of these things.

And now that serves as the first stage of a space launcher. And the Iranians are like, yeah, that's a good idea. We'll do that, too. But that doesn't, they're not exactly the same. Right. But what I love about this is that is the historical relationship that started in the 1980s and went through the 1990s, which is the North Koreans providing technology to the Iranians.

Right.

Aaron 7:30

But that second stage... Let's put a pin in that, because let's talk about the second stage, then come back to the dudes from the shake.

Jeffrey 7:36

Right. So the second stage is a... So Iran has a smaller launcher called the Safir. Yeah, and this one's been tested a lot more. Right. And sometimes you'll hear the Safir, the Simorgh called the Safir 2. The upper stage of the original Safir is a pair of steering engines. That look like they're from the Musudan, which was originally a Soviet engine.

And the problem is that's a pretty common design, and so it's hard to say that it's literally from the Musudan, but it's the same propellant mix and basically the same design. But the Iranians popped those out or copied them and made an upper stage that was a pair of those, a turbopump and an exhaust. And the double version of that, so two pairs, so four steering engines, two exhausts, and I'm guessing two turbo pumps, is the Simorgh upper stage.

Right, exactly. Right now, listeners' ears are bleeding.

Aaron 8:41

No, it's important. I mean, because it shows how they've, well, one, made progress on design from the Safir moving forward, then design iterations on what, you know, North Korean copies of Soviet technology, and then how the missile's gotten bigger, from the original Safir test now to the second Samorek test.

Jeffrey 8:59

Well, and I think the interesting thing here is the Safir upper stage, which is just the two Vernier engines, to me looks exactly like the image of the engine in the Hwasong-14 upper stage being tested.

Aaron 9:14

Right, and so this becomes the meat of the dudes from The Shig. Yeah. Again, listeners of the podcast, dudes from The Shig are... I think we've talked about North Korean-Iranian fusion.

Jeffrey 9:27

Shahid Hamad Industrial Group, S-H-I-G. Right. The Shig.

Aaron 9:32

And this starts with a Bill Gates, Bill Gertz story as well, who somehow makes his way into a lot of our podcasts.

Jeffrey 9:38

The thing about the Shig is a couple of, maybe a year ago, I wrote this piece with Dave and some of our research assistants where... We noticed that there was this kind of circumstantial evidence that the flow of technology had reversed. That it used to be North Korea helping out Iran, but now increasingly it was Iran helping out North Korea.

And so things we were seeing first in Iran were showing up later in North Korea. Right? So... To us, that was really interesting because, you know, we know Treasury Department, the Treasury Department sanctioned a couple of dudes from the SHIG for helping the North Koreans with a new space launch engine that we haven't seen. Well, we saw it tested on the ground, but we haven't seen it in a launcher yet.

Tomo, I can't, my Japanese is so terrible. Inoue, who's a cool reporter for Kyoto, who I'm going to see in Tokyo. Yeah. You know, he had this great story about how there was a group of Iranians actually living near Shinpo. Yeah, I think this Safir and then Simorgh upper stage, I think those technologies are now showing up in North Korea, which means that the North Koreans need the Iranians a lot more than the Iranians need the North Koreans.

And that's an interesting change, because I got to tell you, when we published that piece, people are like, no, you're an idiot. Right. It's like, this technology transfer goes one way, it's North Korea to Iran.

Aaron 11:02

And it's like, I don't think so. And in the podcast, we talked about the possibility of fusion restaurants or a food truck running around there. It's a possible secondary explanation for this.

Jeffrey 11:15

Yeah, I mean, that's always what I tease Tomo about. Because, you know, I actually think his story is true, but he only had one source on it. Yeah. And, like, there's nothing he can do. Like, whatever. Like, one source tells you that, that's what you got. I don't, I really, I truly don't blame him, because I think it's true, but, like, yeah, I mean, how do you know there are Iranians in North Korea unless you get, like, you know, right, the best kebab stand in all of Hamhung site, and I...

Aaron 11:40

Right.

Jeffrey 11:41

I got nothing.

Aaron 11:43

Well, we were talking about it off-pod, is that, you know, the, maybe the fuel elements of the second stage, I call it the sphere times two, you know, is just some of the open source hints that you guys are using to, to... Draw your conclusions, at least that the technology flow is reversed.

Jeffrey 12:00

Well, yeah. I mean, you know, it's hard to do it because when something pops up, you don't really know who made it. So what we do is we sort of record where did we see it first. Yeah. And it's always possible that the Iranians will get something from the North Koreans and fly it before the North Koreans either fly it or release a picture of testing it.

So we never really knew for sure. But this is the first clear example where the Iranians showed off the Safir upper stage in pornographic detail. Yeah, wonk porn. I mean, they showed, I mean, very explicit, you know, the bare engine, both sides of visible sort of the nozzles, but also the turbo machinery. You could see it really clearly.

It was in Iran. They described it as something they had made. We had never seen that in North Korea before. And we've only just now seen an image of Kim Jong-un at an engine test where, and it's a blurry picture, right, where it looks exactly like the severe upper stage. So I think the balance of evidence now suggests that it's the Iranians who are helping the North Koreans more than the other way around.

Which has, you know, really big implications for how we think about efforts to constrain missile proliferation and the nuclear deal with Iran.

Aaron 13:16

Because the backdrop to this within Washington is amongst – do we call it an administration anymore or do we sort of call it like rival factions? I mean I don't know what to call it. We're recording this podcast about 16 hours after the Mooch talked to Ryan Liz and the New Yorker.

Jeffrey 13:33

I call it the federal apprentice. Federal – OK. It's a reality. Exactly. So there is – Sean Spicer, you're fired.

Aaron 13:42

Right? You're on the rocks there, bro. OK.

Jeffrey 13:45

Can we just pause? I'm sorry for listeners with delicate ears, but how incredible is it that the New York Times just published trying to... How did that happen?

Aaron 14:01

So I've been, as a product of the West Coast, who really doesn't have much experience on the East Coast, I'm calling up people from New York and New Jersey and asking if these people actually really exist. I always thought they were cartoon characters, but now they're showing up And getting sexually explicit quotes into the New York Times and the New Yorker, sort of like the pantheon of publications in the United States.

But this thing of an admin... Yeah, this goat rodeo... This goat rodeo is now debating what to do about the Iran nuclear agreement.

Jeffrey 14:36

Well, no, they're not debating what to do.

Aaron 14:37

They're looking for a pretext to abandon it. Okay, they are trying to fit... Right. They're trying to pretend that Iran is in noncompliance to fit their predetermined outcome that... The nuclear deal is bad. And so we have the Simorgh launch, which sort of says, well, shoot, maybe this could be something that they could use to go after the deal.

Jeffrey 14:59

Yeah. So I want to say a couple of things about that, right? The first thing is I got quoted in an op-ed in Fox News where someone was saying the Iran deal is a terrible agreement because North Korea is just going to give Iran a nuclear-armed ICBM, right? And that was very frustrating for me because what our research shows is it's the other way around.

That the Iranians could make a nuclear-armed ICBM really quickly. It's not that they're going to get it from the North Koreans. It's that the North Korean nuclear-armed ICBM represents help from Iran and capabilities that the Iranians have and that the Iranians have chosen to this point not to exercise. So, you know, yeah, we're not like, there's not like a physical constraint on the Iranians.

It's not like our sanctions are preventing them from building a nuclear-armed ICBM. Like, they can, there is no technical reason they couldn't do that relatively quickly.

Aaron 16:00

And you say this because of the discussion before we got into the Goat Rodeo about the Safir times two.

Jeffrey 16:07

Yeah, I mean, when I'm looking at the Safir upper stage showing up in North Korea, right, and I'm looking at a much larger engine, by the way, you know, an 80-ton engine that shows up in North Korea, which is, it's a different engine than the one tested in this ICBM, in the North Korean ICBM, but it's also like, you know, a third bigger that was built with Iranian assistance.

Right? So, like, there's nothing that the North Koreans have done. And by the way, I think the North Koreans are doing most of this themselves. They're just getting, you know, like anybody you take advantage if you can get some help here or there. But, like, there's nothing the Iranians are doing that the, or there's nothing the North Koreans are doing that the Iranians can't do better.

Aaron 16:53

And just back up, because there might be some confusion on the listeners. How does this compare to the Simorgh engine? Oh, sorry.

Jeffrey 16:57

The Simorgh engine is like the Unha, which means it's an okay space launcher, but would make a lousy ICBM. Iran could certainly build a better engine because Iran helped the North Koreans build a better engine. We know they could do that. They just haven't chosen to do that. So there's no technical barrier to the Iranians building an ICBM in relatively short order.

They have to do it, but North Korea did it too, so they can do it.

Aaron 17:31

Which brings us back to where this comes full circle. If you have a predetermined outcome, That you want to kill the nuclear agreement, you know, and this becomes something that you try to do it for, to try to use to kill it. You know, there is precedent for this, where this becomes a effing stupid idea to take the pretext of a sh**y, double underlined, first stage, and then using that as a pretext to basically dare the other side to then go after a real sort of heavier, heavier is not the right word, like a real sort of more efficient engine.

Right. Without constraints on top on the actual effing means to build a nuclear weapon.

Jeffrey 18:13

Yeah. So let me say, there were actually three things I wanted to say, and I got waylaid. So there are three reasons that this idea that the Simorgh launch should lead us to leave the JCPOA, I think that's a crazy thing to say, right? The first is the Simorgh launch Is not an ICBM. No. Like, it's just not.

Aaron 18:38

It's four Shahab engines clustered together. I mean, let's not elevate it too high.

Jeffrey 18:42

Yeah. You can certainly convert that thing into an ICBM if you really want, but the S'more itself can't go that far. And... We already have a test case from North Korea, which is, did they convert the Taepodong to an ICBM? Like, no, right? They went out and built their own ICBM because they wanted something that was small enough to fit on a truck and therefore mobile and use sort of better propellants, better engine, better airframe.

And I think we're going to find out with this most recent launch, they're testing it in such a way that shows us the importance of mobility. So the Simorgh cannot go far enough to be an ICBM. And, moreover, I think does not represent a credible path to an ICBM. I mean, you know, you could jerry-rig it, but, like, that would be the world's worst ICBM.

So, like... What we should really be freaked out about is not the Simorgh, but if Iran basically decides to take all the dudes at the Shig who are working on space launches and tell them to build something that's optimized for an ICBM like North Korea did, because they could do it fast and it would be good. And, you know, actually, my colleague, Shea Cotton.

So the second thing is Shea, who built the North Korea missile test database, has built an Iranian missile test database. And it's really interesting because The dudes from the Shig are flying far fewer missiles now. Yeah. They are largely launching space launchers. The missile tests that we're seeing are increasingly short and medium range solid fueled missiles. This is where I wanted to go into the solid.

Right. And so, you know, Bob Gates made this argument when they were readjusting the European missile defense architecture. And I think the data that Shig has collected actually supports this. The North Koreans have gone crazy for longer range systems that can target the United States. And so they have gone down the liquid fuel route because that gets them there quickest.

The Iranians are interested in regional missile forces. And so they are going down the solid fuel route, largely building up forces that can strike things regionally, which is not like good news. But also way preferable to them building an ICBM, at least in my opinion. We saw this with the operational strike. What did they use? It was one liquid-fueled missile and then six solid-fueled missiles.

Aaron 21:10

Layered on top of this is something that we don't have with North Korea, which is that an ICBM within the context of the American threat perception only matters, seriously matters, If you could put a nuclear weapon on top of it. And so it becomes a trade-off, right? And this becomes at the heart of the debate about the JCPOA and the sort of fuzzing, it's not even fuzziness, but the perceived fuzziness about missile launches in itself.

Go ahead.

Jeffrey 21:41

And we have said that the JCPOA does not prohibit space launches. It doesn't! It does not even prohibit missile launches. What it prohibits Iran doing is developing something which is an undefinable thing, which is missiles designed to carry nuclear weapons.

Aaron 21:57

Right. I mean, yeah.

Jeffrey 22:00

Which is not really a thing, because all missiles can carry astronauts. It just, I guess, depends on whether you want the astronaut back. Put a monkey up there. The Iranians love to incinerate. That's right. Yeah. Sorry to get back on track. Yeah. I mean, you know, the, the deal didn't address Iran's missile programs. Which stinks, but whatever.

You know, it has other benefits that we've talked about in other podcasts, but it just did not limit their missile program. And so we have gotten, despite that, we've gotten this kind of positive shift in the Iranians, which may have happened anyway. I don't know if it's a result of the deal, but since the deal, you know, the Iranians basically took a big long time out on missile testing during negotiations.

They did. And since then, they've largely tested solid-fueled short-range systems.

Aaron 22:52

Do you think it's any coincidence that they decide to test the nebulous space launch vehicle at the time when the GOAT rodeo has decided that it's basically trying to kill the deal and they're just looking for an excuse? No, I think it is just a coincidence.

Jeffrey 23:06

I mean, they've been talking about these launches for years, right? They were supposed to have three up by now. I think the dudes from the SIG are struggling a little bit because it's a new rocket system.

Aaron 23:16

Fair enough. Okay.

Jeffrey 23:17

Yeah. But my view is the dudes from the Shig are, I am happier that they are launching stuff into space than working on an ICBM. And like, yes, there are technologies that shift between those two things. But, you know, I don't take the view that, like, oh, well, you know, they're working on a space launcher, so that's bad because they're getting all this, like, learning.

Like, because we're not going to keep Iran locked away in, you know, 1952. This is really, we don't have a supply-side solution. They can do this if they want. So, like, we are approximately out of sticks and, like, all into carrots. And I go back to the leap day deal the U.S. had with North Korea. You know, the leap day deal, which North Koreans...

Screwed the u.s because our negotiators made a mistake the north korean statement was carefully worded to permit space launches but only prohibit missile launches and we were like no we don't like that we're taking our ball and going home space launches our missile launches right yeah and like so now what do we have oh north korea does space launches and missile launches And the ICBM the North Koreans built is nothing like their space launcher.

So it was a terrible mistake, in my opinion, to not just make our peace with the space launch program. And I used to make this argument to the people in the Obama administration all the time, and they were like, oh, it's terribly naive. They'll just use that technology in an ICBM. And it's like, oh, really? Because they freaking didn't.

Aaron 24:49

They built a different ICBM. So I think zooming out, big picture from this pod is that We'd like to keep them under the constraints of the JCPOA, and if they want to shoot off a crappy SLV... That's okay because the upper stage characteristics of the SMORC, the SAFIR, look a hell of a lot like what the North Koreans are using, which suggests capabilities to do what the North Koreans are doing.

And therefore, you don't want to get to that place. You want to let diplomacy work. Otherwise, you have an unconstrained program on two sides.

Jeffrey 25:28

That's right. And ultimately, the way I look at it is you don't get rid of the JCPOA. You come and try to work out some kind of missile deal. Right. And I think there's no chance of limiting regional missiles because it's not just the Iranians who have them.

Aaron 25:42

Yeah, podcast listeners can check out our other podcasts on regional missiles.

Jeffrey 25:47

You know, I mean, it's annoying that the Iranians have them, but, like, unless you're going to get the Israelis and the Egyptians and the Saudis and the UAE and the Syrians and the Yemenis all to agree, like, they're just missiles in the Middle East. Yeah. But I do think we could usefully talk about getting the dudes from the Shig to be focused on space launches, which, by the way, like you have to do scientist conversion anyway.

And when you have a disarmament agreement. Right. Yeah. So let them put stuff up in space. Let them have their budget. Let them have their science program. And like, let's try to channel them into a relatively productive area where they feel anchored in the international community and they don't want to like start working on an ICBM. Because I think, you know, when you get to the bottom of this, the people who claim that they're going to get a better deal on Iran always exaggerate the leverage that we have.

And I think what the North Koreans show is that even a relatively poor and backward country, and North Korea is way poorer and way more backward than Iran, can do this. So we don't really have the ability to physically stop them. We have to persuade them. And that sucks, and that's weakness, and nobody likes that. Nobody likes having to admit that the bad guy gets a pretty good deal, but they have the leverage.

Aaron 27:10

Can I read you the final paragraph in the Wall Street Journal op-ed today about this?

Jeffrey 27:14

Yeah, am I going to laugh for nearly two minutes and then get in trouble again with the very serious NPR ombudsman?

Aaron 27:21

You may. It says, Advocates of the nuclear deal persist in arguing that Iran is in compliance with its provisions. It takes considerable credulousness to believe that over the course of this agreement, the Iranian military won't adapt technical knowledge gained about launch and guidance for projects like its quote-unquote satellite missile program. With or without compliance, Iran is making progress as a strategic threat.

Jeffrey 27:42

And to which I would say, hey, if you love North Korea's nuclear-armed ICBM, you're really going to love Iran's when we walk away from the deals.

Aaron 27:51

We're laughing about this because we find it so absurd. Can I ask you one final question? What do you think the mooch would say?

Jeffrey 28:03

Hey, I'm not like the Ayatollah trying to... I'm a f***ing patriot.

Aaron 28:12

I f***ing love this country. I don't have anything else to add, but maybe we wrap up with some admin stuff about the Slack channel. Yeah.

Jeffrey 28:22

Hey, Scott, how are things going over there on the Slack channel? Slack channel is always good. We've had a number of new people join, so welcome new Slack members. I hope they're enjoying it. We are trying to do a little bit of fundraising. So our first satellite imagery purchase was successful. We're trying to do more satellite imagery purchases of current events, such as ICBM launches, but that sort of imagery tends to be expensive.

So we're doing a fundraising drive on Patreon to try to reach $2,000 per month, which will allow us to pay for the raw imagery and analysis and distribute it to our Slack channel members. It'll be real cool. And to support that, we are going to be moving towards having our Slack access be at the $5 per month level.

But people who have access to Slack now, you're grandfathered in. It's cool. Welcome to the Founders Club. Y'all have been with us through this whole thing. We really appreciate that. But new folks are going to have to pay a little bit more. Unless you're a student, students are still at the $3 level. Just sign up with a .edu email to show that you have a student account and you're still good.

We should also say that we are currently having a discussion about whether to have advertising on the podcast. Yeah, a lengthy conversation, and we would like people's input. So if you're a member of the Slack channel, feel free to send me a direct message, or we can start conversations on any of the channels. The general channel would probably be the best place to have this.

If you have opinions and are not a member of the Slack channel, armscontrolwonkpodcast at gmail.com. That's armscontrolwonkpodcast at gmail.com. Feel free to drop us a line. So let us know. How do you feel about possibly including advertisements at the Beginning or, more realistically, end of episodes. And to be clear, this isn't just greed. It's that we've been looking at doing a number of research projects.

We looked at recently buying a satellite image, and we have chosen to buy the satellite image later so that the price comes down. Which is fine, but it would have been cool for the analysis to be hot and fresh. And so we're just looking at ways of whether we can either increase the revenue that we have coming in through the Patreon page so that we can then buy stuff like that, or maybe looking at advertisers so that we have those funds.

But at this point, none of us are taking any money out of the podcast. We're just trying to spend it on cool stuff that makes the pod better. Yeah, basically, we've got some new mics, and now we want to see if we can actually invest in qualitative increases in research knowledge. Hey, Aaron, thanks for joining me.

Aaron 31:03

Thank you.

Jeffrey 31:05

Scott, thanks for laughing at all our jokes. And to the rest of you, thank you for listening.