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The “Would they? Could they?” debate in regard to nuclear terrorism is an old one. There has been a lot written about whether terrorists want to use nuclear weapons and, if they do, whether they have the technological capability to “make it so”.

A PhD student at King’s, Simen Ellingsen, has come up with what I think is a rather clever way of summarising this debate: in the form of a graph (or, more accurately, a scatter plot). He has given me permission to reproduce this graph here (thanks, Simen).

Obviously, it’s slightly tongue in cheek but what Simen points out (and is worth taking note of) is the reasonably strong correlation. Generally, authors who think terrorists could, think they would (May being the exception).

It’s interesting to speculate about why this is. My guess is that those “terrorism experts” who don’t believe that terrorists want nukes, selectively present evidence that building nukes is hard. In contrast, those “technical experts” who think that building nukes isn’t so hard, tend to assume intent.

Anyway, Simen has an article coming out in next month’s Defense and Security Analysis, about the application of game theory to measures to counter nuclear terrorism, and it’s well worth a read.

Comment [21]

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It’s a good question, one that we will try to answer tomorrow afternoon.

Special guest star likely to appear. There is a little reception afterward. It will be awesome, I promise.

Thousands, Hundreds, or Zero?
How Many Nuclear Weapons Do We Need?

Nuclear weapons are the most destructive weapons ever invented. However, since the end of the Cold War, they have received little attention from the highest levels of government. There are many questions that need examination, including:

What role do nuclear weapons play in United States national security policy?
How many nuclear weapons does the United States need?
Is there a nuclear posture that can command bipartisan support?
Is the elimination of nuclear weapons feasible or desirable?
Join New America Foundation’s Nuclear Strategy and Nonproliferation Initiative and AAAS’s Center for Science, Technology and Security Policy for a discussion of these and other important questions.

To register for this event, go to the AAAS website.

Start: 05/07/2008 – 2:30pm
End: 05/07/2008 – 4:00pm
AAAS
1200 New York Ave, NW 2nd Floor
Washington, 20005
United States

Dr. Arnold Kanter
Principal and Founding Member, Scowcroft Group

Dr. Morton Halperin
Director, US Advocacy, Open Society Institute

Dr. Barry Blechman
Co-Founder, Henry L. Stimson Center

Moderator
Dr. Jeffrey Lewis
Director, Nuclear Strategy and Nonproliferation Initiative, New America Foundation
Publisher, www.ArmsControlWonk.com

Comment [13]

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I hear the Administration has delivered the Nuclear Strategy Follow-On White Paper a/k/a How I learned to stop worrying and love the RRW to the Hill in time for the FY 2009 budget process.

Of, course, the NSFOWP is classified. But rumors that neither endanger national security nor risk fine and/or imprisonment are encouraged. For example:

  • Did the “myths” section make it?
  • Is there a (coherent) explanation of how we size our forces today?
  • Does it refer to the RRW as “super awesome-tastic”?
Comment

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Just over a week ago I arrived in Paris for a weekend away, went to my hotel and (while my room was being prepared) went to use the lobby ‘facilities’. On the wall was Le Figaro with the headline ‘Sarkozy to relaunch nuclear disarmament’. You could have knocked me over with a feather. I was not expecting it at all. Jeffrey has already discussed the speech; I (somewhat tardily) want to talk a bit about the background.

France was the last weapon state to join the NPT in August 1992. I was trying to find some good background on what prompted this French volte-face, but can find remarkably little about it. (Yes, I know the end of the Cold War was not unrelated but I want to know about the domestic politics of the decision—can any Wonk readers point me in the right direction?) Anyway, at the 2000 Review Conference, France very reluctantly signed onto the 13 Steps Agreement (their ambassador apparently became persona non grata in Paris as a result) and, like the other weapon states, was happy to step back from it subsequently.

Let’s fast forward to last year’s Carnegie Conference and Margaret Beckett’s speech. Suffice to say that the French (like the Americans) were not happy. Actually, I’m not sure ‘unhappy’ is the right word. It might be more accurate to say that some corners of the French civil service thought their British cousins had gone insane. The French were worried that by playing up disarmament and raising expectations, more stress would be placed on the NPT later when those expectations went unfulfilled. Moreover, I believe the French were less convinced than the British that non-nuclear weapon states’ position on disarmament reflects a genuine grievance rather than a negotiating position.

Anyway, last year Sarkozy commissioned a new livre blanc (white paper) on defence. It’s being written by a fairly small circle centred on Jean-Claude Mallet and there is genuine uncertainty about what it will contain (Jeffrey has found the same thing). However, I had been warned repeatedly not to expect France to embrace the ‘disarmament agenda’. Hence my surprise about the following (it seems worth quoting the whole of the relevant section):


I would now like to address disarmament. It is a subject I would like to discuss with realism and clear-sightedness. When international security improves, France draws the consequences. It did so with the end of the Cold War.

Rather than making speeches and promises that are not translated into deeds, France acts. We respect our international commitments, and notably the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. France has an exemplary record, unique in the world, with respect to nuclear disarmament. France was the first State, with the United Kingdom, to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty; the first State to decide to shut down and dismantle its facilities for the production of fissile materials for explosive purposes; the only State to have transparently dismantled its nuclear testing facility in the Pacific; the only State to have dismantled its ground-launched nuclear missiles; the only State to have voluntarily reduced the number of its nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines by a third.

France has never engaged in the arms race. France never manufactured all the types of weapons that it was technologically capable of designing. France applies a principle of strict sufficiency: It maintains its arsenal at the lowest possible level compatible with the strategic context. I am dedicated to this principle. As soon as I assumed my duties, I asked for this strict sufficiency to be reassessed.

This has led me to decide on a new measure of disarmament. With respect to the airborne component, the number of nuclear weapons, missiles and aircraft will be reduced by one-third.

I have also decided that France could and should be more transparent with respect to its nuclear arsenal than anyone ever has been.

After this reduction, I can tell you that our arsenal will include fewer than 300 nuclear warheads. That is half of the maximum number of warheads we had during the Cold War.

In giving this information, France is completely transparent because it has no other weapons beside those in its operational stockpile.

Furthermore, I can confirm that none of our weapons are targeted against anyone.

Finally, I have decided to invite international experts to observe the dismantlement of our Pierrelatte and Marcoule military fissile material production facilities.

But let us not be naïve; the very basis of collective security and disarmament is reciprocity.

Today, eight nations in the world have declared they have conducted nuclear tests. I am proposing to the international community an action plan to which I call on the nuclear powers to resolutely commit by the 2010 NPT Conference.

Thus I invite all countries to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, beginning with China and the United States, who signed it in 1996. It is time for it to be ratified.

I urge the nuclear powers to dismantle all their nuclear testing sites in a manner that is transparent and open to the international community;

I call for the immediate launching of negotiations on a treaty to ban the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons purposes, and to establish without delay a moratorium on the production of such materials;

I invite the five nuclear weapon States recognized by the NPT to agree on transparency measures;

I propose opening negotiations on a treaty banning short- and intermediate-range surface-to-surface missiles;

I ask all nations to accede to and implement the Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation, as France has done.

At the same time, the entire international community must mobilize in all other fields of disarmament. Here too, France will make its contribution.

The crucial point about this speech is not any of the specific measures announced by Mr Sarkozy (welcome as they are). It is the fact that a French President is talking publicly using the ‘D word’ in this way. French policy has undergone a very significant shift.

Part of it, I suspect, is frustration that the UK has been getting a lot of credit for its disarmament initiative and France, not unreasonably, wants a piece of the action (especially as French disarmament credentials are, in relative terms at least, pretty strong). Indeed, a number of the comments made by Monsieur le President are clearly (friendly-ish) digs towards the UK and the US.

I also wonder whether the British-French nuclear deal has anything to do with it. There has undoubtedly been a lot of high-level nuclear diplomacy across the Channel in recent weeks and it’s possible (though not all that likely) that the UK indicated it would feel more comfortable buying reactors off a state that was promoting all aspects of the NPT (not, of course, that the UK has decided which reactors to buy yet… oh no.)

As for the policies themselves, China will make it clear very shortly (if it has not already done so) that confidence-building measures are OK but transparency is a non-non. The missile control proposal is pretty bold but ties in with Russian interest in expanding the INF. However, most interesting for me is Sarkozy’s promise that France will allow inspectors into Pierrelatte and Marcoule (I wonder if this is a rather subtle dig at the Americans over FMCT verification). It’ll be interesting to see who these international inspectors are (Euratom? IAEA?) and what kind of access they’re given.

Comment [5]

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I was reading some recent RRW testimony, when I noticed that Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England was not aware that nuclear weapons programs were largely funded out of the Department of Energy budget.

I often mistake esoteric facts for common knowledge — call it the curse of the wonk. But, shouldn’t the Deputy Secretary know whether or not his department is responsible for the lions share of nuclear weapons development costs?

REP. HOBSON: Well, you will find a lot of differences within Congress in the manner in which both NNSA and the Defense Department approached RRW, and that’s why there’s pushback on RRW, as you see it today.

But let me ask another question, too, because this — RRW is really not probably something you’ve worked on, but it’s something that really needs to be looked at, and what we do with the stockpile in the future and how we handle it.

Over a quarter of the Department of Energy’s budget is focused on nuclear weapons activities or dismantling them, monitoring them and extending their lives. I’ve often wondered if this arrangement made sense. And what I mean by that is, your department develops the strategy for using these weapons, for what their operational requirements are, how many are needed and that sort of thing.

Yet the Energy and Water Subcommittee is left in the position of having to come up with the money to pay for them, often taking funding away from energy programs or funding for levees. And I heard some complaints that Defense asks for the pie in the sky sometimes because they don’t have to pay for it; it doesn’t come out of your budget, so ask for everything.

Is this arrangement — do you think this current arrangement makes sense, or what, if anything, will be lost by requiring the Defense Department to actually pay for what they’re requiring? Will we get more bang — kind of a bad word, but more bang for our buck if we looked at it that way rather than having Energy and — you guys just say, “Oh, we want this,” and the guys over at [N]NSA just kind of bow and scrape and say, “Yeah,” because it doesn’t come out of your budget, it comes out of their budget, which comes through Energy and Water?

MR. ENGLAND: So Mr. Hobson, I guess I was not aware that we were not paying for these programs —

REP. HOBSON: You’re not.

MR. ENGLAND: — with Department of Energy, because — okay, I guess that’s a surprise to me. I mean, I always thought we were funding those development programs and funding the DOE labs to do work for us. So I though there was a money transfer to DOD (sic) to do this. I guess I’m surprised —

REP. HOBSON: There may be some minor monies, but the majority of the money comes out of Energy and Water accounts.

MR. ENGLAND: So —

REP. HOBSON: You provide — you build the delivery systems. The weapons and the weapons development is funded by Energy and Water. And those labs are basically funded out of Energy and Water.

REP. CRAMER: If the gentleman would yield, it’s a Defense function, but Energy picks up the tab.

MR. ENGLAND: So Mr. Hobson, we’ll look into that, sir. I wasn’t aware of that.

Comment [8]

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Er, again. Another nuclear weapons related incident:

The U.S. military has regained control of four non-nuclear nose cone assemblies for a Minuteman missile mistakenly sent to Taiwan in 2006, Air Force Secretary Michael W. Wynne said during a news conference here today.

Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates learned of the situation on March 21 and immediately ordered that the United States regain “positive control” of the systems, Wynne said. He also notified the president of the situation.

It was the second incident with a strategic weapon in the past year. In August, an Air Force B-52 flew from Minot Air Force Base, N.D., to Barksdale Air Force Base, La., carrying atomic weapons. The crew did not realize they were carrying nuclear weapons until they landed.

Today, Gates signed a memorandum directing Adm. Kirkland Donald, director of Navy Nuclear Propulsion, to conduct a comprehensive investigation “to determine the facts into how this error occurred and who is accountable throughout the chain of command,” said Christopher R. “Ryan” Henry, principal deputy undersecretary of defense for policy.

There it is again, the rhetoric of personal accountability when what we have is a sick organization. I’ve said it before. I will say it again:

Heads are going to roll — officers will lose promising careers, regular guys will get the blame. This process has already started, with the squadron commander in charge of Minot’s munitions crews.

If I have one bit of advice to Secretary Gates, it is this: Call an organizational theorist, like Charles Perrow, or a like-minded political scientist, like Scott Sagan, immediately.

Apportioning blame reassures the public and makes you look tough. But, if this accident represents a broader organizational pathology rather than mere negligence, disciplinary actions won’t solve the problem any more than screaming at someone who is sick.

These guys don’t get it. This is not an isolated incident. The organization has a problem. This is dangerous.

The New America Foundation will pay all of Scott Sagan’s expenses to come to DC if Secretary Gates will send someone — say Mr. Henry — to attend the meeting.

Comment [15]

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Click on the image for the AFP story, which has the best images, including Sarko talking and, my favorite, Sarko climbing down into a hatch.

Launching Le Terrible, France’s new SSBN, French President Nicolas Sarkozy announced reductions in France’s arsenal.

The recommendations were more adventurous than press reporting on the Livre Blanc had suggested.

Here is the text of the speech (in French; you can also watch it, though again en français). The important part is:

Ceci m’a conduit à décider une nouvelle mesure de désarmement : pour la composante aéroportée, le nombre d’armes nucléaires, de missiles, et d’avions sera réduit d’un tiers.

J’ai également décidé que la France pouvait et devait être transparente sur son arsenal nucléaire, comme personne au monde ne l’a encore fait.

Après cette réduction, notre arsenal comprendra moins de 300 têtes nucléaires. C’est la moitié du nombre maximum de têtes que nous ayons eu pendant la guerre froide.

En donnant cette information, la France est pleinement transparente car elle n’a aucune autre arme que celles de ses stocks opérationnels.

In case you don’t speak French (or date a French speaker or know how to use GoogleTranslate), Sarkozy will cut the air-delivered leg by 1/3, bringing the total force below 300 warheads or half the number during the Cold War (aka la guerre froide). France keeps no warheads in reserve.

This is a significant step in transparency for the French, who have been cagey about the size of their force.

Sarkozy’s announcement also calls into question existing estimates of the size of the French force — others have asserted 60 aircraft delivered warheads and 288 warheads (6 × 16) for three of four SSBNs for a total of 348. One cannot cut the aircraft delivered warheads by 1/3 and end up with less than 300 warheads. So, presumably, French SSBNs are either loaded with less than 6 warheads per missile or less than 16 missiles per submarine.

The French could, for example, load four warheads on 16 missiles across four boats for a total of 256. Cut the aircraft delivered warheads from 60 to 40, and one goes from 316 to 296.

Your guess is as good as mine.

Comment [31]

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And the nominees are …

The following individuals have been nominated to the Commission by the House Armed Services Committee:

• William Perry, Commission Chairman, former Secretary of Defense;
• John Foster, Director Emeritus of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory;
• Lee Hamilton, former Congressman and Vice Chair of the 9/11 Commission;
• Keith Payne, CEO and President, National Institute for Public Policy;
• Ellen Williams, University of Maryland Distinguished Professor; and
• Harry Cartland, former physicist, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.

The following individuals have been nominated to the Commission by the Senate Armed Services Committee:

• James Schlesinger, Commission Vice Chairman, former Secretary of Energy and Secretary of Defense;
• John Glenn, former Senator and NASA astronaut;
• Fred Ikle, former Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency;
• Morton Halperin, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs;
• James Woolsey, former Director, Central Intelligence Agency; and
• Bruce Tarter, former Director, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.

For the terms of reference and some background, see Strategic Posture Commission ACW, May 11, 2006

Comment [12]

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Rob Edwards in New Scientist writes about a material called FOGBANK, which is used in US nuclear weapons such as the W76. (Ian Sample in the Guardian also picked it up.)

Edwards’s article contains some speculation on the use of FOGBANK, which is something I’ve been looking into since Frank Munger started asking uncomfortable questions about delays in the W-76 Life Extension Program in January (January 24, January 25, February 12, and March 6).

I believe that FOGBANK is an aerogel used as the interstage material — Howard Morland’s exploding styrofoam — in three thermonuclear designs: the W76, W78 and W80. I believe it is recycled, and will be produced, at the so-called Purification Facility at Y-12.

John Field thinks FOGBANK is an aerogel based on a hypothesis he has about how a thermonuclear secondary works. I suspect he is right for a more mundane reason. Aerogels (that’s one on the right, with a brick sitting on top of it) are extremely low-density materials that feel like polystyrene and look like smoke or fog. Indeed, the nicknames for aerogels include “frozen smoke” and “San Francisco fog.”

Witty bastards in our nation’s nuclear weapons complex, eh?

***

There are not many official references to FOGBANK, but I’ve collected them for you here. I think they link FOGBANK, ACN, interstage material and the Purification Facility very tightly.

  • A variety of DOE Nuclear Explosive Safety documents describe FOGBANK as a material “used in nuclear weapons and nuclear explosives” along with Lithium hydride (LiH) and Lithium deuteride (LiD), Beryllium (Be), Uranium hydride (UH3), and Plutonium hydride.
  • A Y-12 employee was paraphrased as saying “They’re starting to make things with FOGBANK again after many years of not using it, and it’s a big concern.”
  • NNSA Administrator, Tom D’Agostino, has mentioned FOGBANK twice, linking it to the interstage material of a Navy nuclear warhead and the flammable chemical, Acetonitrile (ACN):

Finally, there is a material that we currently use and it’s in a facility that we built … at Y-12. It’s a very complicated material that — call it the fog bank. That’s not classified, but it’s a material that’s very important to, you know, our life extension activity. And we are spending a lot of money as part of the [LEP] in making — trying to … produce that material, and we are not out of the woods yet. And it’s a material that uses a cleaning agent that is extremely flammable. And in fact, we had to build a separate spillway, external, because if this stuff ever caused a problem we would want — we would have to put it in this area. It’s expensive to operate and maintain that facility.

My ideal world would be — I don’t have to make that material anymore. I don’t have to deal with these chemicals anymore. I can take advantage of outsourcing as — in fact, one of the things on the RRW — in a closed session I would talk about what we would outsource on this — what we think we can outsource on this weapons system that would reduce cost. Want to take advantage of all those things.

[Emphasis mine. Hearing of the Energy and Water Development Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee, March 29, 2007]

There’s another material in the — it’s called interstage material, also known as fog bank, but the chemical details of course are classified.

That’s a facility that we currently have right now. It’s a very complicated process. I use that to support the Navy’s program. It takes a tremendous effort to operate this facility. It’s dealing with toxic materials — hazardous to our workforce — but it’s required. It’s the way we did things back in the Cold War. The RRW will allow us to not have to develop and maintain that capability. And that’s very important because that’s got a long-term cost to run and it’s got an impact on our workforce, just like the case material.

[Emphasis mine. Hearing of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee, March 28, 2007]

We have another material that requires a special solvent to be cleaned. It’s — the chemical term is ACN. But that solvent is very volatile. It’s very dangerous. It’s explosive. And I’m required to use it because that’s what we used 30, 40, 50 years ago, when we made this special material. And so these are the kinds of things that I can eliminate.

[Emphasis mine. Remarks by Thomas D’Agostino at the Woodrow Wilson Center, June 15, 2007]

  • NNSA released a chart (below) on features of the RRW, including the replacement of an “expensive ‘specialty’ material … eliminating need for unique facilities” in the interstage.

  • I believe the so-called “Purification Facility” at Oak Ridge replaced building 9404-11 and is used to recycle and produce FOGBANK. Dennis Ruddy, then-president and general manager of BWXT Y-12, the government’s contractor, said the Purification Facility was used to refurbish a classified material:

“It reprocesses a material that we’re taking out of weapons so that we can reuse it in refurbished weapons. That’s probably all I can say.”

“The material is classified. Its composition is classified. Its use in the weapon is classified, and the process itself is classified,” Ruddy said.

  • John Ainsle, in an excellent backgrounder, quotes a Los Alamos document as stating that the “evaluation of internal gas generation of a Fogbank in a neutron environment was started in FY95.”
  • The Purification Facility uses ACN. On three separate occasions in March 2006, workers evacuated the Purification Facility after alarms went off. According to DOE documents, the Purification Facility is alarmed to monitor for acetonitrile (ACN) levels.
  • Contrary to D’Agostino’s claim that FOGBANK is used to “support the Navy’s program,” I would think three warheads — the W76, the W78, and the W80 — use FOGBANK based on when those warheads were produced.
Comment [15]

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I heard two new ideas today that I found interesting, not least because they were, well, new.

Anyway, in both cases, the speakers suggested adopting successful ideas from other areas — one on efforts to combat climate the change; the other to keep Antarctica for science.

(1) An Intergovernmental Panel for Climate Change for nuclear disarmament.

The speaker knew how to play to the crowd, since Norway handed out a Nobel Peace Prize to the the IPCC along with Al Gore this year.

Recall, that the goal of the IPCC is to assess the “latest scientific, technical and socio-economic literature” relevant to the challenge of climate change. Just replace “climate change” with “nuclear disarmament.”

(2) A treaty committing states to the peaceful use of the fuel cycle modeled on the 1959 Antarctic Treaty.

This would be a companion to the NPT, under which states would reiterate their right to the nuclear fuel cycle, while recommitting to the peaceful use of these facilities.

Like the Antarctic Treaty, they could sign _without launching a program, would only become active in governance when they did and would be immediately subject to an any time, anywhere no warning inspection regime. Also, just as the Antarctic Treaty which remains silent on past territorial disputes, this treaty would not affect past disputes, ie. Iran.

Comment [10]

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