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From a reader.

Update: Since the full text is now online at the DNI website, I have moved the full text to the comments.

Comment [33]

Robin Wright at the Washington Post and David Sanger at the New York Times are reporting that CIA Director Michael Hayden and other intelligence officials will brief the House and Senate Intelligence, Armed Services and Foreign Relations committees on the Box-on-the-Eurphrates.

The centerpiece of the briefing is a video [presentation showing two still photographs of] a reactor core inside similar to the North Korean reactor at Yongbyon.

Well, finally, some evidence.

• David Sanger reports that it contains “what appears to be the construction of a reactor vessel inside the building that Israel later destroyed.”

• Robin Wright reports that “shows that the Syrian reactor core’s design is the same as that of the North Korean reactor at Yongbyon, including a virtually identical configuration and number of holes for fuel rods.”

Above are two images of the top of the Yongbyon reactor core (both from the IAEA, the color one via ISIS). I can imagine that a [picture] showing that would cause some consternation. If the Administration makes the Syria video public, we can do a little comparison.

Assuming the provenance, interpretation and timing are all square, I would think the presumption now shifts to “it was a reactor” — which is not to say that hitting it was a sensible foreign policy decision or that the Six Party process should stall.

Martha Raddatz gets credit, in retrospect, for her story saying that Israel had photographs. I was skeptical and some of the details were certainly wrong in retrospect, but the main point seems more solid today.

I confess I am a little surprised. An agent inside with a video camera is a littler more 24 or Alias than typical clandestine operations. I am not sure how or why the Syrians let a video camera into the facility in the first place.

***

There are still tons of unanswered questions, but I suspect folks will ask those in the Congressional briefings:

• Who took the [pictures], when and why? How did the Israelis get a copy?

• Where are the fuel fabrication and reprocessing facilities? I would be surprised if Syria would be willing to depend on foreign fuel and, even more, on foreign reprocessing services.

• Why weren’t Administration officials willing to call it a reactor, even off-the-record?

Update: As you can see from the changes to the post (clearly marked, of course), apparently what we have are two still photographs inside the BOE.

Comment [66]

I was on a panel today at a CNS lunch to discuss Hugh Gusterson’s article in The Nonproliferation Review, entitled Paranoid Potbellied Stalinist Gets Nuclear Weapons: How the U.S. Print Media Cover North Korea.

As you might imagine, Hugh is pretty tough on the media, particularly the New York Times and Washington Post, for relying on “stereotypes, assumptions, and narrative frames” that “depict Korea in a metaphorical funhouse mirror.”

On the panel, along with Jon Wolfsthal and my own bloggin’ self, were David Sanger, Glenn Kessler and Jonathan Landay.

At times it was, um, tense. (I will link to the audio when CNS posts it in a week or so.)

Although I am tend to agree with Hugh’s criticisms, I genuinely respect Glenn Kessler and David Sanger for appearing.

***

I won’t go into the blow-by-blow, but I do want to make one correction for the record. There was a discussion of when the media started to question seriously administration claims that North Korea about North Korea’s uranium enrichment program.

As I wrote a while back in The Incredible Shrinking HEU Program, the media started to questioned the claims in March 2007 after Joe DeTrani and Chris Hill testified that the intel on what we now call the UEP was sketchy.

Four reporters wrote stories critical of the HEU claims before that date:

• Mark Hibbs, writing in in Nuclear Fuel in October 2002, cited intelligence data to suggest that North Korea “may not have made needed technical breakthroughs in its secret uranium enrichment effort, and may even have reached a critical impasse leading Pyongyang to effectively terminate the program …”

• Barbara Slavin and John Diamond, writing in USA Today in November 2003, described CIA officials as being “not certain there even is” a uranium-enrichment plant.

• Paul Kerr, writing in October 2005 in Arms Control Today and here, reported that “the Bush administration has never presented any ‘credible evidence’ to relevant congressional staff that North Korea has ever sought to advance its enrichment efforts beyond a research and development program.”

During this period, the Times and the Post were asserting the debate was not if, but when, North Korea would enrich enough uranium for a bomb, as this in January 2004 story makes clear:

Although the Bush administration has been deeply divided over how to respond to the North Korean crisis, there is little disagreement inside the government over the intelligence indicating North Korea has been secretly building uranium enrichment capability in violation of the 1994 accord. The main question has been when the program would be fully functioning and capable of making fissile material, with the Energy Department and Defense Intelligence Agency estimating the end of this year and the CIA and State Department providing a more conservative forecast of 2006 or 2007.

Comment [13]

A week or so ago, the Washington Post printed a story by Joby Warrick and Colum Lynch about Olli Heinonen’s briefing to the IAEA Board of Governors on weaponization work in Iran. Warrick and Lynch, apparently, had the notes of diplomat who attended.

I asked “what else is in those notes?” Apparently, quite a lot about the “administrative interconnections” that keep me up at night. (Or is that the jet lag? Or Rusek picking up rounds at the Raven?)

Anywho, Warrick writes today about Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, who was first outed as Iran’s would-be AQ Khan by Warrick’s colleague Dafna Linzer in 2006 and sanctioned in 2007. (Although the sanctions list ain’t exactly science)

Warrick writes:

Iranian nuclear engineer Mohsen Fakhrizadeh lectures weekly on physics at Tehran’s Imam Hossein University. Yet for more than a decade, according to documents attracting interest among Western governments, he also ran secret programs aimed at acquiring sensitive nuclear technology for his government.

Experts at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) have repeatedly invited Fakhrizadeh to tea and a chat about Iran’s nuclear work. But for two years, the government in Tehran has barred any contact with the scientist, who U.S. officials say recently moved to a new lab in a heavily guarded compound also off-limits to U.N. inspectors.

The exact nature of his research — past and present — remains a mystery, as does the work of other key Iranian scientists whose names appear in documents detailing what U.N. officials say is a years-long, clandestine effort to expand the country’s nuclear capability. The documents, which were provided to the IAEA, the U.N. nuclear agency, in recent months by two countries other than the United States, partly match information in a stolen Iranian laptop turned over by Washington.

IAEA officials say these documents identify Fakhrizadeh and other civilian scientists as central figures in a secret nuclear research program that operated as recently as 2003. So far, however, Iran is refusing to shed light on their work or allow U.N. officials to question them. After being presented with copies of some of the new documents, Tehran denied that some of the scientists exist.

[snip]

Fakhrizadeh is prominent in several of the documents, according to two officials who have seen them. A personnel chart listed him as the senior authority overseeing all the research projects. Another paper, purportedly signed by Fakhrizadeh, establishes spending guidelines for the research programs, while a third sets rules for communication among scientists, suggesting, for example, that researchers avoid putting their names on correspondence that might eventually become public, according to a Europe-based diplomat who viewed the documents.

Fakhrizadeh, 47, who became a Revolutionary Guard Corps member after the overthrow of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi in 1979, is a former leader of the Physics Research Center, which U.N. officials say was heavily involved in drawing up plans and acquiring parts for Iran’s first uranium enrichment plant. He was among eight Iranians placed under international travel and financial restrictions under the terms of a U.N. resolution adopted last year because of his alleged ties to “nuclear or ballistic missile” research, U.N. records show.

This is a really good story. Warrick is particularly careful with the caveats.

This blog has spent a lot of time batting around the NIE’s definition of “weaponization” which seemed to hint that the clandestine program was defined by the administrative links:

… by “nuclear weapons program” we mean Iran’s nuclear weapon design and weaponization work and covert uranium conversion-related and uranium enrichment-related work; we do not mean Iran’s declared civil work related to uranium conversion and enrichment.

Replace “we do not mean Iran’s declared civil work related to uranium conversion and enrichment” with “and all the other sketchy stuff Fakhrizadeh was up to.”

Housekeeping

Before I left for Singapore, a couple of other stories appeared on Heinonen’s talk:

• “That is what allowed Mr. Heinonen to make at least part of his presentation last Monday. He knew the most compelling aspect was the video of the work for designing a nuclear warhead to fit atop the Shahab 3, Iran’s most advanced missile. European capitals are within its range, which helps explain the new enthusiasm by France and Germany to lead the charge against Iran.”

Bill Broad and David Sanger, “Meeting on Arms Data Reignites Iran Debate,” New York Times, March 3, 2008. link

• “U.N. investigators want Iran to explain an organizational chart linking projects to process uranium, test explosives and modify a missile cone for a nuclear payload, diplomats briefed on the matter say.

“They said a top U.N. nuclear watchdog official last week gave a detailed presentation of intelligence alleging illicit atomic “weaponization studies” by Iran and naming the man who ran them for the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics.

“In a written summary given to Reuters of the presentation, they said Iran had refused to let inspectors interview Mohsen Fakrizadeh or visit sites where the experiments took place.”

Mark Heinrich and Louis Charbonneau, “IAEA unveils allegations of Iranian arms work,” Reuters, March 2, 2008.

Comment [2]

DNI has posted 721 Reports from 2005 and 2006.

• January 1 – December 31, 2006: Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions

• January 1 – December 31, 2005: Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions

Apart from expanded sections on Iran that seem to draw from IAEA reports, I don’t see much new.

Maybe its the jet lag. (Seriously, I am sitting wide awake at 5 am in some Kimono-like thing listening to TLRx.)

Will try to read the DOD report on the Chinese Military Power en route to Singapore.

Comment [1]

© John Locker

AP’s Eileen Sullivan quotes government officials stating that a US spy satellite “has lost power and could hit the Earth in late February or early March…”

The satellite, which no longer can be controlled, could contain hazardous materials, and it is unknown where on the planet it might come down, they said. The officials spoke on condition of anonymity because the information is classified as secret. It was not clear how long ago the satellite lost power, or under what circumstances.

Speculation among visual satellite observers centers on USA 193 — a US Radarsat that malfunctioned shortly after it was launched in December 2006. (Friend of Wonk Jonathan McDowell has a couple of choice quotes in the New York Times about USA 193.)

Reuters’ Andrea Shalal-Esa had a pretty decent story on USA 193 in March 2007:

The experimental L-21 classified satellite, built for the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) at a cost of hundreds of millions of dollars, was launched successfully on Dec. 14 but has been out of touch since reaching its low-earth orbit.

Limited data received from the satellite indicated that its on-board computer tried rebooting several times, but those efforts failed, said one official, who is knowledgeable about the program and spoke on condition of anonymity.

John Locker has been watching this sucker steadily lose altitude, posting images of the satellite like the one adorning this post. “193 has come down about 30 km in the last 3 months, so by spring we should be able to get even better resolution,” Locker noted in December 2007, “but it begs the question , will the operators let it continue to fall …”?

For more on NRO’s troubles, I recommend the links my posts FIA joins Misty on SpySat Budget Scaffold, FIA Autopsy and Sayonara, Misty, especially:

• Robert Kohler (One Officer’s Perspective: The Decline of the National Reconnaissance Office Studies in Intelligence 46:2, 2002) warns that “the NRO today is a shadow of its former self. Its once outstanding expertise in system engineering has drastically eroded.”

• Jeffrey Richelson (The Satellite Gap, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 59:1, January/February 2003 pp. 48-54) predicted a major gap that could develop in our all-weather radar imagery coverage if the FIA Radarsat was delayed, and

• Philip Taubman (In Death of Spy Satellite Program, Lofty Plans and Unrealistic Bids, New York Times, November 11, 2007) noted that the failure of USA 193 has delayed the FIA’s radar satellite.

The fact that USA 193 is coming down is not a surprise; but it reminds us of the real problems that have plagued NRO for too long now.

Comment [44]

So says the 1974 Special National Intelligence Assessment, “Prospects for further proliferation of nuclear weapons,” declassified the other day by the Bush administration. Avner Cohen and William Burr were able to get a portion of the document released in early 2006 under the Freedom of Information Act, but now the whole shebang is public.

I haven’t been able to find the text, but Haaretz has the best coverage so far of this breaking story.

Update: The document is available on the CIA’s FOIA page (thanks Allen!). It’s the fifth document down. I’ve also taken the liberty of converting the document to a .pdf file so it can be saved and downloaded.

Later Update, from Jeffrey As usual, the National Security Archive has been on top of the story since I was a child.

Comment [7]

McClatchy Newspapers’ Kevin G. Hall puts the final nail in the myth attributing “supernotes” — almost perfect counterfeit $100 bills — to North Korea.

In an article titled “U.S. counterfeiting charges against N. Korea based on shaky evidence,” Hall identifies and demolishes the central role played by defector testimony:

However, a 10-month McClatchy investigation on three continents has found that the evidence to support Bush’s charges against North Korea is uncertain at best and that the claims of the North Korean defectors cited in news accounts are dubious and perhaps bogus. One key law enforcement agency, the Swiss federal criminal police, has publicly questioned whether North Korea is even capable of producing “supernotes,” counterfeit $100 bills that are nearly perfect except for some practically invisible additions.

Many of the administration’s public allegations about North Korean counterfeiting trace to North Korea “experts” in South Korea who arranged interviews with North Korean defectors for U.S. and foreign newspapers. The resulting news reports were quoted by members of Congress, researchers and Bush administration officials who were seeking to pressure North Korea.

The defectors’ accounts, for example, were cited prominently in a lengthy July 23, 2006, New York Times magazine story that charged North Korea with producing the sophisticated supernotes.

The McClatchy investigation, however, found reason to question those sources. One major source for several stories, a self-described chemist named Kim Dong-shik, has gone into hiding, and a former roommate, Moon Kook-han, said Kim is a liar out for cash who knew so little about American currency that he didn’t know whose image is printed on the $100 bill. (It’s Benjamin Franklin.)

The Secret Service, the Federal Reserve Board and the Treasury Department all declined repeated requests for interviews for this story.

The story has a whole bunch of good stuff, including stories by Tim Johnson and government documents such as the 2004 indictment of Sean Garland, leader of an IRA-splinter group, for counterfeiting.

Comment [4]

I figured that Senator John Ensign’s (R-Nev) blatant attempt to politicize the Iran NIE would go nowhere, but my sources on the Hill tell me his effort is still very much alive. Ensign’s goal is to write the commission into law this week, before the recess.

The draft legislation is reportedly a cut-and-paste job from the the so-called Rumsfeld Commission that the Congress established in 1998 to undermine a 1995 NIE on ballistic missiles — with one, telling alteration.

Predictably, the Rumsfeld Commission condemned the ’95 NIE. Conservatives then used the Rumsfeld Commission’s findings to bolster the case for withdrawing from the ABM Treaty and pouring resources into development of a national missile defense.

Ten years later, however, it turns out the 1995 NIE was right and the Rumsfeld Commission was wrong: the ballistic missile threat to the United States has actually declined since 1998.

Addendum: Check out our hero Jeffrey’s December 7 post pointing out, were Ensign to use the Rumsfeld model, the commission would include 6 D’s and just 3 R’s.

Comment [21]

I hope readers are enjoying having James and Andy around — with Iran on the front burner and Jane knee-deep in textbooks and problems sets, I figured I could use the help.

Among other things, this frees me up to focus on my pet peeves — if one can one have multiple pet peeves.

Former DNI John Negroponte made an offhand remark to PBS about the role of opposition groups in blowing the cover on Iran’s then-clandestine facilities at Natanz and Arak:

… Iran had previously concealed its enrichment activities, only made them public once they had been revealed by sources inside of Iran who are opposed to the regime.

(Keep in mind, Negroponte wasn’t DNI at the time of the revelation — he became DNI in April 2005.)

Anyway, NCRI put out a press release declaring that Negroponte: Iran’s Uranium enrichment first revealed by Iranian Resistance.

Well, not quite. I repeat, as I have before, that:

• In December 2002, Mark Hibbs reported that the US intelligence community, based on imagery and procurement data, had suspected that Iran was building a clandestine uranium enrichment plant in Natanz and a heavy water production facility in Arak for about a year.

• Hibbs also reported that six months earlier, in mid 2002, the US briefed the IAEA on the intelligence, providing “precise geographical coordinates of the sites.”

• When NCRI held its press conference a few weeks later, in August 2002, they misidentified the purpose of the Natanz facility as a fuel production plant.

• In December 2002, Corey Hinderstein, then with the Institute for Science and International Secruity, was the first person to publicly identify Natanz as a gas centrifuge facility.

You can look it up.

Comment [5]