ICAN wins the Nobel Peace Prize

Jeffrey Lewis 0:02

Win a Nobel Prize, get a podcast. You are listening to the Arms Control Wonk Podcast, the leading podcast on arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation. I'm Jeffrey Lewis, the founding publisher of the Arms Control Wonk blog and a scholar at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey.

Aaron Stein 0:29

And I'm Aaron Stein, a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council's Rapid Career Center for the Middle East. Aaron, ICAN won the Nobel Peace Prize.

Jeffrey 0:37

I guess we have to talk about it, don't we? But first we have to talk about our sponsor. Of course. Hey, if you like this podcast, you should check out Power Problems, a new foreign affairs podcast from the Cato Institute. Host Trevor Thrall and Emma Ashford offer a skeptical take on U.S. foreign policy and discuss some of today's big questions in foreign policy and international security with guests from across the political spectrum, but not across our friend spectrum.

Pretty much all people we like. Recent guests like the Stimson Center's Samir Lalwani, Joshua Pollack, my colleague, and Arion Tabatabai at Georgetown University, who, by the way, had a fantastic thread today on Twitter about Iranian reactions to the Trumpkins walking away from the Iran nuclear deal. Power Problems offers a different approach to today's foreign policy problems, energetic, compelling, and not afraid of controversy.

This is a great podcast. You can find Power Problems on iTunes, Google Play, and via Cato's website at cato.org forward slash power problems.

Aaron 1:43

I think you're too overwhelmed by the news about the Nobel Peace Prize.

Jeffrey 1:46

Holy cow. I'm prepared to defend it.

Aaron 1:51

Yeah, I guess we have to talk about disarmament, because we are a show about arms control disarmament and nonproliferation.

Jeffrey 1:58

Does this mean Beatrice Fihn gets to wear it around?

Aaron 2:02

I don't know, but she is a friend of the pod and was a guest, so it is her right to do that.

Jeffrey 2:09

Anyway, we should say sincere congratulations to them. I think one of the things we've discussed a lot on the podcast is our discomfort with the turn that the negotiations on the treaty banning nuclear weapons took. I don't think either of us thinks the United States should sign it. And so we think there are probably a lot of problems with the agreement itself.

But I think it's a really interesting decision by the Nobel Peace Prize Committee. Although, you know, one person sort of snarkily remarked on Twitter, can it go on the shelf next to President Obama's?

Aaron 2:51

I saw that. Or Yasser Arafat, for that matter.

Jeffrey 2:53

Yeah. I mean, I think the big thing to start off by saying is that these prizes are often aspirational. Other groups have gotten Nobel Peace Prizes for banning nuclear weapons without actually banning nuclear weapons, including the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War. And Pugwash. Pugwash got it, too.

Aaron 3:16

Yeah, I mean, I have to say, of... The last two you mentioned, the one I'm more familiar with is Pugwash because they were nice enough to bring me out to a conference. That's where I met Ben Russick, friend of the podcast.

Jeffrey 3:26

Yeah, who informed you this morning of the news, you said. No, that's right. He informed you of the Wall Street Journal piece.

Aaron 3:33

Sorry. Right. I found out about your media escapades through a friend, not through you. I found out about the Nobel Peace Prize on Twitter sitting in my local coffee shop. And I will be honest with you. Disarmament is not what gets me out of bed every single morning. It's a topic that even when I was a graduate student was one that I tried to avoid in favor of more of the broader strategic issues of nuclear weapons.

Yeah, why is that? I find as somebody who chose a field that's highly technical, I find A lot of the stuff that goes into this, so the work around the treaty-bending nuclear weapons, for example, is just not up my alley. I find it really boring, if I'm going to be completely honest with you. Why do you find it boring?

Because I often feel that a lot of the aspirational sides of the disarmament debate are divorced from reality. And it's ultimately good to talk about these things, and it sounds good on paper, but when that paper has to be confronted with the real world, it often breaks down. And so you have a lot of diplomats who speak the same language, but that language doesn't leave sort of the world that diplomats inhabit, if that makes sense.

Jeffrey 4:50

You know, I think the reason that I am supportive of this prize, which actually is a little bit different than the reason I was supportive of Obama getting the prize, although I thought that was truly absurd and ridiculous. Although, again, I understand why they did what they did. But, you know, I guess this comes down to, like, what is your model of policy change?

I mean, I don't care for the ban treaty. And I find that the arguments that the ICAN people put forth to be pretty unpersuasive. But at some level, like, it doesn't matter what I find persuasive, right? Like, if you're persuading people, the only question is, are you persuading people? And, you know, I mean, this I think is a little bit like protests that we see in the United States.

I mean, people were really outraged that professional athletes are taking a knee during the national anthem. And it and like they're sort of like, you know, why can't you like why can't you do something else? And it's like, well, that that's the thing about protest is it's supposed to piss you off. Like protest doesn't work if you show up and politely ask for your rights.

You know, I mean, it would be great if you could just, you know, like say, you know, excuse me, Mr. Police officer, you may have noticed I'm an African-American. Please don't shoot me. And then what the cop is like, oh, shucks, I'm sorry. Like, it's not how life is. You know, if you are trying to force social change, you have to be, I think, a little bit unpleasant and a little bit difficult.

And frankly, a little bit ideological, right? Unconcerned with the other side of the issue. As a policy person, I think you and I, or as policy people, you and I are both, Interested in the other side, right? We're interested in designing policies that achieve the big goals we share, which I think we both agree is disarmament. But we care about designing sensible policies to get there.

So we worry about the downsides. We worry about the risks. I take seriously the criticisms of some colleagues about these efforts. And so, you know, we care about trying to craft the ideal policy. But like somebody also has to push, right? Somebody has to push, push, push, push, push. And they do the pushing.

Aaron 7:11

Yeah, I mean I'm not to say that I object to the actual awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize.

Jeffrey 7:17

Am I talking you into this shit?

Aaron 7:19

No, no, no. It's just that – You know, it's based upon the work and the push for the nuclear, you know, the ban, the treaty that bans nuclear weapons, correct? The nuclear ban treaty.

Jeffrey 7:32

Well, I think this is a very interesting distinction. It's actually, the way it is written implies that it is for two different things. They got the award for, and I quote, It's work to draw attention to the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons and for its groundbreaking efforts to achieve a treaty-based prohibition of such weapons.

I am okay with the first one. It's only the second one that I think is a bad policy.

Aaron 8:04

Me too. So that's actually a good distinction, is that the humanitarian campaign that went on, I think it is good to... Seriously bring much more attention to just how destructive these things are because if we can talk about sort of like recent American history I actually disagree with a lot of including nuclear weapons in sort of the WMD catch-all especially with the fiascos in Iraq because a nuclear weapon is not a biological weapon it's not a chemical weapon it's an order of magnitude larger and I think it's important to reinforce that as much as possible if that makes sense.

Jeffrey 8:42

Yeah, and so, you know, this also gets to this question of, like, why do we think the ban treaty is fouled up?

Aaron 8:50

Because, you know... We should tell people what it is, because I'm not sure that we have talked about this specifically on the podcast.

Jeffrey 8:57

Well, definitely, they did. Andrea Berger did three podcasts, but I think I did one podcast with Andrea where we went through the draft when it came out and talked about some of the challenges, but... To put it, I think, really briefly for listeners who are checking back in for the first time, there are really two things that unfolded.

So first is there was a series of conferences on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear war. Those conferences, I think, were designed to generate the political will to do something about it. The kind of slow and lagging pace of disarmament. And the Obama administration responded to those conferences as though, you know, someone was inviting them to, you know, like Christmas in Guyana with Jim Jones.

Yeah. That they were not happy. This is true. And, you know, eventually the U.S. did send a representative. But as someone who travels to Japan a lot, I kind of got a ringside seat for this, a ringside seat for the U.S.-Japan relationship. The State Department put incredible pressure on the Japanese government Not to sign any statements, not to vote for any of the General Assembly resolutions.

And it was really interesting because, you know, the Japanese government's quite conservative. But as it turns out, when you drop nuclear weapons on people, they stay kind of sore about it for a while.

Aaron 10:31

Well, they're nasty things, hence why the humanitarian thing is laudable.

Jeffrey 10:35

Yeah, and so for the Japanese government, this was a really difficult political dance because they wanted to be both respectful of the U.S. alliance, but also, you know, not have a crowd of very angry Japanese people, you know, like drag them out and behead them. I mean, it was really... It was really something. And the State Department made it hard for them.

You know, the State Department...

Aaron 10:58

It wasn't just the U.S. I mean, I think we should say that.

Jeffrey 11:00

Well, no. I mean, but obviously the U.S. is the people who could inflict the most pain on the Japanese government. And so... Of course. I'm just saying, the reason I'm telling this story... I'll tell you, the reason I'm telling this story is some of our wonderful friends in the Obama administration, who we adore... Including one person who I actually think is a fine public servant, and I hope that when the Democrats are back in power, that person has an even more important job.

Some of those people are actually the villains in this story.

Aaron 11:31

But they're also your drinking buddies.

Jeffrey 11:33

Yeah, well, they're good people trying to do the right thing. You know, I mean, I can see the other side. This person and I had a lot of arguments about precisely what to do. And this person found none of my arguments persuasive at all. But that's fine, because the point of this is to say, you know, I don't want people to think that the Obama...

Even though Barack Obama got a Nobel Prize for eliminating nuclear weapons... I wouldn't want anyone to think that the Obama administration was actually excited about eliminating nuclear weapons.

Aaron 12:04

Yeah, but you're building into sort of, I think, why, I mean, so you put the humanitarian aspect aside, and I think you're building into what would be the problem we have with the ban treaty. Right. There are two separate things. That's right.

Jeffrey 12:16

So I said that, so there were two things. There's that process, which I was broadly supportive of, and I thought it was a terrible mistake of the Obama administration to not Participate in that not a terrible mistake not to agree you know I mean I think they could have made a very limited case for deterrence in that context but to generally sort of participate in that and frankly I would have used that as a way to emphasize all the enthusiasm for nuclear weapons we were seeing in Russia Which is truly getting crazy and out of control.

And I thought it was a mistake because the way that the State Department approached that process was to say disarmament is not something that should occur on a multilateral basis. It really is something that first and foremost needs to be done on a U.S.-Russia basis. And I think, one, that was a terrible mistake from the perspective of disarmament because, as we could see, the Russians are not interested in that.

Or the Chinese for that matter. But then the second piece of that is I think it put us in the position of making common cause with the Russians against many states that are our allies. Like Japan. And a lot of European countries. Of course. They're a part of this too. And so from my perspective, what we were essentially doing was aligning with the Russians on disarmament issues and actually making it easier for the Russians to then turn around and do things like violate the INF Treaty.

Aaron 13:43

Yeah, I mean, but the counter and pushback is the argument you just made is that this is not to be something done in the multilateral step because of The ancillary issues attached with two reductions. And so you can't do this in a multilateral forum without taking into the interest of the nuclear weapons state.

Jeffrey 13:58

Well, and I think that's then where the break comes, because while I would have counseled, while I did counsel anybody who had listened to me that the U.S. should participate in these negotiations, should participate in the humanitarian consequences process, the U.S. general approach was to try to stay out of it as long as possible. And then when those conferences turned into negotiations...

The United States took a very strong view that these were illegitimate and we had to deny them legitimacy. And so we didn't participate and we pressured all of our allies to not participate. And so that essentially left the field to ICAN. And I think ICAN is wonderful in that it pushes and creates political pressure. But I think that's all they know how to do is push, push, push.

And so you ended up with an agreement that was... What's the right word? Not helpful, I think. Poorly conceived and potentially a danger to the NPT and other... Nuclear agreements you know I'd wanted a ban on nuclear weapons basically to strengthen the disarmament obligations in the NPT and put more pressure on the United States and other nuclear powers but in fact I think what it's going to end up doing is undermining non-proliferation efforts so it's going to undermine the NPT I think more than strengthen it and so I can you know I can be critical of the arguments that ICAN has made but like Don't hate the player.

Like, hate the game, you know? Like, ICAN's job was to push, and if the US doesn't show up, like,

Aaron 15:43

And they got it. Right. And their campaign was successful. Their tactics were successful. And ultimately, they did link these two issues to the point where these people in Oslo felt that it was worthy of international recognition for their work on trying to stop the use of nuclear weapons.

Jeffrey 16:00

Yeah, it's a little bit like how I feel about the 2018 Democratic primary. You know, it's like... If you can barely squeak by the 70-year-old socialist who's not even a Democrat, like, whose fault is that? It's too soon. Yeah, I mean, like, people are angry at Sanders, and, like, I didn't vote for him, but, like, why are you angry at him?

Like, all he did was run, you know? Like, come on, you know? And I feel like the same thing. Like, if the State Department, you know, can't beat, like, how many people are in that ICAN office?

Aaron 16:39

Yeah, I mean, it's not that big. Let's go into this a little bit, because implicit in the arguments in favor of the ban is that the weight of basically, I think it's 120 states, basically everybody with the exception of the declared nuclear weapon states, is that the pressure of this treaty will make the use of nuclear weapons impossible.

I guess, less likely, or it will make leaders think twice in a crisis about the value and efficacy of nuclear weapons. And that's ultimately my problem with it, is that it's not that I don't... Again, I don't hate the game. I don't hate the player. The treaty is fine. I mean, the efforts to raise awareness about it is fine.

But ultimately, I find it to be irrelevant within the context of how leaders and states... Yeah, so I...

Jeffrey 17:54

I guess I don't share that particular concern. Or at the very least, I feel like the way the nuclear powers conceive of nuclear weapons is flawed. And I, in fact, appreciate people taking a swing at that. And that's kind of the thing that I admire about ICAN and the thing that I like about ICAN. It's just that...

You know, I then care about policy. So the way I look at this is whether it's the nuclear freeze movement in the 1980s with Randy Forsberg saying we should just freeze everything or whether it's ICAN saying we should just ban them. Those are simplistic solutions that are probably, in fact, not good ideas. But they are easy for people to understand and they motivate people and they create political will.

And what is supposed to happen in a healthy political system is that the general or broad demands expressed by groups that are trying to push for things... Then enter into a political process where the other side gets heard and you try to create a policy that's a little bit more nuanced and a little bit more detailed and maybe not exactly what people wanted at first, but which gets you on the path to that.

And that's kind of my model of policy change. And so I think that they are great in that sense. Regard, it's just that when we then turn to this question of, okay, so let's actually write something down on paper that can be adopted, you know, they push and push and push. But I think the job of the, of those of us who are concerned about policy, is to sort of push back And push back and say, well, look, we have to make sure that the deterrence piece of this, which is not negligible, gets respected because it still matters.

And if you end up with a world where there's a bunch of signatories to ICAN and a bunch of nuclear-armed states having nuclear wars, that's a bad thing. And you also want to make sure that the agreement doesn't get hijacked, and this is kind of the thing that I worry about. It doesn't get hijacked by people Who actually are looking to harm the NPT, right, and make it actually easier for states to build nuclear weapons.

And that kind of, I mean, this is a long way of getting around to this, but I mean, my fundamental concern is that, say, for example, very topical, right, the United States is walking away from the Iran nuclear deal. You know, what would we do if the Iranians withdrew from the NPT But then signed this agreement and attempted to use that switch in order to lessen their safeguards obligations.

And by signing this agreement, they would have this argument like, no, no, no, no, no, we're not building nuclear weapons. See, we are still signing, but we're going to sign the non-discriminatory alternative agreement And, you know, in the course of doing so, maybe adjust some of our safeguards agreements. I know that the treaty is not supposed to make that happen or allow that to happen.

But just the way it's written, I'm not convinced that it actually closes off all of those loopholes. To be fair... Some of the loopholes that we identified in the draft, they definitely tried to close them. Like I don't, I don't think that they wanted to create a legal alternative. I just think that, you know, I'm a little nervous about it because the way the safeguards language gets written up is it's a little bit vague to me, right?

Because basically it says that if you, sorry, it's basically, it's written in this, it's written in this somewhat difficult way, but If you enter the state, if you enter the convention as a non-nuclear weapons state that has never possessed nuclear weapons, right, you basically have to maintain your safeguards obligations.

Aaron 22:14

Yes.

Jeffrey 22:17

But it's very unclear to me, for example, if Iran, in a fit of pique over the U.S. walking away from the Iran nuclear deal, Whether if they then left the NPT and signed this agreement, it's unclear to me what would actually constitute their safeguards obligations in force at the time of the entry into force of this treaty, right?

Because there are questions about the subsidiary arrangements. You know, there's the question of the additional protocol, which at the moment in Iran is voluntary. So, you know, I'm just not convinced that you can't venue shop. I'm still nervous about it. I don't know. Maybe I'm overreacting.

Aaron 23:09

It sounds like it's a power problem.

Jeffrey 23:12

Yeah, I think that's a power problem. If you like this podcast, you should check out Power Problems, a new foreign affairs podcast from the Cato Institute. Host Emma Ashford and Trevor Thrall offer a skeptical take on U.S. foreign policy and discuss some of today's big questions in foreign policy and international security with guests from across the political spectrum.

Recent guests include our friends Samir Lalwani at the Stimson Center, Joshua Pollack here at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies, And Georgetown University's Arianne Tabatabai. With a skeptical take on today's news, Power Problems offers a different approach to today's foreign policy problems. Energetic, compelling, and not afraid of controversy, this is a great podcast. You can find Power Problems on iTunes, Google Play, and via Cato's website at cato.org forward slash power problems.

Aaron 24:00

That's a good point you make, and I wanted to tease that out a little bit more, is about how things, I guess, obligations made in excess of the nonproliferation treaty raise all sorts of weird questions about, as you said, this treaty shopping thing. You know, and this is different, you know, because the North Koreans have developed nuclear weapons.

But, you know, it's like they have, quote unquote, withdrawn from the NPT. But could they do something like sign up to the test ban treaty? And then say we're not going to test any longer because they're confident they're deterrent. And then what would that mean legally? And so when you do things in excess of just basic nonproliferation obligations, are you actually undercutting the NPT as the sole thing or the sole treaty that states should abide by to try and not develop or manufacture nuclear weapons?

Jeffrey 24:53

Yeah, you know, I think the reason that I end up being uncomfortable with the way it's written is not so much that I have a specific scenario I worry about, because I can imagine specific scenarios, and then, you know, you kind of have to ask, like, well, you know, how reasonable are they? But because there was a simple solution to this, which is the treaty could have required that signatories also be Members in good standing of the NPT.

They could have done that. That would have eliminated this problem. And when that issue came up, the pushback was, well, you know, there may be some states that want to be in this agreement, but not in the discriminatory NPT. And so there clearly was – just like they had a kind of abstract concern like, no, maybe we do want to preserve a little venue shopping, then my response to that is I am uncomfortable with that because I don't know why you would want to preserve that option.

Aaron 26:03

Well, you can see why they would think that way with – if you just – there's the five, right? But then there's the three, right? It's always the question of the three, right? Well, but then here is my question. This is a treaty on... Well, I should be clear. The three being Israel, India, and Pakistan.

Jeffrey 26:20

So, let's say Israel or India wants to sign this agreement. This is a treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons. You would have to give up your nuclear weapons to sign this agreement.

Aaron 26:31

What happens if your Israelis don't acknowledge that you have them?

Jeffrey 26:35

Well, Israel is not signing this agreement. It's actually... I mean, I think India is the country they were leaving it open for, but... I mean, it's absurd. It... There's no reason that India would sign this instead of the NPT. I mean, unless you're just sort of abstractly worried about the problem of the discriminatory nature of the NPT.

But India ain't signing the NPT if there are five nuclear weapons powers anyway, right? I mean, they're not giving up their nuclear weapons. They're not signing either of these agreements as long as other people have nuclear weapons. And so, you know, they left open a little door to venue shopping. And that causes me to be uncomfortable because you can squint and stare at the words all you want, but you can't really know how any kind of agreement is going to play out.

Right. You can guess. But I really wanted that door to be nailed shut. And they didn't want and they didn't. Not only did they not nail it shut, they made it clear they didn't want to nail it shut. And so for me, like, that's my concern. But then that gets back to the bigger problem. Right. Which is.

Whose fault is that? You know, I mean, like whose fault is it that there was no counterweight to some of these bad arguments in the negotiations? Right. Is that is that ICAN's fault?

Aaron 27:50

No, of course not.

Jeffrey 27:51

Exactly.

Aaron 27:52

They did what they wanted to do. I mean, they have been extremely successful and rewarded for it. I mean, no, it's not their fault. Yeah.

Jeffrey 28:00

So it's not their fault.

Aaron 28:01

It's the fault of people. It's already the fault of the nuclear weapons powers who didn't want to get involved in this process.

Jeffrey 28:08

Yeah. So, you know, I think that, you know, like my congratulations to ICAN is a sincere congratulations. Like they set out to create political pressure to advance the disarmament, to advance the elimination of nuclear weapons, a goal I share. And they were incredibly successful at it. I think the political process that they injected themselves into broke down and it broke down because the Obama administration didn't want to play its role.

Right. It decided to make common cause with the Russians on this issue. And we ended up with a treaty that I don't think is helpful. But, you know, that's I lay that at the feet of St. Barry of Prague, not not not at beef in.

Aaron 28:55

I mean, she's going to get a barn burner of a speech when she gets that prize. I'm going to like it. Well, I think some of the snark out there is directed at the Nobel Committee, to be honest with you, because – Oh, yeah. I mean when I first heard the news, people were making fun of the Nobel Committee.

I mean because questioning not the sort of weight and gravity of being a Nobel Prize winner but of the institution as a whole. This election institution, I should say.

Jeffrey 29:31

Look, they give out aspirational prizes, right? I mean, they gave Barack Obama a Nobel Prize for eliminating nuclear weapons when he hadn't eliminated any nuclear weapons.

Aaron 29:42

Yeah, that's true.

Jeffrey 29:44

And I felt really strongly, I felt at the time, he didn't do it because nobody listens to me, but I thought he should have accepted the prize on behalf of Nunn and Lugar.

Aaron 29:57

That would have been a good idea. That was a good rec.

Jeffrey 29:59

Right, because he hadn't done anything. They actually had done things to genuinely eliminate nuclear weapons. And it would have been a nice bipartisan gesture. Or he could have, you know, the other people he could have accepted on behalf of would have been the four statesmen. None Kissinger, Schultz, and Perry, because their op-ed had created the political space, which allowed him to successfully campaign on that issue.

Aaron 30:28

And Perry's continuing with that, with his very outspoken campaigning against raising rhetoric against the DPRK. The problem with accepting it on behalf of Kissinger is it raises Kissinger's Peace Prize for ending the Vietnam War. I still haven't finished the PBS documentary, so don't tell me how it ends.

Jeffrey 30:46

There's a fantastic Saturday Night Live sketch where, I guess it must be, is it John Belushi is playing Henry Kissinger, and he gets asked two questions. One is, what is the greatest moment of your life? And he says, receiving the Nobel Peace Prize in 1972 for ending the Vietnam War. And they're like, well, what's the worst moment of your life?

It's like when the Vietnam War ended in 1975. Yeah.

Aaron 31:11

That's a good one. That's a good one. But one thing that I – OK. So one thing – and I'm going to now put on my in support of disarmament hat because it's a hat I wear uncomfortably. Now that I don't support disarmament, the process, as I laid out earlier in the podcast, is that we have talked about in earlier podcasts is that we're concerned that the bilateral process, the ones that the U.S. and the Russians are holding onto as counterweights to this and therefore not to participate, I think you and I are both concerned about it.

I mean, to the point where we recorded a podcast about a future without arms control. And so is it incumbent upon people like ICAN, these organizations like ICAN, To basically get everybody else to try and increase pressure? And can this actually help with the bilateral process?

Jeffrey 31:59

So I don't know. I hope that it does. You know, I mean, I think the agreement is... Largely symbolic, and I see some people taking potshots at it for that reason. Although, you know, there's a way in which that's a good thing.

Aaron 32:15

I think James Acton set out the test, which I really like, which is... His tweetstorm on this when the treaty was being talked about was fantastic. Yeah, well, James is just wonderful.

Jeffrey 32:24

Yes, he is. You know, if you read the obligation so that this is I call this the Acton test. Right. This is the Acton test of whether this agreement is actually intended to ban nuclear weapons or whether this is intended to make countries feel good about expressing their desire for a ban on nuclear weapons. Right. Which which are two very different things.

And the Acton test is related to Article one, the prohibitions.

Aaron 32:55

Mm hmm.

Jeffrey 32:58

Because Article I, Section E, prohibits states' parties from... or they undertake never... Each state party undertakes never under any circumstance to... little e... assist, encourage, or induce in any way anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a state party under this treaty. And so... Presumably, this means state's party may not assist nuclear weapons states in developing, testing, producing, manufacturing, acquiring, possessing, stockpiling, transferring nuclear weapons, right?

Yeah. The Republic of the Marshall Islands? Yes. Has both a venerated history of campaigning for nuclear disarmament, including a serious advocacy of this agreement. It also hosts the U.S. facility at Kwajalein, which is essential to our nuclear-armed missile testing program.

Aaron 34:17

Yeah, this is the Acton test, and this was the tweet storm I was talking about.

Jeffrey 34:22

And so is the Marshall Islands going to sign the treaty? And if they do, and they have sort of indicated that they're very likely to do, are the other state parties going to complain? Because if they sign the treaty... Oh, and by the way, they have a lawsuit, right? I actually think they are, in fact, serious about this.

But if they're going to sign the treaty and they're going to allow the U.S. to continue using Kwajalein to support the U.S. nuclear deterrent and no one complains... Then, like, they're not serious, right?

Aaron 35:15

Right. This is true.

Jeffrey 35:17

And I think one of the interesting interactions I saw when James was articulating this test is people's reaction to it was like, oh, you know, you don't...

Aaron 35:28

It's the Marshall Islands.

Jeffrey 35:30

No, no, it was like you are being... Like, you're being cynical, like, not being cynical, but, like, you don't want the treaty to succeed. You know, like, and it struck me as sort of fundamentally not getting what James was saying.

Aaron 35:51

He was pointing out, it's not being tendentious, sorry, you know, and looking for ways to undermine something that, you know, somebody has skepticism about. It's that this is I mean, this is a real issue that they'll have to come up with. I mean, there is a – like with every treaty, there is a dispute resolution mechanism and all that stuff.

But what if somebody calls them out on compliance with this? Well, that's what I mean. Right. And then so you'll test implementation of the treaty almost immediately. Or if you let it slide, you're undercutting the treaty to begin with, and then you create, I guess – loopholes isn't the right word, but you create – What's the word I'm looking for?

Precedent. You create precedent for wiggle room, and you don't really want wiggle room.

Jeffrey 36:39

Well, I mean I would just – I would say more fundamentally it will go to whether people are serious. Like if the implementation of – if the Marshall Islands signs the treaty – And then proceeds to leave things with the relationship with the US and the nuclear deterrent the way they are. Whether it's because they want the money or actually I have no idea if they are compensated.

They must be compensated.

Aaron 37:16

That was the question I was going to ask you because I actually don't know the answer to that. I assume that the United States government pays them for this and that this is a good source of revenue for their government. Yeah, actually, we should look that up rather than accusing them. But for whatever reason they choose... I got it open, baby.

I got it open. There it is. U.S. assistance and lease payments for the use of the Kwajalein Atoll as a U.S. military base are the mainstay of the island's small community's economy. Okay, so to go back.

Jeffrey 37:44

So look, if the Marshall Islands signs the convention, but then leaves... In place the arrangements for the cooperation with the United States, either because they require the financial benefits that that entails, or because they care about the protection the United States provides, whatever reason, and no other state party objects, or a state party objects and the dispute settlement says, no, no, no, it's okay for the poor little Marshall Islands, then This really isn't about a treaty-based regime to prohibit nuclear weapons, right?

Because no one is willing to take steps based on this, right? No one is willing to make sacrifices. This is really just about a bunch of countries signing up to banning nuclear weapons, not actually making any sacrifices on their part, and then using it to criticize the nuclear weapon states, who, by the way, deserve criticism, right? And so then in that case, I think it's just intended to be a statement.

If the Marshall Islands actually says, you know what, we were serious about all this, we are signing this agreement, and we are throwing you out, or we are placing legal limitations on what you can do in the atoll, then that's a different thing. You know, that's a that's a oh, my gosh, they're really willing to, you know, they're really, really willing to go to the mat over over an issue of principle.

I you know, you can probably tell I'm skeptical. I mean, I think that there are a lot of countries who are signing this who really see it as a way to target. Nuclear weapon states, but do not actually intend this in its current formation to be more than a useful talking point, you know, to beat up some people who admittedly, you know, deserve a couple of kicks in the shins and maybe once in a while a bit higher.

Aaron 39:58

No, I think that's right. And I think, you know, just to close this thing out is that may ultimately be the intent. And if you were awarding a Nobel Peace Prize, That's not a bad thing, because you are raising political awareness about the obligations, or at least the agreements, for the nuclear weapon states to disarm. And if this is another pressure tactic to raise popular awareness, leading in from the humanitarian into the disarmament talks, that's a fundamentally good thing.

I think so.

Jeffrey 40:36

And how much is the Peace Prize worth?

Aaron 40:38

I don't know, but that could be a lot of funding for an organization who does good work.

Jeffrey 40:47

It's a million bucks, isn't it? It's a million bucks. 1.4 million is what Wikipedia says. I don't know. It's in Swedish kronor, so I guess that goes up and down.

Aaron 40:58

Yeah, well, maybe they peg it.

Jeffrey 41:01

I don't begrudge giving Beefin and the people at ICAN a million bucks to play with.

Aaron 41:06

Why not? They were a guest on the pod. We had a Nobel Prize winner on the pod.

Jeffrey 41:11

Yeah.

Aaron 41:12

That's pretty cool.

Jeffrey 41:12

Good for them. So seriously, I think a sincere congratulations. A sincere congratulations to ICAN. I'm really happy for them. And frankly, I am grateful for all the advocacy they have done. I just wish that our government and other governments took the political will they created and did something constructive with it.

Aaron 41:38

Well, here's hoping that they now pick up the torch and do something with it.

Jeffrey 41:43

Yeah, well, a little chance of that with Cheeto Jesus. So, you know, at the moment, I think we need all the friends we have who are going to push, push, push, push, push. You know, we've got a nuclear posture review coming out. Oh, I know. We're going to see what that one says. We've got a lot of stuff coming down the pike here.

I'm willing to bet my life it will be exactly like the 2002 nuclear posture review, which is to say it will be aspirational. It will be a wish list. It will be patriotic. Hand on our side of the debate because it will be treated as like this list of incredibly crazy ideas. But I bet you, I bet you, I bet you, it has 20. I mean, I'm now, I don't want to bet the actual number, but you know, it'll have 10 crazy ideas. And I bet you not one of the 10 actually gets done.

Aaron 42:27

Well, that's a decent idea for some betting. We'd have to define crazy, but over or under nine and a half crazy ideas.

Jeffrey 42:37

I mean, I think it's going to look like the 2000 – I guess it was released in like January 2002, so I never know whether to call it the 2001 or the 2002 nuclear posture review that Bush did. The Bush one, yeah. It's a wish list. It's a wish list.

Aaron 42:48

The offense-defense one. Yeah.

Jeffrey 42:51

Right. And as far as I can tell, there's very little evidence that the wish list resulted in any changes to policy. So, you know, I think it'll be a wish list. It'll have a lot of crazy ideas. And we're going to need the good people that I can to push back on some of those crazy ideas. And my guess is.

Whenever we get to the end of the Trump administration, none of them will be done. And we'll have our Nobel Prize winning friends abroad to thank for that, at least in part.

Aaron 43:21

Yeah. Hey, Aaron. Yeah. You've been lurking on the Slack channel? I have been lurking. I have been lurking. As always, the conversations on the Slack channel are robust and ongoing and about multiple different nonproliferation, disarmament, and arms control-related topics. For $5 a month, you can join the Slack channel. And if you were a student, it's only $3.

I certainly learned a lot in there, and I enjoy it. We have a lot of good members, and if you are a Patreon, you will be able to get exclusive offers to come to Happy Hours events, and you can get some swag. So go on and check it out.

Jeffrey 43:59

Yeah, we may have a couple of surprise pop-up Happy Hours coming on the East Coast.

Aaron 44:03

I love that you called them pop-up Happy Hours. That's exactly what they are, but I had not put that concept together. Also, if you like listening to our podcast, you should check out Power Problems, our sponsor this month.

Jeffrey 44:15

Seriously, you should check out Power Problems. That's the Cato Institute podcast that we've been pitching because they're our sponsor, but also because it's really, really cool. I don't know. I've been psyched with the guests.

Aaron 44:27

Maybe that's just because they're all my friends. They're sort of riffing off our episode today. I mean, they're not afraid to challenge conventional wisdom or thinking about certain issues.

Jeffrey 44:36

Yeah, I'm kind of interested to see what the libertarians think about the convention banning nuclear weapons. Just a reminder, you can find Power Problems on iTunes, Google Play, and via Cato's website at cato.org forward slash power problems. I feel like saying any fine. You can find Power Problems at any fine podcast retailer.

Aaron 44:59

They certainly covered all their bases. It's easy to find.

Jeffrey 45:02

Go check it out. Hey, Aaron, thank you for joining me. Always a pleasure. And congratulations, ICAN. You got the Nobel Peace Prize. Good job.