It’s a red-letter day: David Ignatius of the Washington Post has been reading Mark Hibbs in Nucleonics Week. He [i.e., Ignatius] concludes that molybdenum impurities could prevent Iran from enriching its LEU far beyond present levels. No further enrichment, no breakout scenario, right? Well, yes and no. (The Mo question has been discussed at some …
Why Does North Korea Have a Gas-Graphite Reactor?
A close-up view of the decommissioned Tokai Power Station — Japan’s first power reactor The usual answer to that question is the one that the North Koreans have supplied: gas-cooled, graphite-moderated reactors can be operated without enriched uranium or heavy water, and are therefore ideal for a country with limited or no ability to get …
MIRVs and Remorse, Sort Of
Henry Kissinger doesn’t do remorse. The closest he came to second guessing his arms control negotiating record has become a classic quote in Wonkdom: I would say in retrospect that I wish I had thought through the implications of a MIRVed world more thoughtfully in 1969 and 1970 than I did. Kissinger offered this thought …
Deterrence and Reassurance
In meetings over the past few weeks, I have heard repeated references to the wonderful 1983 essay Deterrence and Reassurance by the late Michael Howard. Point of fact — Sir Michael Howard is not dead. But with the way in which conference goers continuously distort his seminal article, published as both an Adelphi Paper and …
