The Redline: Iran and the January Deadline

Jeffrey Lewis 0:00

Carl will have to cut some of this out. I have to walk away from people who are talking. Okay. Now I'm running from a truck. It's pretty funny, right?

Aaron Stein 0:12

But it's an emergency podcast.

Jeffrey 0:14

It is totally an emergency podcast.

Aaron 0:16

That's good. This is good sound right here. Hello and welcome to the Arms Control Wong podcast, the leading podcast on arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation. Hey, it's the only podcast on arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation.

Jeffrey 0:35

That is why we are the leading podcast. I'm Jeffrey Lewis. I am the founding publisher of Arms Control Wonk and a scholar at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey.

Aaron 0:47

And I am Aaron Stein. I'm a contributor to the Arms Control Wonk blog and associate fellow at the Royal United Services Institute in London. And today we're talking Iran, sort of an emergency podcast. So, Jeffrey, you're actually outside at the coffee shop.

Jeffrey 1:00

That's right. This is my writing morning when I hide out in Carmel Valley and write. And instead of writing today, I'm podcasting with you, Aaron.

Aaron 1:09

But because of the news yesterday, exactly, you are taking time away from your precious writing and we're talking about the extension.

Jeffrey 1:15

The Iran talk, so what does it mean? I did some precious writing. I wrote a column for foreign policy. You did.

Aaron 1:20

So let's talk about it. What's up? We're screwed. I tend to agree with you, but you start.

Jeffrey 1:26

Okay. So – The Iranian negotiators and the negotiators of the E3EU plus three could not come to an agreement by the November 24th deadline. So they gave themselves yet another extension, four months to reach a so-called framework agreement, which is something we talked about with Shashank Joshi, and another three months after that to work out the technical details.

But my column and my concerns Is that we simply don't have for months. So unless they pull a rabbit out of a hat and do it much, much more quickly than they intend to, I think negotiations are in a lot of trouble. But I don't know. Am I crazy?

Aaron 2:08

What do you think? No. Actually, having just opened your column and reading it actually as we speak, I agree with you instinctively what you say in the column. We have two tracks that we have to be worried about. One is on the political side in the United States and two is on the Iranian R&D side. So let's just take them like that.

So you make a very persuasive argument in your column about sort of the end of this lull in sanctions given the changes in the Senate.

Jeffrey 2:34

Right. So last year, the White House barely beat back a sanctions bill in the Senate. The House is a foregone conclusion. So what happened was there were 60 votes in favor of a sanctions bill that I think would have imposed negotiation killing requirements on And threatened new sanctions in the event Iran did not comply with the JPOA, the Joint Plan of Action.

The White House barely headed that off. There were 16 Democrats who were going to vote for it. 60 votes is enough to overcome a filibuster. And the only thing that saved it was that Harry Reid, the then Democratic Senate Majority Leader, simply wouldn't let it come to a vote. But the 114th Congress, which will have Mitch McConnell as The Senate majority leader will not be so accommodating.

So come January 3rd, when the new Congress comes in, I fully expect that they will move immediately toward passing a bill that will impose all kinds of requirements on the negotiation and impose new penalties on Iran.

Aaron 3:48

Right. And Iran, when these sanctions were first floated, would say that this would be a deal breaker. This would cause them to withdraw from the negotiations. So one has to ask, why did they come up with this seven-month timeline? Especially when they said they would take four months to come to some sort of a framework agreement and then add on another three months behind it.

If they could come in four months to an agreement, why didn't they just say four months? You understand what I'm saying there?

Jeffrey 4:14

I do. I understand, though. I understand the four plus three. I don't understand the four. So the four plus three makes sense. You negotiate a framework agreement in which you have all of the broad principles. You know, you have kind of narrative descriptions of what R and D will be permitted. You have descriptions of the number of centrifuges and so on and so forth, but then you need a second agreement that actually works out the particulars.

So we can say You know, no R&D or only current R&D, but as the whole kerfuffle with the IR-5, which is the second thing we can talk about, showed the problem with that approach is the details really, really matter. And so you have to negotiate those things really carefully. So, you know, you can say only X number of centrifuges, but then you have to have a subsequent agreement where you can figure out how you are actually going to count each centrifuge.

So I understand Giving yourself time after a framework agreement to figure out the details. But I just don't think we have four months to get to a framework agreement.

Aaron 5:20

No, I mean, as you make clear in the piece, do you think that's just about the political aspects or do you think it has to do with the IR5 kerfuffle, the talks about the Iranians cheating and their – let's say their R&D efforts in general?

Jeffrey 5:37

So I think the answer is there are these two things. And maybe we should talk a little bit more about the sanctions track and what's likely to happen. But these two things are going to interact. So there are people in the U.S. Congress. And now it's not just people. It's like a veto proof majority in the U.S. Congress.

We can talk about how I count that that are going to try to, quote unquote, help out. And they're going to help out by – the comment will be strengthening the president's hand. But in doing so, they're going to set up a whole bunch of ways this could play out. And then at the same time, I think there are going to be people in Iran who are going to say, look – We're ready to move forward in R&D.

We're ready to do extra stuff. And so these two tracks are going to interact. So let me talk about the Congress piece. You and I were just going over it off mic. Somebody was arguing with me about this on Twitter. I'm pretty sure I'm right. There were 60 votes for Menendez-Kirk, which is the name of the bill.

Right. That's the new sanctions bill. Yeah, and 16 of those votes were Democrats. I mean, these are co-sponsors, so they're not, you know, they're very unlikely to vote against it. By my count, four, but when Louisiana's runoff is done and Mary Landrieu is toast, five Democrats who supported sanctions will be replaced with Republicans who support sanctions. You've got the list in front of you.

Let me see if I can do it on my own. It's Hagan, Begich, Pryor. Oh. Walsh. Landrieu. And Owen Walsh in Montana. Right, right, right. At the same time, there are four Democrats who were opposed to sanctions who lost their seat. Well, I shouldn't say lost their seat, who retired or lost their seat. So now we have Shelley Moore Capito in West Virginia who will vote for sanctions, who replaced Rockefeller.

We've got Mike Rounds who replaced Tim Johnson in South Dakota. We have Jodi Ernt, the hog castration lady who beat Bruce Braley to replace retiring Tom Harkin.

Aaron 7:55

It was her ad.

Jeffrey 7:57

Her ad and Cory Gardner, right, who beat – that's a straight loss, right? Right. Because that was – we're down to one Udall in the Senate now.

Aaron 8:06

Right.

Jeffrey 8:07

We're down to Udall.

Aaron 8:11

Sanctions rest on the Udall loss.

Jeffrey 8:13

That's true. That's true. There's no sanctions when you have two Udalls. But when you're down to one Udall, it's – for listeners who don't know, there's a Udall political family and two of them were in the Senate from different states. So now that there's a veto – And Rand Paul is running for president. Right, so there were two Republicans who didn't support it, but Jeff Flake from Arizona has made noises that he would ultimately support sanctions.

Rand Paul's running for president, so he'll come home to mama. That's 66. And so you just need one. You just need one Democrat to flip, and Gary Peters, I guess, who is replacing Carl Levin as the Democrat from Michigan, has made noises that to me sound like he's that vote. So...

Aaron 9:01

You have a weakened Obama. I mean let's just put it that way. I mean I don't think any Democrat wants to go down with the ship. Wow, that is exactly the same phrase I used.

Jeffrey 9:09

I mean I think they're going to have – well, not in the piece but in conversations. Like I think they're going to have trouble filling the SecDef post too. I just think getting the stink of this administration off your resume is going to be hard. Yes. Kind of this. You know, it's very sad and very disappointing, but they're hurting right now.

So, you know, I suspect that what will happen is maybe they'll water down the sanctions bill a little bit, but then they're going to get like 80, 90 votes for the damn thing. Mm-hmm.

Aaron 9:40

I think AIPAC has already come out and called for more sanctions. I could be getting that – screwing that up, but I think I've already seen that. They're pushing to strengthen the hand of the president. Right.

Jeffrey 9:49

So this is what makes me crazy about the extension because the argument was, no, no, no. These poison pills, they aren't intended to kill negotiations. The argument was, no, no, no. By being maximally crazy, we'll strengthen the president's hand. And that was, I think, easy to beat back when the president was saying like, look, I have this under control.

I don't need your help. Your help is not help. Your help is dangerous. But when he kind of comes slinking back like John Kerry kind of with his long face is like, well, we couldn't get the deal. We need another extension. That plays right into this argument that says, ah, You know what you need? Congress to help out.

Aaron 10:30

So I – And it's the way they can't get the deal. It comes down to centrifuge numbers. Do you understand what I'm saying? Because we're doing it over breakout. It's the way to try and browbeat them into making just a little bit more concessions to come towards our understanding of what they should have.

Jeffrey 10:47

Right. So there are two things that can go wrong. One thing that can go wrong is by imposing all of these requirements. And if you read the original Menendez-Kirk, which is dead now, and they have to resubmit it. So maybe they'll resubmit it without all of the total insanity in it. There are two ways this is going to interact in a negative way.

One is that Menendez-Kirk had a whole bunch of treaty killing provisions that Basically required the president to come home with certain deliverables that had nothing to do with negotiation. Like, you know, Iran couldn't test any missiles and Iran couldn't engage in any terrorism. You know, testing missiles and terrorism are terrible things, but like you negotiate one thing at a time.

And so the new bill – and they have to submit a new bill since it's a new congress, but the new bill – Could well reduce the room for compromise, not necessarily entice the Iranians to go that last step, right? Because if they're like two feet apart now and we're trying to figure out like will you come one foot?

Will you come six inches? What Menendez-Kirk is going to do, Menendez-Kirk too, is he's going to say, no, no, no, you have to come 10 feet.

Aaron 12:05

Right, and it will – It will place limits on the administration about what they – they will then have to go to Congress and say that Iran has come that 10 feet in order for them to – Complying with the JPOA. Right. Sorry, 10 feet what? We had a sound break up there. It will require that the administration goes – it will require for the administration to go before Congress and say that Iran has – In good faith undertook all the provisions in the bill.

So it will place an onus on the administration as well that will limit their hands in being able to compromise. Totally, totally.

Jeffrey 12:41

So then the other problem is it will also have new sanctions, which it will hold back. Yeah. Unless Iran violates the terms of the JPOA. But as we discovered with the whole IR-5 nightmare, one can interpret the JPOA in different ways. And so it's very easy to imagine a situation where there's some ambiguous evidence and Congress takes that as evidence.

Definitive proof that the JPOA is being violated and then demands that the sanctions go on now.

Aaron 13:15

So maybe we should talk about the IRF-5. Yeah. Just one other thing I would add is, I don't know if you saw today, Brett Stevens had his column in Wall Street Journal and he accused Iran of cheating. He didn't bring up the IRF-5, but he said that they didn't admit to their PMDs. So possible military dimensions of their nuclear program.

So there's

Jeffrey 13:34

Oh, boy. That is the worst Pulitzer Prize for commentary in the history of the award, right?

Aaron 13:38

Right, because – Oh, wait.

Jeffrey 13:40

You know what?

Aaron 13:40

It's not as bad as the Apologist for Stalin but somewhere – You see my point. It's like these things were separate tracks. The PMDs was being kept by the IAEA and then the JPOA was being held by the P5. EU3, E3 plus 3, whatever, P5 plus 1. Yeah. If they're going to be merged now and encapsulated and perhaps picked up a new sanctions language, that makes it even more difficult.

Jeffrey 14:07

Well, it's easy for any bad thing the Iranians do to be cast as a violation of the JPOA, and I think the IR-5 kerfuffle is a perfect example of that. Yeah, let's talk about it. Okay, so for listeners, as I read the JPOA, it treats each facility – So there are different rules for every facility. There are two different facilities at Natanz.

The pilot fuel enrichment plant – Which is just starting up now. I think Carl is going to have to leave that one in, right?

Aaron 14:47

Yes. That was the pilot fuel enrichment plant starting.

Jeffrey 14:50

Just starting up now.

Aaron 14:52

But anyways, as you were saying, there are two different facilities inside the tons.

Jeffrey 14:56

Yeah, I'm going to make this incredibly complex, wonky board. There's like a Land Rover nearly runs me down. Yes, so there are two facilities. There's a pilot fuel enrichment plant and the fuel enrichment plant. There's a rule that says no new centrifuges at the fuel enrichment plant. And that means you can't feed uranium hexafluoride into centrifuges anywhere.

That are not currently enriching. There are, I think, essentially no rules for the pilot fuel enrichment plan, which is where Iran does R&D. All the agreement says is that Iran will continue R&D using current practices. And what current practices really means is they can enrich as part of the R&D process, but then they have to mix everything back together so that they don't accumulate any LEU, low enriched uranium.

So the Iranians have this series of fancy schmancy new centrifuges they're working on. They've got a couple of flavors of IR2s, IR3s, IR4s, IR6s. And then they have this thing called the IR5. And the IR5 had not been enriching previously. And then they start. Now, as I read the JPOA, that's fine. There's nothing to prohibit that. There's apparently also an implementation agreement.

But it's secret and the EU won't release it. So if we could see the implementation agreement, we'd know for sure. David Albright interpreted that agreement very differently. He thinks that feeding hex into the IR-5 is prohibited. Regardless, there was a dispute. It ends up in Reuters. It's a huge kerfuffle. The administration says to the Iranians, hey, guys, violation or not?

This is not helpful. I think on Twitter I called it a dick move. And the Iranians kind of agreed to knock it off. So now we have this problem, which is we've got a four-month extension. I somehow doubt that the Iranians have agreed to knock it off with the IR-5 for the full four months. And then there's a big looming problem, which is the IR-5 is kind of a prelude to a much bigger problem, which is the IR-8 extension.

Which is like 16 times more capable than the centrifuges they have at Natanz at the fuel enrichment plant.

Aaron 17:24

For the listeners, tell us why we should care about why a bigger, more capable centrifuge really matters.

Jeffrey 17:32

So this whole discussion we're having is about whether the Iranians are going to cap the program or not, whether they're going to cap the number of centrifuges, whether they're going to constrain the type, etc. And I've been very critical of all these various breakout calculations. I think that's probably kind of a waste of time. But whatever, it's done.

That's where this administration is choosing to focus. And so as we negotiate with the Iranians, they have continued developing newer and better centrifuges. And so ultimately, we're going to get to this point where, assuming we have that full four months... Four months down the line, they're not going to be negotiating for a cap on the number of centrifuges at Natanz that includes these like kind of piddly IR-1s.

So the Iranians have these really capable centrifuges in their back pocket. And so it increases their leverage. It drastically reduces the breakout time. And given that I'm worried about so-called sneak out, it raises the prospect that they could have 3,000 of these things somewhere online. What's going to happen is we have these two tracks, and it's interesting to see how they play out.

You're going to have an angry Congress that's imposing new requirements on the negotiation and looking for evidence of Iranian violations. At the same time, you're going to have the Iranians who are making progress on their centrifuge program who are going to, I think, insist on their full rights under the JPOA. So they're going to be developing and deploying new centrifuges and starting them up.

Yes, and starting them up. And starting them up. And so how does this play out? Is it that Congress imposes new sanctions, and so then the Iranians do a bunch of really provocative stuff with the IR-8s, and then that collapses the deal? Is it the Iranians do a bunch of provocative stuff with the IR-8s, and then that leads Congress or gives them the excuse that they need to impose sanctions?

It's hard to know how exactly they're going to interact, right? But these are like a pair of loaded handguns just sitting around. And by extending the deal for four months or extending the negotiation for four months, the administration is just creating the space for people to pick those things up and use them.

Aaron 19:57

Yeah. I mean it's hard to think that there will be a better time than now with this administration. I mean you have to ask yourself – I mean we've been questioning the US. You have to ask yourself, what were the Iranians thinking? I mean they're not going to get a better deal when Hillary Clinton is elected or the Republican candidate is elected.

The sanctions bill is looming and if the negotiations break down, they get no sanctions relief for their government. So what do you think is going on in the Iranians' head?

Jeffrey 20:27

Well, I saw a piece saying that it's a failure to persuade Khamenei that they have a sensible deal. You know, one of the downsides, I think, of focusing on breakout is it means that we are spending our efforts focusing on limiting the number of centrifuges and limiting the development of centrifuges. And I think that's the hardest thing for the Iranians to give away.

It's really the most difficult thing is for the Iranians to trade away those kinds of concessions. Right. I agree. I think it would have been much smarter – To focus far less on hard constraints and far more on verification transparency.

Aaron 21:17

I mean I completely agree. I would have traded centrifuge numbers for like access to – we talked about this in the last podcast. I mean access to machine shops, greater monitoring – Throughout the fuel cycle, not just monitoring inside a couple of facilities but maybe try and do something in a fuel fabrication facility or something like that.

All sorts of different things. But we've chosen to make this all about one thing. So here's my follow-on question.

Jeffrey 21:44

By the way, that one thing which is the hardest for Iran's supreme leader to give on.

Aaron 21:48

Right. So this is my follow-on question. What if we can't make them come the last mile? Have we sort of shot ourselves in the foot where we are more concerned about the IR-5 than the IR-8, not freezing an R&D program, worried about sneak out, and we deep six a deal with a new sanctions bill over a difference of breakout time of 10 months versus 11 and a half?

Jeffrey 22:16

Right. So there are two problems with that or two problems that that nightmare scenario creates. And there are no problems with the logic behind how we get to that horrible place. One is we take the blame for the collapse of the negotiations, which makes it much, much harder to sustain the sanctions regime. I mean the people who want to keep putting the screws to Iran in hopes of getting a better deal – Argue that the sanctions regime hurts the Iranians and is indefinitely sustainable.

And I'm not sure that I believe that. You know, getting the Chinese and the Russians to enforce sanctions is always very difficult. I think it will be especially difficult now that relations with Russia are in the toilet. The Iranians definitely are trying to Undermine sanctions in European courts. And finally, sanctions have a kind of limited time window in which they're valuable.

After that, countries get used to them and they adjust. So the people who are going to go out of business because of sanctions, they go out of business. And then they're replaced by people who go into business because of sanctions. And so

Aaron 23:39

So we need the engines of creativity. What are we supposed to do here? I completely agree with you.

Jeffrey 23:46

I said there was a second problem, which is to say –

Aaron 23:52

I don't remember what it is. What is our creative solution to this? I mean I'm completely with you. When I saw that the agreement was extended for four months, my jaw sort of fell open. I was expecting something like three weeks to be completely honest with you. Maybe a month, two months. I was expecting something very quick.

I wasn't even ruling out the idea that they would come to that framework agreement to have those follow-on technical details to unfold before the new congress was seated. So what are we supposed to do now? Because I think we both agree that we should come to an agreement. I mean there are people who will disagree with us, but I think we both agree that we should come to an agreement.

Jeffrey 24:29

I think the president has to get an agreement before January 3rd. The president has to confront the new Congress with a framework agreement, which while not perfect, is pretty good. It's not the agreement that I would have written. It's not the set of goals that I would have established. It won't have the transparency measures that I would have wanted.

But on the whole, the question will be, is this agreement better than an Iranian bomb, a campaign to bomb Iran, or both? And my guess is – my guess is – That will create a thorny problem for Republicans. One of the reasons I think Jeff Flake, for example, was very reluctant to sign on was, you know, Arizona is getting a little bluer.

And I think he didn't want to be seen as somebody who was proposing yet another war in the Middle East. And so, you know, I don't know if you'd be able to stop the bill from happening, but you'd be able to impose a political cost on the Republicans for passing it. So doing it would strengthen the president's hand to ignore it, use any supervision.

If you can't get a framework agreement by January 3rd, I don't know. I mean it kind of comes down to I think whether you have any confidence in this administration at all. Do we? I don't think we're going to get a better deal two years from now. I don't either. I think we'll get a worse deal. Probably.

But what I can't make my mind up about is whether this extension will then – since I believe this extension will ultimately collapse because there will be new sanctions and there will be Iranian actions. I just don't know. I don't know how to play out a game – In which you go beyond that period. If you go into the four months and you get a whole bunch of new sanctions and you get a whole bunch of new Iranian activities, I don't know how to let this gracefully collapse.

I guess you could, I'm thinking out loud, I guess you could beg McConnell. Mitch McConnell is a very interesting figure. He voted against the New START Treaty But is really instrumental in its passage. And that's a kind of Mitch McConnell maneuver because he's actually really good at being a politician, unlike certain people. And so you might be able to convince McConnell to pass a new sanctions resolution that allows the president To waive some of its provisions if he gets a deal, if the cost is the president takes a public beating over it.

That's a really hard sell to a president, right, that you should basically do this wise but deeply unpopular and politically painful thing, and Mitch McConnell is happy to serve you that, hey, can I swear on the podcast? No, we're clean. That's a poo-poo sandwich. Right. I got to swear in my foreign policy column. Did you see it?

No, I actually haven't seen it yet. Yeah, yeah, yeah.

Aaron 28:08

I think the final thing we have to worry about though is like – it's not really – I think we'll wrap up here. It's just that what limits do you think we should place on R&D? Because this is what I keep coming back to. It's like do we freeze their program? Because I think the time would be – you essentially freeze it for 10 years.

I've seen between 10 and 15 years. Then after that, it becomes unencumbered and they gain all their rights ostensibly under the NPT, assuming you believe in the right to enrich. So what do we do about the R&D in the interim? And I'm sure that's what they're talking about. Right.

Jeffrey 28:39

I mean there's the interim and then there's – I have a radically different agreement in mind than the one they're negotiating. I would put essentially no or very limited constraints. On the number and capability of centrifuges over the long term. You might say, okay, for 10 years, you can only have this many, whatever. But ultimately, my goal would be to build a level of access and verification that could be preserved beyond the life of an agreement.

And since I'm mostly worried about sneak out, it's amazing. I made this argument for years and nobody listened. And then people called it sneak out and it had a catchy name. And people were like, oh, yes, we must be very worried about sneak out. Crap. I would propose two things. The first is we ought to have an agreement that confines the manufacturer of centrifuges, or at least kind of their assembly.

We can talk about components in one second, but confines the assembly of centrifuges to a specific and limited number of locations, prohibits it anywhere else, And then permits the tagging of each individual machine and the monitoring of their location. So if you produce 100 machines a month at this one workshop, everyone gets a unique identifier and it's tagged.

So we know if it's sitting in the warehouse or if it shows up in the tons or it shows up at Fordo. So that we never – so they can build as many as they like. They just each have to have a number and we have to be able to go look at where they are, which would be intrusive and annoying.

But I think for the Iranians, that doesn't hurt them, right? I mean politically, that's not humiliating for them in a way that saying you can only have X thousand would be. And then the second thing is you got to have a track to deal with the components. And so you would want – A level of transparency and access to the places where centrifuge components are made domestically, if in fact many of them are just simply don't know at this point.

But then I would have created a database for any controlled components. So as sanctions came off and you said, okay, you're now free to import X. I think there would still be a special rule that says, look, you're free to import these things. But you need to submit imports to this database that's maintained by the IAEA. And it's got to have a stated end user for all of these dual use goods so that we have a kind of global look at procurement.

So if we see procurements that are occurring outside of that channel, then we know we have a problem. Or if we see procurements that are occurring inside of that channel but are not in line with what we know about the program, we can ask and investigate. I think if you had those kinds of measures, I don't think the number of centrifuges matter at all.

Aaron 31:50

But we're not going to do that, right? Well, that works sort of in theory. I'm going to push you on that one a little bit in the podcast when we do need to wrap up. That becomes untenable for allies, does it not? I don't know which allies, like the Saudis? The Saudis or the Israelis who are going crazy about the breakout time specifically.

One thing I've been – really interesting.

Jeffrey 32:11

You can hear them starting up the jet engines.

Aaron 32:13

That's right. They're queuing up. Is how our negotiating position represents Bibi Netanyahu's Wile E. Coyote graph from the UN. Was it two years ago? Yeah, that's exactly what it represents. Yeah. I mean for everybody out there, our negotiating position from the beginning of these talks have resembled exactly what was on that really strange bomb diagram that Bibi Netanyahu drew in the UN General Assembly during his speech.

Get rid of – basically draw out the breakout time to more than a year and remove the most critical, most sensitive part of their stockpile of LEU, which was the 20%. Well, yeah, and don't get me wrong.

Jeffrey 32:54

I don't object to confidence-building measures like that. So I think it makes a lot of sense for both us and the Iranians to say, well, they've agreed they're not going to make any 20% LEU. And they've agreed that they will limit the number of centrifuges at Matanz for X number of years. And those kinds of things – Have value in presenting an agreement, particularly in the near term.

I just think that it's – I'm now forgetting what I read last, the sort of difference on centrifuge numbers is. I just think it's crazy that the agreement is hamstrung. Over what ultimately is a few thousand centrifuges, which is a level that's not going to matter compared to the sneak out problem.

Aaron 33:46

We completely agree. I think the estimates are somewhere a difference between 1,000 or 2,000 centrifuges. I think 1,000 at the absolute minimum, according to some leaks, I think as high as 3,000 and others. It doesn't matter.

Jeffrey 33:59

So what I think is happening, although I can't see end of the negotiation, but what I think is happening is – We are gradually coming around to focusing on transparency instead of numbers because that's where the natural area of compromise lies. But I think it's a real struggle to abandon the legacy negotiation, both because they're so rhetorically committed to it, but also it's going to come out what our position was and what the Iranian position was.

And when it turns out we caved and gave into the Iranians in order to get a deal, you know, the president's going to get Kicked in the nether regions.

Aaron 34:35

Right. You will get a poo-poo sandwich. Yes.

Jeffrey 34:40

So – It's crazy. It's crazy that I have to talk like a four-year-old on my own podcast but I can swear away in foreign policy.

Aaron 34:46

What is this world coming to? Final question and let's take a bet here. Do we think these things will be – sanctions will come before negotiations are concluded and therefore they will break down or at least go on ice for some time or will they pull a rabbit out of their hat?

Jeffrey 35:04

Gosh, I hate answering that question. I'm very grim at the moment. I think that they're not going to move fast enough, that they're going to dilly-dally and Congress is going to pass sanctions and the administration is going to try to make Congress take the blame for killing the negotiations. Violating our rule of ending on a happy note, Aaron.

Aaron 35:25

That's true. But I actually agree with you. It's because of the weird timeline. Why four months? People in negotiations procrastinate all the way up until the end. It's just the way these things work. And because they did four months, it's like, well, why did you do four? It could have been two and a half. It could have been three.

And you could have put in – A red line around January 3rd that couldn't be crossed. Well, this president crosses red lines. But, you know, we would – I think it would – I just think that that would have been a smarter way to do it. So this is not a positive note. But I think it's excusable because this was an emergency podcast and you're in a parking lot.

Well, it's always a pleasure to talk to you, but the circumstances left something to be desired. That's right. So we apologize for the sound on this one. We thank Carl in advance on live and on air for doing all that he does for our sound editing.

Jeffrey 36:17

People are going to be listening to this and they're going to be saying like, it's fine.

Aaron 36:20

What's the problem? Well, that's because Carl is excellent. And thank you everybody for listening. And Jeffrey, talk to you later. Okay, bye.