Russia Buys North Korean Missiles

Jeffrey Lewis 0:06

You are listening to the Arms Control Wonk Podcast, a podcast on arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation. I'm Dr. Jeffrey Lewis, the founding publisher of the Arms Control Wonk blog and a professor at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey.

Aaron Stein 0:24

I'm Aaron Stein, Chief Content Officer at Wolf on the Rocks. Jeffrey, it's been a while.

Jeffrey 0:30

It's been a minute, Aaron. Greetings from snowy, snowy, snowy Vermont.

Aaron 0:37

You look to be in like an ornate New England manner, not just student housing.

Jeffrey 0:43

I am, in fact, staying at Hadley House, which is named after Egbert Hadley, an early president of Middlebury College. And it's where they put up the trustees and VIPs, although it was made very clear to me that I was here at the pleasure of the president because I was in neither category.

Aaron 1:02

Say, are you a VIP? Nope. Because that was what you'd have to make. Nope. When you walk around the campus there, it is small. Do people go, that's the guy from the Art Patrol Wong podcast? They 100% do not do this. Yeah. OK. And Egbert, that's not a name you hear very often.

Jeffrey 1:21

No, but and I can't remember now. I think Egbert was married to a star and I believe their son Egbert Star Hadley also also went to Middlebury. There's a there's a picture of a young man and he's clearly a very young man in like the 19 teens. You know, he's got like the white the white like tennis sweater and the whole deal.

And I'm. It's unsigned and there's no plaque, but I'm guessing that's Little Egg Burt.

Aaron 1:53

A true VIP. But you know who was a VIP at a North Korean, like, let's call it Missile Bazaar? Oh, who? I think it was one Sergei Shoigu, was it not?

Jeffrey 2:05

Yeah, he went shopping and it now seems he brought some things home.

Aaron 2:11

Yeah, I mean, for listeners, we tried to do this last week, but we bumped it because our schedule is conflicted. But there was news. I think, Jeffrey, you were on the leading edge of it. I think the first reports were in The Wall Street Journal that the Russians began using imported North Korean ballistic missiles to fire and hit targets in Ukraine.

Jeffrey 2:31

Yes. So pretty quickly, the US government announced that some of the debris recovered was either from a missile called the KN-23 or the KN-24. North Korea calls them both the Hwasong-11. One's the A, one's the B. They're distinct but pretty similar. And honestly, when a missile gets to the end of its ride, it's pretty up. So it's pretty hard to tell what you're looking at.

But we looked at some of the pictures online and Reuters gave us access to some additional images. And it's very, very clear that the U.S. government is telling the truth. And in fact, Russia is now firing Hwasong-11s. Sadly, listeners, by the time you hear this, Conflict Armaments Research will have published their report. They have even better pictures.

They were kind enough to let us see them, but I will... I will let them analyze their own pictures, but holy shit.

Aaron 3:35

I mean, for a long time listeners to the podcast, because it's been going on for a long time now, this is what we used to call full frontal explicit wonk porn.

Jeffrey 3:43

Yeah, I mean, I will say I f***ing hate getting data this way because, you know, if it's like some 10-year-old kid is going to be killed by one of these horrible things, I'd rather have the 10-year-old kid than the data. Not really on the other hand, but Given that the Russians are doing this and given that they are hell bent on doing this, I do think it's extremely important for us to document the work.

And this is one of those cases where I think when you look at the debris, it's just extremely clear that this is in fact a North Korean missile.

Aaron 4:22

Yeah. This has been a very North Korean rollout. Again, we made the joke about the VIP, Sergei Shoigu, going to the arms bazaar, but he was clearly looking at things and that those things have since shown up in the country. And that always feels to me like staged North Korean propaganda. It's setting expectations to meet them and then exceed them.

Jeffrey 4:48

Yes, and in fact, one of the wild things is after Shoigu visited and then Kim Jong-un went to Russia, Kim Jong-un began a series of visits to munitions factories. And he was explicit in saying, these are munitions factories. And the North Koreans tried to hide where they were. And we have geolocated all of them, except the ones they just did yesterday.

And I think we have one of the two, and we'll have the other one soon. But these factories are all Factories that we think are supplying Russia. Like, our interpretation is that this is Kim Jong-un showing off the industrial capability, almost like marketing. And it is in fact those visits. That showed us the missiles in production that allowed us to ID the wreckage we saw in Ukraine.

Without those visits that Kim did this summer, I don't think we would have had nearly the confidence. We'd have had some of it, but only a fraction of the confidence we have based on the debris we're looking at.

Aaron 6:04

So I think we should come back to the significance of this, maybe towards the back end of the podcast, but now is the time to go into the wonk porn, you know, into you and your teams. I know you've seen more explicit photos, you know, ability to go through from the Shoigu visit to the Kim Jong-un's follow-on visits, ultimately to what they look like when they impact the ground so that you can confidently sort of, I guess, Fact check?

That's not the right term, but you get my point. I think it was in the Wall Street Journal, right? It's that leaked U.S. intelligence that North Koreans were being used.

Jeffrey 6:42

Well, if you insist, Aaron. I mean, I'm not made of stone. Yeah, I forget who had this story. Eventually, John Kirby came out and did a briefing, and they released a little map that showed where they thought the thing was launched and where it landed. And then they said they thought it was a North Korean missile, and they showed us pictures of a KN-23 and a KN-24.

From our perspective, though, like you say, you have to fact check this. And we wanted to look at the debris and ask, you know, is it an Iskander, which would be the Russian missile of that range and type? Or is it something else? And does that something else match what we saw in North Korea? And, you know, broadly speaking, there are really...

Two bits of data that you can see in the images that the Ukrainian government released and that Reuters has published. I promise you it gets better. But one is from the top of the motor casing and the other is at the bottom of the rocket itself. So at the bottom of the rocket, we probably could have done this analysis without seeing anything in the factory.

It's really as simple as both the Iskander and the Can, well, the Hwasong-11, the two North Korean missiles, which have the same number, but one's an A, one's a B. Both the Iskander and the Hwasong-11 have a housing where the mechanism that swivels the jet vanes to steer the missile sits. And what that housing looks like is purely aesthetic.

It has almost nothing to do with functionality. And the Iskander housing, which we see in lots and lots and lots of pictures of the Iskander, is sort of rounded. It's pretty thin and it's rounded. And the North Korean one is chunky. It's blocky and it's the shape of a trapezoid.

Aaron 8:46

And I- It looks like it's later.

Jeffrey 8:48

Yeah. You know, I find that if you put it in a long leather jacket, it's quite slimming. Yeah, and so that's clearly a North Korean housing. And then there are just other aspects of the bottom. So the Iskander has little nozzles for some additional steering, I think for attitude control. And it has these holes in the bottom of the missile where they can store penetration aids.

And the North Koreans just don't have any of that. And the wreckage that showed up was clean. It was free of all that. So, you know, this, this is so it looks so much like a North Korean missile and looks nothing like an Iskander, just looking at the bottom. But like the bonus, which I never thought only exists because we've been a little bit lucky and a little bit diligent, is there's the top of the solid motor. There's a metal plate that you bolt on where the igniter goes.

And we have one picture of the Iskander from the time they used it in Georgia. And it's got 18 bolts that hold it on, and they're in six little groups of three. And in the factory visit this summer, we saw that same plate bolted on to the Hwasong-11, and it's got 20 evenly spaced bolts.

Aaron 10:17

Are those the same bolts that are in the door of a Boeing 737 MAX 9 or different bolts? Or is it too soon for that?

Jeffrey 10:24

Too soon. Too soon. Too soon. We don't know.

Aaron 10:27

I wanted to... We don't know yet. But what I wanted to say is that for a long time, listeners, we've talked about this missile. We called it the Kim Scander.

Jeffrey 10:35

Yeah.

Aaron 10:36

You know, and it has the pull up maneuver. And so like real diehards and junkies can go back and find that episode where you do a deep dive on some of the the flight profile and what we think we know about it. But Look, I don't think there's any doubt. I saw your Twitter thread. We've talked about it privately, and I know that there's more explicit photos out there that this is the version, the North Korean version, perhaps.

Is it like a riff off of a Russian missile, or is it their own design that sort of looks like a Russian missile?

Jeffrey 11:06

You know, I go back and forth on how to answer this question. Ukrainians say it is a North Korean Iskander-like missile. And I think that's fair. I think it is a riff on Iskander. I also think that pretty much all solid propellant short-range ballistic missiles pretty much look the same. And so... While I think it is the same design philosophy as the Iskander, and I'm sure like the North Koreans looked at the Iskander and were like, yeah, that's pretty good.

I also think like there's nothing about it that's, Peculiar. It's different in really important ways. It's a different size. For years, we have pointed this out, that when you measure the North Korean missiles in parades, they're just bigger than the Iskander. It has more propellant. It travels further. It's shaped a little bit differently. So like, it's really its own thing, but sure, they certainly looked at the Iskander as well, by the way, as the South Korean Hyunmoo series.

Aaron 12:22

You know, when you think about this, because when you I know why you're uncomfortable answering that question is because a lot of people will say, like, see, the Russians just gave them technology and they just copied it. Right. And so, like, it's it's like a one way transfer in it. I don't want to say like undercuts the North Koreans, but it's one of those tactics we do to modulate or moderate.

Jeffrey 12:43

It's totally, it's totally intended to undercut the Koreans because it's, it's this idea that if the Russians are just supplying the North Koreans, then all we have to do is convince our buddy Vladimir Putin to cut them off and the problem goes away. And so there's like a fantasy there. If the problem is like, actually, no, you live in a modern world with the diffusion of manufacturing technology and even the North Koreans can make a plausible knockoff Iskander, not only do you no longer have the ability to stop the North Koreans, You have to stare at that big solid propellant missile plant the Chinese built, the Saudis, and contemplate what does a world look like in which the Saudis and the UAE and everybody else, Turkey, a great example, can all go down this path.

Because that's just a different world.

Aaron 13:37

Different world, but one in which I think When Kim Jong-un signed that contract or they toasted it over whatever is the local libation of choice, he must have been secretly saying, we finally got you, boys. You came to us, right, and we're giving you artillery shells. And not only are you coming for artillery shells, you're buying a missile from us.

It's not the 1950s. It's not the 1960s, 70s, 80s, 90s, whatever. Whenever you cut off that sort of one-way supply of Russian arms, it's now going the other way.

Jeffrey 14:09

Yes, and that is, I think, an important lifeline for North Korea because that means a steady supply of hard currency and bartered goods to support their economy. And by the way, this is great freaking advertising for the North Koreans.

Aaron 14:28

That's the interesting thing here, right, is that the North Koreans used to sort of sell to anybody who would want it, like Scuds, right? Yes. They were Scuds. Now they have something far better than a scud that they can whack around and say, see, even his targets in Ukraine, you know, and it does a pull up.

Jeffrey 14:45

Yes, it maneuvers. I mean, you know, I think maneuvering is overrated, but, but I, you know, if you are Egypt or Saudi Arabia or the UAE or Syria or Vietnam or Burma, like there are lots of countries around the world that, That if you want to get in the missile business, I think it's now very clear that North Korea is a potential supplier of, you know, probably not the highest quality missiles, but relatively inexpensive, perfectly serviceable missiles.

And the Russians have proved that by their actions.

Aaron 15:31

Do we have a sense of what the Russians are firing them at? Because I guess that could give you sort of their confidence in what the Russians, they seem to have a tendency, at least in many missile strikes, to target hotels and high rise apartment buildings. But, you know, what they want to aim this thing at.

Jeffrey 15:48

Yeah, it's very hard to tell because there's only been a handful of them used. And, you know, in one case, it fell near a building. And so now the question is, were they targeting the building or were they targeting something nearby? And it just missed a lot. And we just fundamentally don't know. And the Ukrainians have sort of stayed mum about what they thought they were targeting.

So I think we don't know anything. My guess is the accuracy of them is probably not as good as the Iskander. But, you know, on the other hand, it kind of comes down to what you want your missiles to do. You know, if your goal is to threaten an opponent's civilian population, accuracy is not so important. And then also, like, quantity has a quality all its own.

These missiles aren't that expensive. And so it might, you know, one Iskander, it might take three Hwasong-11s to do the job of one Iskander. It's not clear to me... That three Hwasong 11s cost the same as an Iskander. Like, just buy more.

Aaron 17:03

So I guess it comes down to North Korean production capacity, which, again, I think we have a tendency, or at least there is a tendency, to downplay it as if these guys are backwards and so they can't possibly produce enough of them. But I think in the realm of artillery shells, I know it's apples to oranges, they can far outproduce many European suppliers of the other side, the Ukrainians.

Jeffrey 17:22

Yeah, and well, one thing that we have done is we have tried to analyze the equipment that we see in the plants that make these systems. And so, for example, the KN23s, 24s, the Hwasong-11, that's made at a plant called the February 11th plant. The February 11th plant subordinate to the Ryungsong Machine Factory, which we identified a number of years ago.

Actually, my friend Josh Pollack and I It used to make tank wheels. And Josh and I, for the longest time, were like, I don't feel like it makes tank wheels. And eventually we had this like conspiracy theory. It made missiles. And like now it turns out it does. They have dramatically expanded the floor space at that place.

And they have shown us the production equipment. And that production equipment is not imported. So, you know, I think for them, scaling up production is a question of money. But that money problem is solved if the Russians are buying it. Right. And labor is cheap in North Korea.

Aaron 18:31

I would assume that the cost of North Korea may just be a food ration or just a poultry handout for a voucher at your local superstore.

Jeffrey 18:42

Or, you know, not getting a swift kick in the ass, you know, like. And by the way, one thing we're watching is we're watching the trade come in to North Korea from Russia. So we can see the trade from Russia to North Korea, and we can't exactly make out what it is, but we can tell that it's barter goods that are small enough to be carried by people.

So it's probably like sacks of food.

Aaron 19:10

So I guess the next – so I guess where this narrative will go is that with the next sort of – Let's say North Korean development on their long range missile front, I guess the VM front, is that there will be claims that there was Russian expertise given. Do you know what I mean? Like I can already foresee.

Jeffrey 19:31

You know, I think there is almost certainly Assistance that has come from Russian and Chinese entities into North Korea. There's also a fair amount of evidence of, on the liquid side, cooperation between North Korea and Iran, right? There was a ton of work between the North Koreans and the dudes at the Shig for aficionados of the podcast, right?

Oh, yeah.

Aaron 19:57

A great one.

Jeffrey 19:58

You know, so I think that there is a kind of Technological back and forth. But the example I often think of is Israel. The French designed the Jericho and the French supplied Israel with the production equipment. And so on the one hand, the Jericho was originally a French missile. I It was called the MD, I think, 620, because it was a 620 kilometer range missile made by Marcel Dassault, right?

Like, it was a French missile. Might be 260. I'd have to go back and look. I don't remember. But it was a Dassault missile. But that was enough. You know, that seed allowed Israel to build its own missile program. And so... Whatever help Russia or China might have provided, whatever design inspiration the North Koreans might have taken, whatever use they may have made of international procurement networks, I think that blinds us to the fact that that's actually a pretty typical path for a country that becomes self-sufficient in producing missiles.

In the United States, We relied on Werner Von Braun, but it didn't mean that we didn't have a domestic rocket program. It just meant that we made use initially of the information technology and people that were available to us. I think the North Koreans did the same thing.

Aaron 21:36

Yeah, Nazi or not, we bring them in.

Jeffrey 21:38

Yeah, you know. Interesting character. Once the rocket is up, who cares where it comes down? It's not my department. My grandfather knew him, actually. Oh, really? Yeah.

Aaron 21:49

Oh, yeah. Oh, yeah. Yeah, no, he's a friend of the family.

Jeffrey 21:56

Werner Von Braun, friend of the pod.

Aaron 21:58

Werner, he had reformed. He had found his savior at that point. But, you know, he had said sorry. But the other half of the family.

Jeffrey 22:04

Yeah. He said sorry to the half of the family that survived.

Aaron 22:12

One half knew him as Werner, Savior, and the other half knew him as Werner, Executioner. But we're going to leave it at that because that means I've gone off the rails. It is true. My grandfather did know him. But I think we hit it. Is there anything else that we need to do?

Jeffrey 22:33

You know, I think that it's just probably worth stepping back and saying we're probably in an era where our attitude toward missile proliferation needs to change. Because our ability to restrict missile proliferation seems pretty limited. And these things are becoming normal weapons of warfare. And there are probably some useful things to keep doing in terms of the missile technology control regime, the Hague Code of Conduct, notifications.

But... It's probably time to rethink things. And the unpopular thing I keep saying, no one likes this, by the way, is I keep saying the South Korean government, you know, they had a real interest in discouraging Russia from funding North Korea's missile program. The appropriate tit for tat response for them would be to supply Ukraine with South Korean comparable missiles.

You know, I think in general, the view should be if you're the South Koreans, like we don't want you to do this. If you stop buying stuff from the North Koreans, then we will stop supplying it to Ukraine. But like there has to be a punishment. There has to be a penalty. If not, you're the South Koreans.

You're just basically taking your lumps like a chump.

Aaron 24:04

Yeah, I mean, I guess my final point on this is I've started to think about a lot of these commodities, like their cars. There's a luxury car brand market, and then there's these sort of mid-sedans. And the ability for countries to make that mid-tier sedan, and yes, missiles are not cars. I'm not doing a Fareed Zakaria thing here.

It's just the defute of manufacturing these things.

Jeffrey 24:31

Yeah. Absolutely.

Aaron 24:33

Has proliferated around the world. So it's not just Forge Spence any longer.

Jeffrey 24:38

Yep. I couldn't agree more. I froze, but I couldn't agree more. All right. So I couldn't agree more.

Aaron 24:46

Well, I think we've hit it. Jeffrey, thank you for joining me from the VIP room. Do not get bottle service. It is a ripoff. Buy from your local state store or your local liquor store down the street.

Jeffrey 24:59

There is... A liquor cabinet here in Hadley House.

Aaron 25:05

You do have bottle service. You are in the VIP room.

Jeffrey 25:09

The trustees come, they stay, they buy a nice bottle of something and they leave it. And I, you know, I plan to leave the liquor cabinet in better shape than I found it.

Aaron 25:20

All right. So tip your server. And with that, if you want to tip us and keep this podcast going, go to patreon.com slash ACWpodcasts. $3 if you're a student, $5 if you're not. Join the Kula Slack channel in the Arms Control Wonk space. It is the place to be. It is the VIP room of this community. And with that, Jeffrey, thank you.

Jeffrey 25:43

It was a pleasure, Aaron.