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Over at Verification, Andreas has put up the first two in a series of posts commemorating the tenth anniversary of India and Pakistan’s test series. Well worth checking out.

Comment [1]

Want to know one reason that I hate the US-India nuclear deal?

The House Committee on Foreign Affairs asked 40 questions about the US-India Nuclear Deal, to which the State Department provided unclassified answers that it refuses to release to the public.

Daryl Kimball and Sharon Squassoni, now joined by Fred McGoldrick and Henry Sokolski, have been asking the State Department to drop what described as a “gag order” and release the responses.

That would be offensive enough, of course, but the story got more irritating today.

Physicians for Social Responsibility and the Union of Concerned Scientists organized a panel for the 27 EU Political Counselors at the Embassy of Slovenia tomorrow with speakers from the State Department to discuss the US-India nuclear deal and the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership. (See the full text of the invite that went out last week, below).

The State Department has now uninvited PSR and UCS to their own meeting — or at least the portion about India — because they will be sharing “sensitive” information.

I’d really like to know what sort of “sensitive” information can be shared with 27 foreign nationals, but not US citizens.

Invitation to the EU Political Counselors’ Panel Discussion on

U.S.- INDIA NUCLEAR DEAL
AND
GLOBAL NUCLEAR ENERGY PARTNERSHIP (GNEP)

Introduction:
Ms. Jill Marie Parillo
Deputy Director of Security Programs, Physicians for Social Responsibility

Speakers:
Mr. Edward McGinnis
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Corporate and Global Partnership Development, Office of Nuclear Energy, U.S. Dept. of Energy

Mr. Richard Stratford
Director, Office of Nuclear Energy, Safety and Security, Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, Dept. of State

Mr. Jack Spilsbury
Director, Regional Affairs Office, Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, Dept. of State

Mr. Anish Goel
Regional Affairs Officer, Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, Dept. of State

Dr. Edwin Lyman
Senior staff scientist, Global Security Program, Union of Concerned Scientists

Comment [21]

Apparently the State Department fact sheet on the US-India 123 Agreement doesn’t mention prior consent to reprocess spent fuel, although the Indian fact sheet does. Siddharth Varadarajan explains:

But it is in the U.S. and Indian descriptions of what the 123 agreement says about India’s right to reprocess U.S.-origin spent fuel that the differences are perhaps most consequential. India has highlighted the granting of “prior consent to reprocess nuclear material” and noted that to “bring this into effect” a national safeguarded reprocessing facility will be established and “the parties will agree on arrangements and procedures within one year.” The U.S. fact-sheet repeats this formulation without using the word “prior,” and also chooses not to highlight the fact that the 123 stipulates a concrete time frame for these arrangements to be worked out.

It is a bizarre thing for the State Department to try and hide, assuming this isn’t some massive form of denial about the huge hole in they blew in the nonproliferation regime. After all, of the tiny universe of people who understand reprocessing and why granting prior consent is significant, all will be quite aware of the actual provisions, fact sheet or no.

Anyway, the two fact sheets (India, USA) make for a fun read.

And by “fun” I mean “makes your eyes bleed from the sockets.”

Comment [10]

Maybe this “talking to other countries” thing isn’t such a good idea after all.

After four days of talks with India over the 123 Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, the White House intervenes.

The result? Bottomsecretary Nick Burns gives the Indians advance right to reprocess spent fuel:

The agreement — also known as the ‘123 agreement’ — grants India “prior consent” to reprocess spent fuel produced by U.S.-supplied equipment and fuel, a key requirement for the Indian side, though the specific arrangements will be worked out subsequently within a finite time period.

The agreement reiterates the fuel-supply assurances provided in the March 2006 separation plan and commits the U.S. to the “continuous operation” of any reactor it sells to India. Officials also say the irksome issue of fallback safeguards and the ‘right of return’ — as mandated by the U.S. Atomic Energy Act — of American-supplied material in the event of cessation of cooperation have also been satisfactorily resolved.

Moreover, 123 includes a specific clause that the purpose of the agreement is not to hinder anything India does with its strategic programme or to affect unsafeguarded or military nuclear facilities.

Let’s hope that Superman wears Congressman Markey underwear.

Comment [26]

If you haven’t been paying the closest attention to developments on the India nuclear deal, don’t worry, it’s still almost not quite but closer kind of getting there.

Reuters reports on the latest unspecified disputes in negotiations over the 123 Agreement:

There has been some backsliding on the landmark US-India nuclear agreement and both sides must compromise in order to close the gaps, Undersecretary of State Nicholas Burns said on Wednesday.

[snip]

Burns acknowledged completing the deal has been tougher than anticipated.

[snip]

US and Indian technical experts made little progress when they met in London this week in another attempt to work through persistent differences.

On May 1, the two countries claimed extensive progress during two days of talks in Washington aimed at salvaging their landmark deal.

But they soon ran into new snags, Burns postponed his New Delhi trip, and technical experts were sent to London for talks this week.

Speaking at the Heritage Foundation on May 23, Burns said that they were almost there. (Looks like the intersting stuff was in Q&A, since its not in his prepared remarks for this talk.)

[Burns] said he would be travelling to India in the next week or two for the “final effort” on the 123 agreement. “We have made enormous progress… We are 90 per cent there… In the next few weeks, we can see a major effort,” he said.

At least some of the delays are due to India’s concern over the Hyde Act (full text) which allows for nuclear cooperation but also has what for India are very troubling provisions. A number of issues in dispute have been described often in the press (such as here and here) with the nuclear testing issue being the most prominent. ( The Hindu had an good article outlining the issues from an Indian perspective.)

• US would suspend nuclear cooperation if India violate its voluntary moratorium on nuclear testing. The US could also demand that India return all purchased equipment if they test;
• India insists on being allowed to reprocess spent fuel;
• India does not want enrichment, heavy water and reprocessing technology excluded from the cooperation;
• question over uniterrupted fuel supply and reserves.

***

Speaking of India, I will be on the India delegation at an arms control simulation with Russian college students next week, taking place this sweet location. When I last played this a few years back, spies hacked my delegations’s security system (aka hotmail) and threatened nuclear war. Should be a fun time!

Comment [4]

And, oh, by the way, Mr. Prime Minister, the United States is looking forward to eating Indian mangos.”

President Bush, quipping about the trade deal during the March 2006 press conference with Indian PM Singh annoucning additional measures in the “strategic partnership” formed around the civil nuclear partnership.

***

Well, that day is here!

The Washington Post has a nice fluff piece on “Our Chance To Savor India’s Favored Fruit” that read likes the “American Voices” feature in The Onion.

“People are phoning all day long, asking when we will have them,” the owner of an Indian market in Langley Park told reporter Walter Nicholls. “At home we always eat them. They are the top of the line.”

Hey, who can worry about the spread of nuclear weapons when you have such awesome mangoes?!

“India and the United States began talking about shipping mangoes 17 years ago,” said Secretary of Agriculture Mike Johanns, “Irradiating Indian mangoes safeguards American agriculture while providing additional choices for U.S. consumers in today’s global marketplace.”

Well, damn. You didn’t tell me these were nukular mangoes!

“But this is all in an experimental phase and very new to us,” an importer and distributor told Nicholls, “We expect a shipment within 10 days but can’t say yet where they will go or how much they will cost.”

Uncertain costs and hazy benefits? SIGN ME UP!

Comment

I’ve been remiss in posting about the scandal linking the Indian Embassy in Washington to alleged efforts by a company called Cirrus USA to subvert US export control laws in support of India’s missile and aircraft programs. (Good coverage in the Indian press about the arrest and denial of bail.)

I eventually laid my hands on a copy of the indictment about the time it hit the press (So, to those of you who sent it along, thank you. To those of you who had a copy but didn’t … well, you know what Lady Sov sez ... and if you don’t … well … let me assure you that there is nothing about that young woman that is in any way, shape or form appropriate, let alone for the workplace).

The indictment makes for a fascinating read, revealing how India uses “tenders” to acquire controlled goods. The indictment is divided into two parts, one conspiracy to acquire missile components and another to acquire components for a combat aircraft.

Here is how an Indian official defends the practice of using tenders to acquired controlled goods:

A top DRDO official, however, said the responsibility of ascertaining whether an item needs license or not rests with the company. In this case, ADE is said to have floated a global tender as the i960 microprocessors are out of production. Cirrus bid, won the contract and identified Rochester Electronics as one of the companies that has license from Intel to manufacture this item. “Of course, we lay a condition to a test by DRDO officials before the item is purchased,” said the official. It is one of the jobs of the DRDO representatives in the Indian mission to observe these tests and clear the item for purchase. Now if the company violates any law, DRDO officials claim, they cannot be held responsible.

David Albright pointed EXACTLY to this bullshit practice a couple of months ago—putting out tenders for export controlled goods, then not asking too many questions about how the company gets the item out of the country.

The indictment, however, states that an Indian Embassy employee— “Co-Conspirator A”— was asking questions about specifications—questions that might result in the goods being controlled. ( The Indian Express reports “Co-Conspirator A” is Manik Mukherjee, who until last year, was a counsellor (Defense Technology) at the Indian Embassy in Washington.)

***

Testing some of components to “military specifications”—the purpose of Mukherjee’s trip to one of the suppliers, a trip that we know about because he frickin’ e-mailed Cirrus to have his expenses covered—may actually make a real difference as to whether Cirrus USA broke the law in the second conspiracy (the first looks much more open and shut).

Clif Burns at export law blog suggests one of the microprocessors—the i960—in the second half of the indictment isn’t controlled, noting that its out of production and obsolete.

I asked our old friend Scott Gearity if the i960 microprocessor was controlled. Scott pointed to “a couple red herrings in Burns’ analysis—(1) just because something is no longer being manufactured doesn’t mean its no longer … potentially subject to the ITAR (don’t export that surplus B-52 without asking State first) and (2) a term like “off-the-shelf” obfuscates the main issue, which is whether an item as been specially designed, developed, configured, adapted or modified for a military application.” On the latter question, Scott was a little more circumspect than Burns about exporting items tested for military applications:

I’d say its an unsettled issue as to whether general purpose microprocessors tested to a military standard are subject to the ITAR. The definition of a “defense article” is silent on items tested to military standards. Say you make 100 chips, all of identical design, materials, etc., but when you test them only 90 meet the military QA standards (for reliability or whatnot). Are those 90 defense articles? All 100? I think you could argue that none of them are, but that’s a more aggressive approach then I would recommend to a client without first obtaining a written opinion from State. The prosecutors appear to believe that such testing is sufficient to qualify an item as a defense article and therefore make its export a violation of the ITAR/AECA.

Obviously, Cirrus USA wasn’t going to be asking State for a written opinion on its alleged smuggling operation.

Comment [7]

José Maria Sert’s 1934 mural depicting the progress of humankind toward peace.

Wow, the Conference on Disarmament may be moving toward a program of work.

The good folks at Reaching Critical Will report that the CD could take a decision as early as Tuesday to begin negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty:

On behalf of the six Presidents (P6), Sri Lanka presented a proposal for work, and a draft decision (CD/2007/L.1) for the Conference on Disarmament (CD) to endorse that proposal, on Friday, March 23. The draft decision appoints a Coordinator to preside over negotiations on a treaty to ban the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons (FissBan or FM©T). It also appoints Coordinators to preside over substantive discussions on nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war, issues related to the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS), and appropriate international arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon states against the threat or use of nuclear weapons (NSAs). The P6 intend for the CD to take this decision next week, and if it is adopted, the CD will begin negotiating a new disarmament treaty for the first time in 10 years.

Rumor has it that the United States has finally agreed to substantive discussions on the other issues, including outer space. (Yea!) Unfortunately, China is rumored to be less interested in starting discussions on space than in blocking an FMCT. (Boo.)

India is rumored to be attempting to block the deal. If true, this is a substantial issue: In order to waive certain pertinent sections of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 under Public Law 109-401, the President must certify among other things that “India is working actively with the United States for the early conclusion of a multilateral treaty on the cessation of the production of fissile materials for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.”

Fortunately, I am off to Geneva on Friday for a couple of days (Sunday, Monday and Tuesday) for a conference and (now) to do a little reconnaissance.

Local readers interested in grabbing a beer in Geneva on should send me a note at armscontrolwonk [at] gmail.com. Most likely, I’ll be at Mr. Pickwick Pub, knocking back a Boddingtons or two.

Details here, but you should all appreciate this paragraph from Hassan Rowhani:

As for the question of what we can do now that they all disagree with our having the fuel cycle, I submit to you that we require an opportunity, time to be able to act on our capability in this area. That is, if one day we are able to complete the fuel cycle and the world sees that it has no choice, that we do possess the technology, then the situation will be different. The world did not want Pakistan to have an atomic bomb or Brazil to have the fuel cycle, but Pakistan built its bomb and Brazil has its fuel cycle, and the world started to work with them. Our problem is that we have not achieved either one, but we are standing at the threshold. As for building the atomic bomb, we never wanted to move in that direction and we have not yet completely developed our fuel cycle capability. This also happens to be our main problem.

I await the love notes…

Comment [1]

I am in New Delhi, attending a Financial Services Volunteer Corps dialogue among Russian, Chinese, Indian and American participants.

Our meeting kicked off on Friday, which just happened to coincide with a state visit by Russian President Vladimir Putin and India’s Republic Day.

(Republic Day is a dry holiday in India, which led to some churlish nostalgia for colonialism among thirsty conference-goers.)

Anyway, Volodya dropped in, viewed some of his country’s wares on parade and promised to build four VVER reactors just as soon as he can help the US blow a ginormous hole in the Nuclear Suppliers Group.

Good times.

Comment [10]