A Chinese ICBM Test in the Pacific

Jeffrey Lewis 0:06

You are listening to the Arms Control Wonk podcast, a podcast on arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation. I'm Dr. Jeffrey Lewis, a professor at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey and the founding publisher of the Arms Control Wonk blog.

Decker Eveleth 0:23

And I'm Decker Eveleth, an associate research analyst at the CNA Corporation. Boy, it has been a week for us, hasn't it?

Jeffrey 0:30

Oh, my gosh. I am so glad you're back with us. His duckness, Decker, El Duckerino, if you're not into the whole brevity thing. More China, more Decker.

Decker 0:45

Uh-huh. I mean, it's like a holiday. It's so rare we get this level of visibility into anything related to the PRC ICBM force.

Jeffrey 0:58

Yeah i have to say so for listeners we're going to talk about china's decision to launch a df31a aka css10 mod 2 on a minimum energy trajectory to something approximating its full range the first time that china has done a full range test of an icf icbm out over the ocean since 1980 when i was a little boy And, Ducko, you were but a gleam in your parents' eye.

Decker 1:30

Not even that.

Jeffrey 1:31

Had your parents even met in 1980?

Decker 1:34

I could ask. I'm not sure.

Jeffrey 1:37

Yeah. So, boy, China sent one a long way. And, boy, howdy, they gave us a picture. And I don't know. What were your initial reactions? Because I know what mine were.

Decker 1:51

Well, the first weird thing was that they did it from Hainan, right? We had a good idea this was something unusual because the NOTAM came out, and it was a unique NOTAM. We hadn't seen that NOTAM before. It wasn't coming from the Space Launch Center on Hainan. And so very quickly, a couple people on Twitter were like, that's weird.

And the NOTAMs were clearly for a large, multistage missile. And so we were like, well, that's probably something weird. And then we got the really, really nice picture. And I was like, wow, that's the highest resolution image of a solid glass CBM I think we've ever seen. I mean, it's a really nice image.

Jeffrey 2:35

I mean, from the Chinese, yes. And I think from a modeling perspective, you and I had looked at trying to take the grainy images we had of the DF-31A, China's workhorse, solid propellant ICBM, And some of the diagrams that had been released, but we could never see the cable raceways. So we, it was really hard to know how much propellant was in each stage, but boy, you can see those cable raceways just clear as a bell.

Decker 3:05

Yeah. I mean, they're like in the sun, just right reflected. So you can clearly see the outline. It's really great. Yeah.

Jeffrey 3:12

And I, you know, you and I were talking about this on Twitter. I mean, for me, one of the things I appreciate about this image is I think it settles what I think was some uncertainty that had existed. China originally fielded a version of this missile, the DF-31, which had a kind of very pointy nose. They subsequently fielded the DF-31A, which has a different front end configuration.

But when China showed at, what is it, Juriha, I guess? Yeah. In Inner Mongolia, they showed us for the first time the DF-31AG. We had this huge debate about whether the AG, whether the G meant it was just a new transporter or erector launcher or whether it was a whole new system with a whole new missile. I was of the view that GE just meant improved launcher.

I think not everybody agreed with that, but I feel like we have now seen a DF-31AG put a DF-31A up into the air. So I think that definitively eliminates at least any evidence of what a CSS is. What is it, 10 Mod 3?

Decker 4:32

Yeah, yeah. I mean, part of the confusion was the fact that this new modification, the AG, shares a lot of its ground support equipment with the 41. It's actually the same chassis, and they've shortened the canister, but the canister diameter doesn't actually match the, it's actually a little bigger than the DF-31 is. And so there was a lot of discussion about, Well, is there a new, is it a bigger missile, right?

And there was all that discussion that was, I mean, totally unsourced about the DF-31AG being MIRVed.

Jeffrey 5:13

And so people took it to their- Yeah, I mean, it was even hinted at in Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat where they said the warhead loading and the range were unknown as though it was like, you know, and I, you know, I get it. You want to be careful and cautious. And I mean, it is a bigger canister, but yeah, go ahead.

Decker 5:28

Yeah, and so people were like, well, they would need to have a bigger missile to make it have the firepower to actually take a heavier payload, like a MIRV bus across the ocean, sales modeling. And what we've seen is not only have they shown us the missile, it's the same, but also if you look at the past two years of CMPRs, they have stopped listing out Df31 df31a yeah df31ag and that's likely because the original mod the df31 is retired and the df31 and 31ag are basically the same system right there's a lot of talk and they've actually shown us this happened i have a great video of a a different df31ag practice launch firing or not not an actual fire but like a practice you know a dry run basically And there are additionally Chinese texts that talk about how the – there's a new, quote, improved missile system, ICBM.

And they have – they talk about, like, reducing the number of cables. They talk about improving the ground support equipment, right? So I was always of the view that when you look at the actual – what they've shown us in terms of the video and the text, it's very clear in the way they talk about this is the same missile, right?

Jeffrey 6:54

Mean, that is how I interpreted that, and, and there was even one of those launchers was on display at an exhibit a few years ago, and they referred to it as the DF-31A integrated improvement. Yeah, they had living models for all the different tells, and they had a big shirt on the wall. Yeah, so they didn't call it the DF-31B, and they, they.

The integrated improvement clearly made it seem like it was still for the DF-31A. I think this basically settles this debate. Yeah, I agree. It is possible that there is a DF-31B under development, but I think I'm now – I mean, this could be confirmation by us talking because I love being right – But I think G just meant all the kinds of improvements you described in both the launcher and the ways in which that probably streamlined launch processes and increased, I would imagine, the speed and flexibility of the system.

Decker 7:59

Yeah, I absolutely agree. And the clinching proof for me, or not the proof, but the clinching piece of evidence I always gravitate towards is that when you see them do launch drills with the AG, They're still using an incredibly antiquated alignment process for the guidance system, right? And in my view, like, if you're going to modernize an old missile system, all of that guidance stuff is going to be ripped out, right?

So the fact we still saw those old guidance system procedures in there was like, that was, for me, the clinching evidence.

Jeffrey 8:30

Yeah, so I think – so one thing is we finally get a nice clean view of the missile. It's the highest resolution view we've ever seen of the DF-31A. We're pretty sure the AG now carries the DF-31A. That would suggest that the DF-31A is probably going to go in the silos, which is a thing we had seen U.S. officials say but always seemed a little bit – I had some questions.

That's one thing we learned via OSINT. Then there is this other interesting set of questions of why did China do this now? It's the first out-to-sea test in 44 years. That's the thing reporters wanted to talk to me about. I think I understand and I think I tried to explain it to them. I'm not sure I did that great of a job.

Then there's this interesting question about how the United States reacted, which, I, I think, the answer is appropriately and well, but nonetheless, yeah, absolutely, praise, praise, praise should be given. when you are asked, why did China do this? What are the answers? And I say that in the plural because I think there are probably, you know, things can be two things, there can be multiple reasons for something. What are the answers you give?

Decker 9:47

Funny you should say that. I just cut off the phone with a journalist like an hour ago about this particular topic. And I did give two answers, and I gave – the first answer is technical, right? One problem that China has is that the distance between its ICBM test ranges and its impact sites is, in terms of an ICBM range, not that far away, right?

You're talking about doing a test of an ICBM over only 2,000 to 3,000 kilometers, right? And when you do that, what you have to do is you have to loft the missile, right? And so you fire the missile in a very, very high arc trajectory, and it comes back down. And it's not really a problem, but one thing you have to account for when you do that is that the arc that you fire the missile at Puts different stresses on your heat shield, right?

A lofted trajectory means that you are putting higher heat on the RV for a shorter period of time because when it's just burning through the atmosphere, it's doing so at very high speed, but it's doing so quicker. With what we call a MET, a minimum energy trajectory, which is a shallower arc, When the missile is reentering the atmosphere, the RV, you're putting lower heat stress on the missile RV, but you're doing it for a longer period of time.

Jeffrey 11:23

Yeah, I would say it's like the difference between broiling and roasting. Yes. Yes, absolutely. Right, you can have short periods of high heat or you can have long periods of, I mean, still pretty freaking high heat, but those are fundamentally different environments. So yeah, okay, I also think, The interesting question – see, I slightly reframed that. The US and Russia do this all the freaking time, and we do it because it is the correct thing to do technically.

I believe the United States should be doing this because I want to ensure high levels of reliability. I am not surprised when the Russians do it. The interesting question to me was always why did the Chinese not bother to do it because that was the aberration, not the norm. Yeah. So what was the second reason you gave?

Because my first reason is the same as yours. My second reason flows out of this.

Decker 12:18

My second reason that I gave is closer to what Tong Zhao has already said, in that there has been a credibility crisis among the Rocket Force. There have been a variety of corruption scandals. And a lot of Rocket Force generals have been summarily fired from their posts. And so it's possible this was test was done so that the Rocket Force could show internal political stakeholders in Beijing that they still had a competent and credible force, and they could still execute the missions, especially as we said that.

Admiral Charles Richards said two years ago that the DF-31 was going to be the missile. Yeah, he said very clearly. Do we miss Chucky Dick? I don't think we do. You know. I miss Chucky Dick a little. He was great source of information. He was very blunt. Yeah. He said things that I was like, wow, you really did say that.

Jeffrey 13:23

That was unclassified, huh?

Decker 13:24

Yeah. But he said very clearly, like, They think that the 31 series missile is going to be the thing they put into the silos, right? Yeah, he sure did. And that adds to the credibility aspect of why they did this.

Jeffrey 13:39

Yeah, so I think that, I buy that. I think it is important to say we are dealing with a China that is, that has basically just fewer to give about the neighbors. Not in a hostile sense, but I just think that I don't know. I think they're willing to – the old China wouldn't – really, they wanted to do one ICBM flight and then be done with it.

Decker 14:09

I'm not sure the new China cares quite as much. That's probably partly true. I will say, however, as a counterpoint, why did they do it from Hainan? Because you don't have to overfly anything.

Jeffrey 14:24

Yeah, that's probably true. It is it is a it is a very convenient location. Right.

Decker 14:29

Like they they warned everybody and they did it from a place where they wouldn't have to overfly anything like that to me. Yes. That says they still do care, at least to some extent, about what the Philippines thinks, what the you know.

Jeffrey 14:47

Well, I don't think that they're – yeah, I don't – oh, to be clear, I don't think that they are being irresponsible at all. In fact, I think they were pretty responsible the way they did it, and that will, I think, segue us into, I think, the adroit way in which the Pentagon handled this. It's not that I think that they – it's not that I think that they have zero regard for whatever other countries think.

I just think that – In the past, they were willing to bear what I would consider an unreasonable level of technical risk to avoid the slightest criticism, and I think China under Xi Jinping is much more willing to endure some criticism, right, in exchange for technical benefits. But yes, this, this is absolutely right. They issued a notice to air missions and mariners.

And they avoided overflying other countries. And they did this in the way in which the US and Russia do it. It's very responsible. And I have the Pentagon statement, which I think was the right thing to say, which was, we did receive some advanced notification of this ICBM test, and we believe that was a good thing. It's a step in the right direction, and it does lead to preventing any misperception or miscalculation.

Weirdly, the fact that the Chinese announced this Is good on the transparency front.

Decker 16:15

Yes. I mean, I think that they're becoming a lot more comfortable showing and doing things with their nuclear forces that they wouldn't do before. And that may be a confidence thing, right? They used to not say anything about Operational, or do anything operational with their missile forces, partly because I think they were, they were not confident about the survivability of the force structure, right? I think they are growing, I think they are growing a lot more confident, which means they may be approaching, you know, this is a key example of this, a space where they can do these sort of things on a regular basis without a lot of concern over showing too much to the adversaries.

Jeffrey 17:02

And so for listeners, the United States and Russia have had since the depths of the Cold War a ballistic missile – well, depths. I mean I guess at the end of the Cold War. Not really the depths. But the US and the Soviet Union and then the United States and Russia have a ballistic missile launch notification regime.

But we notify each other of launches. And the Chinese and the Russians have a bilateral regime of their own, which has a fair number of loopholes in it. And it's better than nothing. And I think one thing that the US has been pushing the Chinese on is this is already data that they're willing to share with the Russians.

This is data that the US and Russia share with one another. China should be comfortable sharing this kind of information as a I think, first of all, just as a basic measure to prevent any misunderstandings. But then I think as a secondary goal is as a step toward the kinds of conversations that we should have about stability and then maybe someday even arms control if we are about to embark On this arms race, right?

Like their number is going to come up and our numbers are going to respond to their numbers and there is going to be interaction. And like, we should be talking to one another because even if we plan to run an arms race, we want to run it relatively stably.

Decker 18:37

Right. I mean, I, a couple of years ago, I was at a conference and one of the moderators asked basically, you know, show of hands, In a decade, do you think there will be space for risk reduction and arm control between U.S. and China? And I was the only person who raised their hand. And I did so, as I explained, because this is a key example of this.

Part of the reason why China was very cautious about previously about arm control was because they had a small force. They believed it was pretty insurvivable. I mean, you could look at even what the Chinese say about the survivability of the force structure, and they're like, it's all going to be blown up, right? But now they have this much bigger force.

It's very survivable. They have the numbers and the technology, I think, to ensure the survivability of the force. And that opens up a really big door for For them to come to the table on risk reduction and arms control because they don't need to worry about some black swan technical event or just the United States overwhelming the Chinese force structure.

They don't need to worry about that.

Jeffrey 20:02

Yeah, so your glum assessment was, of course, we're going to end up talking about arms control because the Chinese will be totally comfortable doing that once they reach parity. And my even glummer assessment is, of course we will talk about arms control because that's survivor bias talking. And if we are alive to be talking at all, there will have been arms control.

So if we opt out of that, we will be dead and nobody will be asking the question of whether there was arms control or not. No, I mean, I have to say, I don't know that this is a tremendously complex conversation. I mean, I think it is... It was long overdue that China did this. It's normal. It's a thing the Russians do.

It's a thing we do. I think it is a little bit a sign of changes in China. It is definitely, I think, a little bit. Well, one question I have for you is this. Who do you think the primary audience of the test was? If the test was indeed driven by a desire to prove That the rocket force could still operate despite the scandal.

Do you think the primary audience was internal, which is saying to Xi Jinping, yes, this thing works still? Or do you think the audience was primarily, and I know they're always both audiences, but primarily external in the sense of, well, we know it works, but like, let's remind the Americans.

Decker 21:30

I definitely think the primary audience was the CMC.

Jeffrey 21:34

Yeah, okay. This is the problem is we agree about everything. We should find somebody who disagrees with us. It's domestic politics all the way down. Well, I mean, this is something I really... I got really... It's almost like you got a degree from the Institute.

Decker 21:49

Yeah, it's almost like I spent two years studying under you. It's remarkable. But I got... I had a disagreement with someone at a conference once because I brought up the fact that one problem that the... Rocket Force has is that it used to be they had a monopoly on this capability, right? They were the Rocket Force, no one else could do it. Yeah, but now you have the, the Air Force in China, the Navy in China, and even the ground forces are fielding their own ballistic missiles. Yeah, all of them want to carve off bigger and bigger chunks of the Rocket Force budget.

Yes. If you want to maintain that budget, you have to show the CMC that you can do the mission.

Jeffrey 22:37

So are you saying that while they may have aimed at a point in the ocean, the real target was the JL-3's budget?

Decker 22:45

Oh, absolutely.

Jeffrey 22:46

I think there's some chance of that.

Decker 22:48

I have to imagine that there is an absolutely brutal bureaucratic knife fight going on in Beijing between the Air Force, the Rocket Force, and the Navy on a variety of missile budget systems.

Jeffrey 23:03

So the Rocket Force's view is like that of – Los Alamos about Livermore, you know, the old saying, or maybe Livermore said about Los Alamos that the Russians, the Soviets are the adversary, but Los Alamos is the enemy. Yes. The Americans are the adversary, but the Navy is the enemy.

Decker 23:24

Well, I mean, it's like the absolutely brutal knife fight that LeMay had with the army over the early ballistic missiles.

Jeffrey 23:32

Oh, yeah. Ah, poor General Medaris. I have his very, very bitter memoir. I was an unhappy man. All right, so summarizing for listeners, I think where we both are, it settles for us this question of does the DF-31AG carry a DF-31A? Answer is almost certainly yes. It's only one test, so statistically we still don't know if the thing works, but boy, it seemed to work.

The primary audience was probably internal. It helps address concerns about reliability arising from corruption and keeps at bay the jackals of the other services who might want some of those funds. And it's not really fundamentally a big deal because the U.S. does this and Russia does this. And in fact, the U.S. has handled this pretty adroitly because the Chinese announced it.

And maybe, maybe this opens us up to a conversation that adds a lot more stability and security to the relationship than any single test could ever possibly take away.

Decker 24:51

It's a very counterintuitive happy note that they fire an ICBM over the ocean and we're like, yeah, this is great for stability.

Jeffrey 24:58

I mean, I got some wonk porn. I got some prospects for arms control. I'm a happy man. I think I'm off to get a cocktail.

Decker 25:07

Yes. Well, I'm very sick right now, so I can't drink. But I have a nice big cup of tea that I could put some alcohol in. Well, Decker, I will have a cocktail for you.

Jeffrey 25:19

And listeners, I can't afford these cocktails without support. Otherwise, I got to be writing articles. I can't be doing podcasts. I got to be writing articles for foreign policy. I got to be doing my day job. All those bulk shipments of Campari do not come cheap. Indeed. So if you want to continue to support the podcast, And if you are interested in joining our Slack group, which is where all the neat, fun stuff goes down, it is a mere $5 a month for a normal person, $3 a month for a student.

Go to patreon.com forward slash ACW podcast. And, you know, buy us a Campari. Decker, thank you so much for coming on.

Decker 26:17

Always happy to be here and thank you for listening.