Jeffrey LewisRussian New START Resolution

Here is the US Department of State’s translation of the Russian resolution of ratification for the New START treaty.

U.S. Department of State
Office of Language Services
Translating Division

LS No. 01-2011-0191
Russian/English
PH+JS/VL+PH

Translation

Draft No. 382931-5
Second reading

FEDERAL LAW

On Ratification of the Treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States of America on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms

Article 1

Ratify the Treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States of America on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms signed in Prague on April 8, 2010, hereinafter referred to as the New START Treaty.

Article 2

The New START Treaty shall be implemented subject to the following conditions:

1) maintaining the capacity of the Russian Federation’s strategic nuclear forces at a level necessary to ensure the national security of the Russian Federation, including by the development, testing, production, and deployment of new types and new kinds of strategic offensive arms that will have advantages for overcoming missile defense;

2) maintaining the combat readiness of the Russian Federation’s strategic nuclear forces for response to any development of the strategic situation, and preserving and developing the necessary research and development base and production capabilities;

3) funding, in accordance with the level of existing requirements, of the Russian Federation’s strategic nuclear forces, and measures for preserving and developing the necessary research and development base and production capabilities, as well as operations for safely eliminating and disposing of the Russian Federation’s strategic offensive arms and implementing the New START Treaty;

4) ensuring safe conditions for operating, storing, eliminating, and disposing of the Russian Federation’s strategic offensive arms;

5) taking into account the interrelationship between strategic offensive arms and strategic defensive arms, that this interrelationship will become more important as strategic nuclear arms are reduced, and that the strategic defensive arms of one Party do not undermine the viability and effectiveness of the strategic offensive arms of the other Party to the New START Treaty;

6) applying the provisions of the New START Treaty, including those in regard to counting warheads and their means of delivery, in accordance with its terms, to any strategic offensive arms, as well as to any new kinds of strategic-range offensive arms;

7) the question of the applicability of the provisions of the New START Treaty to any new kind of strategic-range offensive arms should be resolved within the framework of the Bilateral Consultative Commission established in accordance with Article XII of the New START Treaty, prior to the deployment of such new kind of strategic-range offensive arms;

8) providing to the United States of America telemetric information about launches of existing types of intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles only prior to the time of separation of the self-contained dispensing mechanism or the payload from the last stage of the intercontinental ballistic missiles or submarine-launched ballistic missiles of the Russian Federation and not providing to the United States of America telemetric information about launches of new types of intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles of the Russian Federation;

9) effectively using, improving, and developing the means of verification provided for by the New START Treaty, including the Russian Federation’s national technical means of verification of compliance by the United States of America with the New START Treaty.

Article 3

1. The Russian Federation’s obligations under the New START Treaty shall be fulfilled in compliance with this Federal Law and with other Russian Federation legal enactments governing the actions and procedures whose necessity arises in the course of implementing the New START Treaty.

2. In the process of implementing the New START Treaty:

1) The President of the Russian Federation:

a) ​shall determine the main areas of state policy in the field of development of the Russian Federation’s strategic nuclear forces and of nuclear disarmament, and the procedures and time frames for carrying out measures to implement the New START Treaty, while ensuring that the capacity of the Russian Federation’s strategic nuclear forces is preserved, and their combat readiness is maintained at a level necessary to guarantee deterrence of aggression against the Russian Federation;

b) ​shall, after entry into force of the New START Treaty, approve a program of development of the Russian Federation’s strategic nuclear forces as a component part of the state armament program, and shall inform the chambers of the Russian Federation Federal Assembly;

c) ​shall determine the main areas of international activities of the Russian Federation in the field of strategic offensive arms and missile defense in order to strengthen strategic stability and ensure the national security of the Russian Federation;

d) ​shall make a decision about developing new types and new kinds of strategic offensive arms, and about commissioning them;

e)​ shall define the national conceptual framework for further international talks in the field of strategic offensive arms and missile defense, and shall consult and negotiate with the leaders of other states in order to strengthen strategic stability and ensure the national security of the Russian Federation;

2) The Government of the Russian Federation:

a) ​shall, in accordance with Federal Laws and other Russian Federation legal enactments and the state armament program, ensure priority funding of the Russian Federation’s strategic nuclear forces;

b) ​shall ensure the preservation and development of the research and development base and production capabilities necessary for maintaining the nuclear capacity and combat readiness of the Russian Federation’s strategic nuclear forces;

c)​ shall ensure the effective use of the Russian Federation’s national technical means of verification of compliance by the United States of America with the provisions of the New START Treaty and their technical improvement, and ensure that the verification procedures provided for in the New START Treaty are carried out;

d) ​shall, after the day of entry into force of this Federal Law, approve a targeted federal program for industrial disposition of arms and military equipment, providing for the possibility of using the reduced components and infrastructure of the Russian Federation’s strategic nuclear forces in the interests of development of the national economy;

e)​ shall take measures to ensure safety in the operation, storage, elimination, and disposition of strategic offensive arms, nuclear warheads, and missile fuel, as well as to rule out unauthorized access to nuclear warheads;

f) ​shall take measures to use economically optimal methods and means for the elimination and disposition of strategic offensive arms;

g)​ shall, after the day of entry into force of the New START Treaty, annually inform the chambers of the Russian Federation Federal Assembly about the progress of implementation of the New START Treaty in regard to the following issues:

fulfillment by the Russian Federation and the United States of America of their obligations under the New START Treaty;

deployment by other states of missile defense systems, their effect on the capacity of the Russian Federation’s strategic nuclear forces, and possible threats to the national security of the Russian Federation in the event of emergence of new kinds of strategic-range offensive arms, or of deployment of weapons in space;

development of a dialog between the Russian Federation and the United States of America in the field of strategic offensive arms;
information about the international agreements concluded by the Russian Federation that are connected with implementation of the New START Treaty (including the forwarding of official texts of the agreements);

financial provision for measures to maintain the capability of the Russian Federation’s strategic nuclear forces, their combat readiness, and the results of implementation of the aforesaid measures;

the condition and capacities of the research and development base and production capabilities;

the progress of elimination and disposition of Russian Federation’s strategic offensive arms that have been decommissioned, and the status of funding of measures for implementation of the New START Treaty, including with the use of international technical assistance;

the environmental situation at sites for the storage, elimination, and disposition of Russian Federation’s strategic offensive arms, particularly nuclear warheads and missile fuel;

h) ​shall, pursuant to the instructions of the President of the Russian Federation, implement foreign-policy measures in the field of reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms and of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

3. The chambers of the Russian Federation Federal Assembly, each within the scope of its authority:

1) shall participate, during the annual review of the draft federal law on the federal  budget for the coming fiscal year, in adopting (approving) decisions on the amount of funding for research and development projects in the field of strategic offensive arms, the purchase of strategic offensive arms, and the construction (repair, modernization) of the main basing facilities for the strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation, as well as operations for the safe elimination and disposition of strategic offensive arms and implementation of measures for carrying out the New START Treaty;

2) shall participate in developing draft federal laws, the state armaments program, and the main criteria for state defense procurement for the relevant fiscal year, and shall adopt (approve) federal laws aimed at maintaining the strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation at a level necessary to ensure the national security of the Russian Federation and at implementing measures in the area of nuclear arms reduction, including measures that provide for the possibility of using the reduced components of the strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation and their infrastructure in the interest of development of the national economy;

3) shall review the annual report of the Government of the Russian Federation on the status of the strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation and the progress of the implementation of the New START Treaty;

4) shall take measures as needed, in accordance with section V of Federal Law No. 101-FZ “On the International Treaties of the Russian Federation” of July 15, 1995.

Article 4

1. The provisions of the preamble of the New START Treaty shall have indisputable significance for the understanding of the Parties’ intentions upon its signature, including the content of the terms agreed between them and the understandings without which the New START Treaty would not have been concluded.  In this connection, they must be considered in toto by the Parties in the course of implementing the New START Treaty.

2. The Russian Federation shall exercise the right provided by Article XIV of the New START Treaty to withdraw from it in case of extraordinary events that jeopardize its supreme interests. These events may include:

1) a material breach by the United States of America of its obligations under the New START Treaty that could give rise to a threat to the national security of the Russian Federation;

2) deployment by the United States of America, another state, or a group of states of a missile defense system capable of significantly reducing the effectiveness of the Russian Federation’s strategic nuclear forces;

3) a build-up by the United States of America, another state, or group of states of strategic offensive arms, or adoption by them of decisions in the field of military construction, as well as other circumstances that could pose a threat to the national security of the Russian Federation;

4) deployment by the United States of America, other states, or a group of states of arms that hinder the operation of the Russian missile-attack warning system.

3. In case of the extraordinary events specified in Part 2 of this Article, the President of the Russian Federation:

1) shall take political, diplomatic, and other measures to eliminate the extraordinary events or to neutralize their consequences;

2) shall ensure that immediate consultations are held with the chambers of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation and, taking into account the results of such consultations, shall make decisions bearing on the New START Treaty, submitting as needed to the chambers of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation the proposals provided for by Federal Law No. 101-FZ “On the International Treaties of the Russian Federation.”

4. In case the chambers of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation deem that events have arisen that can be categorized as extraordinary within the meaning of Article XIV of the New START Treaty, they shall send proposals for holding consultations to the President of the Russian Federation, make their own recommendations to him, or take other actions within the limits of their competency.

Article 5

The President of the Russian Federation shall make a decision to conduct negotiations on further reduction and limitation of nuclear arms, taking into account the progress of the implementation of the New START Treaty and its principles and provisions, as well as the status of such arms of the United States of America and third states, together with other national security tasks of the Russian Federation.

Article 6

This Federal Law shall enter into force on the date of its official promulgation.

The President of the Russian Federation

Update | 8:06 pm 17 January 2011 I’ve cleaned up the format. Also, you can compare with the translation/textual analysis helpfully prepared by Paul Podvig at his excellent Russian Strategic Forces blog.

Comments

  1. yousaf (History)

    BTW, Do you have the txt of the US resolution of ratification?

    In the Russian:

    “5) taking into account the interrelationship between strategic offensive arms and strategic defensive arms, that this interrelationship will become more important as strategic nuclear arms are reduced, and that the strategic defensive arms of one Party do not undermine the viability and effectiveness of the strategic offensive arms of the other Party to the New START Treaty.”

    Since the administration’s Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) is much more ambitious than the very limited Bush plan (which already inspired the ire of many Russian analysts) it is only a matter of time before the New START honeymoon afterglow subsides into a full-on cat fight.

    For the end state of the PAA — see Table II in:

    http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL33745.pdf

    43 Aegis ships (i.e. mobile platforms) with 436 interceptors.

    Even if Russia can live with that, China almost certainly cannot.

    =========

    Also, an interesting tie-in to weapons in space:

    “g)​shall, after the day of entry into force of the New START Treaty, annually inform the chambers of the Russian Federation Federal Assembly about the progress of implementation of the New START Treaty in regard to the following issues:
    …….
    deployment by other states of missile defense systems, their effect on the capacity of the Russian Federation’s strategic nuclear forces, and possible threats to the national security of the Russian Federation in the event of emergence of new kinds of strategic-range offensive arms, or of deployment of weapons in space;”

    • yousaf (History)

      PS: Lavrov specifically gave the US the “talk-to-the-hand” on tacnukes, unless we also want to talk about space weapons:

      http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704307404576079953654840710.html

      “Under conditions spelled out Thursday by Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, a new round of talks aimed at slashing Russia’s large arsenal of short-range tactical nuclear weapons must involve other nuclear powers and focus as well on conventional warheads and weapons in space.”

  2. jeannick (History)

    .
    pretty much as could be expected

    that’s my take on the main points

    article 5 ….. link between offense and defense
    article 6…… non nuclear ballistic missiles
    article 7……prior warning on new missile defense progress
    article 8…… telemetry data limitation

    What exactly is article 8 about , is there some disagreement ???

    • yousaf (History)

      8 says: “providing to the United States of America telemetric information about launches of existing types of intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles only prior to the time of separation of the self-contained dispensing mechanism or the payload from the last stage of the intercontinental ballistic missiles or submarine-launched ballistic missiles of the Russian Federation and not providing to the United States of America telemetric information about launches of new types of intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles of the Russian Federation;”

      My reading is that they prob. do not want to give away anything about possible future countermeasures against missile defense by only giving telemetry info prior to separation.

      The telemetry issues have been changed (less exchange) from START to New START to be more restrictive — e.g. you can see some articles in Arms Control Today.

  3. Eugene Miasnikov (History)

    Yousaf,

    The text of the US Senate Resolution is here: http://bit.ly/hSAXZ3

  4. jeannick (History)

    .
    Thanks Yousaf , read the text and my head still spin
    It’s full of caveat and provisions totally at odd with the letter and spirit of the treaty .

    Missile defense is put above any other consideration
    In particular the bit about engaging the Russians on tacticals explicitly excluding any discussion on missile defense ( an obvious no goer )
    The telemetry data exclude M.D. test including the target
    which I would presume must be close to an ICBM

    Conventionally armed ICBM if of a “new” design would be excluded from telemetry requirement

    …etc ..etc

  5. jeannick (History)

    .
    The thanks goes to Eugene for the text
    Yousaf get them too 😉

  6. MKS (History)

    the more important part of Art. 8 is the last clause that prohibits Russia from providing telemetry on any new systems, thus making clear just how worthless the New START telemetry provisions really are. This also pretty much obviates the chance that the President will provide to Russia telemetry on CPGS systems, since the Senate required that this be done “in exchange for significant telemetric information regarding a [new Russian] weapon system,” which obviously will not be forthcoming. (CPGS telemetry could also be provided to Russia to demonstrate that the systems are not accountable under the treaty).

    • Anon (History)

      Much better than the telemetry we would get if Sen. Kyl had his way and New START had not been ratified.

      Let’s hope the idiocy that is CPGS dies a quick death.

  7. MKS (History)

    actually it’s not, Anon, since there is a decent possibility no telemetry will be exchanged under New START. As the Committee Report made clear on page 33, telemetry exchanges are not required at all under the treaty. It is almost certainly the case that no telemetry of any value will be provided to the US under the treaty.

    • Anon (History)

      The obsession with telemetry is really unfounded.

      This is in reference to the same nation with which we will be holding hands on a missile defense system right? Our new best friends right? Why would you want telemetry from them — the Cold War is over.

      I don’t care if we get or give telemetry to the Russians.

      I wouldn’t mind North Korean telemetry if Sen Kyl and John Bolton can arrange that.