Pakistan is ramping up fissile material production capabilities for military purposes while vetoing a fissile material cut-off treaty negotiation at the Conference on Disarmament. India is also increasing production capacity, but the FMCT’s problems extend well beyond these two states. Non-aligned members at the CD believe a cut-off treaty isn’t ambitious enough, and it’s hard to gin up much enthusiasm from Russia and China.
There is, however, some forward movement. Useful discussions have begun in March in a newly-convened Group of Governmental Experts chaired by Canada. India has a seat at this table. Pakistan, which voted against the establishment of the GGE, is not among its 25 members. Pakistan has now felt obliged to engage more substantively on these issues in parallel, informal discussions at the CD. For the first time ever, two diplomatic channels are wrestling with the challenges of dealing with fissile material production for weapons.
Pakistan has long held the view that existing stocks should be covered under a treaty – hence its use of the acronym FMT, as opposed to FMCT, to broaden the agreement’s scope. Pakistan’s veteran Ambassador to the CD, Zamir Akram, argues for an expanded scope “because of the asymmetry existing in our region – that has been compounded by the discriminatory civil nuclear cooperation agreements and NSG waivers.” The object of Pakistan’s nuclear diplomacy is to constrain India’s nuclear capabilities without placing any constraints on its existing stocks. Failing this unlikely outcome, Rawalpindi has sought, so far successfully, to compete effectively with Indian nuclear weapon capabilities.
The utility of serious discussions on fissile material was demonstrated at the CD on June 5th, when Ambassador Akram clarified Pakistan’s stance regarding how to deal with existing stocks:
“We propose that this weaponized fissile material may not be touched by the treaty, and be dealt with in the future Convention on Nuclear Disarmament.
“[Regarding] fissile material that has not been weaponized as yet, but set aside either for new warheads or for the replacement and refurbishment of existing warheads, [including] irradiated fuel and reactor-grade separated plutonium produced from any unsafeguarded reactor – military or otherwise, [w]e propose that this non-weaponized fissile material should be brought under the verification coverage of the treaty and placed under safeguards to ensure its non-diversion for nuclear weapons manufacturing. The transfer of this material to safeguarded civil and non-proscribed military use may be permitted… A second option would be to reduce this sub-category of fissile materials to the lowest possible levels necessary for the safe maintenance of nuclear arsenals through mutual and balanced reductions on a regional or global basis.
…Material assigned for nuclear weapons including the fissile material released from retired warheads and those in the dismantlement queue, including such material that is already in waste disposal sites… should also be brought under safeguards in accordance with the principle of irreversibility to preclude its re-weaponization. Its transfer to safeguarded civil and non-proscribed military use would be permitted.
“…[As for] fissile material not assigned for nuclear weapons [e.g.,] material designated for civil purposes; excess material for military purposes; and material for non-proscribed military activities like naval propulsion etc., we propose that each of these three sub-categories of fissile material should be brought under safeguards – both the future and past production – to ensure their exclusive use for non-prohibited purposes only. Leaving the past production of these types of material outside of safeguards would provide a potential source for thousands of nuclear weapons.
These are useful distinctions that can be discussed in detail, but none of the other states possessing nuclear weapons will accept Pakistan’s positions that fence off its own previous production while capturing the stocks of others or incentivizing the weaponization of existing stocks. Pakistan cannot hold its own against an economic powerhouse like India if New Delhi decides to crank up fissile material production for military purposes. So why would Pakistan insist on provisions that would only extend the timeline for an FMCT during which it could fall increasingly behind India?
One possible reason is that Pakistan’s nuclear stewards feel relatively comfortable about the nuclear competition, at least in the near-term. When Pakistan feels more concerned about its relative position, or when it feels it has sufficient stocks, it will change its stance on the FMCT. Another possibility is that Pakistan truly believes its worst case scenario, in which India’s eight unsafeguarded nuclear power plants are applied to bomb-making instead of electricity and that India’s fast-breeder reactors will somehow operate far more efficiently than those in the United States, Russia, Japan, France, Germany and the United Kingdom.
There are now diplomatic fora to unpack and discuss these assumptions, including Pakistan’s worst case, which is completely over the top. In the meantime, progress will remain slow while Pakistan and India gear up their bomb-making capacity.