Jonathan Medalia at the Congressional Research Service has written a very thorough treatment of the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RW) program.
Medalia quotes Raymond Jeanloz, chair of the National Academies Committee on International Security and Arms Control, to describe the basic choice involved with RRW:
He supports a version of RRW that would build on the success of SSP to improve manufacturing practices, lower costs and increase performance margins, as these enhancements would support the Administration’s decision to significantly reduce the size of the U.S. stockpile. This RRW would stay within the design parameters that have been validated by nuclear testing.
In contrast, he opposes an RRW that would move beyond those parameters in order to create new weapons, as that approach could lead to new weapons that are less reliably validated, that require testing, and that would counter U.S. nonproliferation efforts. In particular, he believes that new designs would undermine U.S. attempts to convince other nations not to develop nuclear weapons by showing them that the United States still feels the need for new weapons.
That strikes me as about the right balance. If members of Congress share this view, Medalia observes they could impose legislative restrictions to require:
- RRW components stay within the design parameters validated by
nuclear testing. - RRW not be used to enhance military capabilities or provide for new military missions.
- The number of non-deployed warheads be significantly reduced if RRW proceeds.