Concerns about Iran’s Nuclear Program in the Gulf

Jeffrey Lewis 0:08

Hello, you're listening to the Arms Control Wong podcast. I'm Jeffrey Lewis, the founding publisher of the Arms Control Wong blog and a scholar at the newly christened Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey.

Aaron Stein 0:19

And I'm Aaron Stein. I'm an associate fellow with the Royal United Services Institute in London and a Ph.D. candidate at King's College.

Jeffrey 0:27

And you're back, Aaron.

Aaron 0:28

I am. I've been gone for a while, but I think the downloads went up without me, so I think you had a better chance. The podcast went better.

Jeffrey 0:34

We're joined today by a special guest, Dina Esfandiary, a research associate in the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Program at the International Institute of Strategic Studies. How are you, Dina?

Dina Esfandiary 0:44

Good. Thanks. Thanks for having me.

Jeffrey 0:46

Great. Well, this podcast is inspired by an idea that Aaron had. Aaron wanted to talk about the differences among countries in Egypt when it comes to looking at a deal with Iran. So I thought I would turn it over initially to Aaron to talk about why he thought that was an interesting thing. Defend your choice, Aaron. And then maybe we'll go back and forth a little bit.

Aaron 1:08

Yeah, I mean just with your piece last week in foreign policy and a lot of the talk around the Iran deal is about the nuts and bolts, particularly from a U.S. or British perspective on breakout times, enrichment, and issues like that. And one thing that I've learned through my travels throughout the region, and this is what made me think of Dina, is that different countries have – Different perceptions of what those breakout times mean and the threat posed by even a very small Iranian nuclear program that I think is different than, say, ours here in Washington or in Monterey.

I thought it would be interesting to flesh those out here over the podcast.

Jeffrey 1:42

Well, let me ask Dina about that. My sense is that breakout is one of these things that's a very American or very Washington kind of concern, and that the anxiety over Iran's nuclear program, whenever I talk to policymakers or experts from countries in the region, is much more general. But then again, I'm not the regional expert. Dina is.

Dina, what do you think about that?

Dina 2:07

I think you're absolutely right. I don't think the concerns over Iran's nuclear program at the moment in the region are in any way technical. So they don't look at breakout times. They don't look at the number of centrifuges. In my view, in the region, it's very much a political problem. What will happen if there is a deal?

What will happen if Iran's nuclear program is recognized? What does that mean in terms of security? Concerns over the safety of Iran's nuclear program, what does that mean for Iran's regional ambitions? I mean, it's very much a political issue.

Jeffrey 2:44

Well, let me follow up on that, and then I'll turn it over to Aaron because I want to ask you both this. But starting with you, Dina, when we talk about a deal, I think one of the assumptions in the United States is that a deal will be a good thing. And one of the differences I've noted is I think there is a lot of concern among – Again, policymakers, officials, experts in the region, that a deal might actually in some ways be bad.

And so I was hoping you could talk maybe a little bit about your sense of how people view just the act of negotiating with the Iranians in the first place.

Dina 3:22

Yeah, again, I think you're right. I think the region sees a potential final nuclear deal as more of a negative thing. That's partly because their threat perceptions are very much in the moment. Nobody's really looking long term. And they don't see this as a resolution of the Iranian nuclear crisis. So there are a couple of problems there.

Firstly, they're afraid that any deal that's signed with Iran wouldn't necessarily be permanent. They understand the Iranian political system very well, and they have concerns as to whether Iran will be able to implement a deal. If the hardliners push back or people start denouncing it, then at the end of the day, they wouldn't have anything to show for these negotiations.

They're obviously worried about how much would be given to Iran. And I suppose this is a little bit more technical and a little less political, but, you know, the size and breadth of the Iranian nuclear program. I think this ties in with some of the concerns they have over the safety of the Iranian nuclear program. So just a little bit of background.

Iran's main and only nuclear power plant at the moment is in Bushehr, and this is closer to some of the GCC capitals than it is to Tehran. And it's prone to breakdowns. It's in an area that's prone to earthquakes. Winds in that area blow from east to west, so it would leave some of the capitals in the Gulf vulnerable to radiation leaks.

And of course, Iran is not party to the Nuclear Safety Convention. So that's a big concern for the countries in the region. And then finally, a deal would only address one issue for the Gulf states, and that's obviously the nuclear issue. But the problem is the Gulf states in particular are worried about Iran's regional hegemony. And they're afraid that a deal would actually lead to a normalization of Iran's position in the region.

And that the U.S. will start to consider Iran more as a friend than a foe. Now, of course, we're quite far from that, but it is still a concern for them. And in the context of U.S. trying to pull out from the region, they're worried about these things. So, Aaron, is that what you expected to hear?

Aaron 5:46

Yeah, and if I could just take it one step further, I think that one of the concerns that's going on as well is – That no matter what deal that comes out is you'll see a legitimization of the Iranian enrichment program. So in a sense, whether the breakout time is six months to a year, the Gulf states are concerned that this enrichment program will continue and thereby giving Iran a nuclear, let's say, a lead and a possibility weapons breakout for the duration of the program with no end in sight.

And they see this as being a long-term security threat that then feeds into their smaller security threats, which are much different than ours. So we look at Iran as a destabilizing force in the Gulf, perhaps being able to hassle our carriers running around the Persian Gulf. They see Iran as being behind all these networks within their countries.

If you look at Yemen, if you look at Bahrain, if you look at Saudi Arabia. And so their threat perceptions are completely different, and they feel that even with a Let's say a better inspected nuclear program with some sort of longer breakout time, that doesn't fundamentally alter the dynamics, that they'll be more emboldened to cause trouble in the region.

And I think it's an important point.

Jeffrey 7:01

Well, you know, I have to say, one of the reasons that I thought your suggestion for a topic was so interesting is that I was really struck when I looked at the way regional countries reacted to the 2007 U.S. National Intelligence Estimate that said Iran had had a nuclear weapons program, but had halted it under pressure. Because...

If you read the document in that way, in the way it's written, it should be good news. It should say, yes, we see they have a program, we have some visibility into the program, but they are susceptible to pressure, and so it's possible to make progress. But virtually everybody I have ever met Who isn't an intelligence community weenie, reads that document as a kind of clean bill of health for the Iranians.

And so I have always been interested in why, especially in Saudi Arabia, UAE, why there is this tendency – To look at the problem through that kind of very different lens. So I guess my question, and I'd love to hear what Dina thinks about this, is if you have this kind of very generalized concern and fear that any deal will in some ways exacerbate the regional security issues, which we should probably talk about, What does that mean for the diplomacy of the US or the E3, EU plus three?

Dina 8:34

Well, I think that you can see what it's meant for the diplomacy in the sense that the countries in the region have really pushed back as far as they could and complained quite heavily about the way that, firstly, the talks were conducted, and more importantly, the signing of an interim deal in November last year. So while most of us welcomed this interim deal, A lot of the Arab states grumbled about it because they were like, well, you know, this is the beginning of the end for us.

And you're now, you know, selling us out in negotiations with Iran. And they're afraid that they will no longer be the West's first partners in the region. And so they've been putting quite a bit of pressure, I'd say, on the P5 plus one and especially on the U.S. in the last decade. Little while and during the entire negotiations with Iran.

I don't think that this pressure has had much of an impact. I mean, you do see the U.S. spending quite a bit of time coming to the region, talking to people in the region and try to convince them of their strategy. But beyond that, I think the U.S. is pretty immune at this stage from this complaining. I sometimes, perhaps unfairly, but you tell me, I sometimes characterize the Saudi reaction to this.

To both the interim deal and to these negotiations as though there's like a little toddler sitting on the floor kind of banging its hands and legs, you know, crying. But at the end, nothing's really happening. There's not much that they can do other than complain about it because they're still going to continue relying on the U.S. and the U.S.'s security guarantees vis-a-vis Iran.

Jeffrey 10:28

Well, so that is... Just one more question for Dina, but that's what I really want to puzzle about, which is if, if they feel that way and, and I agree with you, I see exactly the same kind of dynamic. It, it, I can't imagine though, if negotiations completely collapsed that there would be rejoicing in that regard either.

And so what I was trying to, what I, what I am trying to figure out is you know, what is sensible advice for us policymakers who are committed to a deal who think that a collapse of negotiations would be bad because It would sort of force our hand on using military force or not, probably end up in an Iranian bomb.

Lack of confidence, the sanctions regime will last. So if you go through the process of negotiation, is there other things that we can, are there other things that we can do? You know, is that something like the Gulf security dialogue? Is that something like arms sales? Is that some handholding? Or do we just ignore all of the complaining?

Dina 11:35

Well, I think to a certain extent the U.S. is already doing a lot of what it can do to reassure its allies in the region. Like I said, Kerry often travels to the region to talk to U.S. allies there and to explain to them what they're doing. U.S. security guarantees, although many people will argue that they're quite shaky at the moment and U.S. supposed policy of pivoting to Asia has You know, impacted how the Gulf States feel.

But I mean, beyond that, I'm not sure that there's, that there's that much they can do. I mean, the Gulf States kind of have to wake up and realize that in the longterm, a final deal on the Iranian nuclear program is, is in everyone's interest. It would address their you know, safety and security concerns. It would certainly address their safety concerns over The safety of the Iranian nuclear program.

It would hopefully stop and perhaps scale back some of the Iranian nuclear program. I mean, these are all things that the Gulf states want. There is, in terms of what you were asking, there is perhaps... Scope for the U.S. to kind of bring in Iran and Saudi Arabia in terms of their actions against ISIS. But again, everybody's made it clear that they're a little bit uncomfortable with openly coordinating on that front.

So I'm not sure what more could be done.

Jeffrey 13:09

Well, and especially Turkey, which is probably a good place to bring in Aaron to start talking about the regional security situation.

Aaron 13:16

Yeah, I mean it's been longstanding – well, I mean I guess it's hard for the Obama administration to pick up the pieces. The announcement of the pivot and using that exact language at the time that the US was withdrawing from Iraq was a big error in the Gulf. It fed into the narrative that Obama is weak and this idea that Obama is leaving the Gulf.

The United States is leaving the Gulf and it's going to leave it to the Iranians. And then when you add the nuclear negotiations on top of that, it increased these fears. And again – Rationality sort of goes out the window here. I always argue that the perception of the Gulf I think of as more as akin to some of the more neoconservatives here in the US.

It's that the deal, however it comes out, is going to be bad because it will empower Iran and nobody likes to see an empowered Iran. It's – so – I always say it takes two to tango. I mean the United States, it's been their policy to try and get more Gulf cohesion militarily through the GCC for two decades now.

And the GCC has their own internal squabbles that have been preventing this. And those don't seem to be going away even with this – New air campaign against ISIS. There's clear fractures within the within the Gulf community about it. And if you want to bring in Turkey, then you haven't had a new player to it. It's also uncomfortable with it and has differences about the unfolding regional security architecture.

So in terms of what the U S can do I think the U.S. actions thus far have been correct. It's just the way that they've been framed, particularly in the Arab world, have been short-sighted. I mean, I think Dina and I had this conversation in Istanbul a couple months ago about the Obama administration's rhetoric and how maybe their actions are correct.

But it's just the region isn't understanding it correctly, and there's a big chasm between what we're trying to do and what the region thinks our ultimate aims are.

Jeffrey 15:11

It's interesting that you say that. I think in some sense I'm a little bit sympathetic to the Gulf monarchies in this regard because it strikes me that it's not unlike the situation that the United States has in Northeast Asia. I laugh because, as Aaron knows, I analogize everything to Northeast Asia, which is probably a really terrible habit in an analyst, but I kind of run home to mommy whenever I have a tough intellectual problem.

But whenever I look at, for example, Japanese security policy, it seems to me that it's marked by the same kind of ambivalence about U.S. policy. I have always assumed that that's a little bit like riding a motorcycle, which is if you're the whether you're the Japanese government or the Saudi government, you have a really limited amount of control over your own security and you're totally dependent on the U.S. and you can't do anything about that.

And all you can do, it's like I say, riding on the back of a motorcycle, you can see the twists and the turns and the bumps, but all you can do is sort of hang on for dear life and maybe scream in fright. And I wonder if American policymakers just aren't very... Attentive to how much generalized concern there is about the nature of U.S. security guarantees.

And so while we're focusing on things like breakout and we're making very technical arguments, I suspect, and it's certainly true in Northeast Asia, and I wonder if you think it's true in the Middle East, that we're not so good about tending to, maybe you'd call it the fundamentals of the relationship? I don't know. Do you think

Dina 16:46

Yes perhaps but actually I found a hint of disagreement you should totally go for that No, absolutely. But I was actually going to say, I find it pretty interesting because, so I've done quite a little bit of research on what the Gulf thinks about Iran. And when you go to the region and you speak to, whether it's officials, opposition leaders, business leaders, just, you know, anyone, they have a really interesting view.

So I mean, obviously, by virtue of being neighbors, of having a similar culture, they understand Iran, I would say, perhaps better than people in the West. So, you know, they'll understand the Iranian political system quite well. They understand the rivalries in Iran quite well. They get Iran culturally. So all of that is quite positive. Yeah. But they're also obviously afraid of Iran, as we've said.

And in terms of how they view their security, and particularly, you know, what the U.S. does for them, that's also split. They are obviously absolutely terrified of the U.S. selling them out in a deal with Iran, of being left alone. They, you know, they... They can't imagine what they would do without U.S. security guarantees. But then when you talk to a lot of leaders in the region, they'll also say something completely different.

They'll say, well, yes, you know, we'd rather have U.S. security guarantees, but we're not going to sit around and be bullied by the U.S. If things don't go the way we want to, then we'll have to find another solution. We are rich enough, strong enough. We have, you know, relative – well, they consider relatively strong – Defense systems, and they've spent quite a bit of time in the last little while cultivating their relationship with, you know, the East, as they would term it, with countries like China.

And so they're both afraid of Iran, afraid of what the U.S. will do, but relatively confident of their ability to be able to handle any kind of change in their current security situation.

Jeffrey 19:02

So Dean, two quick questions and then I will go over to Aaron. Is that how we should interpret the use of force by Egypt in the UAE in Libya? And Aaron, I hope you'll address this too because that's what I was going to ask you about very directly. Maybe you could say something about whether those splits that you describe are among countries or within countries.

Dina 19:28

In terms of the use of force, actually, I hadn't thought about it that way. But I would say yes, absolutely. I mean, in the last couple of weeks, you can... You know, you're seeing a much more active Middle East with Arab countries joining on to international coalitions to address their regional security issues, for example. That's definitely something that's pretty new.

I mean, I feel like they're joining up despite themselves because they don't really want to. But you do see them kind of taking responsibility a little bit for their own security issues. In terms of splits amongst them, absolutely. So from what I was describing was a general view of particularly of Gulf countries. But amongst the Gulf countries as well, you have massive splits.

I mean, you have Oman, who is much more friendly towards Iran and very anti-Saudi Arabia when it comes to, you know, Saudi taking the lead internationally. In the region, you know, for security purposes and in terms of strengthening the GCC. And then you have Qatar that's kind of in the middle because it's obviously quite, although not in the last little while, but it's obviously quite close to the rest of the GCC countries.

But at the same time, it shares these gas fields with Iran and so kind of wants to be seen as the in-betweener. You have Bahrain, who is absolutely petrified of Iran because it's, you know, a tiny country with a big Shia population. And so very much in the Saudi camp. So you do see a lot of internal rivalries within the GCC on Iran.

Aaron 21:04

Yeah, and I'll just jump in right there. And then within those countries that Dina just mentioned, you have a new schism emerging over the role of political Islam, and particularly the Muslim Brotherhood. So you have Qatar basically lining up against every other GCC state in supporting a different political system in Egypt than, let's say, the Saudi bloc, and Qatar is backed by the Turks.

And you're seeing that dynamic actually play out in Libya, where you have The Emiratis, which outside of the Israelis have the region's strongest air force, conducting strikes in Libya ostensibly on behalf of what's called the anti-brotherhood bloc. And what I find fascinating is the way in which the Emiratis are using air power. I think this is new in Gulf politics and new in Gulf dynamics.

And it shows a greater willingness for these countries to actually use the American hardware that they have. And in the case of the Emiratis are quite capable of using to great effect. And so if you then expand this out to the region, it goes back to what I was saying earlier. There are schisms within the Gulf block that make U.S. policy on Iran very, very difficult because the Omanis are going to be much more willing to accept the U.S. position, whereas the Saudis and Bahrain, absolutely not.

And so the GCC isn't united either. They are not a block. They are not monolithic. So in a way... Going back to one of your earlier questions, it's like what can U.S. policymakers do? Well, there's not much we can do. I mean these are individual countries with different security priorities as ours. And so it goes back to what we were saying earlier.

It's like they are on the motorcycle perhaps with the eyes closed and the U.S. is driving the bike and they feel a little bit out of control. But there are six or seven different motorcycles and the U.S. is trying to coordinate them. And it's extremely difficult. So my argument is always the U.S. needs to cut the best deal possible.

And I think it needs to ultimately come down to our security interests because we're the ones at the negotiating table. Again, Dina and I have had the same conversation as well. That makes the Israelis extremely nervous. That makes the Saudis extremely nervous too. But at the end of the day, it's U.S. policy, and this is a priority for us.

So I think the best we can do is just try and liaise and coordinate with them as best as possible and try and find the happy middle, if you will, where nobody in the region will be happy. We probably won't be all that happy, but at least the deal gets cut because the alternative is worse.

Dina 23:31

I completely agree with Aaron. It is, I think it is up to the U.S. to basically find the best deal possible. Iran will be doing the same, obviously. But, you know, this will annoy a lot of people in the region because when you speak to them, the first thing that I hear, in fact, an Omani official once told me, you know, Iran is our neighbor.

Whatever happens to Iran will happen to us first. And so the problem is ours. So they get very upset at the idea of being left out of the negotiation process and of the deal-making with Iran. But then if you go around and talk to them and say, okay, how would you like to be involved in these negotiations?

Everybody has a heart attack, puts their hands up and says, well, I don't know, look at the other guy. Maybe he'll want to get involved. So it's really interesting to see these dynamics.

Jeffrey 24:24

Well, I know we're drawing near to the end of our time, and Aaron and I have a rule about trying to end on a happy note. But I want to ask about a frightening hypothetical because that's really interesting to me. So I'll ask you about it, Dina, and then I'll ask Aaron about it, which is let's say that the unthinkable happens and the United States elects a Rand Paul-like isolationist Who looks at the Iranian nuclear program and says, eh, I don't know, seems like a bunch of trouble to me, and lets those negotiations collapse, in part arguing that our Gulf allies are not enthusiastic about them.

Aaron 25:00

What do the Gulf states do then?

Jeffrey 25:02

I mean, do they, you know, use their storm shadows and black Shaheens to try to slow the program down? Do they initiate a program of negotiations? Or do they, you know, come back to Washington begging us to try again?

Dina 25:18

Well, this is exactly it. You have countries in the Gulf who are anti the negotiations and anti a final deal, but if you ask them what their solution is, then they don't have one. They want this problem to go away, and it won't. So what would the Gulf states do? Well, the answer is really not much. Continue to panic.

They are certainly unlikely to initiate negotiations with Iran directly. I mean, I would perhaps single out Oman, who might try... To continue being the in-betweener. But again, it would only be the country facilitating negotiations between Iran and the West. It wouldn't take the lead on negotiating with Iran because that's just not what these countries do. Saudi Arabia is unlikely to sit down with Iran, although the Iranians are pushing hard for it now.

So perhaps there is some scope for at least some Talking between Saudi Arabia and Iran, but nothing on the nuclear issue. And at the same time, if the negotiations break down and the possibility of military strikes kind of veer up again, I'm not sure the Gulf states will be pro that. They don't want... This kind of action against Iran because they'll inevitably get involved and Iran will inevitably target them afterwards.

So to be honest, I can't foresee a situation where they would do anything or where they would be better off. Far from it.

Jeffrey 26:45

Well, to be fair, I've seen that same pathology in Washington. There was a U.S. official I talked to who was opposed to a deal, and he argued that Iran getting a nuclear weapon was inevitable. And so I asked, well, what are you going to do If the negotiations collapse. And his argument was express our disapproval very strongly.

And I found that really unsatisfying.

Aaron 27:08

It's like this ISIS stuff that's going on now. No Gulf state or no Arab state, for that matter, that I've seen is actually happy with the plan. But if you push them and say, what is your plan? They don't have one. It's the same thing. They don't actually have an Iran policy, if you ask me, Iran nuclear policy.

It's We need the United States to act like a global leader and solve it, but you have to solve it in a way that makes us feel comfortable. So you have to convince the Iranians to give up all of their nuclear program. And then when that becomes – when that's not possible, they simply get frustrated and say, well, you're not taking our security concerns into account.

You need to do more. And there's no happy medium there. So say the negotiations completely break down. I think the next phone call to Washington is, well, why did the negotiations break down? You better start again. And I think Oman is the – again, would be the likely place to host some sort of – to try and get them going again because they were the key intermediary before.

I just think it goes to the fact that they haven't quite figured out what they want. They're absolutely terrified of the program but don't like the idea of military strikes but also don't like the idea of Iran maintaining an enrichment program. So they're all over the map, and there's no clear cohesive policy, which goes back to the original point I made in my last comments, which is this ultimately falls on the United States.

And it's our chance to negotiate a deal, not excluding the Gulf countries, though certainly listening to their concerns, but ultimately pressing forward if we see there's a good opportunity out there because the alternative, A, there's no other alternative, and B, the alternative of military strikes wouldn't make the Gulf all that happy either.

Jeffrey 28:50

Aaron, I am going to declare that a rousing endorsement of diplomacy, declare that a happy ending to our podcast. No violence. Absolutely. That is as happy as it's going to get. And Dina, thank you so much for joining us.

Dina 29:04

Thanks for having me.