Waiting for the Boom

Jeffrey Lewis 0:02

I told you so, with Jeffrey Lewis and a very tired Aaron Stein. You are listening to the Arms Control Wonk podcast, a podcast on arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation. I'm Dr. Jeffrey Lewis, the founding publisher of the Arms Control Wonk blog, and a professor at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey.

Aaron Stein 0:25

And I am Aaron Stein, Director of Research at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, coming to you from a microphone-less computer because it decided to break right before this podcast. Sorry, listeners.

Jeffrey 0:36

Aaron, we've been bad about recording. It's because life has been tough lately. My house caught on fire. It's been a thing.

Aaron 0:47

Yeah, I mean, life happens. And so sorry to the listeners, but we actually promise we're going to fix it this time.

Jeffrey 0:54

Yeah, we've actually discussed a whole number of pods and we're going to record one of those today. I'm actually in D.C. at the moment, although I feel bad because I have a ton of friends I didn't even tell I was here because I'm just like in and out like some kind of some kind of lame ninja. I don't know.

Aaron 1:09

I think that's the entirely appropriate way. Like when you have to jet in and out of D.C., like you have to be strategic. Like sometimes you can't tell a lot of people because you can't visit everybody if you're only there for like 48 hours.

Jeffrey 1:21

Oh, I'm feeling terribly guilty about it because there were like several people. I was like, I want to see you. I'll be back in October for the Carnegie Nuclear Policy Conference. But this is just a quick hitter.

Aaron 1:32

There you go. Speaking of quick hitter, you have a meeting in 25 minutes. So let's bang this one out.

Jeffrey 1:39

Yeah. You know, it's a meeting with the CNS open source North Korea team. And so that's the topic of our podcast as well. So I got the DPRK on the brain.

Aaron 1:52

Well, in full disclosure, we did try and record this podcast on Saturday. It's Tuesday, May 31st. But we kind of held off because we were maybe, you know, I don't know what the handicap was, thinking that they would light one off and we would get a nuclear explosion to talk about. But no nuclear explosion thus far over the weekend, which is obviously a good thing.

So we just had missile launches.

Jeffrey 2:15

Yeah, and I thought this would be a good opportunity to just maybe talk a little bit about how we're thinking about where things are headed with North Korea, both in terms of nuclear testing and missile testing, just as kind of a scene setter for the summer. And just famous last words, you know how I hate to predict stuff.

But at least my thinking was in terms of a nuclear test, you know, there was some chance we'd get one over Memorial Day because there had been previously a nuclear test on Memorial Day and there had been a few missile tests on previous Memorial Days. But if they haven't done a nuclear test by now, I mean, it's getting pretty late in the year because it gets kind of rainy there.

And, you know, you can't do a test if there are no roads, right? If the roads wash out. So we haven't traditionally seen any North Korean nuclear testing in the summer. I say this and then they're going to pop one in the summer just to make me a liar. But I kind of feel knock on wood that if we got through this weekend, we maybe are good until September.

Yeah.

Aaron 3:25

Well, there's a positive and negative to that. The positive is no nuclear explosion, but the negative is there's probably less podcasts.

Jeffrey 3:32

Yeah, well, I mean, there are plenty of other people who've taken us up on the test to missile get a pod. But, you know, one thing I kind of want to say about predicting a nuclear test, because I got asked about this before Biden's trip. When Jake Sullivan came out and said, you know, oh, well, we think there's a very high chance of a nuclear test or a missile test.

And I told reporters, I actually didn't think that this was based on any specific intelligence. I think that was the Biden people covering their rears. Yeah, it was like much better to take like we have strategic warning in the sense that we can see all the activity at the nuclear test site. And Kim Jong Un has said in, you know, a slightly roundabout way, but I think a fairly easy to interpret way that they are going to resume nuclear testing.

So we know that's going to happen unless something dramatic changes. But I suspect that the language we saw coming out of the administration didn't really reflect the fact that something was imminent. So much as it did, it was way better to say it's imminent. So if it happens while Biden's there, you look prepared than it is to treat it like any other day and then be stuck holding something in your hand.

Aaron 4:41

Yeah. And in fairness, I mean, we can't see into the administration, but my guess is that there was some prep if they were to let one off while we were there. So there was some staffer whose job it was, was to figure out talking points and what the response would be. So I don't think he was unprepared in that sense, in the sense that you can be prepared to react to a nuclear test because there's not much else you can do at this point.

Jeffrey 5:05

But, you know, that struck me really as pretty much a fundamentally Washington story where the president's going abroad. So the worst thing we could possibly imagine is the North Koreans doing a test while the president's abroad and ruining his little trip. And at least in my experience, that has not been how the North Koreans roll. They might like to ruin Fourth of July or Memorial Day or Labor Day.

But there's a kind of slippage between like if you're a staffer, what is the worst thing you can imagine? And if you're Kim Jong-un, what is the worst thing that you can imagine to do? And they're not the same thing. And so I just don't get any sense that the North Koreans deliberately time these things to spoil presidential visits.

That's very much the kind of stuff a staffer worries about. Well, they did light off some missiles. You know, they did give us that party.

Aaron 5:52

I think it was after he returned. Oh, my God, though, when have they stopped?

Jeffrey 5:56

Yeah.

Aaron 5:57

This is true. You know, so like it would be like a better way to think about it was what weekend have they not launched missiles? You know, and is there anything in common with those with those weekends rather than the president visiting South Korea and Japan?

Jeffrey 6:14

Yeah. And I let me just say the last thing I would say about this is the other question I kept getting from reporters is this kind of expectation that the U.S. intelligence community would be able to provide exquisite warning of a nuclear test or a missile test. And while I think the intelligence community has done a great job, the thing I kept saying to reporters is like, you already have enough warning.

You know, you're asking people to stick their necks out for a level of warning that is not useful or necessary. Like we know they are gonna resume. Nuclear testing. We know they are testing in ICBM. You trying to make them like tell you the day is absurd, right? It's not something that you have any reasonable expectation to be told.

And like if the intelligence community gets a day like that wrong, like who effing cares? You have the evidence you need to understand analytically what's happening in the world. This is a bit of a tangent, but I'm curious if you think that that was influenced. Oh, my God, Aaron. We cannot have tangents on the Arms Control Wonk podcast.

That's strictly for me. I think it's actually in the terms of service. When you sign up to be a Patreon patron, it says there will be no tangents.

Aaron 7:38

No tangents. Do you think that they're influenced by how the Biden administration handled the lead up to the Russian invasion of Ukraine? It made me think about that, where like quite literally- Oh, that's not a tangent.

Jeffrey 7:48

I think that's exactly what's happened. I think the Biden people are pretty good about selectively disclosing intelligence for both high substantive purpose, but also low political cunning. And, and that's just kind of the world we live in now. And I, to be clear, I don't fault them for this. I think they're, they're staffing the man pretty well. And I think on Ukraine we saw the, like, positive effects that come out of that. yeah, absolutely. I think, I think people have gotten this expectation that they're going to get a lot of information, and that expectation is fueled by people like us.

Who provide a lot of that on the open source. And now that the Biden people have like jumped on that train and been like, yeah, we can use that for public diplomacy. You know, yeah, I think reporters are expecting that, you know, we're gonna be like, okay, well, Thursday at four o'clock, even though I, you know, I think that's probably not a reasonable expectation.

I mean, it's one of those, it's the curse where we do it once, Where we spot a missile being launched and you get like a satellite picture of the plume. And then every time there's a missile launch, the reporter's like, oh, do you have a picture of it going off? And it's like, yeah, that's like a once in a decade picture.

Aaron 9:11

Right, right, exactly. Well, speaking of missiles, they fired off three. And so there were some fireworks, at least towards the tail end, at least on the way home from the trip. But we are reporting on those missiles.

Jeffrey 9:30

Yeah, I've got my little list in front of me. So I will give you the rundown on what I have. I have three tests, three projectiles at 6 p.m. or 5.59 if you're, or sorry, 6 a.m. At 6 a.m. or 5.59 a.m. if you're the Japanese, I have a suspected ICBM, which is what Yonhap later called it.

But it was basically it went 360 kilometers downrange and 540 kilometers in altitude. So that basically looks exactly the same. Like the three other tests we saw out of Sunan that were described by the North Koreans as important tests for developing a reconnaissance satellite, but which the US says was a test of a Hwasong-17 component, although they don't tell us what component it is.

Something went off at 637 that pretty quickly disappeared after about 20 kilometers. No idea what that was. The Japanese didn't see it at all. Probably was a failure of one kind or another, but hard to say. and then something at 642 which has been reported by Yonhap as a KN-23, but which went 720 kilometers with a 60 kilometer apogee. So, like, yeah, sure, that's a short-range missile of one type or another, probably a KN-23.

Aaron 11:06

Well, for you, what was the most interesting? You know, for me, it's actually the short range. I mean, of course, the ICBM, like suspected, my kids walked in true emergency pod cast fashion here. The ICBM is the biggest and the sexiest, but like the short range, I actually think is more relevant.

Jeffrey 11:23

Yeah, well, so while you're dealing with parenting issues, which I totally understand, I have had my three little junior fellows constantly assaulting. Hey, dude, good to see you. Was that a transformer you had to fix Aaron? It was Optimus Prime. Ah, awesome. Oh my gosh. You know, I would love, I would love Hwasong-17 transformer. Wouldn't that be awesome?

Like a big tell. I mean, I promise we'll get back to the subject in a second, but wouldn't it be great to have a Hwasong-17 tell that turned into like a giant Optimus Prime and, you know, maybe had like Kim Jong-un's face or something.

Aaron 12:05

Well, you can pitch that as a treatment, like down with your buddies in Los Angeles.

Jeffrey 12:11

Yeah. Anyway, so the thing I was going to say is, I don't know, I guess the short range tests are the most significant. I mean, the big thing that I am obviously alarmed by at the moment is the shift that North Korea is making to tactical nuclear weapons. And while we don't, I mean, they didn't really announce what it was, North Korea has tested all these new short range systems, KN-23 variants, KN-24, and, you know, like some of them, although I, you know, not all of them, I assume, are going to be nuclear armed.

In concert with all the other evidence that we're seeing that indicates the North Koreans are moving to sort of increase the amount of fissile material available to them, with Kim Jong-un talking about developing tactical nuclear weapons. While we tend to focus on the stuff that can hit the U.S. for understandable reasons, and we should talk about that missile, I do think that the big story right now Is that Kim Jong-un, having acquired a basic deterrent against the United States, is shifting to develop tactical nuclear weapons to what they have called in the past to repel a US invasion, which is, you know, like, A plot point in the 2020 commission.

It's destabilizing.

Aaron 13:38

Yeah. And the reason I brought that, that's what I was expecting nuclear tests to be built around. If there was one, it would actually be a tactical system. So slightly different than sort of the big kahuna that they tested last time. So like we have the big kahuna subsection and then we have the little, the smaller, I guess, sort of section, not smaller in terms of yield, but like the smaller section.

The smaller missile and then the smaller perhaps warhead for that missile and the tactical side. So you have two things.

Jeffrey 14:06

Why not both Aaron? Well, that's what I mean.

Aaron 14:08

That's clearly what they decided. Right. No, that's what I'm saying. It's like, like, that's what I'm saying. It's like, I like the smaller stuff at the moment, but that's purely just subjective.

Jeffrey 14:17

Why? I mean, I, I, I like the smaller stuff because I do think that you know how I love the opportunity to say, I told you so.

Aaron 14:26

That is a theme of this podcast. We didn't change the name.

Jeffrey 14:32

I told you so with Jeffrey Lewis and a very tired Aaron Stein. But, you know, since 2020, we've been warning this shift is coming and that it'd probably be a real good idea to bribe the North Koreans to try to get the moratoria back. And we're no. Instead, we're going to go with we're going to show them who's bossed.

And I, you know, I'm actually, you know, I'm more sympathetic. I understand the politics of it and all. But I think we're going to look back at this period and see that there's a real turning point in the number and diversity of North Korea's short, medium range nuclear weapons. And that's not good.

Aaron 15:12

No, none of this is good. And so, like, maybe bring it... There's a tendency to be sanguine about this, is that we can almost at this point write the press releases after these things happen, right? Oh, yes. And so, while I'm laughing, there's nothing to be sanguine about, because in some ways it's more... Do you know who also loves kids, Aaron?

Jeffrey 15:36

Our listeners? No, Kim Jong-un. Really?

Aaron 15:41

Haven't you ever noticed that?

Jeffrey 15:44

One of the things we laugh about in the office all the time is when Kim Jong-un has to watch a performance of some tank factory's musical brigade, he is utterly unable to hide The boredom. Like you can tell he has died a little bit. Like his eyes are like glassy and he's like polite, but you can tell he wants to be anywhere except for in that tiny little room with some KPA person and a freaking accordion.

The minute a child walks into the room, he lights up. He is like the happiest person on earth. We often note that the two groups of people he is physically affectionate and loving with are missile scientists, you know, sweaty bear hugs, piggyback rides, you know, having them for beers. Like just, he loves those guys, but then also children.

He loves kids.

Aaron 16:47

For listeners, the backdrop is my daughter jumping on the bed and my son playing with the Optimus Prime. So he can come and watch this recording this podcast.

Jeffrey 16:56

I think he would. I think he's straight up like You know, like, I think he, you know, he sends the two thoughts off to rub VX in his half-brother's face. And then, like, he, like, walks into, like, the other room with the kids. And he's, like, a totally different person, you know? He's like, you know, who wants to have a piggyback ride on Uncle Chongun's back?

And, you know, it's like a totally different guy. Yeah. Well, should we talk about the big kahuna before we sign off here?

Aaron 17:20

Because that's probably the one that a lot of people are more interested in than us because of how large it is. Yeah.

Jeffrey 17:26

I mean, there are two things I want to say about that. The first is the trajectory of that sucker is exactly like the previous ICBM component tests, but it's, Not of a range that an ICBM would fly to. And so our working hypothesis has been that they're testing the bus For a system with multiple warheads, right? They're just testing the thing that's gonna maneuver, which is why they're claiming it's for a reconnaissance satellite and they're testing the attitude control system to point the camera.

And I think they're testing the bus based on approximately no evidence, I admit, right? Like when it turns out I'm wrong about all this, like, well, I just had a couple of North Korean press releases, I'm sorry. You can say, I told you so. Yeah, right. Oh God, yeah, I was gonna joke about the, I told you so for the North Korean, but anyway, that's over.

So- One question we have is, are they testing other components of the 17? So we're currently trying to run some models to see if maybe you can get this kind of Apogee in range if you've got like a Hwasong-17 booster with either a dummy upper stage or some kind of reduced sized upper stage. But it's not a proper ICBM.

I do think that they're working on the bus. Or something is just going miserably wrong, right? But it's going wrong consistently. Like, let me say- That seems like it. You go ahead. Yeah. The distance it's traveled has been 300, 270, 470, and 360 kilometers downrange. And the Apogee has been 620, 560, 780, which was kind of the biggest one, and then 540.

So I just, I don't know. I mean- It seems like it's possible that it's just petering out for some reason. And we have a whole line of inquiry that I'm not ready to talk about. But I don't know. I think it's just too early at this point to say whether it's a test of some component of the Hwasong-17 in this funny trajectory, or if it's just, for example, the attitude control system, or if it's a test of more, whether that's a booster with a dummy upper stage or something else.

Just don't know. Also, can I say, soon on. You know, like they're doing it all out of the big airport in Pyongyang. Well, we saw that missile facility, which, you know, to his credit, Joe Bermuda has stuck his neck out for a couple of years ago. And I remember when he did it, he was like, this is a missile facility and we'd all been looking at it.

And we were all like, yeah, it looks like a missile facility, but like, it's not a missile base. And why would it be next to the airport? And I mean, it took me a couple of years before I was, Willing to say it's the insane thing that it turns out that it is, which is they built a freaking missile test support facility at their main international airport.

Aaron 20:40

I mean, it's convenient for Kim, and they're not using the airport. He doesn't use it, and maybe he just wants to get in his limo and drive down the street rather than go too far.

Jeffrey 20:52

I mean, I guess, but you know, like... Who boy, who would have ever, I mean, who would ever thought that they would have put a missile testing facility at a dedicated, a dedicated missile testing facility at their primary international airport?

Aaron 21:15

I don't know. I don't know what to say to that. It's just absurd, but it's far for the course when it comes to analyzing these guys. Any final words before we sign off here? Because I have my own chaotic experience behind me, and I know you have a meeting in four minutes.

Jeffrey 21:33

No, I'm going to take these thoughts and impress them upon the youth of the Middlebury Institute. What do you have to say for yourself, Aaron?

Aaron 21:41

Just that we have some couple of good pods coming up. I mean, I think we're going to, I can, I can tease it. Don't you think? Yeah. We're going to look at the wizards of Armageddon at 40 years. Jeffrey and I were just talking about that and we both love the book and the book is really interesting and we're going to talk about it again.

So for listeners, if you want to pick up the copy, read it now because the podcast is coming. And once Jeffrey gets around the same top gun too, we're going to talk about it because the whole plot device is blowing up a uranium enrichment facility. And that's what we do around there. And so, yeah, tune in for future episodes.

Jeffrey 22:13

You know, one place that you could go to have these conversations if you can't wait for the podcast. I do.

Aaron 22:20

It's at patreon.com slash ACW podcast. It's our Patreon page, which gets you access to our Slack channel for $3 as a student, $5 if you're a normal person. The Slack channel is the place to be in cyberspace for all arms control wonk fans. Stuff and it gets you in cool newspapers like the washington post and the economist if you stick around long enough so join it patreon.com slash acw podcast and you can talk about top gun too why not bring it all out aaron that was so much fun i am so happy and glad that we finally did this we're revving it up in the emergency podcast style bad audio i'm gonna fix it next time around the cable is already in the amazon mail and thanks everybody for listening He fixes the table.

Bent. Somebody stepped on it.