ArmsControlWonk.com

The first time I met Piers Millett, we were having a drink at Mr. Pickwick Pub in Geneva.

Now, Piers — one of only three members of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) Implementation Support Unit in Geneva — is in town.

Long-time readers know one of my hobby horses is the fact that the policy community obsesses about phantom BW programs at the expense of international cooperation to fight the spread of virulent influenza. Someday, a lot of people are going to suffer for this particular sin.

Anyway, along with my friend Paul Walker at Global Green USA, I am hosting a talk and a wine reception for Piers here at the New America Foundation:

Strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention
Discussion and Wine Reception

Unlike the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) has no mechanism to ensure compliance and verification.

Given the dramatic advances in the life sciences over the past decade, the international community urgently needs to discuss strengthening the BWC.

Join the New America Foundation and Global Green USA as Piers Millett, one of the three experts from the BWC Implementation Support Unit in Geneva, and Paul Walker, president of Global Green USA, discuss how best to combat bioterrorism and the spread of bioweapons
.
Start: 07/08/2009 – 3:30pm
End: 07/08/2009 – 6:00pm
New America Foundation
1899 L Street NW Suite 400
Washington, 20036
United States
See map: Google Maps

RSVP

Participants
Featured Speakers
Dr. Piers Millett
Political Affairs Officer
Biological Weapons Convention Implementation Support Unit

Dr. Paul Walker
Director, Security and Sustainability
Global Green USA

Moderator
Dr. Jeffrey Lewis
Director, Nuclear Strategy and Nonproliferation Initiative
New America Foundation
Publisher, ArmsControlWonk.com

Please come and join us. RSVP here.

James collected a couple of articles on Yinhe incident for an October 2008 post entitled, The Yinhe Incident.

Worth revisiting.

A couple weeks ago, Benn Tannenbaum invited Ted Postol to come down to Washington. Ted gave a fascinating talk, in which he argued that the second stage of the Unha may be a re-purposed SS-N-6.

This is a plausible answer to the BM-25 — the North Korean bought kits to use as a second stage of the Taepodong series.

David Wright and Ted have a provocative article in the Bulletin suggesting that the Unha-2 “second stage appears identical to the single-stage Soviet R-27 sea-launched ballistic missile, called the SS-N-6 in the United States, which the Soviet Union first deployed in 1968.”

First the bad news: An SS-N-6 second stage massively increases the range-payload curve (doing away with the golf ball of death), putting CONUS within range of a 1 ton payload from North Korea.

Now, the good news: North Korea can’t indigenously manufacture the second stage, so if we can secure the rest of the SS-N-6 kits components (and cut off external assistance), the North Korea ICBM program is at a technological dead-end:

Analysis of the Taepodong-1 and Unha-2 launchers strongly suggests that they may be designed and built around components of Soviet missiles. The apparent lack of testing of these components by North Korea suggests that they aren’t indigenously produced systems but are existing components that North Korea has been able to combine to build multistage launchers. The Taepodong-1 appears to have used a modified Nodong missile for the first stage; a modified engine from a Soviet surface-to-air missile for the second stage; and the engine from a solid-fueled Soviet SS-21 tactical missile for the third stage. As noted above, the second stage of the Unha-2 appears to be a modified SS-N-6 missile, which was produced by the Makeyev bureau in the 1960s.

It’s possible that North Korea learned, with significant Russian assistance, to manufacture Scuds and Nodongs and is therefore not limited in its number of these missiles, assuming it can acquire the necessary materials. But this is much less likely for the SS-N-6, which is a far more advanced system due to its use of highly optimized rocket motors, very energetic propellant, and a complex airframe fabricated from aluminum alloy.

None of this evidence is conclusive, but because it has important policy implications, it should be a high priority for the United States to assess it and work with Russia to determine what technical assistance and components North Korea may have received.

Many nuclear experts recently gathered in Oslo for an event on nuclear disarmament, organized by the Nobel Institute.

Bruno Tertrais, attendee and friend of wonk, sends along this photo of what, for him, was the highlight of the meeting: A talk by Joachim Rønneberg, “who, in addition to bearing a slight resemblance to Clint Eastwood (and is now 90), was the first successful counter-proliferator in history. He led the Norwegian team that conducted Operation Gunnerside, the sabotaging of the Nazi-occupied Norwegian heavy water plant in February 1943.”

Bruno might think Rønneberg looks like Clint Eastwood, but Kirk Douglas (right) played the Rønneberg character in The Heroes of Telemark.

Of course, Kirk is also father of Michael, no slouch when it comes to acting himself, who fights proliferation in his capacity as Ploughshares Board Member.

Bruno did not ask whether any of Rønneberg’s descendants were available for a short visit to Arak — no visa required.

Dan Pinkston pointed out this gem from KCNA:

Taedonggang Beer

Pyongyang, June 25 (KCNA) — The beers including black beer and rice beer made by the Taedonggang Beer Factory are these days popular with the Pyongyang citizens.

Beer houses are crowed with working people who look pleased with their successes in the current 150-day campaign.

It was Juche 91 (2002) that the just built Taedonggang Beer Factory began supplying beer to the citizens.

The cold and soft Taedonggang beer rich in gas content immediately came into great favor among the customers by catering to their tastes.

Its fermentation degree is 77.5 percent.

The beer houses distributed rationally in residential quarters regularly serve beer carried to them directly from the factory.

The refrigerator vans carrying beer have a traffic privilege on the streets of Pyongyang like cars carrying soybean milk to children.

The citizens call Taedonggang beer “cold yet warm beer” as it is associated with the warm care of General Secretary Kim Jong Il for the people.

A couple of weeks ago, I complained that the Los Angeles Times‘s Ralph Vartabedian wrote a misleading story on the W76-1 stockpile life extension program (W76 Problems Seem Overblown, June 3, 2009).

Bascially, Vartabedian used a relatively minor delay in the delivery of a “classified part” — the arming, firing and fuzing (AF&F) system — that had held up delivery of the first W76-1 in order to reprise now resolved concerns about the manufacture of a different “classified component,” aka FOGBANK. (For more on FOGBANK, see FOGBANK, March 7, 2008).

The two are problems are very different, since the AF&F system is not part of the physics package and can be replaced without testing. NNSA, to my mind, badly managed the FOGBANK production process and prematurely released a self-congratulatory press release, but neither sin justifies Vartabedian’s alarmist warning “about the Energy Department’s ability to maintain the nation’s strategic deterrent.”

After Vartabedian’s story, I was surprised that Peter Stockton from the Project on Government Oversight (POGO) doubled down on the issue, insisting that the problem was not with the AF&F, but rather the production of FOGBANK (Show me the FOGBANK, June 7, 2009). I was (and am) very skeptical of that claim:

Now, Peter Stockton at POGO tells Munger that the hold-up is still related to FOGBANK:

[snip]

So, which is it? What Stockton said certainly was true, at least until recently. GAO stated while awaiting FOGBANK, Pantex remained “in ‘stand-by’ mode, which includes maintaining the skills of the technicians who will assemble refurbished W76 weapons.” (I suspect “stand-by” mode refers to the process described by Stockton.)

But is it still true in Spring 2009? I have to say, I would be very surprised if the problem continued to relate to FOGBANK. My money is on the AF&F system.

Well, it seems my suspicions were correct — or at the very least, NNSA is sticking to its story.

Frank Munger, of the Knoxville News-Sentinel and the excellent Atomic City Underground, reports an “unspecified number of W76 warheads are fully assembled, certified and ready for delivery to the military” though delivery won’t take place for several more months. “[NNSA public affairs chief Damien] LaVera reaffirmed earlier reports,” Munger also writes, “that there is an issue with the warhead’s arming, fuzing and firing (AF&F) system.”

Here is the text of LaVera’s email, relating to the issues dating back to first production unit of the W76, that Munger posted on his blog:

After the first production unit was completed in September 2008 and before the Nuclear Weapons Council accepted the W76 into the stockpile, a specific vulnerability in one of the AF&F components was discovered. This was a minor design tolerance issue that only impacts the operation of some of one component. The component is a safety and surety feature that is designed to permanently lock the component and disable the warhead if an incorrect arming signal is sent. The component is one of several redundant safety features that is designed to permanently lock and disable the warhead if an incorrect arming signal is sent in an accident. As a result of this design tolerance issue, under a very improbable accident condition, a locked AF&F component could unlock, though the warhead would remain unarmed.

As the AF&F components are produced, they are screened to determine whether this design variance will impact performance. If it is determined that it will, the AF&F component is pulled aside and used for other purposes. If AF&F performance is not affected, it is installed on the warhead. None of the AF&F components with this problem were ever installed on any of the refurbished W76 warheads. This problem did not delay delivery of W76s to the Navy beyond the fall 2009 timeframe we discussed.

We are currently implementing a design modification to permanently address the issue. While the problem with this AF&F component has not delayed delivery of the refurbished W76 to the Navy, correcting the design tolerance issue will remove the need to screen the AF&F components.

The House Armed Services Committee defense authorization bill contains language that would repeal language creating the RRW program in favor of a “stockpile management program.”

I notice that the term of art is management, not modernization, although I wouldn’t object to latter word if the effort was confined to the purposes established in the language:

Section 3112—Stockpile Management Program

This section would strike section 4204a of the Atomic Energy Defense Act (50 U.S.C. 2524), which codifies the Reliable Replacement Warhead program. This section would also amend section 4204, which establishes the Stockpile Life Extension Program, with a new provision establishing a Stockpile Management Program. This section would establish that the objectives of the Stockpile Management Program are to: increase the reliability, safety, and security of the United States’ nuclear weapons stockpile; further reduce the likelihood of the resumption of underground nuclear weapons testing; achieve reductions in the future size of the nuclear weapons stockpile; reduce the risk of accidental detonation; and reduce the risk that an element of the stockpile could ever be used by a person or entity hostile to the United States, its vital interests, or allies.

This section would also provide guidelines for stockpile management, requiring that changes may only be made to the stockpile in pursuit of these identified objectives. This section would further require that any changes must be consistent with basic design parameters, and must use components that are well understood or are certifiable without the need to resume underground nuclear weapons testing. Additionally, this section would provide that any such changes shall adhere to the design, certification, and production expertise resident in the nuclear security complex to fulfill current mission requirements of the existing stockpile.

The Stockpile Management Program would support and complement
the science-based Stockpile Stewardship Program, which focuses on sustaining the scientific and technical expertise and the experimental tools and capabilities needed to ensure that the nuclear stockpile is safe, secure, and reliable without nuclear testing. The Stockpile Management Program, in turn, would provide a framework for the activities associated with actual work on the weapons that comprise the stockpile, including limitations on any changes to the stockpile.

It seems to me that this is a pretty sensible approach — consistent with my preference that the Congress ought to dispose of RRW on the very narrow grounds that WR1 is not the most cost effective or technically appropriate (ie lowest risk of testing) option to maintain (or manage) the capability provided by the W76. (And not on the more sweeping grounds that it is “new” or “modernized.”)

In case you are curious, here is the actual language.

Back in January 2008, Michael Bilton in the Sunday Times had a very interesting article on the UK Trident force that I somehow missed. Sort of a UK-version of Doug Waller’s excellent, Big Red.

The most intriguing part, to me, is the suggestion that the UK warheads have variable yields. Previously, UK officials had indicated that the UK “has some flexibility in the choice of yield for the warhead on its Trident missile.”

“Some flexibility,” according to Bilton, runs all the way down to 10-15 kt:

As a gesture to disarmament, in 1998 the Blair government dramatically cut the British nuclear stockpile – getting rid of all tactical weapons and limiting each submarine to a maximum of 48 warheads, weapons that can nevertheless cause terrible damage. They can strike anywhere on Earth and cause some countries to cease to exist. Britain’s post-cold-war Trident submarines go to sea with fewer missiles and warheads. Sometimes one or more of the missile tubes contains concrete ballast blocks to control buoyancy. Most British weapons have a yield of 80 to 100 kilotons – seven or eight times the destructive power dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. But some are much smaller – 10 to 15 kilotons. Some missiles have multiple warheads and dummies; others contain only a small single device – probably a low-yield weapon, with limited destructive power. In some scenarios it doesn’t take a sledgehammer to crack a nut.

The key to deterrence-theory is to convince a potential adversary that we have not only the capability but also the will to fire a nuclear weapon if critically threatened. A British prime minister might feel constrained in giving the order to fire if the result was massively disproportionate to the threat from a rogue state or terrorist group. Smaller-yield single warheads could be used to demonstrate British resolve, coupled with a warning of the devastation that might follow if a potential enemy did not back off. Deliberate ambiguity is a crucial strategy. Would Britain make the first use of nuclear weapons? Ministers refuse to say. Keeping an enemy guessing is the name of the game.

Fascinating.

The International Crisis Group, to my mind, is a very uneven operation. It also annoys me that they never sign their reports.

But Dan Pinkston, out in Seoul, has a trio of very good reports on North Korea’s Chemical and Biological Weapons Programs, Nuclear and Missile Programs and Getting Back to Talks.

Top notch stuff from a top notch analyst.

I am less optimistic, at least in the near term, than Dan seems to be about getting back to talks with North Korea — though I agree that we need to be ready to engage them, as Dan says, “if and when there appears to be a prospect, however uncertain, that the North is willing to engage seriously.”

Scott Sagan argues very convincingly in the pages of Survival that the United States should adopt a declaratory policy of “no first use” of nuclear weapons (Scott D. Sagan, “The Case for No First Use,” Survival 51:3, June–July 2009, pp. 163–182).

Particularly compelling, to me, is his demolition of “calculated ambiguity” using a case study from the Bush Administration. Whatever the appeal in theory, in real life “calculated ambiguity” degenerates into the clumsy brandishing of nuclear weapons.

I had been mulling a similar case study in a memo using the almost comical efforts to maintain “calculated ambiguity” regarding a possible nuclear strike against the Libyan facility at Tarhuna. The Clinton Administration looked like the Keystone Cops armed with nuclear weapons, which says something when you manage to upstage Muammar al-Gaddafi in a black comedy.

No need to, now. Scott executes a much cleaner demonstration of why “calculated ambiguity” is, to my mind, more trouble than it is worth:

Options on the table

A US no-first-use declaration would also enhance US non-proliferation objectives by increasing international diplomatic support for tougher diplomatic measures against potential proliferators. Recent attempts to use coercive diplomacy against Iran illustrate the point. Bush and Cheney repeatedly hinted in 2006 and 2007, by noting that ‘all options are on the table’, at US plans to use military force to attack Iran’s nuclear programme if diplomatic efforts and UN sanctions failed to persuade Tehran to give up its uranium enrichment and other facilities. In April 2006, journalist Seymour Hersh sparked an international controversy by reporting that the US contingency attack plans that had been sent to the White House included the option of using tactical nuclear weapons to destroy Iranian underground facilities.

At a press conference on 18 April 2006, Bush pointedly left open the possibility that his statements were meant to include the option of a preventive first strike with nuclear weapons:

Q: Sir, when you talk about Iran, and you talk about how you have diplomatic efforts, you also say all options are on the table. Does that include the possibility of a nuclear strike? Is that something that your administration will plan for?

THE PRESIDENT: All options are on the table.

It is not clear whether Bush was engaging in coercive diplomacy, following the ‘calculated ambiguity’ nuclear doctrine, or whether he was simply following the script laid out in his notes. In response to this press conference comment, however, Iran’s UN ambassador, Javad Zarif, immediately protested, in a letter to UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, against what he called ‘a tacit confirmation of the shocking news on the administration’s possible contemplation of nuclear strikes against certain targets in Iran’. British Foreign Minister Jack Straw also joined the debate, answering ‘yes’ when a BBC reporter asked him if the UK government would ‘unequivocally say we want nothing to do with this’ if the United States attacked Iran, and adding that ‘the idea of a nuclear strike on Iran is completely nuts’.

The point is not that potential veiled US nuclear threats were in any way the cause of Iran’s nuclear-weapons programme, which began long before the Bush administration took office. But US nuclear threats, intentional or not, both play into the hands of domestic forces in Iran that favour developing nuclear weapons and reduce international diplomatic support for coercive diplomatic efforts to pressure Iran to end its defiance of UN Security Council resolutions requiring suspension of its enrichment programme. If the United States were to adopt a no-first-use doctrine, the temptation for US politicians to resort to veiled nuclear threats as part of coercive diplomacy against Iran or other potential proliferators would be reduced, as would the ability of Tehran to claim it faces nuclear threats.

The very fact that the UK Foreign Secretary feels compelled to characterize the US position as “completely nuts” — to me — is a sign of a declaratory policy FAIL.