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So, the one time I met Tom D’Agostino, he called me “Jerry.”

It was interesting moment, because I couldn’t decide whether he just suffered from some mild aphasia or was trying to be insulting. (Though, you know, Jerry Lewis is big in France.)

I’ve since seem him speak a couple of times, and still can’t decide if this is just an act or he really is just in way over that shiny pate of his. But, the endless speculation entertains me in a cruel way — and I do love new data points.

Enter Nick Roth, of the Alliance for Nuclear Accountability, who went to watch T-D’Ag testify before the Senate Appropriations Committee (Subcommitte on Energy and Water Development). Nick observes that T-D’Ag wildly misrepresented the recent JASON report on Lifetime Extension Programs, and got thumped pretty hard by Dianne Feinstein:

Tom D’agostino was explaining the findings about LEPs in the latest JASON report. Tom D’awg’s interpretation was if we don’t want to improve safety, security, and reliability, we continue doing what we do now. Senator Feinstein instantly interrupted explaining that was NOT what the JASONs said. Tom D’awg responded that he did not have the report in front of him.

Later in the hearing Senator Feinstein submitted the declassified JASON study for the record and acknowledged that the original rationale for new pits has been refuted. She also said that she is going to arrange a meeting for the JASONs to sit down with Tom D’awg.

You can listen to the whole thing as a webcast. T-D’ag draws Senator Feinstein’s ire at 29:24-30:04 and then later, at 51:30 she has the unclassified executive summary submitted for the record.

The report said, as Senator Feinstein noted correctly, something very different. Regular readers will remember that Arms Control Wonk acquired an early copy of the unclassified executive summary, titled Lifetime Extension Program (LEP), JSR-09-334E.

The study plainly states that refurbishment and component reuse will allow improvement of safety, surety and reliability (to be precise, “margins”). Replacement would be necessary only in one, extreme instance — an effort to add “intrinsic” surety features (ie those inside the nuclear explosive package) to some reentry vehicle warheads. (Elaine Grossman had a nice story before I had a copy of the document.)

Either T-D’ag has limited reading comprehension, or he was foolish enough to think he could get one past Senator Feinstein. I don’t know which is worse.

I think that sometimes, because she is such an effective politician in terms of speaking plainly, that wonks underestimate Senator Feinstein. That is, as T-D’ag has no doubt noticed, a big mistake. I had the pleasure of hosting Senator Feinstein at one of my nuclear strategy dinners, watching her talk to Mort Halperin and Arnie Kanter all evening. She’s impressive, and not just “for a politician.”

At any rate she’s certainly a lot smarter than Tom D’Agostino.

Comment

Mark Stokes has a really cool paper out on China’s system for handling warheads (China’s Nuclear Warhead Storage and Handling System):

The Chinese Communist Party’s Central Military Commission (CMC) maintains strict control over China’s operational nuclear warheads through a centralized storage and handling system managed by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Second Artillery. Nuclear warheads are granted special consideration due to their political significance and potential consequences of an accident, incident, or unauthorized use. As a result, warheads are managed in peacetime
through a system that is separate and distinct from Second Artillery missile bases and subordinate launch brigades. Second Artillery nuclear warheads also appear to be managed separately from China’s civilian fissile material protection, control and accounting (MPC&A) system. In addition, the Second Artillery appears to control and manage nuclear warheads that could be delivered by other services, such as the PLA Air Force and Navy.

The narrative is not surprising, but the detail is jaw-dropping.

He’s gotten well-deserved raves in Defense News (Wendell Minnick, “China’s Central Nuke Storage ID’d,” March 8, 2010) and the Washington Times.

Comment [1]

As I noted yesterday, the Japanese government released two reports (an official report and an experts report) on the so-called “secret agreements” regarding the storage and transit of US nuclear weapons in Japan, as well as a massive amount of declassified supporting documentation.

Unfortunately (for me at least), this treasure trove is entirely in Japanese.

Below is the text of an article in the Yomiuri Shimbun, identified by reader Julia, which is the best description of the contents that I have found so far:

A Foreign Ministry panel of experts concluded in its report released Tuesday that there were three secret deals between Japan and the United States out of four alleged deals it has been investigating, including one on the introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan concluded when the bilateral security treaty was revised in 1960.

[snip]

The six-member panel of experts classified secret agreements into two types: narrowly and broadly defined pacts. Narrow deals carried official agreements, but the government accepted obligations or cost burdens without informing the general public of the agreements. Broad secret deals were those without clearly documented arrangements that represented “tacit agreements.”

Although the panel could not confirm there was a clear secret agreement made at the time of the revision of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty in 1960 between Japan and the Untied States over bringing nuclear weapons to Japan by U.S. forces, it recognized a “tacit agreement” to effectively tolerate port calls by U.S. vessels carrying nuclear weapons, categorizing it as a broadly defined secret agreement.

Concerning combat operations of U.S. forces in the event of a contingency on the Korean Peninsula, there was a “narrowly defined secret pact” compiled at the time of the 1960 treaty revision as the panel confirmed the existence of documents to prove that Japan promised the United States use of U.S. bases in Japan without prior consultations if the occasion arose.

On an agreement to cover cost burdens for the 1972 reversion of Okinawa to Japan from U.S. control, documents found in the United States, signed by the Foreign Ministry’s then American Bureau chief, did not bind the two nations and therefore cannot be called a narrowly defined secret deal, the panel concluded.

However, the panel recognized that the Japanese government shouldered costs for restoring land plots that the U.S. forces had used to their original condition—costs which should have been paid by the U.S. government—thus constituting a broadly defined secret pact.

However, the panel did not recognize the minute of an accord in 1969, believed to have been exchanged between then Prime Minister Eisaku Sato and then U.S. President Richard Nixon during negotiations on the reversion of Okinawa to Japan, made public by a relative of Sato in December, as a secret agreement to allow nuclear weapons into Okinawa Prefecture in times of emergency, although the panel authorized the minutes as “genuine.”

The minutes did not have binding power after the Sato administration, according to the panel, which also cited other reasons.

As I read this, Japan allegedly agreed to four secret deals: two following the 1960 Security Treaty relating to (1) port calls and (2) the introduction of nuclear weapons in the event of renewed fighting in Korea and two following the 1972 reversion to Okinawa relating to (3) compensation to local landowners — it seems Tokyo agreed to pay the compensation to avoid revealing that nuclear weapons had been present in Okinawa — and (4) the Sato-Nixon accord on reintroduction of nuclear weapons that caused all the uproar in December.

Interestingly, the panel concluded that the Sato-Nixon understanding was the only allegation that did not constitute a secret understanding. The document is genuine, but apparently not binding. This Asahi editorial captures my thinking perfectly: “We do not understand how the panel reached this conclusion.” No kidding.

Of course, the answer may lie in the reams of Japanese documents that might as well be written in Klingon as far as I am concerned. Fortunately, we have some great Japanese speaking readers who’ve helped out on past issues like the Okada letter and an article in Sankei, including blogger Michael Cucek.

I really hope this interests you all as much as it does me.

Comment [2]

As you can see from the poster, the University of California-San Diego is hosting its annual Public Policy and Nuclear Threats course from July 16–August 6, 2010:

A rapidly evolving nuclear landscape poses major challenges and opportunities for the United States. The most critical of these issues include the growing threat of nuclear proliferation and terrorism, the renaissance of civilian nuclear power, and the pressing need to renew the country’s aging intellectual infrastructure of specialists equipped to address America’s nuclear weapons policies.

The Public Policy and Nuclear Threats course is designed to cover important issues in U.S. nuclear strategy and policy, supported by an understanding of the scientific foundations of this policy. This course aims to give participants the knowledge and analytic tools to contribute to the debate on future U.S. nuclear policy.

The course features lectures, discussions, debates and mini-workshops on a wide range of issues. Participants will attend talks by distinguished researchers, academics, policy officials, and operational specialists from the University of California system and other leading universities, the Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories, the International Atomic Energy Agency, and federal government agencies dealing with nuclear policy, threat, detection, and safeguard issues.

[snip]

For more information about any aspect of the program, please email igcc-recruiting [at] ucsd.edu.

The deadline is March 26.

I’ve participated the last two years; it’s been fun.

The big draw, though, is Linton Brooks, who is set to appear as a scholar-in-residence again. You can learn more about nuclear weapons by hanging out with Linton for two weeks than just about any other way I can imagine.

The fact that you can do so in sunny La Jolla is just gratuitous.

Comment

The United States has long had a policy to “neither confirm nor deny” the presence of nuclear weapons on US ships in foreign ports (NCND). There has always been an interesting question about the degree to which foreign governments understood, until early 1992, many US warships calling on their ports were loaded with nuclear weapons.

To date, our case studies on the theory and practice of the “neither confirm nor deny” policy have been concerned Iceland, Norway and Denmark. (Some of Hans Kristensen’s very best work has been on the question of NCND with respect to his native Denmark. Here is a short article by Hans on what that work means for Japan.)

As a result of Japan’s ongoing debate about its nuclear history, Japan’s Foreign Ministry has released an official report on “secret nuclear agreements”, backed up with a treasure trove of documents — which unfortunately (for me at least) is almost entirely in Japanese.

Here is my initial attempt at an English guide to what the Japanese have released. There is a general introductory page, with several links including one to the main page on the March 9 announcement. The principal documents appear to be:

❶ Ministry of Foreign Affairs internal report

❷ Report by the Expert Committee

❸ Historical Documents, including

✓ List of documents

✓ Documents related to the 1960 Security Treaty

✓ Documents related to the 1960 Security Treaty

✓ Documents related to the 1972 Okinawa Reversion

✓ Documents related to the 1972 Okinawa Reversion

❹ Other relevant documents

✓ List list other relevant documents

✓ Other Documents related to the 1960 Security Treaty (Volumes 1, 2, 3, and 4)

✓ Other documents related to the 1960 Security Treaty (Korea) (Volumes 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5)

✓ Other documents related to the 1972 Okinawa Reversion (Volumes 1 and 2)

✓ Other documents related to the 1972 Okinawa Reversion

I can’t speak a word of Japanese, so I welcome efforts by Japanese speakers to begin making sense of what is a treasure trove of documents.

Comment [2]

Footballer Grenddy Perozo (L), of the Venezuelan national squad, marks An Chol Myok of North Korea during a friendly match held in San Felipe-Yaracuy, some 300 km from Caracas, on March 4, 2010. The Match ended 1-1. AFP PHOTO/Juan Barreto

Because nothing involving North Korea is ever easy.

North Korea, which qualified for the World Cup in South Africa, met Venezuela in a friendly, but didn’t manage to bring along uniforms and just generally acted like North Koreans:

As part of preparations for its first World Cup appearance in 44 years, North Korea was in Venezuela on Thursday for a friendly. The match ended in a 1-1 tie. But with the North Koreans, it’s never that cut and dried. According to reports in Venezuela, the Koreans lost their uniforms at some point and had to borrow replacement kits from the Venezuelans. Because of the intense heat, the Koreans refused to start on time, a delay that resulted in the match being stopped 10 minutes early because the field in San Felipe didn’t have lights. The teams will play again Saturday in Puerto la Cruz. (A game against Chile was canceled because of the earthquake.) Why do I have a feeling we’re going to hear many more wacky tales from North Korean camp over the next few months?

As you can see from the image, the DPRK team had to play with tape over the Venezuelan crest on the borrowed kit.

Apparently the jerseys arrived for the second game, which Venezuela won 2-1.

Comment [4]

Update | 8 March 2010 Well, damn. That story is dated March 4, 2009. My parents used to get the year wrong when I was a kid. I’d roll my eyes and they warned me that it would happen to me someday. Wow.

India is planning a test of its hit-to-kill theater missile defense system:

The launch will feature two missiles. The “enemy” missile will be a modified version of Dhanush, a surface-to-surface missile. It will take off from a naval ship in the Bay of Bengal and simulate the terminal phase of the flight of a ballistic missile with a range of 1,500 km, similar to Pakistan’s Ghauri. As it zeroes in on the Wheeler Island, off Damra village on the Orissa coast, a Prithvi Air Defence (PAD) missile will lift off from the Wheeler Island, intercept the incoming “enemy” missile at an altitude of 70-80 km in the last one second and a half of its flight and pulverise it.

Loyal readers will know that the rapid proliferation of hit-to-kill technologies, and the total neglect of this development, is one of my hobby horses:

First, once uncommon hit-to-kill technologies are now at the early stages of spreading around the world. Second, the broad focus on space weapons and ASAT technologies, many of which are quite unrealistic and exotic, distracts from the technological challenge posed by the proliferation of hit-to-kill systems. Third, partial arms control measures, such as a ban on kinetic ASAT testing, may mitigate the most threatening aspects of hit-to-kill technology while avoiding some of the difficulties associated with more comprehensive agreements.

Comment [7]

Julian Borger has a post up on the Nuclear Posture Review, in which I liken choosing among the two options on declaratory policy to the choice between plague and cholera.

Chris Jones over at PONI literally doesn’t understand the argument, which leads me to think that if a smart guy like Chris can be so confused, then I should explain more.

My preferred option for declaratory policy is to state the purpose for possessing nuclear weapons, rather than speculating on when a future President might use them:

The United States maintains nuclear weapons to deter and, if necessary, respond to nuclear attacks against ourselves, our forces, or our friends and allies.

My reason for phrasing it this way, as Josh Pollack captured, is to avoid the “what-if questions meant to exhume sinister contradictions” in our nuclear policies. That’s much better than I said it.

The authors of the NPR appear to have internalized this message — to talk about the purpose, rather than speculate on use — but the two options for the final document, as described by Borger and Josh Rogin, are very unsatisfying to me.

The first choice is to state that the the primary purpose is deterrence. This, in my opinion, merely draws attention to any secondary purposes, which is precisely the conversation to be avoided. It’s better not to have a declaratory policy that raises an obvious question unless you know the answer to that question in advance. And it seems to me that no good can come of answering what “secondary” purposes might exist. The fact is that decisions about the size, composition and posture of our nuclear forces are all made in the service of deterrence. Anything else is a lesser included case that is not a fit subject for discussion in polite company.

The second choice is to say that our goal is for some future President to someday be able state that the “sole purpose” is deterrence. (For the record, I am not wedded to the adjective “sole.”) To articulate the preferred outcome as a goal, rather than a description of current policy, is is almost, though not quite, as bad.

This is a simple question: Why do we have these awful things? Setting sole purpose as a “goal” leaves this question unanswered. We know what the purpose is not (solely deterrence), but not what is. We are left to guess at which purposes might prevent the Obama Administration from answering this simple question forthrightly. Rather than lamely admitting that the posture (and the posture review) is in some sense a disappointment, one might as well defend the role of extending nuclear deterrence to conventional attacks against allies.

A second downside of admitting that the reality of a nuclear policy falls short of our ideal is the degree to which it implicitly undermines the goal set in Prague. The President committed the United States to seek the “peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons.” The logical corollary of that statement, is that all other threats — including those to our allies — could be met with what Bundy, Crowe and Drell called “prudent conventional readiness.” The argument, especially in Paris, has been that it is easy for the United States to seek a world without nuclear weapons given our vast conventional military power. If the United States today doesn’t have enough conventional capabilities to relegate nuclear weapons to the task of deterring nuclear attacks, no country ever will.

Still, it must be admitted that “sole purpose” is an admirable goal for US nuclear weapons policy, even if admitting that the reality of US nuclear policy falls short of it makes the Prague Speech look a little naive.

Yet, I do not understand why we can’t simply state that the purpose of the weapons narrowly, while declining to speculate on their use. After all, as a practical matter, the United States maintains nuclear weapons today for purpose of deterring, and if necessary responding to, nuclear attacks against the United States and our allies. Any other scenario is, at best, a lesser-included case.

The President should just say so.

All this is terribly disappointing, but fortunately it is not the sort of disappointment that can’t be overcome with a stiff Manhattan at the University Club with an old friend. I guess in that way it really isn’t like plague or cholera. Until tomorrow …

Comment [7]

Two announcements of note.

First, the International Panel on Fissile Materials has a cool new blog. (No one tells me anything!)

Second, writing on said blog, Zia Mian notes that construction on Pakistan’s Khushab 2 reactor is now probably complete:

On 20 February, Pakistan’s Prime Minister visited the Khushab nuclear complex, along with senior military officers and top officials from the country’s nuclear weapons program. The Prime Minister is reported to have congratulated Khushab engineers for completing important projects, announced one month bonus pay, and approved new projects. He was accompanied by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director General of the Strategic Plans Division, and the Chairman of Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission.

The Prime Minister’s visit may mark the completion of work on Pakistan’s second plutonium production reactor. Khushab is the home of the country’s first plutonium production reactor (Khushab-I), which started work in 1998, and is the site where two new reactors are under construction. The construction of Khushab II appears from satellite imagery to have started in 2001-2002, while work on Khushab III seems to have started in 2005 or 2006.

Comment

The Missile Defense Agency released a new logo yesterday. I was contemplating some witty commentary regarding alternate logos, maybe two streaks of light just seeming to miss one another, or maybe just moaning that it would be best if they gave the dough to Raytheon for the SM-3 instead of some design firm.

I was even planning on tracking down that Bloom Country strip in which the Defense Department sends Opus $900 million, mistaking him for “Mr. Spock, chief science officer for ‘Star Trek’ defense research.” Opus designs “Net Wars”, a strategic defense concept in which the earth is covered with a “space net” comprising $500 billion in small bills, and testifies before Congress.

(The strip helped Berke Breathed win the Pulitzer Prize. If someone could scan the strips from Billy and the Boingers Bootleg, I’d love a copy.)

But no commentary on the new MDA logo could best this little wonder from Frank Gaffney (with help from another nut-job), who has taken the whole “Obama as secret Muslim” thing where no wing-nut has gone before:

Team Obama’s anti-anti-missile initiatives … seem to fit an increasingly obvious and worrying pattern of official U.S. submission to Islam and the theo-political-legal program the latter’s authorities call Shariah.

What could be code-breaking evidence of the latter explanation is to be found in the newly-disclosed redesign of the Missile Defense Agency logo (above). As Christopher Logan helpfully shows, the new MDA shield appears ominously to reflect a morphing of the Islamic crescent and star with the Obama campaign logo.

[snip]

Even as the administration has lately made a show of rushing less capable sea- and land-based short-range (theater) missile defenses into the Persian Gulf in the face of rising panic there about Iran’s actual/incipient ballistic missile and nuclear capabilities, Team Obama is behaving in a way that — as the new MDA logo suggests — is all about accommodating that “Islamic Republic” and its ever-more aggressive stance.

Watch this space as we identify and consider various, ominous and far more clear-cut acts of submission to Shariah by President Obama and his team.

Seriously, Frank Gaffney believes that Barack Obama has a secret plan to subject the United States to Shariah, which he has decoded based on the logo for the Missile Defense Agency.

This is not, as far as I can tell, Juvenalian satire. Indeed, an aspiring satirist could hardly go as far as Gaffney without inviting the criticism that his caricature was too crude.

Wow.

Update | 12:54 I just noticed that Media Matters, Al Kamen in his In the Loop column in the Post and Max Bergmann at Think Progress all beat me to it.

Comment [14]