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Update | 8 March 2010 Well, damn. That story is dated March 4, 2009. My parents used to get the year wrong when I was a kid. I’d roll my eyes and they warned me that it would happen to me someday. Wow.

India is planning a test of its hit-to-kill theater missile defense system:

The launch will feature two missiles. The “enemy” missile will be a modified version of Dhanush, a surface-to-surface missile. It will take off from a naval ship in the Bay of Bengal and simulate the terminal phase of the flight of a ballistic missile with a range of 1,500 km, similar to Pakistan’s Ghauri. As it zeroes in on the Wheeler Island, off Damra village on the Orissa coast, a Prithvi Air Defence (PAD) missile will lift off from the Wheeler Island, intercept the incoming “enemy” missile at an altitude of 70-80 km in the last one second and a half of its flight and pulverise it.

Loyal readers will know that the rapid proliferation of hit-to-kill technologies, and the total neglect of this development, is one of my hobby horses:

First, once uncommon hit-to-kill technologies are now at the early stages of spreading around the world. Second, the broad focus on space weapons and ASAT technologies, many of which are quite unrealistic and exotic, distracts from the technological challenge posed by the proliferation of hit-to-kill systems. Third, partial arms control measures, such as a ban on kinetic ASAT testing, may mitigate the most threatening aspects of hit-to-kill technology while avoiding some of the difficulties associated with more comprehensive agreements.

Yes, Virginia, India’s H-bomb fizzled.

K Santhanam (who was director of test site preparations for India’s 1998 nuclear tests; pictured above, handing the firing keys to the range safety officer) has admitted what everyone else has known for a long time — that India’s 1998 test of a thermonuclear device was unsuccessful:

“Based upon the seismic measurements and expert opinion from world over, it is clear that the yield in the thermonuclear device test was much lower than what was claimed. I think it is well documented and that is why I assert that India should not rush into signing the CTBT,’‘ Santhanam told [the Times of India] on Wednesday.

[snip]

Sources said that Santhanam had admitted that the test was a fizzle during a discussion on CTBT organised by IDSA. Karnad also participated in the seminar. He told TOI that no country has succeeded in achieving targets with only its first test of a thermonuclear device.

“Two things are clear; that India should not sign CTBT and that it needs more thermonuclear device tests,’‘ said Santhanam.

This is a subject we have covered in some detail here at Arms Control Wonk.com (see The Bomb, Dmitry. The Hydrogen Bomb, 10 April 2005.)

1. Yes, India’s thermonuclear device probably probably did fizzle, looking at the seismic data.

2. Some Indian scientists, including the former chairman of India’s Atomic Energy Commission PK Iyengar and now Santhanam, keep pointing out this somewhat embarrassing fact because it is part of an argument for India to resume nuclear testing.

3. India’s evident need to resume testing to complete development of a thermonuclear device is the principal reason that I opposed a “clean” NSG exemption for India (See: Will India Test Again?, 23 June 2008 ).

Here is my original post on the subject, reproduced because I am lazy and I recall the reading list was somewhat helpful:

Did India successfully test a two-stage thermonuclear device in May 1998?

There are substantial reasons for skepticism. India claimed that it detonated three devices on 11 May 1998 at Pokhran (right)—a 43-kiloton thermonuclear explosion, a 12-kiloton fission explosion and a 0.2-kiloton fission explosion. (India then claims to have conducted low yield tests on 13 May 1998.)

Seismic analyses (particularly Wallace et al) conclude the cumulative yield for the 11 May tests was only 12-kilotons. A yield that low is probably “too small to have been a full test of a thermonuclear weapon”—suggesting the test fizzled.

The US intelligence community reportedly shares this conclusion. Govenment officials told Mark Hibbs of Nucleonics Week that analysts from Livermore’s Z Division “have now concluded that the second stage of a two-stage Indian hydrogen bomb device failed to ignite as planned.” Subsequently, “senior U.S. expert” confirmed to Hibbs that this account was correct.

Indian scientists have been quick to dispute these estimates, arguing that Western scientists have made inaccurate assumptions about the geography of the Indian test site. This argument has always struck me as unconvincing, in part because of data that has been presented from the 1974 test.

A former chairman of India’s Atomic Energy Commission, PK Iyengar, has used calculations similar to those of Wallace et al to suggest that the second stage of the two-stage thermonuclear weapon failed to ignite—“the fusion core burnt only partially, perhaps less than 10 per cent.” Iyengar, however, has an axe to grind—he wants India to resume nuclear testing.

Such failures have plagued new nuclear designers before. China’s seventh nuclear test (CHICOM 7)—and second thermonuclear weapon—also fizzled, resulting in a yield estimated at the time between 15-25 KT.

Similarly, Livermore’s first attempt at “super” also failed—resulting from what Herb York called “a simple design flaw … engendered by the novelty of the technology and by our inexperience.”

Sources:

Brian Barker et al, “Monitoring Nuclear Tests,” Science 281:5385 (25 September 25, 1998) 1967-68 (subscription).

Mark Hibbs,”India May Test Again Because H-Bomb Failed, U.S. Believes,” Nucleonics Week 39:48 (26 November 1998) 1.

Mark Hibbs, “Because H-Bomb Fuel Didn’t Burn, Iyengar Pleads For Second Test,” Nucleonics Week (1 June 2000) 6.

PK Iyengar, “Nuclear Nuances,” The Times of India (22 August 2000) (full text in the comments).

SK Sikka et al,”The recent Indian Nuclear Tests: A Seismic Overview,” Current Science 79:9 (10 November 2000) 1359-1366 (draft).

Gregory van der Vink et al, “False Accusations, Undetected Tests and Implications for the CTB Treaty,” Arms Control Today 28:4 (May 1998) 7-13).

Terry C. Wallace, “The May 1998 India and Pakistan Nuclear Tests,” Seismological Research Letters 69 (September 1998) 386-393 (preprint).]

Herbert York, Making Weapons, Talking Peace: A Physicist’s Odyssey from Hiroshima to Geneva (Basic Books, 1987) 78.

India’s CIRUS reactor in Google Earth (top) and Bhuvan (bottom)

I love Google Earth and don’t know how I could have ever done my job before it was invented. (The love is apparently not mutual since Google censored my work on China’s ASAT, at least in China.) However, not everyone loves Google Earth (GE). Perhaps you remember India strongly objecting to GE when it first came out. Of course, India has always objected to people photographing its bridges and military instillations and perhaps it has a point considering how the Mumbai terrorists apparently used GE to familiarize themselves with their targets. These are some of the issues we who use open source information have to face. that is why it is so surprising that India has, apparently, introduced its own knock-off of Google Earth with the introduction of Bhuvan, Sanskrit for Earth. It seems like India has decided that if you cannot ban GE, you should emulate it, but at a much reduced resolution. And as far as I can tell, no coordinates. (In the interest of full disclosure, I have to say that I am just getting familiar with Bhuvan and some of its features might not have revealed themselves to me.)

Both the low resolution and the lack of geographic coordinates would make Bhuvan much less of a security threat, but of course do nothing to get rid of GE. As the above two images show, GE has little to worry about as far as competitors go; the resolution of Bhuvan is reported to be 5 meters which severely limits it usefulness for, at least the kind of work I do. (Interestingly, the little blurb I saw that stated the resolution was 5 meters also bragged about how you could zoom down to 10 meters while GE was limited to 200—is that true?—it didn’t say, however, that 5 meter resolution looks awful at 10 meters height.) Bhuvan does look like it will eventually have some interesting features such as reporting the type of soil in different locations. But if this proves useful, GE will undoubtedly incorporate such information too.

From yesterday’s Global Security Newswire:

The United States and India removed an “albatross across our necks” by sealing a civilian nuclear trade deal and can now look forward to cooperation in other sectors, New Delhi’s departing envoy to Washington said yesterday.

The relationship “still has to reach a certain critical mass,” said Ambassador Ronen Sen, who spent 4 1/2 years as India’s top official in the United States. “But today I don’t see any major area where you have a difference in terms of long-term objectives — none.”

Given some of the concerns about the US-India deal—specifically, that it will allow India to free up domestic uranium for fissile material production—I think the ambassador could have found a better way to describe US-India relations than heading toward a “critical mass”.

The International Herald Tribune reported yesterday that Islamabad and New Delhi has exchanged the list of their respective nuclear installations and facilities on New Year’s Day, in accordance with the 1988 Agreement between India & Pakistan on Prohibition of Attack Against Nuclear Installations and Facilities.

According to the agreement, the term ‘nuclear installations and facilities’ includes:

…nuclear power and research reactors, fuel fabrication, uranium enrichment, isotopes separation and reprocessing facilities as well as any other installations with fresh or irradiated nuclear fuel and materials in any form and establishments storing significant quantities of radioactive materials.

Both countries have classified the list, but I learned the approximate numbers today. India has declared 30 facilities while Pakistan has declared “about 20”. The Indian government has put some university sites on the list, presumably because “significant quantities of radioactive materials” are stored there. I cannot give you more specifics than that.

It is, however, encouraging that the list continues to be exchanged despite the heightened tension between the two countries. One day, perhaps, the list will be made public. But don’t hold your breath.

Glenn Kessler has an interesting little story in the Washington Post about the agreement to waive Nuclear Suppliers Group restrictions on civil nuclear trade with India. Kessler cites “sources familiar with the discussions” making two claims:

1. “[The NSG] privately agreed last weekend that none of its members plans to sell sensitive technologies to India .. [to] persuade several skeptical member states to support a waiver authorizing nuclear trade with India…”

2. “The NSG separately is nearing consensus on a total ban on sensitive sales to countries such as India that have not signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty … [This was] another factor in persuading countries such as Ireland, New Zealand and Austria to end their effort to write such trade restrictions into the waiver for India.”

Here is the money quote:

“In the discussions about how to handle enrichment and reprocessing, it was made clear that nobody had any plans to transfer such technologies to India in the foreseeable future,” said a senior U.S. official, speaking on the condition of anonymity because he was describing private diplomatic exchanges. While such statements were not binding, he said, the NSG countries recognized that they were planning to “tighten up” the rules on such sales in the near future, allowing them to achieve the same restrictions on India later without causing a diplomatic rupture now.

It is a good bit of reporting. US policy is to generally oppose the transfer of such materials. In case that wasn’t clear before, let me remind you of the Answer to Question 5 of the 45 Questions:

Consistent with standing U.S. policy, the U.S. government will not assist India in the design, construction, or operation of sensitive nuclear technologies through the transfer of dual-use items, whether under the Agreement or outside the Agreement. The United States rarely transfers dual-use items for sensitive nuclear activities to any cooperating party and no such transfers are currently pending.

I am glad to see that the NSG countries reached a private understanding to block the sale of enrichment and reprocessing technologies to India. Some Indian officials have described this as a red line. I hope so.

A prohibition on enrichment and reprocessing technologies — either private or formal — doesn’t, however, address my core concerns: that carving out an exception for India undermines the rule of law and allows India to use the international marketplace to mitigate the effect of any sanctions following a resumption of nuclear testing.

Well, the Nuclear Suppliers Group has given India a cleanish waiver. It’s a good day for France and Russia — well, AREVA and Atomstroyexport. (I have my doubts about the future of Westinghouse in the Indian market, but oh well.) ACA has good coverage on the debacle.

Austrian officials are trying to slap some lipstick on this pig, pointing to a statement by Indian External Affairs Minister that reaffirmed India’s commitment to its “voluntary, unilateral” moratorium on nuclear testing, a commitment which is mentioned in the exemption. Here is that statement:

We remain committed to a voluntary, unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing. We do not subscribe to any arms race, including a nuclear arms race. We have always tempered the exercise of our strategic autonomy with a sense of global responsibility. We affirm our policy of no-first-use of nuclear weapons.

We are committed to work with others towards the conclusion of a multilateral Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty in the Conference on Disarmament that is universal, non-discriminatory and verifiable.

It’s not much beyond the standard boilerplate, though I have to admit I wish President Bush would make a similar statement about US nuclear posture.

I worry this sets up a potential trainwreck:

• Indian officials believe they have what they seek: the legal commitments at the core of a strategy that will mitigate the consequences of a resumption of testing. (The fuel reserve, access to the international marketplace, etc.)

• NSG members, on the other hand, believe they have a political commitment, however weak, from India to refrain from testing and options to isolate India again in the event that it violates the pledge.

One of the two parties is wrong. I am not eager to find out which.

***

Another important story will be China’s role — although China didn’t appear in the news stories as prominently as Austria, Ireland and New Zealand, Beijing apparently played an active role in attempting to block the waiver behind the scenes. This will be a great case study for a dissertation on the new Chinese diplomacy.

Overcoming Chinese opposition apparently took a direct intervention from Bush to Chinese President Hu Jintao. I wonder what we had to trade for China’s cooperation?

Indian Atomic Energy Commission Chairman Anil Kakodkar tells the Indian Express that whether India tests or not will depend on the consquences:

Asked about the right to conduct nuclear tests, he said, “in terms of consequences, of course, when we decide to do that, we need to factor in possible consequences.”

Seems like a good reason not to give India a clean exemption at the NSG.

Hat tip to MK.

The Arms Control Association has the revised text for India’s draft NSG exemption. I thought it might be fun to compare, word for word, the old text with the new.

It wasn’t (I got rather obsessive about it). However, I hope it might prove useful for some of you.

Apart from lots of fiddling the two drafts are fairly similar. The most significant changes are the addition of text about consultation and information exchange, and the removal of a reference of the need for clean energy. Given the opposition to the original draft, I would be surprised if the new draft was enough to satisfy the deal’s critics.

Anyway, here are the fruits of my labour:

1. At the _____ pPlenary meeting on ______ the Participating Governments of the Nuclear Suppliers Group agreed that they:

a. dDesire to contribute to an the effectiveness and integrity of the global non-proliferation regime, and to the widest possible implementation of the provisions and objectives of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;

b. sSeek to limit avert the further spread of nuclear weapons;

c. wWish to pursue mechanisms to affect positively the non—proliferation commitments and actions of those all states outside the traditional nuclear non—proliferation regimes; and

d. sSeek to promote fundamental principles of safeguards and export controls for nuclear transfers for peaceful purposes.

e. recognize the world’s need for clean and reliable sources of energy for sustained growth and prosperity

2. In this respect, Participating Governments have taken note of steps that India has taken voluntarily taken as a contributing partner in the non-proliferation regime and they welcome India’s efforts with respect to the following non-proliferation commitments and actions:

a. Deciding to separate its civilian nuclear facilities in a phased manner and to file a declaration regarding its civilian nuclear facilities with the International Atomic Energy Agency IAEA, in accordance with its Separation Plan (circulated as INFCIRC/731);

b. Conducting Concluding negotiations with the IAEA and obtaining approval of its by the Board of Governors on 1 August 2008 for an “Agreement between the Government of India and the IAEA for the Application of Safeguards to Civilian Nuclear Facilities,” regarding a Safeguards Agreement for application of safeguards to civilian nuclear facilities that is in accordance with IAEA standards, principles, and practices (including IAEA Board of Governors dDocument GOV/1621);

c. Committing to sign and adhere to an Additional Protocol with respect to India’s civil nuclear facilities;

d. Refraining from transferring of enrichment and reprocessing technologyies to states that do not already possess these have them and supporting international efforts to limit their spread;

e. Having adopted Insituting a national export control system capable of effectively controlling transfers of multilaterally controlled nuclear and nuclear-related material, equipment, and technology.;

f. Harmonizing its export control lists and guidelines with those of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and committing to adherence to NSG the Nuclear Suppliers Group gGuidelines;

g. Continuing its unilateral moratorium on nuclear testsing, and declaring its readiness to work with others towards the conclusion of a multilateral Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty.

3. In view of the Based on the commitments and actions mentioned above, Participating Governments have adopted the following policy on civilian nuclear cooperation by Participating Governments with the IAEA-safeguarded Indian civilian nuclear program:

a. Notwithstanding paragraphs 4(a), 4(b) and 4(c ) of InfcircNFCIRC/254 (/Rev. 9) /Part 1, Participating Governments may transfer trigger list items and/or related technology to India for peaceful purposes and for use in IAEA safeguarded civilian nuclear facilities, provided that the transfer satisfies all other provisions of INFCIRC/254/Part 1, as revised.

b. Notwithstanding paragraph 4(a) and 4(b) of the INFCIRC/254/Rev.7/Part 2 guidelines, Participating Governments may transfer nuclear-related dual-use equipment, etc. materials, software and related technology to India for peaceful purposes and for use in civilian nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards, provided that the transfer satisfies all other provisions of INFCIRC/254Part 2, as revised.

c. At each Plenary, Participating Governments shall notify each other of approved transfers to India of Annex A and B items listed in INFCIRC/254/Part 1, as revised. Participating Governments are also invited to exchange information, including about their own bilateral agreements with India.

cd. Participating Governments shall will maintain contact and consult through regular channels, including the Consultative Group and Plenary, on matters connected with the implementation of the Guidelines, of this statement taking into account relevant international commitments and or bilateral agreements with India. With a view to intensification of dialogue and partnership with India, the Chairman is requested to confer and consult with India and keep the Plenary informed of these consultations.

e. In the event that one or more Participating Governments consider that circumstances have arisen which require consultations, Participating Governments will act in accordance with Paragraph 16 of the Guidelines.

4. In order to facilitate the efforts of non-member India’s adherentsce to InfcircNFCIRC/254/Parts 1 and 2 and to remain current in theirits implementation of the Guidelines, the NSG Chair is requested to review proposed amendments to the Guidelines with all non-member adherents on a non-discriminatory basis and solicit such comments on the amendments as a non-member adherent may wish to make India and inform the Plenary of the outcome of the dialogue with India. Participation of India in the decisions regarding proposed amendments will facilitate their implementation by India.

5. The NSG Point of Contact is requested to submit this sStatement to the IAEA DG Director General with a request that it be circulated to all Member States.

Howard Berman has released the long-awaited State Department responses to more than 40 questions the House Foreign Affairs Committee asked about the US-India Nuclear Debacle in October 2007. You can find them on the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center website.

Glenn Kessler explains that the questions were kept secret to protect the Indian government:

The correspondence concerned 45 highly technical questions that members of Congress posed about the deal. In 2006, Congress passed a law, known as the Hyde Act, to provisionally accept the agreement. But some lawmakers raised concerns about whether a separate implementing agreement negotiated by the administration papered over critical details to assuage Indian concerns. The questions were addressed in a 26-page letter sent to Berman’s predecessor, the late Rep. Tom Lantos (D-Calif.), on Jan. 16.

The answers were considered so sensitive, particularly because debate over the agreement in India could have toppled the government of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, that the State Department requested they remain secret even though they were not classified.

Lynne Weil, a spokeswoman for Berman, said he made the answers public yesterday because, if NSG approval is granted, the U.S-India deal soon would be submitted to Congress for final approval and “he wants to assure that Congress has the relevant information.”