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The Institute for Science and International Security has obtained a copy of IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei’s report on Iran.

The report makes it clear that Iran has no intention of addressing the most sensitive of the outstanding questions, namely those that are most closely associated with a nuclear weapons development program. Iran continues to insist that it never had any such program, and considers allegations to this effect to be entirely baseless and not worth addressing. If that’s the case, then ElBaradei’s transparency process may have reached its limits. At any rate, it is high time for a third UNSC sanctions resolution coupled with a real multilateral negotiation process.

The report does not give Iran a clean bill of health, but it does say that Iran has addressed certain issues to the IAEA’s satisfaction. In the past six weeks, Iran has suddenly come up with a raft of documents, reports, and other physical evidence in support of its claim that the polonium-210 experiments, the Gchine uranium mine complex, uranium particle contamination at a technical university, and suspicious procurement activities by the former head of Iran’s Physics Research Center are all civilian in nature. The IAEA now considers these matters closed, but Iran’s sudden change of heart really stinks: why has it waited so long to address these activities and put up with so much grief if it possessed such a convenient array of exculpatory documents? I wonder…

Iran continues to refuse to address evidence of activities that have a much more clear-cut weapons purpose, such as the green salt project, high explosive testing and the design of a missile re-entry vehicle. The IAEA report says much of the evidence comes from an unnamed “Member State,” probably the United States. Iran asserts that the evidence is fabricated and, according to the report, has made it abundantly clear that it has no intention of entertaining these matters any further.

There is a clear pattern here. For activities that have a colorable civilian rationale, Iran is suddenly happy to offer one. Since the IAEA is not in the business of second-guessing the sincerity of its member states in the absence of a technical rationale, it must accept these explanations unless and until new data comes along that calls the original rationale into question. And for activities that only have a weapons purpose, Iran plays the “How can you trust the Americans?’ card and simply refuses to engage the evidence.

It is hard to see what happens next in this process. There are a few lingering issues that the report suggests could be resolved, such as the uranium metal document (the report says that Pakistan is the roadblock). But on the most sensitive issues relating to alleged weapons-related activities, this report makes it clear that Iran has no interest in addressing them.

So what next? The UNSC should enact the third sanctions resolution, but this won’t be enough to induce a change of behavior in Iran. I can’t imagine Iran ever coming fully clean—or adopting the kinds of transparency measures needed to verify the peaceful nature of its program, such as the IAEA Additional Protocol—unless it is given a face-saving way out of this mess. Such a pathway cannot emerge until the United States gets serious about meaningful multilateral diplomacy with Iran that includes credible incentives to accompany the sanctions.

I am sitting in a very cool meeting that the New America Foundation is co-sponsoring with the Stanley Foundation and American Association for the Advancement of Science.

The meeting is invitation only, and off-the-record, but I can share the agenda:

Iran: Fuel Cycles, Verification, and Multinational Fuel Assurances Workshop

September 5, 10:30am – 3:30pm
at
The Stanley Foundation (co-located with the Henry L. Stimson Center)

1111 19th St., NW, 12th Floor, Washington, DC

Note: Each session will begin with a pair of five-minute introductions to the key technical aspects of the topic by two of the workshop participants, with the balance of time dedicated to a structured discussion moderated by one of the hosts.

Coffee and pastries will be available beginning at 10:00 am.

10:30 am Welcome and Introductions

10:45 am – 12:00 pm Status of Iran’s Nuclear Programs

Mr. Mark Fitzpatrick, International Institute for Strategic Studies
Ms. Corey Hinderstein, Nuclear Threat Initiative
Dr. Jeffrey Lewis, New America Foundation, Moderator

12:15 pm – 1:30 pm Verifying a Suspension or a Pause
This will be a working lunch.

Mr. David Albright, Institute for Science and International Security
Ms. Sharon Squassoni, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Dr. Benn Tannenbaum, AAAS, Moderator

1:45 pm – 3:00 pm Multinational Nuclear Arrangements

Dr. Geoff Forden, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Dr. Frank von Hippel, Princeton University
Mr. Matt Martin, Stanley Foundation, Moderator

3:00 pm Wrap up and next steps

We will adjourn by 3:30 pm.

So.

We know that Iran operated 8 cascades between 18 April- 19 August. That is seventeen weeks, 119 days or 2856 hours.

Eight cascades, fed 70 grams of hex per hour, should have consumed 1,600 kg of hex.

Assume the four additional cascades began operating on May 13 (about 14 weeks). The additional four cascades should have consumed another 650 kg, for a grand total of 2,250 kilograms.

Instead, Iran consumed 690 kilograms of hex during that period, for an operating efficiency of about 30 percent.

That’s very low.

What is very odd that is that 260 of those kilograms were consumed between 15 April-22 May.

As a result, all twelve cascades consumed only 430 kilograms in the not quite 13 weeks that followed. Twelve cascades, over the course of 89 days or 2136 hours, should consume almost 1800 kg of hex. That means Iran’s centrifuges operated close to one-quarter of their efficiency, a substantial decrease from the relatively continuous operation between 15 April – 22 May (about half their maximum feed).

Are the Iranians husbanding that Chinese hex?

Do the centrifuges with indigenously produced components not work right?

Is Iran holding back for political reasons?

GOV/2007/28, like clockwork, is out on the ISIS website.

Items of note:

• Hey, remember that David Sanger story about how, during the May 13 short notice inspection, “all the centrifuges appeared to be enriching uranium and running smoothly”? Yeah, well, the IAEA report states that “Between 17 March and 22 July 2007 … there was no feeding of nuclear material into the cascades.” I guess someone lied to you David, but, then again, you don’t give a f*ck, do you?

• Iran is still underfeeding its centrifuges, although it is getting closer to the 70 grams/hour goal. The report states that “Since February 2007, Iran has fed approximately 690 kg of UF₆ into the cascades at the Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP), which is well below the expected quantity for a facility of this design.” We know the 12 cascades didn’t start operating until 22 July and that Iran used about 260 kg of hex during the 18 April-May 17 campaign. The 12 cascades consumed less than 430 kilograms during 22 July-19 August (29 days) or three-quarters the expected amount. Getting better but not really all that impressive.

• Iran claimed to have enriched uranium to 4.8 percent U-235, but IAEA environmental sampling says the best they have done is 3.7%. The IAEA will need to look at the products and tails before they know for sure.

• Iran has another 328 centrifuges close to operation (one operating without hex, another undergoing vacuum testing), with about 328 under construction. Guess they’ve finally pushed past the 2,000 mark. We’ll see how well those work.

Update: Ahem, I am eating a little crow today. The looks like the “no feed” reference is only to the PFEP. Don’t have the dates on the FEP cascade operation, yet. That let’s Sanger off the hook — maybe — and drops the operating rate down substantially.

The IAEA has posted the Modalities Plan, formally Understandings of The Islamic Republic of Iran and the IAEA on the Modalities of Resolution of the Outstanding Issues.

(Apparently Iran and IAEA ignored my plea to name it the “Action Plan” — although the IAEA website refers to it as a “workplan”.)

Interestingly, Iran asked for the workplan to be made public. Hossein Shariatmadari, managing editor of the conservative Keyhan (full text in the comments) offered one rationale in calling for Iran to release the document:

In an interview with ISNA, speaking about this issue, Hoseyn Shari’atmadari said: “In order to make sure that public opinion throughout the world, as well as experts, are informed about the truth of the matter, the Islamic Republic of Iran must announce the agreed modalities of the agreement with the Agency. As the modalities have been set out in a technical and legal language, its publication can allow the public to become familiar with the reactions of the 5+1 countries, and it can also show that many of their demands are illegal.”

Yeah, well, regardless of what you think about that logic, at least we get to see the full text.

The workplan is basically a timetable for resolving various disputes in a logical order — putting the horse before the cart. So, for example, Iran and the IAEA agree to resolve questions about the history of the P1 and P2 programs before moving to the source of the HEU contamination at a Technical University in Tehran. That seems sensible, since ElBaradei has said the IAEA can confirm Iran’s explanations about HEU contamination “only with a full understanding of the scope and chronology of Iran’s centrifuge enrichment programmes.”

Criticism, from the US Ambassador to the IAEA and David Albright, emphasizes that Iran can’t be given a clean slate without additional verification measures, including compliance with the Additional Protocol.

That seems right to me, but the workplan does has the virtue of forcing Iran to provide satisfactory, exculpatory explanations by a certain date. That, in and of itself, is quite valuable. I don’t think Iran can do it, although I would be happy to be proven wrong.

Update David Albright and Jackie Shire have released a short statement calling the workplan a flawed agreement.

Apparently, we have an IAEA-Iran action plan.

Iran, IAEA see progress on nuclear talks Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency both said on Tuesday they had made progress in talks about Tehran’s offer of more transparency aimed at defusing a row over the Iranian nuclear program. Reuters / AP / AFP.

Details to follow.

IAEA inspectors are back in Iran.

A lot has happened since my last update (Olli, Ali, Oxen-Free: IAEA-Iran Action Plan). Making sense of the press reports is tough, though, without some context.

Here is what I can piece together on the who, what, why, when and how of IAEA visits to Iran..

• After IAEA DDG Olli Heinonen and an IAEA delegation visited Tehran for meetings with Javad Vai’idi on 12 July, the two teams had a second meeting in Vienna on 24 July. A third meeting is now scheduled for 20 August in Tehran to discuss further details of the “Action Plan.”

• At the July 24 Heinonen-Vai’idi meeting, Iran agreed to let the inspectors visit the heavy water reactor under construction near Arak. A three person IAEA inspection team was already due in Iran on July 26 to conduct routine inspections of Isfahan and Natanz. That team spent about five hours at Arak reactor on 30 July. They were schedule to remain in Iran until the end of the week.

• On August 6, an IAEA team will visit Tehran to discuss appropriate monitoring arrangements for Natanz. Let’s hope that the IAEA can get the remote monitoring arrangements that David Albright from ISIS and Andreas Persbo from VERTIC have been publicly advocating.

For background, I would suggest Reuters’ Frederick Dahl, as well as stories in IRNA, Mehr, and Fars. I will post the full text in the comments section.

Persbo spots a very funny typo.

IAEA inspectors have confirmed that the NORKs have shut down 15-20 MWt reactor at Yongbyon.

That’s a welcome bit of news, as they go about verifying the freeze that North Korea will place on five of its nuclear facilities (the three reactors, plus the fuel fabrication and reprocessing facilities).

But what really struck me is the rock star treatment the IAEA is giving the inspection team, with 18 color photographs showing the inspectors gearing up, checking in at the Vienna airport, checking in at the Beijing Airport, etc.

(The photograph above is from AP. Delegation head Adel Tolba is doing an excellent Mick Jagger, with the cig dangling from his lip.)

Of course, the work these folks do is really important, so it is cool to see them get the attention they deserve.

Still, I hope they don’t let all the attention go to their heads, because this is the guest house (at right) they stayed at last time. Not much room for the fine art of hotel expressionism—though no harm, I suppose, in throwing the television through the window.

Rock on.

The IAEA announces, and ISNA confirms, that IAEA inspectors will be able to visit the 40 MW Heavy Water Reactor near Arak.

I am deeply suspicious of this reactor—which looks a lot like the reactors that were used in India, Israel Pakistan and Taiwan’s bomb programs. Getting the IAEA in, along with appropriate monitoring arrangements, is a priority.

No one in the open source community has been keeping a closer eye on construction at Arak than David Albright and Paul Brannan.