The Janky Triad

Jeffrey Lewis 0:06

You are listening to the Arms Control Walk podcast, a podcast on arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation. I'm Dr. Jeffrey Lewis, the founding publisher of the Arms Control Walk blog, and a professor at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey.

Aaron Stein 0:23

And I am Aaron Stein, Chief Content Officer at War on the Rocks. Jeffrey, it's good to see you again.

Jeffrey 0:29

Hey!

Aaron 0:31

Well, launch a missile. Get a pod. Get a pod. I'd say he's our most featured guest. Does he want residuals? Are we going to break sanctions if we start sending him a check for his impact on our show?

Jeffrey 0:44

I would totally have Kim Jong-un on for an interview. I know we don't do interviews anymore for all the people who have tried to get on as interviews, which I guess sometimes we break down, but... We really don't do interviews, but Kim Jong-un, I'd make an exception.

Aaron 1:02

You know, as long as we don't end up in jail for violating some sanctions, I'd be cool. I mean, we could do it in the Philippines. Where do we meet? We want to meet in Singapore. We could take a train, chug on in, nice hotel, you know, feel the love.

Jeffrey 1:16

And I think he speaks English.

Aaron 1:19

He's the big movie file, right? The big cinematic movie file? Or was that his father? Yeah.

Jeffrey 1:24

That was his father, but he went to boarding school in Switzerland, and very famously, when Donald Trump made that comment to him in the meeting about being fat, he reacted visually. Like, you're f***ing kidding me? And he didn't say anything, but you could just see it on his face. And then the translator didn't translate that comment, and he looked at the translator like...

You know, like I know what you did.

Aaron 1:52

I know what you did. Okay. Right. That's right. It was his dad. Cause I was about to say, he's probably watching a lot of those Hollywood blockbusters without the subtitles on. Anyway, he's busy. Speaking of, he is, he, he's just firing him off. We didn't get a nuke test. At least not yet. But we've had we had the missile test and it was the first one, I think since 2017, where they didn't try to thread the needle.

And it just went straight over. I think the Northern part of Japan, right?

Jeffrey 2:20

Yeah, that's right. So, you know, really, there have been these two sets of missile tests. There's the single missile that they fired over Japan. And then the next day, I guess, or maybe it was two days. It's hard to remember now. The North Koreans did a test of a pair of short range ballistic missiles. And then, I mean, just for, you know, shits and giggles, the South Koreans responded with their own Hyunmoo test.

And one of those like blew up spectacularly. So a lot of fireworks on the Korean peninsula this week.

Aaron 2:52

And I saw this morning is that the DPRK flew at the South Korean border with some of some of his Air Force jets, prompting a scramble from South Korea, too.

Jeffrey 3:03

Yeah, I think that I think we're really going to be parsing that last act for a little bit because there was some reporting that there was a bomber included. And so I think it's a little unclear whether this is an indication of North Korea's continuing investment in their conventional military, which Kim is doing, but kind of gets ignored because it's the nuclear bits that interest us the most.

Or whether those fighters were, you know, whether that was a snowcat and they were trying to get a bomber through to put an air-launched cruise missile on a target, which is a thing the North Koreans have that doesn't seem to ever get reported on. They might have a kind of janky triad.

Aaron 3:48

The janky triad. We should call the episode that. But let's talk about the test. Yeah. You guys, and by you guys and gals, I should say you, based upon the initial reporting, because I have access to the super secret DM groups where you guys hash all this stuff out, it matched your models. And so you were able to make a pretty good guess about what it was early, I would say early within the hour of the announcement.

Jeffrey 4:15

Yeah. So I will say that we're still it is a guess. It's an educated guess because the North Koreans never gave us pictures. But if it had been new and it had worked, I think they would have. So on balance, I think we're right. When we you know, the. The time it flew. The range and the apogee were all consistent with this being a Hwasong-12.

Now, I think some people were a little surprised by this because our model for the Hwasong-12 was always a lot more capable than other people's models. Right. So, you know, and, like, models are precisely that. They're models. They're not necessarily completely accurate to life. But our sense was that on a minimum energy trajectory, that thing could sort of get around, you know, 4,500 kilometers.

And this thing apparently went 4,600 kilometers. Now, that's with a fairly light warhead, like, lighter than we would typically model that missile as having. But, like, yeah, you know, like... 4,600 kilometers, 1,000 kilometer apogee, 22-minute flight time, all those things were within, you know, like 5% of our model. So given that they had flown that missile on this trajectory before, given that all the parameters worked out, now especially given that they haven't told us anything new, I think it's a Hwasong-12, maybe slightly improved.

Aaron 5:46

Yeah, and so... I think the other part of the reporting was, is that between, I think it was the end of 2017 and basically up until the test, so let's say October 2022 or late September, I can't remember when they did it, they had tried, or at least maybe not tried, to specifically overfly Japan. But in this case, they did.

And then the overflight prompted, I think, the issuance of those cell phone or mobile phone orders, or perhaps on the TVs, to shelter in place for parts of Japan Which if you remember from our own scare with Hawaii, like how terrifying that could be for people, you know, in terms of taking shelter with the uncertainty and stuff like that.

Do you make anything of them like overflying Japan in this case? Or you just think it was the best way to go to model or to test this missile?

Jeffrey 6:33

My official view is it's the best way to test this missile. And the fact that it causes Japanese people to panic is a bonus for the North Koreans. I mean, I saw somebody on Twitter saying, like, what did the people of Japan ever do to Korea? And I was like, oh, boy, I'm just going to mute this conversation right now.

Aaron 6:51

That sounds like my Twitter feed whenever I wade into anything that has to do with Greeks and Greeks and Turks. It's days of bad stuff.

Jeffrey 6:58

I am all about letting bygones be bygones, but like, ain't nobody else feeling that way. Like, so I'm like, this is where I get off the train. I nearly got stabbed with a pair of those nice metal chopsticks Koreans use once for like winding a guy up about Dokdo. So like, just no. but you know, people are like, oh, but it's been five years, and I I'm a big believer that like now that I'm old and time passes very quickly, like five years is nothing.

Because basically what happened was North Korea was routinely overflying Japan. Right. They had done it a couple of times with the Hwasong-12. And then they agreed to the moratorium. Right. And then the moratorium lasted for a couple of years. And then Kim was like, OK, the moratorium is off. But he didn't break it. Right. He said it's off.

But then he like gave Trump the rest of his term to see if they could, you know, get those colored lights moving again. And and then. When. Biden came into office, you know, things then started to change. But even then, I think the North Koreans calibrated what they were doing. So, you know, they didn't get around to testing a Hwasong-12 again until January.

And they did that one on a lofted trajectory. And so I kind of think that, you know, it was like time now. You know, like they're back to testing the Hwasong-12. I think they're going to, I mean, they've done some ICBM tests. I think they're going to do those. And like it's better to overfly Japan because you're flying it on a minimum energy trajectory, which is a realistic trajectory.

And like Japan is this long freaking chain of islands. And so if you're the North Koreans, like you really can't avoid it.

Aaron 8:50

No, you can't avoid it. And so if you want to get out, there's only sort of one way to get out.

Jeffrey 8:56

They seem to fly it over that little strait, right, between Hokkaido and the main island. So, you know, I'm not—I get why the Japanese are freaked out. I mean, if the Russians popped up in the Caribbean and fired a submarine-launched ballistic missile over Florida into the Atlantic, we would freak out. But— The altitude at which it passed over Japan was so high it posed zero risk to anybody in Japan.

And I do think that they aim at that straight, which, I mean, it's not cool, but, like, whatever. I... When you have a crappy relationship with a nuclear powered neighbor or nuclear armed neighbor that is testing missiles, they're going to do crap like this. I mean, that's just that's what we signed up for. It reminds me of when I tried to tell the that senior Japanese official that North Korea was going to test an ICBM in a year.

And he was like, no, they're not. Sanctions are going to work. And I'm like, OK, well, chief, this is what you're signing up for. So here you are. So.

Aaron 9:58

I mean, it sounds like you're buttering up Kim Jong Un to get him on the podcast here.

Jeffrey 10:03

You know, I was defending him as a rational decision-maker this morning on the telephone. I think he is making rational decisions. I mean, like, none of us can really empathize with the man. Like, I think it was rational of him to, like, murder his half-brother, but, like... None of us are going to murder a sibling to maintain power, right?

It's hard to be empathetic with somebody who is in a radically different social, cultural, political context, right? When you're the evil dictator of a country, that's like a different gig than being a loser professor in California. These are really different jobs.

Aaron 10:45

Or just a podcast host. But... So... What is... So, like, when you... We call it the janky triad, but, like... Like, I... Because the Hwasong-12 is an intermediate range. It has 4,500 kilometers, I think, at the farthest end.

Jeffrey 11:04

The South Koreans were like, it traveled at Mach 17. Like, A, Mach numbers are not great when something's outside the atmosphere. B, that's literally the definition of an IRBM. Yes, it must burn out at that speed to go that distance. Those are basics.

Aaron 11:19

It's hypersonic. But...

Jeffrey 11:23

Sorry. We're going to institute a rule. Every time somebody says hypersonic, I'm going to say bombs. So there, we have deterrence.

Aaron 11:33

Okay. You hypothesized, and I think it's right. And I think when you look at the tests in aggregate, so the Hwasong-12 and then the two shorter range missiles, and let's throw the bomber flight out for now. Is that they're preparing theater systems for scenarios that involve nuclear use for a theater war rather than, even though they have them, missile tests for targets against the U.S. mainland.

Jeffrey 12:02

Yeah, I mean, I think we are seeing, and we probably should have done like nine pods on this at this point, but how many times do we want to like talk about Kim Jong-un?

Aaron 12:09

Yeah.

Jeffrey 12:10

North Korea is going really big on tactical nuclear weapons.

Aaron 12:13

Right.

Jeffrey 12:14

They have two missions for their forces. One is to deter an attack. Those are the ICBMs. But if an attack is coming, they are super clear. And I don't think an attack is coming. I think they are wrong that we want to invade them. But whatever. He's afraid he's going to end up like Saddam. And if the U.S. invades, like it did in Iraq, which is now 19 years ago, they're going to use a sh** ton of nuclear weapons against U.S. forces in South Korea and Japan to try to stop that invasion.

Aaron 12:42

And how far is the air base at Guam from North Korea?

Jeffrey 12:47

It is Hwasong-12 range. There you go. Hwasong-12 that they were going to use to bracket that island. So my guess is on day one of an invasion, a lot of stuff gets hit. I don't know how much they hold back. They probably hold back the ICBMs, but they might target San Diego and Pearl. But they're going to try to, what they say, is repel that invasion with nuclear weapons.

And so I think that accounts for Kim Jong-un convening the Central Military Commission and announcing that they're giving them new capabilities, which are almost certainly tactical nuclear weapons. It accounts for the speech Kim gave the other day in which he said they are never going to give nuclear weapons up and they're never going to bargain them away.

It was very explicit. And I think it accounts for the fact that they counter-program their missile tests to our exercises. We practice invading them, and they practice nuking us. Like, as I was saying, it's like the Taeguk. It's balanced.

Aaron 13:44

I was about to say, you could make a joke about escalate to de-escalate, but I'm just trying to wind you up at this point, because I know you're in a good mood.

Jeffrey 13:51

Oh, my God. It's so difficult to wind me up. No, I mean... Hey, Jeffrey, have you looked at Twitter today? Ahhhh!

Aaron 14:02

I don't think there's anything much more to it than that. I mean, it was a Hwasong-12 test. You think, I'm persuaded by the evidence, but regardless of what it was, they were simulating the distances needed to get to Guam, because it appears to be part of a rigorous and extensive missile testing program that keeps their forces, I guess, limber, I guess, used, and has their scientists collecting data so that they can improve them.

Jeffrey 14:28

Yeah, I think that's right. And it is important to remember that they are both testing the missiles. But I think increasingly for many of these exercises, they are testing the launch crews.

Aaron 14:39

Oh, that's interesting. I don't think we've talked about that in the podcast. Why don't you spend 30 seconds on that and then we can wrap up.

Jeffrey 14:44

I mean, I certainly think the reason we're seeing so many conventional SRBM tests or maybe they're not conventional. Some of them are conventional. Some of them would be for nuclear weapons. But so many tests of the short range missiles. Which are well beyond what they need, I think, at this point to establish statistical confidence in the missiles themselves, is because they are practicing.

These are, I think, operational units that are going out and doing a launch so that Kim Jong-un knows that, you know, when he gives the order, they'll actually be able to execute it. So, you know, like this is not a joke. They are genuinely afraid we are going to invade them, even though we aren't. And they are genuinely preparing to use nuclear weapons in large numbers against our forces in South Korea and Japan if we do.

So, by the way, it's really in our interest that they don't get the wrong idea. Somebody wrote a novel about that. I don't know.

Aaron 15:33

It's true, but it's, you know, can we use the political science-y stuff? It's like percepts and misperception. How do we deal with that? Because for listeners, we recorded a podcast back to back today. I'll let you behind the curtain. Back to back to back. It's like, what happens when the potential adversary, whether it be Kim Jong-un or Putin or something along those lines, believes in the conspiracy theory that we're actually planning to invade them and can't be talked out of it?

Jeffrey 15:58

We all f***ing die. That's the scary part. Yeah. I mean, in theory, right, deterrence horrifies everyone into being cautious. So we hope that they are extremely reluctant to reach that conclusion because they know that it's going to lead to this calamity. But, you know, decision makers make bad decisions all the freaking time. You know, George W. Bush thought we'd be greeted as liberators.

Wrong. Vladimir Putin thought Zelensky would flee to Poland and the Ukrainians would embrace the ill-trained Russian army. Like, wrong.

Aaron 16:37

Liz Trust lowers taxes and stimulates an economy in a huge inflationary environment. That was a bad idea.

Jeffrey 16:43

Lyndon Johnson thought he could escalate his way out of the Vietnam War. The greatest politician of his generation literally destroys his presidency. Saddam Hussein was convinced Bush wouldn't go to Baghdad. These people are dumb.

Aaron 16:57

Right. This brings us to our off-podcast discussion about me making my vaccine appointment. Let's not go there.

Jeffrey 17:05

I just, you know, I... Maybe they're not any dumber than the normal person, but what I would say is that being a successful politician selects for lots of traits and skills which are not always... Ideal for governing or making high stress decisions. I, someone I forget who it was, you know, was sort of like vaguely frustrated that like we still haven't come up with a better, better like governance strategy by other than letting assholes run the world. And like, yeah, like we still don't have a better governance strategy than letting assholes run the world.

Aaron 17:46

Is it janky triad or assholes who run the world? That's going to be the intro drop on this podcast.

Jeffrey 17:53

There's a Jarvis Cocker song about this, which is, you know, it's got some choice wordage in it. But yeah, you know, like decision makers are...

Aaron 18:03

Not that great at their jobs. They're just, they're human beings that we, and as anybody can attest for how many times they screw up during times of high pressure. Like getting your kids out to swim lessons imagine that with nuclear. The threat of nuclear ICBM is coming down on you.

Jeffrey 18:19

And it's important to remember they're not like IR majors, right? So like Putin is not there sitting there going like, Hmm, should I act like Schelling or Jervis in this occasion? Right? Like they're much simpler, more visceral creatures than that. And you know, that's why we believe in nuclear deterrence because we think for a simple visceral creature, a simple visceral threat is good.

You know, the downside is it might not always work out for us.

Aaron 18:48

Yeah. I guess the upside is for those, what is it, 33 minutes? Is there on the way you can tweet yourself into oblivion and say, I told you so.

Jeffrey 18:57

I told you so. There you go.

Aaron 18:59

With that, we are doing fantastic work. And by we, our Patreons do work that is unrivaled in the open source space, in this emerging field of OSINT and how it ties into all those deterrents, which we need a refresher.

Jeffrey 19:16

Someone asked me whether we were better at this or Bellingcat was better at this. And I was like, it's not CNS or Bellingcat. It's the Slack channel.

Aaron 19:23

It's the Slack channel. It's where the two meet and they party, actually. It is the happy hour of the world's greatest Ocenters.

Jeffrey 19:32

They're freaking incredible. Much better at it than I am at this point.

Aaron 19:36

So if you want to join that party, it's exclusive. It's members only. And it only costs you three bucks. You don't even have to grease the doorman. It's patreon.com slash ACW podcast. Three dollars. That's less than your Starbucks. Five dollars. If you are not a student, that's still less than your Starbucks. You can join and join the party.

Jeffrey, it's good to be with you.

Jeffrey 19:57

Good to talk to you, Aaron. Thanks for listening.