The first impulse of states that acquire nuclear weapons is “simple” deterrence, and the simplest form of deterrence is massive retaliation to existential threats. (India and Pakistan, for example, now embrace declaratory policies of simple deterrence.) The second impulse, made possible by the growth of nuclear capabilities, is to avoid “all or nothing” decisions that …
Nat’l Security Strategy & Iran
Does the Obama Administration’s National Security Strategy signal a policy shift that in effect drops the condition that Iran suspend its enrichment related activities as a precondition for negotiations? Stephanie Cooke, Uranium Intelligence Weekly’s editor, thinks so: Speaking of Iran, few seem to have clocked the possible significance of an Iranian offer to suspend their …
Public Service Announcement
Even in the sweltering July heat, there are still events in the DC area. A few that caught my eye this week. ☞Wednesday, July 14, at noon at CATO. What to Do about North Korea? Featuring Stephen Linton, Karin J. Lee, Doug Bandow, and moderated by Ted Galen. The Cato Institute 1000 Massachusetts Avenue, NW …
Further Enrichment of Salehi’s Statement
Some readers noted errors in my previously posted calculations (Enriching Salehi’s Statement, 25 June 2010). My assumptions were quite wrong. I’ve now, finally, found some time to sit down and revisit my numbers. And as it happens, on the same day as Mr. Ali Akbar Salehi, the head of the AEOI, have announced that his …
