Iran’s October Missile Raid

Jeffrey Lewis 0:06

You are listening to the Arms Control Wonk podcast, a podcast on arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation, though maybe not much of any of those things at the moment. I am Dr. Jeffrey Lewis. I'm the founding publisher of the Arms Control Wonk blog. And for the time being, a professor at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey.

Aaron Stein 0:29

And I'm Aaron Stein, president of the Foreign Policy Research Institute. But why for the time being? Where are you going? You're in Monterey.

Jeffrey 0:35

You're not leaving? I guess not. I guess not. You know, some some days, some days, some days, Aaron. All right.

Aaron 0:43

Well, there are certainly some days in the Middle East. Iran fired, what, 200 ballistic missiles at Israel?

Jeffrey 0:52

I mean, that is that is the number that reporters have told me that they were told by the U.S. government. So, yeah, sure. I mean, we saw launch videos of, you know, Some fraction of that. So why not?

Aaron 1:05

Is that the largest ballistic missile strike in history? I was thinking about this driving around yesterday. What would be bigger?

Jeffrey 1:13

I mean, it is a pretty substantial massed attack. It's got to be bigger than the onesies and twosies we saw in the War of the Cities, although maybe I'm not thinking of some. The Soviets launched a lot in Afghanistan, the Soviets and the Afghans, but I don't think it was this many. So maybe you're right.

Aaron 1:37

Maybe they should submit to the Guinness Book of World Records for that one. Wow. Wow. I mean, it would help if they hit something. Well, let's, okay. So we did one of these after April 13th. And I think our basic conclusion and takeaway was that conventional ballistic missiles kind of suck for this type of mission at these type of ranges.

Jeffrey 1:58

It is really hard at 1,500 to 2,000 kilometers to destroy something with less than 1,000 kilograms of explosives and accuracies that can be measured in football fields. Yeah, that's hard.

Aaron 2:14

But the Israelis last time were spiking the football. And then there was, I believe, correct me if I'm wrong, we were able to get access to the satellite footage of Nevatim Erebis pretty quickly.

Jeffrey 2:27

Yes, yes. And so Sam Lair and I did a quick accuracy calculation for that strike, which used, I think, largely a different class of ballistic missiles, although we're just looking at debris. And we came back with an accuracy of about 1.2 kilometers, circular error probable. So that means half would fall within 1.2 kilometers of the aim point.

The other half would fall outside of that. That's not that's not great.

Aaron 2:56

Well, okay. Well, let's start. The one video that has been going around is in Neva Team Air Base, and it looks like 17 or 18, you know, sort of clustered strikes just coming in with one interception, sort of way at the end there. And that one seems a bit more, let's say, I don't know. That one's obviously manifestly different than last time.

Jeffrey 3:23

If that video bears... And if the cluster that we're seeing isn't a trick of perspective... Because we can see sort of left to right, but we can't really see depth. So it's going to be a little hard. That is the one video that to me leads me to say the attack was apparently more successful. But all the satellite imaging companies have 30-day holds now on the satellite images.

So it will be, I think, at least a month before we can really properly assess. Assuming we get any because it was cloudy yesterday.

Aaron 4:04

That's right. You're right. There was a low cloud cover. You can see that. I mean, the Israelis have said there were no casualties. And so...

Jeffrey 4:14

I mean, other than that poor guy who got crushed by the falling rocket body. That's insane. The math on that. Do you know how hard – I mean, this is – I mean, I kind of – that is so statistically improbable. I keep wondering if it's not CGI.

Aaron 4:32

So, one, I'm slightly being – to your point, because it's so crazy. I mean, it's sad. It's absolutely sad. I don't want to sound like I'm trashing the guy. They said Israeli casualties. No, no. But that poor guy who turns out to be a Gazan. So let's put it on top of everything. So this guy is obviously not having a good year.

No. And just happens to be wandering outside in a rocket body fall. To this day, to this hour, I should say, it's only been a day. I was watching yesterday. I was like, is that computer generated? Just like you did. I was like, is that real? Can we put that through something? Because it doesn't seem real.

Jeffrey 5:07

I mean, just to be so statistically... I mean, it's so statistically unlikely. I mean, you know, whatever. People do get killed by falling debris. Like, it happens. It just... The odds are... Vanishingly, vanishingly small. so I, you know, I don't know, I don't know. I mean, there is later, there is later image of the rocket body on the ground, and then, and somebody covers the person. Yes, I mean, that's trashy. So I, I guess it's true. it just, boy, that is That is really unlucky.

Aaron 5:45

Should we talk about the missiles that they used? Because we got a few in there, and they are different than April 13th, at least from what we can see and what we speculate.

Jeffrey 5:56

Yeah. I mean, I'm a little uncomfortable saying this because last time we saw a mix, and this time we see a mix. So it's not as simple as saying last time it was all liquid-fueled, and this time it's all solid propellant. But- But last time, much of the debris was liquid fueled. Like, I would say the majority of the debris we saw.

And so we concluded that most of the missiles used were liquid fueled, or at least most of the missiles that got through were. This time, it looks like most of the missiles, again, based on the debris, and it's not like, are we getting a representative sample? It's a small sample. Most of it appears to be what we think is the FATA-1.

Could be the Caper Chican, but those, they're really hard to tell apart. They look so much alike. but Seth Hosford, one of my graduate students, spent a lot of time staring at the, the rear end of these things, and they look just a teeny tiny bit different, although You know, it's always hard to tell for sure. But yeah, this time, it looks like most of the missiles or a larger proportion are the more advanced Fata-1 solid propellant missile.

And that might explain the improved accuracy and penetration. Although again, I think I think that the fact that the Israelis – or sorry, the fact that the Iranians appear to have done better doesn't necessarily mean they did well. Right. Exactly. If that makes any sense.

Aaron 7:39

No, it makes perfect sense. And I mean that's backed up by what the Iranians said. They said they used more advanced missiles this time. I think they were embarrassed last time. I think they got the message. I mean I would be. I mean – I mean, I calculated the accuracy of the strike last time and I was like, Jesus, that sucks.

Well, what's funny is we obviously can't accurately do the – we can't accurately assess the accuracy of the missiles this time around. But did you see Nick Schifrin on CNN was like – He was basically standing in the shadow of Mossad headquarters. And you can see it over his shoulder. I can't remember if it was 1,500 meters or if it was 1,500 feet.

But my guess is it's 1,500 meters. And then there's this big f***ing crater right there. And he says, that's where the rocket struck. It's 30 feet deep and blah, blah, blah. And I was like, huh. I was like, about 1,500 kilometers away from Mossad headquarters. I was like, that computes. Do you know what I mean? Yeah.

Jeffrey 8:40

But I mean, that's... And ultimately... I mean, ultimately, this is sort of my – I mean, this is my like I'm a broken record on offense and defense. One of the reasons I'm not crazy about spending vast amounts of money on defenses is it's just not clear to me that long-range conventional ballistic missiles – and I'm not saying the shorter-range stuff because the shorter-range stuff is a different kettle of fish.

But it's just making a 30-meter crater – When you have an accuracy of 1,000 meters, it's pretty freaking useless. Making a 30-meter crater when you have an accuracy of even 150 meters is not so valuable. You really got to hit it right on. If you can't do that, then what are you doing? You're breaking the windows?

Aaron 9:34

Right. I mean, it's psychologically impacting. My guess is that Israelis living at the under edge of these things weren't exactly pleased last night. And perhaps they were able to put some on the airbase, but an airbase is concrete. You know what I mean? I made the joke earlier in a call, like the only place where potholes aren't fixed quickly are in Philadelphia.

You know, but if you're on a runway for the F-35, you're going to get out there and pay that thing.

Jeffrey 10:00

I mean, this is sort of the, you know, this is the problem of using value-laden language, whether something is a success or not. We have the case of the Iranian strike on Ain al-Assad air base in Iraq. Pretty good. There were no missile defenses there. So everything got through you know, they had the normal reliability problems, I think.

So only a portion of them got all the way there, but whatever, everything got through because there were no defenses. They exhibited a fairly high degree of accuracy, less than 30 meters, because this was a series of short range systems. They damaged some buildings and I think maybe a helicopter. They resulted in a large number of traumatic brain injuries to personnel, which I think is no joke.

And, you know, like I think it's vile that Donald Trump calls it a few headaches. I think that's really appalling. On the other hand, no one is killed and the air base is only out of action for a few hours. So – and that's a strike that is vastly more effective because it involves more accurate systems and there are no defenses.

And like I don't know. Like what was the value of that strike to Iran? When they don't kill anyone – again, traumatic brain injuries are no joke and I don't mean to – like those people earned their Purple Hearts and I have tremendous respect for them. I just think that if you're the Iranians, you're like disappointed you didn't kill anyone or – so like – I don't know.

You can be objective about what happened in that case, and I still think we could have a debate about whether it counts as successful or not. This is like an order of magnitude less effective by that same measure because it's further away, and you're going to have less accuracy, and you just can't get quite as much oomph there.

Aaron 12:17

Well, here's – so, okay. Well, now the question turns to the Israeli response. And by all speculation, by the way, is that they're going to go and they're going to go hit them. I mean, they have to, right?

Jeffrey 12:28

I mean – I mean, I would. How can you – well, like, I guess we're just chumps. We're going to – I mean, like, they're not the Saudis. They're not just going to let the Houthis, like, rocket them and be like, oh, we intercepted them all. It's like, really? What is that large smoking crater, you know? No, they're not chumps.

They're not going to take it in the face. They're going to hit them back.

Aaron 12:47

So the speculation is, is that it's been reported they may hit the nuclear sites. They may hit oil and gas infrastructure or – So all of a sudden, our field is relevant again. Do you know what I mean? It feels like we're going back to vintage.

Jeffrey 13:02

We're back. We're back.

Aaron 13:04

Maybe people want to know. Proliferation Cascades.

Jeffrey 13:06

What's going to happen?

Aaron 13:07

It's like, God, this feels so 2010. But what do you think is going to happen, I guess, in terms of- Yeah, I don't know. I don't know either. I mean, people keep asking me.

Jeffrey 13:19

I mean, partly the reason I say I don't know is because I- I think that it's not a purely rational response. There's a political component to this. This is – first and foremost, this is a decision that political leaders make that has their political well-being and survival foregrounded, and Netanyahu loves this stuff. This is his – This is good for him, right?

This sense of on this sense of never ending war and ongoing crisis keeps his political opponents at bay. Like he is a pig in slop, right? Like he is just happy as can be about this situation because all of this means it's another, another six months. He doesn't go to prison.

Aaron 14:01

Right.

Jeffrey 14:03

So like, and it's interesting to me also, no one mentions Israel's nuclear program. Because I think it's irrelevant.

Aaron 14:13

And that's why I wanted to end up there.

Jeffrey 14:15

Well, is it though? Okay. Well, we can come back to that. But the Israelis, not that they're going to use nuclear weapons, but I think they're going to hit the Iranians pretty hard. Very. Yeah. And then the Iranians are going to have questions about how much they wish to escalate.

Aaron 14:31

Correct.

Jeffrey 14:33

And so if they hit the Iranian oil and gas infrastructure – and I heard Chuck Freelick, who I really like, who's apparently back in Israel now, was talking about some of their options on NPR this morning. Hey, Chuck. Yeah. You know, if they strike the Iranian oil and gas infrastructure, I presume since, you know, Israel, not a big exporter of oil, the Iranians may, like with the tanker war, choose to start to target oil and gas infrastructure in the region.

Aaron 15:04

I mean, they've said I mean, they've signaled that they would consider strikes in the UAE, Saudi Arabia and throughout the Gulf. Yeah.

Jeffrey 15:11

Which is the if we're not safe, nobody is safe strategy, which is what they did with the tanker war in the 80s and I think is an interesting horizontal escalation because it's not clear to me that the Saudis and the UAEs will do anything about – and the Emiratis rather will do anything about it. For me, the question is if the Israelis target the nuclear program, what happens?

Because I don't know that the Iranians have an immediate response, but they do have the ability to throw the IAEA out and take things underground. And I presume this ultimately results in the Iranians finally getting around to doing the thing and building a nuclear weapon.

Aaron 15:55

Yes. Which, again, we've been so lucky that they haven't done for the last 20 years. Right. So I made this case earlier on Twitter.

Jeffrey 16:04

Eventually, they're going to go North Korea. Come on.

Aaron 16:06

No, I mean, the nuclear program was originally stood up kind of as a science experiment, but then it becomes a nuclear weapons program because it was American insurance. It was insurance against somebody coming in and kicking their ass. And then the Ayatollah had to go – would not live out his days in a retirement community. He would sort of live out his days in a bunker as he's being chased up in a spider hole.

And so once that option came off the table, because the idea that the U.S. could regime change or would regime change became far and far less likely because of the challenges in Iraq and Afghanistan – He didn't have to go nuclear anymore. It made sense to be latent. Like, it's a rational and strategic choice by the leadership over there to sort of keep things on a simmer.

And if you want to, depending on who's in charge, trade some stuff away for sanctions relief. Like, that makes sense. Now, if they get their asses handed to them in a bunch of airstrikes and somebody collapses down their program, all of a sudden that incentive structure changes. Even though it would be stupid. I think that's right. It would be stupid for them to build the bomb because it would just invite more airstrikes.

Leaders make dumb decisions all the time. So you can be convinced if you're the supreme leader that we can stop any more escalation if we have the ultimate tool to end escalation.

Jeffrey 17:22

Well, and I mean, again, this is why I went back to the Israeli bomb, because first of all, the Israeli bomb does not prevent Iran from doing things like this. It does not deter. You know, this is we've whatever we've been spending, I don't know what, 60 years now talking about the stability instability paradox, which technically speaking is not a paradox, but that's fine.

So the Israeli deterrent doesn't deter stuff like this. I do think it gives the Israelis. A kind of escalation control.

Aaron 17:56

In what sense? Because what I think really bails us out here is that the Iranians just don't have the capability to send tanks across the border.

Jeffrey 18:08

I think that's right. It is interesting to me that the Iranians continue to target military targets.

Aaron 18:17

I think they want to be seen as legitimate.

Jeffrey 18:19

You know what I mean? Yeah. I do too. I do too. So maybe that sense of restraint from the Iranians will persist no matter what. But boy, I just – I feel like – You know, we have seen little glimpses of what that policy debate in Iran looked like with the Supreme Leader seeming to be pretty cautious.

Yeah. I just, I, maybe I'm, I mean, I guess there is no way to know, but I would think that widespread Israeli strikes on the Iranian nuclear program would probably tip the balance internally toward actually producing a bomb.

Aaron 19:02

So I agree, but I think it's stupid. And I think it would be a dumb policy because people keep saying this. So regional specialists are saying Iran's in a corner. Because their ultimate form of deterrence against Israel was Hezbollah. And now Hezbollah has been decapitated pretty badly. And they look weak at the moment. Although, like, let's see how the Israeli invasion goes.

I just don't agree with that.

Jeffrey 19:27

Yeah, we looked great when we were taking down that statue of Saddam. Things looked amazing. It's so easy to get in.

Aaron 19:35

I just don't agree with that. The ultimate form of Iranian deterrence against Israel is that they're separated by a thousand miles and that the Israelis are a country of six million people and they can't topple the Iranian regime. So the regime is not at risk.

Jeffrey 19:51

Yeah. I mean, okay, fair. But what authoritarian regime has ever been able to persist as an authoritarian regime without a healthy dose of paranoia about threats to the regime? I mean, these people think a stray strand of a woman's hair is the end of the Islamic Republic. What? And like you have to think that way if you're going to run an authoritarian regime.

I get you.

Aaron 20:15

I'm totally with you.

Jeffrey 20:16

A competitive authoritarian regime. They have elections. I get it.

Aaron 20:19

No, I agree with you. But just because they make an irrational decision doesn't mean that it's actually rational. No, these guys are nuts. They're complete nut balls. I mean – and so again, they're frightened of women having – Not any worse than anyone else, I have to be clear. I'm not passing judgment.

Jeffrey 20:36

I'm simply making – World political leaders are all insane. Yeah.

Aaron 20:40

My point is that, rationally speaking, after they get their ass handed to them, somebody's going to go into the Supreme Leader's office and say, here's an option, Chief. The North Korea model. Leave the NPT. Boot the IAEA inspectors. Dig a deep hole in the desert that's a hundred feet beneath a mountain and build a centrifuge facility and then just build a bomb.

Jeffrey 21:06

Well, I mean, they have that huge construction project going on right across from Natanz. Right.

Aaron 21:11

Which is really big. And build a bomb because that will protect you in the future. But as we have discussed on this, it wouldn't stop the Israelis in Lebanon. And the dynamics in the region, it's no longer 1973, it's no longer 1979, it's no longer 1994. Look around the region. Who's coming into Tel Aviv? With ground forces, the Egyptians?

No. Jordanians? No. Syrians? No. The Lebanese don't exist. It's sort of a government. It's sort of a patchwork.

Jeffrey 21:42

It is remarkable how weak all of Israel's neighbors have become. I mean, those governments seem to have really hollowed out.

Aaron 21:51

Saudi Arabia, no. The UAE, no. And so you just keep going through the list. And so it's just like what I think keeps the relationship in check is not the presence of mutual deterrence on either side by a proxy or a nuclear program. It's that they are separated by Jordan and Iraq from each other.

Jeffrey 22:11

I mean, I think the one thing that complicates this narrative, I agree with this rationally, but the one thing I think that complicates the narrative is that The domestic politics of these two places still interact with one another. Absolutely. And so it is in Netanyahu's interest to retain a sense of siege. And it is within the Iranian leadership's interest to appear to be responsible for that sense of siege.

Right. And so you can imagine ongoing terror attacks.

Aaron 22:50

Yes.

Jeffrey 22:51

Just as you get assassinations in Iran, you can imagine funding and support for terrorist attacks in Israel. That, I think, always runs the risk of breaking out into open warfare. In a situation where the Israelis have nuclear weapons, maybe the Iranians start to feel like The Israelis can be more aggressive than they can be. I mean there's always that – there's that famous quote where somebody asked Saddam who loved supporting such things.

What would you do if you had a nuclear weapon? And his answer was, I would drown the Israelis in their own blood.

Aaron 23:30

I mean it's poetic. That's probably how he felt.

Jeffrey 23:34

Yeah. So I mean you can – if Iran acquires a nuclear weapon, I think the one thing that Israel would have to be worried about is that the Iranians would feel – More willing to engage in not these kinds of missile strikes, but I would think terrorist attacks and things. But I don't know. I think you are right that we – yes, they're both – the Iranians I think have been much more cautious than people give them credit for in part because of I think their own politics.

Aaron 24:07

No, I think we're both agreeing. We're not actually disagreeing. I'm saying that if the Iranians choose to break out and build, It won't actually be from a place of like rational cost. Like you can – it's like if you were Pakistan and India detonates a nuclear weapon. Oh my god. Are you trying to talk me into the domestic politics of proliferation because that's your – It's like a seminar in 2008.

You are kayaking downstream, friend.

Jeffrey 24:28

I am – I am 100% on board with it, yet nobody ever does anything rationally.

Aaron 24:37

I was rereading my dissertation besides the typos. My entire argument boils down to, well, it depends on how the leader in charge feels. I mean, it's not a trivial factor. It's like the leader who has control over the nuclear program can make a decision and it's usually a he. It's always a he. Wakes up and goes, yeah, that one seems all right to me.

Let's give it a whirl. Maybe Hymenae wakes up tomorrow and says, let's give it a whirl, baby.

Jeffrey 25:08

You know? Yeah. I mean, I do think – I mean, just to make this serious before we really go off the rails. He is waking up just like Netanyahu is and he is asking the question, how do I retain power and how do I pass power to my – there's some rumor he wants to pass it to his son.

But like whatever, to my team or my side or my people. And so I think in – one of my biggest complaints about our field is we try to rationalize the stuff in terms of strategic outcomes. Which is certainly how Hamaneh will present it to others. But like, we don't have to be that naive. Like we don't have to believe everything these guys say.

He's actually thinking like, how I handle this interaction with Israel is Is first and foremost about how I maintain my power, husband it, deploy it, and set up a leadership transition that I will favor. And yeah, he's not going to say that because that's just too craven. But that is fundamentally my model of his decision making. So if he thinks escalation makes it more likely his son ends up as the next supreme leader, he'll do that.

And if he thinks it makes it less likely, he won't do that. And so I think reverse engineering these political processes is the important thing to understand how Iran is going to escalate. And I think that in part explains why they've been, you know, whatever, a month away from a bomb for the last 20 years.

Aaron 26:46

Right.

Jeffrey 26:52

Suggest leaving open the possibility of, I don't know if it's reapproachment with the West, like whatever it is. He doesn't want to pay that cost. He doesn't want to pick that side. And so he hasn't. I, I worry hitting the nuclear program will change that calculation for him. So I, I had some, I mean, so

Aaron 27:14

I, I agree with that. Whether it's a son or somebody from his movement there's debate on who the next Supreme Leader will be. But the point stands. But like, the idea that, I keep thinking about, it's something I'm curious to hear about as well. You know, there are some leaders who don't think about transition at all. Yeah, I was gonna make a transitioning joke in the Republican Party, but I'll stop there. but I mean, one, we saw another example of missile defense last night, and I don't really want to talk about it because I don't really know the answer to it, whether it was effective or not, sort of this black or white thing.

But one thing I am curious about, and I was curious about it last time, is that by all accounts, we're watching them roll these missiles out to these firing places, and then we're getting warning time. And then the Iranians are confirming it by telling everybody, you know, I think responsibly, we're about ready to fire off a bunch of ballistic missiles.

Don't misinterpret this or something else. Is one. There is distance involved, and so you have to get airplanes from, you know, Israel through Jordan to, or Syria to Iraq. But the left of launch scenario, I don't understand. I know what's the incentive structure is there not to hit them on the ground.

Jeffrey 28:27

I know. I'd shoot the archer, not the arrow.

Aaron 28:30

I don't know. I don't think the Israelis can get there, is my sort of working hypothesis. Because if you have five hours notice – because did you notice that Thomas Friedman basically had the outlines of the attack in the morning?

Jeffrey 28:42

Yeah. I mean, it's really strange because they fire them from the same places. They set them up in launch areas right outside the tunnels. We've mapped all the bases. I – Boy.

Aaron 28:57

Why wouldn't that be your target set? So, like, we keep reading about oil and gas, we keep reading about nuclear, we keep reading about, you know, command and control, i.e., like, the people in charge of these places. Why can't it be these missile sort of, like, roll in, roll out points?

Jeffrey 29:13

I mean, I think that The missiles themselves are in tunnels that are pretty well protected, so you might try to cave in the entrances. That probably takes a certain level of accuracy that maybe the Israelis don't feel like they have. Otherwise, you're just tearing up fields. Maybe you could hit some support structures out top. Yeah, I mean, as you say it, I mean, you know, like, yeah, hitting missile bases seems like not a bad idea.

Aaron 29:46

The other option I had was not that.

Jeffrey 29:47

You're right. I think if I'm in the little room, I think missile bases leap to the top of my, like, recommended list, although it seems like they want something showier than that.

Aaron 29:58

Yeah. I mean, and then the last question I had is, why not the centrifuge workshops?

Jeffrey 30:05

Not the facilities, but where they produce the centrifuges. That's another one that popped into my head. I mean, assuming they really know where that is. I mean, I know we used to know where that was.

Aaron 30:15

We did used to know where that was.

Jeffrey 30:17

I mean, if I were the Iranians, you know, once I was freed of the constraints of the JCPOA by the great Donald Trump, the first thing I would have done is move all those machines someplace else.

Aaron 30:32

Just trying to come up with a target list that doesn't involve dropping the tons. Because I think if you drop the tons, you end up with another hole. And it's going to be deeper and you'll have a breakout capability.

Jeffrey 30:42

Well, they are building across the road in the mountains. They are digging a giant underground facility. And our first analysis was that it was small. And then we realized that was just the entrance. And that thing is huge. And it is, I don't want to say it's much too big for what they say it's for, because I think they have Indicated that many functions are moving.

So it's not like they've said it will only be for this. But there's a lot of space under that mountain. And if I were them, I would, I would go underground for sure.

Aaron 31:19

Wasn't when love is on. She almost first discovered that they sell us for textiles. Wait, no, I think it was Calais Electric. Calais Electric was for textiles. Was it textiles? Textile plant.

Jeffrey 31:34

I don't remember it. It's got a basketball court on it now, right? It's a park or some shit.

Aaron 31:39

It's still my all-time favorite arms control on blog days before the podcast.

Jeffrey 31:44

No, it was the Israelis. The Israelis said Demona was like... The Israelis had some crazy cover story for Dimona. Okay, this would be a good extra arms control wonk episode when we've done the research of what are the worst all-time cover stories for nuclear-related facilities.

Aaron 32:01

I'm telling you there was a textile plant somewhere, but maybe that was Dimona. Who knows? But I think we're off the rails.

Jeffrey 32:08

We are off the rails, which is where I like to be.

Aaron 32:13

Well, maybe by the time this episode posts, the Israelis will have struck. And so we'll see how we get on the report card, but we'll try and get it up faster than usual.

Jeffrey 32:21

Do you want to try to take the good people's money?

Aaron 32:23

Oh, yeah. I mean, well, you know, the good people's money is put to a good cause, which is the production of this podcast. And in payment or in service or in return for that good money, you get access to the world's greatest Slack channel, where you will be the first to see satellite photos of Nevitim Airbase 30 days from recording today.

That is Patreon.com slash ACW podcast. $3 if you're a student, $5 if you're not, which gets you the hottest ticket in town to the what was old is now new, which is now old again, which is the study of nonproliferation cascades and trends.

Jeffrey 32:59

Come join up. Yeah, we just don't really do any arms control non-proliferation or disarmament anymore. It's just all proliferation, arms racing. I should change the leader.

Aaron 33:11

Transport yourself back to 2008 at patreon.com slash acwpodcast.

Jeffrey 33:19

Yeah, from now on, you are listening to the Arms Control Podcast, a podcast on arms racing, proliferation, and armament.

Aaron 33:28

Yeah, it's the Disco Vintage Podcast. Check it out. I'm Matt Jeffrey. Let's get off the rails tomorrow.