If I am not mistaken, module A24 has one less than last report cascade taking UF6, so the total is 17 + 6 (A26) =23 cascades which adds up to 3772 vs. 3996 from the last report.
Enrichment per day is still about the same as before, 4 Kg per day (376 Kg / 96 days). With this rate Iran will pass 3 tons by the December report.
There is nothing else out of the ordinary, except for the same gripes from the Director about AP, Code 3.1, and etc.
Anxious to see how Sanger will spin this one, because for the next one he could say Iran has enough LEU for 3 bombs, this one is a bit short of that statement. Well I guess he could project at the 4 Kg per day and estimate 50 days from now to cover the remaining 200 Kg to reach 3 tons.
Aside from 15% more LEU and some 20% EU (which is up for trade or for the TRR, as I understand), is there anything else new in the latest IAEA report which supports the reported Administration claim that Iran “is moving closer to nuclear weapons capacity”? http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/07/world/middleeast/07nuke.html?hp
Vaguely interesting that the number of additional sites IAEA wants to inspect in Syria has increased from three to four.
BTW, I FOIAed the State Department for information the US gave the IAEA on additional sites and got back a couple of cables from mid-2008 that had anything that might be of interest redacted out. Sigh.
Information in publicly available scientific publications indicates the past use of nuclear material in experiments and the possible presence of additional unreported nuclear material in Syria. The experiments described in the publications are not included in the activities which Syria has declared as having occurred at the MNSR.
Looks like an interesting open source research project for an aspiring wonk – it would very interesting to know which publications the DG is referring to.
Washington Post called 60% HEU weapons grade in an op-ed today. Thought anything below approximately 90% was essentially dirty bomb territory. What’s your take?
“Already, it has enriched 22 kilograms to the level of 20 percent, which is considerably closer to the 60 percent threshold for weapons.”
Iran and Syria Reports
If I am not mistaken, module A24 has one less than last report cascade taking UF6, so the total is 17 + 6 (A26) =23 cascades which adds up to 3772 vs. 3996 from the last report.
Enrichment per day is still about the same as before, 4 Kg per day (376 Kg / 96 days). With this rate Iran will pass 3 tons by the December report.
There is nothing else out of the ordinary, except for the same gripes from the Director about AP, Code 3.1, and etc.
Anxious to see how Sanger will spin this one, because for the next one he could say Iran has enough LEU for 3 bombs, this one is a bit short of that statement. Well I guess he could project at the 4 Kg per day and estimate 50 days from now to cover the remaining 200 Kg to reach 3 tons.
Aside from 15% more LEU and some 20% EU (which is up for trade or for the TRR, as I understand), is there anything else new in the latest IAEA report which supports the reported Administration claim that Iran “is moving closer to nuclear weapons capacity”?
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/07/world/middleeast/07nuke.html?hp
Vaguely interesting that the number of additional sites IAEA wants to inspect in Syria has increased from three to four.
BTW, I FOIAed the State Department for information the US gave the IAEA on additional sites and got back a couple of cables from mid-2008 that had anything that might be of interest redacted out. Sigh.
Para 11 from the Syria report is interesting:
Looks like an interesting open source research project for an aspiring wonk – it would very interesting to know which publications the DG is referring to.
Oops, I guess blockquote doesn’t work in the comments. The second paragraph in my comment above is the quote from the Syria report.
Washington Post called 60% HEU weapons grade in an op-ed today. Thought anything below approximately 90% was essentially dirty bomb territory. What’s your take?
“Already, it has enriched 22 kilograms to the level of 20 percent, which is considerably closer to the 60 percent threshold for weapons.”
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/09/09/AR2010090905731.html