Reader Chris Camp, who comments under the name Cthippo, sent me an essay last week that I wanted to share with readers. Camp asks which states would be winners (or losers) if some sorcerer used a magic wand make all the world’s nuclear weapons disappear.
As I read through and found myself agreeing here, disagreeing there, I realized that I was having fun and thinking about an old problem in new way. The essay is deceptive in its simplicity.
Really, try it.
After Global Zero,
Winners and losers in a post-nuclear worldWhat if we woke up tomorrow and there were no more nuclear weapons? What if, overnight, they had ceased to exist, and no nation could ever build one again. What if the genie decided to crawl back in its bottle?
While it’s easy to say the world would be a safer place, not every state that had formerly possed a nuclear arsenal would feel this way. Some would certainly feel more secure, but others would very likely feel far more vulnerable.
It’s easy to say that we favor global zero, and to encourage everyone else to get on board, but without understanding the role that nuclear weapons play in the perception of security of each nation it becomes difficult to make an argument as to why they should give them up. By looking at how each nuclear weapons state might perceive a world without nuclear weapons we can gain some insight into the role that these weapons play in their security and perhaps identify the concerns that need to be addressed before those who have the bomb might be willing to give it up.
United States – Winner
The United States sees its nuclear arsenal as an expensive tool of limited utility mostly to deter Russia and to a much lesser extent other nuclear states and also states posessing chemical and biological weapons. These lesser considerations can be countered by the US military’s conventional power which far outstrips that of any other nation, and is compounded by the country’s geographical isolation from hostile states.
Outside of a massive nuclear exchange with Russia, America does not percieve itself to be the subject of any real existential threat, and so if the Russian threat were to evaporate then with it would go the utility of the American arsenal.
Russia – Loser
The counterpoint to the American perception of nuclear weapons is Russia, which sees itself as very weak conventionally and surrounded by real or potential enemies. The collapse of the Russian economy coupled with ongoing systemic reforms withing their military and the loss of the Warsaw Pact “buffer zone” between Russia and those who might seek to invade it has left the Russian government feeling that nuclear weapons are their only remaining effective defense against hostile forces. In addition, the possession of the largest nuclear arsenal in the world gives Russia a political relevance and a parity with the United States disproportionate to its economic power and regional influence. If that defense were to suddenly evaporate then Russia would truly feel up the proverbial creek without a paddle.
China – Winner
China maintains a small nuclear arsenal to deter the arsenals of Russia and the United States, and probably to some extent to threaten Taiwan. This small arsenal is backed up by a massive conventional force, and a strong economy to support it, which guarentees China’s conventional security. If the nuclear threat were to disappear then it’s doubtful if China would miss their own arsenal.
United Kingdom – Winner
The UK developed its nuclear arsenal with two goals in mind, independent deterrence against Russia and to prop up its great power status in a post-colonial world. With the end of the Soviet Union and the political changes since the cold war, both of these drivers have lost relevance and yet the nation continues to spend billions on an arsenal that they don’t feel that they need, but are politically unable to get rid of. If that arsenal were to disappear overnight the British government would likely breath a sigh of relief and move on with life.
France – Winner
The origins of the French arsenal are very similar to those of the British, but perhaps more strongly held given their experiences in two world wars. The independent deterrent has played a greater role in the French perception of itself as a sovereign nation than it has for the British, especially since that deterrent was developed domestically. None the less, the French reaction to sudden global zero would likely be the same as the British, if perhaps a little less heartfelt.
India – Winner
India developed nuclear weapons to deter China, and also to burnish their image as in independent regional power in a bipolar cold war era. Since then, the threat from China has diminished significantly, and the ongoing move from bipolar to multipolar geopolitics has increased India’s perception of its security and place in the world. The counter point to that improving security situation is the emergence of Pakistan as a nuclear weapons state in direct opposition to India. Currently India continues to see its arsenal as a deterrent to China and Pakistan and as a point of national pride, though the latter role is probably greatly diminished after almost 40 years. Currently, the Indian arsenal is usually discussed in the context of a Pakistani nuclear threat and so if that threat were to disappear then India would likely continue to feel quite secure.
Pakistan – Loser
Pakistan developed its nuclear arsenal in response to the Indian development of such weapons and continues to see them as primarily a deterrent against Indian strength, both conventional and nuclear. A secondary motivation is that Pakistan receives much recognition as the home of the “Islamic bomb” and has an outsized relevance on the world stage due to its status as a NWS. Unfortunately for Pakistan’s perception of its own security, its arsenal is the only guarantor of this status. Were it to lose nuclear deterrence they would feel themselves under much greater threat without the conventional or economic might to counter Indian or other foreign aggression.
Israel – Loser, sort of
The question of the Israeli nuclear arsenal in a global zero world is probably the most complicated. When the program began Israel faced probably the greatest existential threat of any nation on earth, and also sought an independent deterrence against the Soviet Union. In addition to the deterrent role, these weapons were also intended as retribution weapons in the event that deterrence failed, something not often spoken about in the nuclear doctrine of other nations. However, since those days the world and regional situation has changed dramatically and Israel’s security has been the big winner. Currently the nation does not face a credible existential threat and so it would seem like they should be a winner in a weapons free world.
On the other hand, due to its history both as a nation and as a a people, the “siege mentality” is somewhat built into Israeli politics and security perceptions and so while they in fact would not be less secure without a nuclear deterrent, it seems likely that they would feel significantly less secure.
North Korea – Loser
North Korea is another case where perceptions of security and relevance cloud the issue. On the one hand the massive North Korean conventional military capability provides excellent national security, but their tiny nuclear arsenal contributes little to that security while greatly increasing their international relevance. Were that arsenal to disappear overnight it seems unlikely that North Korea’s security would be diminished in a real sense, but their perception of their security would be greatly diminished. In addition, without nuclear weapons nobody would be talking much about North Korea, much less talking to them.
Summary – What makes winners and losers, and why it matters
The difference between winners and losers in a global zero world is the role that nuclear weapons play in their national security, both real and perceived. The winners are states who see nuclear weapons as having a limited utility in countering other nuclear weapons states and who’s national security is supported by both economic and conventional military power. The losers are states for whom the utility of their arsenals is asymmetric, who depend on nuclear weapons to deter not only other nations nuclear weapons, but also their conventional forces.
A further complicating factor is one of international relevance and prestige. The more that a nation is dependent on their nuclear arsenal for relevance, regardless of their actual security situation, the less likely they are to give up those arsenals.
While this is a theoretical exercise, the practical application comes in understanding the motivations of nations when negotiating arms control issues. When asking a sovereign nation to reduce or abolish its nuclear arsenal, it’s important to understand what role that arsenal plays in their perception of their own security and relevance on the world stage. If we are going to ask them to give up a piece of their security, what can we offer them in return that might improve their security, real or perceived?