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Whatever one thinks of the editorial page, Nicholas Kralev at the Washington Times has had a pair of good stories on the document dump from North Korea.

Nicholas Kralev, “N. Korea to give nuke files to U.S.,” Washington Times, May 1, 2008. link

Nicholas Kralev, “N. Korea gives U.S. nuclear papers,” Washington Times, May 9, 2008. link

It is worth noting that Warren Strobel, no slouch himself, did some good work at the Washington Times. So much for stereotypes.

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It’s a good question, one that we will try to answer tomorrow afternoon.

Special guest star likely to appear. There is a little reception afterward. It will be awesome, I promise.

Thousands, Hundreds, or Zero?
How Many Nuclear Weapons Do We Need?

Nuclear weapons are the most destructive weapons ever invented. However, since the end of the Cold War, they have received little attention from the highest levels of government. There are many questions that need examination, including:

What role do nuclear weapons play in United States national security policy?
How many nuclear weapons does the United States need?
Is there a nuclear posture that can command bipartisan support?
Is the elimination of nuclear weapons feasible or desirable?
Join New America Foundation’s Nuclear Strategy and Nonproliferation Initiative and AAAS’s Center for Science, Technology and Security Policy for a discussion of these and other important questions.

To register for this event, go to the AAAS website.

Start: 05/07/2008 – 2:30pm
End: 05/07/2008 – 4:00pm
AAAS
1200 New York Ave, NW 2nd Floor
Washington, 20005
United States

Dr. Arnold Kanter
Principal and Founding Member, Scowcroft Group

Dr. Morton Halperin
Director, US Advocacy, Open Society Institute

Dr. Barry Blechman
Co-Founder, Henry L. Stimson Center

Moderator
Dr. Jeffrey Lewis
Director, Nuclear Strategy and Nonproliferation Initiative, New America Foundation
Publisher, www.ArmsControlWonk.com

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McClatchy correspondents Jonathan Landay, Warren Strobel, and Nancy Youssef have a cool new blog called Nukes and Spooks.

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This is kind of a big deal. Glenn Kessler explains why, perfectly.

North Korea has agreed to blow up the cooling tower attached to its Yongbyon nuclear facility within 24 hours of being removed from the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism, diplomats said this week.

The destruction of the cooling tower is intended by U.S. officials to be a striking visual, broadcast around the globe, that would offer tangible evidence that North Korea was retreating from its nuclear ambitions. Wisps of vapor from the cooling tower appear in most satellite photographs of Yongbyon, making it the facility’s most recognizable feature, though experts say its destruction would be mostly symbolic.

North Korean officials had privately indicated previously they would destroy the tower as part of the disablement of Yongbyon. During talks last week with a top U.S. State Department official, Sung Kim, North Korea reaffirmed it would act quickly after Pyongyang is removed from the terrorism list.

Much more important — though not nearly as visually striking — is the agreement to provide “thousands of pages of documents, dating back to 1990, concerning the daily production records” from Yongbyon that will allow us to verify the plutonium production declaration.

I’ve been meaning to say something about the verifying the 30kg declaration. Maybe today.

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Peter Zimmerman, late of King’s College London, sends along a challenge that I am calling “wonk school.”

Peter proposes a series of take-home exams to see how well various readers do analyzing overhead images. And, as an inducement, he is offering to buy a pint of (good) beer for the best answer to the exam at a tavern of my choosing in Dupont Circle.

This is a take-home examination; There is an honor code. Send answers to: peter.zimmerman [at] cox.net.

The full text of the assignment is in the comment section.

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As many of you undoubtedly noticed, Scott Kemp and I contributed captions to the slide show that accompanies Bill Broad’s article in the New York Times, entitled A Tantalizing Look at Iran’s Nuclear Program.

It was tremendous fun working with both of Scott and Bill Broad. I am hoping to post a master list of captions when I have a little more time.

The most gratifying element of the story, however, is the incredible emphasis given to the blog and, in particular, your comments. Here is a sampling:

“This is intel to die for,” Andreas Persbo, an analyst in London at the Verification Research, Training and Information Center, a private group that promotes arms control, said in a comment on the blog site Arms Control Wonk.

[snip]

Arms Control Wonk, which Dr. Lewis of the New America Foundation runs, led a discussion of the photo. Most comments focused on parts. But Geoffrey E. Forden, an arms expert at M.I.T., noted that the table also held an Iranian flag.

“Indigenous manufacturing of sophisticated components is something to be very proud of,” he wrote. “And showing them with an Iranian flag is a very good way of graphically proclaiming it.”

It isn’t often that a discussion on a blog is considered part of the all the news fit to print. I am really humbled to have such great readers.

Thanks.

***

Now that I’ve got your feeling all warm and squishy, a little question. I observe that one of the tour guides for the April 2008 Ahmadinejad visit appears to be the same tall, bald guy who led Khatami around Natanz a couple of years back. Compare and contrast:

Now, maybe baldy is just the regular old Natanz tour guide. But he’s shown both Presidents around and I would expect some representative of the senior leadership at the Fuel Enrichment Plant to play tour guide for a big deal like the President of Iran coming to visit.

Also, I obverse that, unlike the other Natanz employees, he doesn’t have a badge — though he is wearing a pin with a logo that might be similar to the one visible on the badges.

Possible candidates could include the individuals identified in sanctions reports as being responsible for the FEP. (Given how those lists were compiled, however, I am little cautious.)

  • Dawood Agha-Jani, Head of the PFEP, Natanz
  • Ehsan Monajemi, Construction Project Manager, Natanz
  • Seyed Jaber Safdari, Manager of the Natanz Enrichment Facilities

My suspicion is that it is Monajemi. He is quoted in the news stories about Khatami’s tour, which leads me to believe he was present.

And the bald guy showing Ahmadinejad around takes over the tour during the visit to the cascade halls that are still under construction — which would be an appropriate time for the construction manager to take over the tour.

But that is just a guess.

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CIA Director General Michael Hayden stuck to the size estimate of the Al Kibar yesterday, comparing it to Yongbyon:

“In the course of a year after they got full up, they would have produced enough plutonium for one or two weapons,” Hayden told reporters after a speech.

The reactor was of a “similar size and technology” to North Korea’s Yongbyon reactor, Hayden said, disputing speculation it was smaller than the Korean facility.

“We would estimate that the production rate there would be about the same as Yongbyon, which is about enough plutonium for one or two weapons per year,” he said.

(via Total Wonkerr)

The CIA estimates that Yongbyon produces “about 6 kg per year” of plutonium. (I think it is a stretch to call that one “or two” weapons per year but whatever.)

So, the IC must really think it is the same size.

A couple of summary points about the How Big Was Al Kibar post:

  • The ratio of entry points for the fuel and control rods is 61:97. Extrapolating capacity from the number of entry points is not straightforward, but capacity if the entry points imply a proportional number of fuel and control rods, the reactor could be significantly smaller than Yongbyon.
  • On the other hand, the core could still be the same size, of course, just with fewer entry points. I took a quick look at the collapsed concrete containment vessel and came up with like 10 meters — a little tight for a Yongbyon-sized pressure vessel (884 centimeters), but not clearly impossible. That estimate could easily be off by 1 or 2 meters.

This is all very interesting. Thoughts?

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Siegfried Hecker examining machining lathes removed from machine shop at the Yongbyon, North Korea, fuel fabrication facility.

This image is one of eighteen photographs by Hecker and SFRC staffer Keith Luse. I was surprised to see the images online, as well as a trip report by Luse for members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which is available on the National Committee for North Korea website.

The most interesting statement, to me, was Luse’s question whether hardliners in the military will resist any deal:

Chairman Kim Chong-il may be the only person in North Korea who truly knows the basis for North Korea not submitting a complete and correct declaration of its nuclear weapons program by December 31, 2007. Endless speculation circulates regarding North Korean intentions for the short-term, as well as future prospects of eliminating the nuclear weapons program. There are other issues and questions regarding dismantlement and eventual elimination of North Korea’s nuclear weapons inventory.

Is the North Korean military resisting MFA efforts to substantively engage with the U.S. and the other five countries? Chairman Kim’s best efforts to orchestrate a balance among competing interests within the North, may be a “stretch too far” for North Korean military hardliners. Declaring and discarding the jewel of their arsenal will be difficult for those viewing it as the ultimate deterrent.

Luse’s report included a memo by Hecker, which I linked to the other day.

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I just love my job. I am like a kid in a candy store with all these photos of Al Kibar. A couple of things don’t add up just yet. Not saying they won’t eventually, but I am trying to work through the evidence with some rigor.

Despite early press reports that the fuel channels atop the Al Kibar reactor core were identical to Yongbyon, I and others — including Geoff Forden, Cheryl Rofer and Richard Wendland — see some pretty significant differences that suggest Al Kibar might have been quite a bit smaller than its North Korean cousin.

To be clear, I don’t doubt that Al Kibar was a reactor and, although I think the evidence of North Korean involvement is less impressive than early press reports suggested, that’s my working hypothesis too.

But I don’t understand the claim that Al Kibar is a copy of Yongbyon in the strict sense — in particular, I don’t understand how the IC concluded that Al Kibar is the same size as Yongbyon.

Are the Fuel Channels Identical, Similar or Dissimilar?

Early reports suggested that the Al Kibar reactor had virtually identical configuration and number of channels to lower fuel rods into the core as at Yongbyon. Robin Wright wrote in the Washington Post:

Sources familiar with the video say it also shows that the Syrian reactor core’s design is the same as that of the North Korean reactor at Yongbyon, including a virtually identical configuration and number of holes for fuel rods. It shows “remarkable resemblances inside and out to Yongbyon,” a U.S. intelligence official said. A nuclear weapons specialist called the video “very, very damning.”

The actual claim during the video was much more careful — that there were similarities in the configuration and in the size and capacity of the reactor.

This photograph shows the top of the reactor vessel in the reactor hall before concrete was poured around the vertical control rod and refueling tubes. Note the similar arrangement of vertical tube openings in the top of the Syrian reactor on the left and North Korea’s Yongbyon plutonium production reactor on the right. We assess the Syrian reactor was similar in size and capacity to this North Korean reactor.

In fact, the number and configuration of fuel channels are different in some ways. Cheryl Rofer, over at Whirled View has been sifting through the images with care and meticulous attention and noticed that Al Kibar has only about 60 percent of the number of fuel channels as Yongbyon. Richard Wendland made a similar observation in a comment on the blog. Then Geoff Forden sent me a note stating:

I’ve been counting fuel tubes and it appears to me that the Syrian reactor is considerably smaller than the North Korean reactor.

The’ve got a point.

Take another look at the image of the fuel channels and count them.

One can see quite clearly that the reactor at Al Kibar had 52 56 fuel channels in a 4-6-8-8-8-8-6-4 configuration like this (my arithmetic is especially poor on Sundays):

(There are a few onsies here and there, maybe for control rods, but that doesn’t dramatically alter the picture.)

That’s the same arrangement in the computer model released by the IC, so it seems quite plausible that no additional channels were to be installed. Here is a screen capture:

Yongbyon has considerably more fuel channels — 97, configured in 5-7-9-11-11-11-11-11-9-7-5. Like this:

If you model the core of a reactor as a sphere, the volume (and hence capacity) of Al Kibar would be about one-fifth that of Yongbyon — sixty percent cubed.

The implication of a smaller reactor is smaller plutonium production — roughly, while Yongbyon could produce 5-7 kg of plutonium per year, Al Kibar could only produce about 1 kilogram of plutonium per year.

That’s still not good, but it also invites comparison’s to the fuss over Algeria’s reactor, which was resolved with safeguards not airstrikes.

On the other hand, maybe there are design differences in the size of the channels or the rods that we aren’t taking into account. But it doesn’t seem to be a copy of Yongbyon, in the strict sense.

Whiskey Tango Foxtrot?

The possibility that Al Kibar is smaller might explain why the “copy” of Yongbyon doesn’t have a secondary cooling tower as Yongbyon does (although, to be clear, Yale Simkin and others caclulate that Syria could river-cool even a Yongbyon-sized reactor without unreasonable pumping requirements or boiling fish).

A smaller reactor would also require less natural uranium fuel — something that might matter if one plans extract uranium from phosphates.

Finally, a smaller reactor would also, presumably, reduce the design throughput for whatever reprocessing facility the Syrians intended to build or have squirreled away. That question — what about the reprocessing facilities — is a big one that I suspect we will be talking about a lot in the coming weeks.

But for now I just want to know if the IC really judges that Al Kibar was going to be exactly the same size as Yongbyon and, if so, on what basis was that judgment made given the different number of fuel channels?

I mean that as an honest question.

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From a reader.

Update: Since the full text is now online at the DNI website, I have moved the full text to the comments.

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