Not Lackin’ LACMs

Jeffrey Lewis 0:01

I'm feeling bad. You are listening to the Arms Control Wonk podcast, a podcast on arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation. I'm Dr. Jeffrey Lewis, the founding publisher of the Arms Control Wonk blog and a professor at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey.

Aaron Stein 0:23

And I am Aaron Stein, Director of Research at the Foreign Policy Research Institute in Philadelphia. How the hell you doing, Aaron? Not too bad. Not too bad. Going through the second proofs of my forthcoming book, January 22nd, for those who are interested. And I actually do not like this process one bit, but I don't think I'm an anomaly in book proof reviewing.

Jeffrey 0:51

You want to plug it or are we going to have to wait and find out what this magisterial work concerns?

Aaron 0:57

Oh, I mean, you can plug it. You know, it's just it's the it's the U.S. war against Islamic State, as told from the men and women who fought it and tried to manage the diplomatic process rather than told through the eyes of the opposition, which I think sort of has stilted coverage of the war in other books that try and do the same thing.

Jeffrey 1:18

All right. I don't have a clever segue because ain't got nothing to do with North Korean cruise missiles.

Aaron 1:26

No, North Korea is the gift that keeps on giving. And test a missile, get a pod, and they test the cruise missile. At least they told us they did. And Dennis Gormley, it's time.

Jeffrey 1:37

Yeah, I mean, I think at this point we all presume that North Korea tested a land attack cruise missile. But it is important to note that the evidence that we have at the moment is just the North Koreans say so. And they released a pair of not terribly high resolution images, one showing the rocket booster accelerating the missile out of the launch canister and another showing the missile in what looks like an early stage of flight.

Aaron 2:07

And that there were, I think, reports from Yonhap that corroborated or at least picked up on this that suggested that the missile flew out to 1,500 kilometers, which is a pretty good and healthy range for a cruise missile.

Jeffrey 2:20

Yeah, yeah. Well, we weren't, I think, surprised by this because Kim Jong-un in January had said that the Academy of Defense Sciences had developed an intermediate range cruise missile. So this is something, I think the thing I said on Twitter is every North Korea watcher I knew had a LACM test on his or her bingo card. So it's not surprising.

But on the other hand, like, You know, 1500 kilometers allows North Korea to range targets throughout South Korea and Japan with, you know, a fairly stealthy and I would presume fairly accurate system.

Aaron 3:03

And I know that some of the initial stuff that was floating on Twitter after this was updating assumptions about certain vehicles that we saw in parades. Perhaps where they fired this thing from, what the canister looks like, so that we could... Because obviously you could compare that to the not so high resolution, but high resolution enough image that they released of the rocket booster firing it out of the launcher.

Jeffrey 3:28

Yeah, you know, that's like a really strange little rabbit hole that we all fell into. When Kim said in January that North Korea was developing an intermediate range cruise missile, then we all went back and looked at the parade and there was a particular system that Looked like a surface-to-air missile system, but because it was a missile in a canister, you really couldn't make it out.

At the time, we thought, maybe that's the new cruise missile, and I still think that may have been what it was intended to convey, but really, weirdly, there was a different launch vehicle which was shown carrying artillery rockets, and it's that other launcher That we saw launching this cruise missile. So it's sort of interesting because one, it gives you a sense of the diameter of the cruise missile, kind of less than 60 centimeters, you know, somewhere in the 50s, which is kind of similar to lots of other cruise missiles, including the Kalibr and the Nearby and the Bubber.

But just some weird parade signaling to go ahead and show us the launcher for the new cruise missile, but arm it with something else. And then it leaves this question of like, well, then what the hell was the other thing?

Aaron 4:48

Right. You know, you brought up something we were talking about this off air, you know, like. All these cruise missiles at some point start to look alike, you know? And so I think that that's endemic, or at least that's emblematic, I should say, to the wide scale proliferation of land attack cruise missiles, you know, is that, you know, we have enough models now that we've seen to where like, oh yeah, that's a cruise missile and they kind of all look the same.

So it's hard to make, at least from a visual comparison, a lot of judgments or analysis about just what it looks like.

Jeffrey 5:22

Yeah, I should say, I was remiss in not mentioning Joe Dempsey at IISS, who beat me to noticing that they weren't the same launchers. And then Ankit Panda at the Carnegie Endowment, who made the right call from the other thing in the parade. I mean, this was one of those kind of collective team efforts, although in this case, I was just on the side cheerleading and retweeting.

But yeah, when it comes to the missiles themselves, like, form follows function. They all kind of look the same. I mean, there are little differences, like, you know, what does your inlet for your jet engine look like? But you can't actually see the engine because it's inside the missile. And then, you know, I don't know. Sometimes, you know, people make a big deal.

It's like, oh, well, are the wings on the bottom? Or are they on the top as it's flying? But it's just... I don't know, man. They all look the same.

Aaron 6:16

Yeah. Well... One thing I found interesting is that, I mean, unless I missed it, right, and it's possible I missed it, but I don't think I did, is that we didn't have any sort of like advanced warnings. So like with ballistic missiles, you tend to get leaks from the U.S. government that they're preparing for something. And in this case, while I think we all expected a LACM test, we didn't have any of that, at least, media chatter before it went off, unless I was missing anything before any of it happened.

Jeffrey 6:48

Yeah, no, none whatsoever. And I think it's pretty interesting watching the way this played out. I mean, I guess I would say that there were kind of three phases that you would normally expect. I mean, phase one, which we got, was the North Koreans pretty clearly conveying to us that they were going to respond to our military exercises with South Korea with their own test.

You know, Kim's sister came out and said... They were going to respond with power for power. And then Kim Jong-chol, you know, the notorious KYC, our boy who always is saying rude things, came out and basically doubled down on what she said. And, you know, I was joking that... You know, he couldn't have been any more direct unless he had like stuck his arms out like wings and like ran around going like, I'm a cruise missile, I'm a cruise missile.

Right. I mean, it was it was really clear that a test was coming. And like I said, we all had that as an as a lack of as an option. But then you're right. There's usually this period where the U.S. government detects communications going back and forth and then that leaks again. And that didn't happen at all.

Right. It was total silence. And then the other thing that typically happens is the South Koreans or the Japanese usually announce the test before the North Koreans. But that didn't happen either, which raises some really interesting questions about whether or not anybody actually saw this thing, which, you know, is kind of the point with cruise missiles.

Aaron 8:27

Well, let's circle back to that, but let's talk about that because the point of cruise missiles is why we actually need to take this more seriously than I think some people are. But it wouldn't be that surprising if we didn't see the test or if people didn't see the test. Now, they may have had inclinations that a test was coming, but perhaps didn't have as much confidence in that to leak it as the Japanese and the South Koreans normally do, like you just said.

Jeffrey 8:58

Yeah, I think that, you know, we saw this a little bit with the previous test of the much shorter range coastal defense cruise missile North Cray had that came out in the spring where it just didn't look like there was good detection. And, you know, partly that's just a function of cruise missiles, right? So the North Koreans said this thing flew in an oval and then a figure eight over 1,500 kilometers, but entirely within their own territory, which means it would be really unlikely for radar to be able to see this if it's keeping relatively low to the ground and not getting, you know, inside the radar fans.

And, you know, pretty unlikely that a space-based sensor would be able to see it. So I'm not surprised that Nobody saw it fly, and indeed, like, that is the freaking point of cruise missiles, is that they can fly low and they're hard for radars to see. I am mildly surprised that when the solid rocket booster, which, you know, pops the thing up and accelerates it, when that thing fired, I'm mildly surprised that we didn't see that.

So that kind of, that caught my attention, although, you know... It's cloudy and you don't go that high. You know, maybe maybe that's plausible. But I do think the fact that. There wasn't the typical level of detection, it does really raise the possibility that that, you know, the cruise missile works like it's supposed to, which is it's hard for us to see.

Aaron 10:36

So, this raises the broader point, I think, that we wanted to talk about in this podcast, which is how, I guess, we, the royal we, or maybe the national security community more narrowly, conceptualizes threats. You know, like this one seemed to have passed with a shrug and maybe because it was around the 9-11 memorials and stuff like that.

It kind of quite literally flew under the news radar.

Jeffrey 11:07

Yes.

Aaron 11:07

But a cruise missile is designed to do exactly what we're talking about here, which is to escape detection and to fly really low and to complicate things. And so and if it's 1500 kilometers, as they claim. That should be viewed with a lot of concern, far more than what I'm seeing at least chatter around on my Twitters outside of the five people that are always mentioned on this podcast.

Jeffrey 11:31

Yeah, I mean, I have a lot of feelings about this, and there are a lot of things that I want to say. And I guess the first thing I want to emphasize is... This is a serious military capability that is an important part of what I think North Korea's long-term military strategy is. And that is, and I say it over and over again and nobody believes me, but damn it, I think I'm right.

North Korea's plan... Once an invasion is imminent, is to hit US forces in South Korea and Japan with everything they have to try to stop an invasion and interdict all the sea lift. And that's conventional weapons, but it is also nuclear weapons. And so... One of the big things Kim said in his speech in January was that North Korea was shifting to developing more tactical nuclear weapons.

And I think that that's because now that they have kind of a core deterrent, and I think they will keep working on that. I think they are really focused on developing a capability to repel an invasion. And so, you know, to me, one of the big arguments I made with exactly zero success to folks in the Biden administration was, you know, we are having this really dumb debate about whether they have nuclear weapons or not, like they do, and about whether we should insist they give them up or not.

They won't. And we are ignoring the fact that things are about to get much, much, much more dangerous if North Korea actually develops this other capability they want, not just a deterrent to hold the US at risk, but this. Nuclear based war winning capability that they desire. And it's not that I think that they will win the war.

It's that I am freaked out that I think their plan is on on day one to go nuclear and having things like 1500 kilometer range land attack cruise missiles is really good for that strategy. So like it would be worth lifting some sanctions to keep them from testing things like this.

Aaron 13:53

Right. No, I think that's right. Have you got all the other stuff?

Jeffrey 13:56

I feel like the social construction of threats and how the people handled the previous cruise missile tests and like all the other stuff that like gets me really worked up. But but like, good God, they are about to spend two or three years developing lots and lots of tactical nuclear weapons. We would be happier if we avoided that outcome.

Aaron 14:18

I just let's take it there. But for like points of clarity, like the reason why these things are so for the for people who like maybe this is their first time rolling through the podcast, you know, like the reasons why these things are problematic is because they fly.

Jeffrey 14:32

So we get a lot of casual listeners. You know, people are like, I'm just going to check out the mensuration of cruise missiles and how that affects range estimation.

Aaron 14:43

I can't rule out that some people aren't clicking through their Apple podcasts and saying like, whoa, these two guys, they sound great, right? No, I just think that the point is that they fly low. And therefore, they're hard to see. And they're hard to see. They're hard to intercept, even harder to intercept. And if you have lots, lots of numbers of them combined with lots of numbers of ballistic missiles, you have lots of things that can fly far combined with the range.

Right. And should we talk a little bit about how they tested it? You know, like the quote unquote figure eight, which suggests some stuff.

Jeffrey 15:16

Yeah, I mean, well, so what one question is, did they just do the oval and the figure eight so that they stayed entirely in North Korean territory? But then obviously the other implication of that is that it's got some pretty interesting guidance. You know, I mean, it can turn, which is pretty normal for a cruise missile. But if they were able to keep it low enough that we didn't see it, I mean...

Do they have like terrain contour maps of North Korea? I guess they probably do, right? I don't know. You know, I hadn't thought about that. I would love to get my hands on a North Korean DEM of South Korea and Japan.

Aaron 15:58

Is that not available online? You guys have all sorts of open source tools.

Jeffrey 16:03

It'd be hilarious if they were just using the open source stuff. I mean, you can get really high resolution digital elevation maps anyway, but...

Aaron 16:10

Well, OK, but let's let's pivot. So like to the the social construction of threats.

Jeffrey 16:17

Yeah. Let me start by throwing a minor temper tantrum.

Aaron 16:22

That's the point of the show. That's what brings in the cause of the casual.

Jeffrey 16:27

And this actually bothered to write an article about it rather than just throwing a temper tantrum on a podcast. So all credit to him. We have been going through this with the precursor systems like the KH-35, which is the North Korean copy of the Russian KH-35 cruise missile, which has much shorter range, but is... You know, I mean, it's...

Everything in it is smaller and less capable, but it, you know, if you looked at it, it looks like a real cruise missile. I mean, it's, you know, it's a starter cruise missile.

Aaron 17:07

Yeah.

Jeffrey 17:08

And when the North Koreans tested this system a couple of years ago, I actually remember we somebody else actually noticed it. I think I noticed it too, but somebody else got it first. Oh gosh. I Where the North Koreans released some footage of it, and people are like, oh, you're making a mountain out of a molehill. It's like, well, no, this is a capability that's going to get gradually bigger.

But even in May, the Biden administration, when the North Koreans tested one of these things, they kind of took the opinion of like, well, the UN Security Council resolutions say ballistic missiles, not cruise missiles. This thing is just kind of a normal, short-range, conventional system, so it's okay. And it's like, well, I mean, if it stops there, it's okay.

But, you know, this should be a warning to you of what's coming next. And then, you know, especially in light of the stuff Kim Jong-un had said. And so we have kind of created this. Political interpretation of this technical event that it's not a big deal, that cruise missiles are just a normal part of every country's, you know, self-defense arsenal.

Yonhap News, which is, you know, functionally state media in South Korea, called this test a low-level provocation, to which Josh Pollack said, like, well, I mean, I think it flew at a low level, but... Beyond that, the social construction of this is so interesting to me that South Korea and the United States have basically just decided that North Korea testing a 1,500 kilometer land attack cruise missile is no biggie.

By contrast, when Russia tested a comparable land attack cruise missile, we threw a giant temper tantrum, stomped our feet, and left the INF Treaty declaring that this was the end of Western security. So I don't... Like, what the f***, guys?

Aaron 19:05

But let me... I interpreted that first one, like the sort of like, oh, the coastal cruise launch missile isn't that big of a deal, as perhaps that they were flirting with... With engagement, you know, so like they weren't looking for something to escalate about, you know, like while I agree with you, is that maybe like how these differ?

Like your threat conceptions differ, whereas the Russian, the SSCA to the 9M729 test was literally a violation of the INF, right? Whereas this one sits in that gray space where you could politically interpret it as you see fit, perhaps in ways that would be beneficial down the long run. Or am I being too optimistic here?

Jeffrey 19:53

I don't know. I'm feeling pretty down on the Biden administration at the moment. I mean, they have been so timid on arms control issues, you know. So just – and I admit that my view is being shaped by – You know, how they approached the Iran nuclear deal, which was, you know, make no investment and just let it fall apart.

Which is like to me, very frustrating. And I so I guess that infects how I look at what they're doing in North Korea. Here I say I don't believe in credibility as a concept and I'm making a credibility argument here. You know, but just looking at how they're responding to North Korea, I guess I am having this kind of.

Worry that what's really happening is, you know, they did their they did their policy review, which at the time I made fun of. Right, where it was like, well, we're not going to do a Trump like grand bargain, but we're also not going to do Obama's strategic patience. So, you know, it's like the Goldilocks, not too hot, not too cold.

Just right. And at the time, like we're like, well, you know, there are hints there that they might be really pragmatic and be willing to do some small things in service of making some progress here. But like that was like several months ago. And what has happened in the interim? Well, they reprocessed another load of spent fuel.

They restarted the Yongbyon reactor. Now they've tested a 1,500-kilometer-range land-attack cruise missile, which I keep repeating at some point. That phrase is going to – people are going to be like, wait, you mean that's a missile? And I'm not seeing anything out of them. I mean, I'm not – I see them – so my interpretation of this is that they are – Minimizing all this stuff, not because they are trying to hold the door open for some amazing approach, but because they are trying to keep this off the President's plate, and, and, to me, that, that bothers the hell out of me. And by the way, also, I should say, all of this is informed by the fact that once that reactor goes on, you know, I think we are two years out from any kind of serious talking with the North Koreans, because I don't think they're going to shut the reactor down.

Aaron 22:14

Right. No, no. I totally agree with you.

Jeffrey 22:16

So like what's the reactor – once the North Koreans flip the reactor on, it's probably 18 months minimum before the North Koreans are even willing to come back to talks. And then they're going to drag their feet for six months until they shut the reactor down and start letting the plutonium cool. So I just – I feel like they have missed their window for Iran.

They have missed their window for North Korea. Yeah. You know, we can feel however we feel about the withdrawal from from Afghanistan, but it was like all consuming and not a big win for them. And like at this point, I think, you know, he's just he's got like the pandemic left and like that's all he's got energy for.

I think the posture of you is going to be a giant failure. Like I just I'm feeling bad about how timid they are and how little capacity they have.

Aaron 23:05

It certainly seems like the North Korea issue is not a top-line issue. It's definitely down in sort of the prioritization of the administration.

Jeffrey 23:19

Which, you know, it's like I get it. Like if they were doing big things. Right. I mean, I used to make fun of the Obama people when they were like, our North Korea strategy is our Iran strategy. We'll get a deal with the Iranians and that will show the North Koreans were serious, which was like total bullshit.

But like at least they were making progress on one of the two. Right. So I it's like, OK, well, that's total bullshit. But, you know. You know, you know, like, OK, fine. But this is like they're literally just, you know, it's like a dollar store foreign policy. Right. It's just keep it as cheap as possible. And so I don't know.

I guess my sense is that they are fundamentally minimizing these things, which is like, I guess, better than like Biden screaming about fire and fury for sure, but also not really addressing the issue.

Aaron 24:14

Yeah, no, no, I think that's right. And, you know, I do think we have to be cognizant because we spend our time in this space, how consuming the pandemic is, right? Yeah. But, but I, you know. They're not just going to stop at a ground launch cruise missile. No. Do you know what I mean? No, they're not going to stop at a ground launch cruise missile.

Just because it's not our top priority, right? That's what I always think. It's like, we'll come to this later. We'll get the JCPOA and we'll sort of... I'm gesticulating wildly on the Zoom here. They will continue to make progress. I think your 18-month, 18 to 24-month benchmark to run the reactor is a good one. But we also have to assume that they will try and do other things with this cruise missile because why wouldn't you?

That's what you do with cruise missiles.

Jeffrey 25:11

Yeah, I mean... I remember when North Korea was testing its submarine-launched ballistic missile, and I wrote an article where I said, you know, the natural thing to do would then be move this thing ashore. Because that's what you do when you have a nice, solid propellant missile that you're popping up out of a canister. You can put that canister on a truck.

And people looked at me like I was insane, and then the North Koreans did precisely that. And so the natural technological evolution of this is to put it on submarines and Right. Like that Romeo class submarine we saw getting its sail worked on that everybody thought might be for a ballistic missile. Well, I don't know. You know, I think we have to consider the possibility that some of their attack submarines will come armed with these cruise missiles.

And Scott LaFoy and I did it. I say did a nice write up because Scott did all of the all of the write up. So, you know, the compliment is to Scott. But we looked at. What I think is an underappreciated fact is that North Korea has tested both its Silkworm cruise missile and its KH-35 off aircraft.

And, you know, there is a facility next to an airfield in northern near the near the Chinese border where the U.S. identified as air launched Silkworm storage, which nobody ever talks about. And that thing kind of went to pot and they build a new one. Right next to it. And if, if the original idea is right, then I would suggest that the new one is probably sitting there filled with other kinds of cruise missiles.

So, you know, they tested this off of a launcher and that's like a real part of this story, but I would certainly expect North Korea to deploy this system at sea. Cause that's certainly what they did with the cage 35, right. And, and, and, and, and from the air. So like, You know, that's quite a capability to have to deal with.

Aaron 27:07

So... What's the happy note? No, no, I was about to say, the happy note is something like... It's talking about Dennis. It's talking about front of the show Dennis Gormley. Oh, yeah. This is the future he was warning us all about. You know, and tying this back to the beginning of the show, which is that we now have enough from...

Outside of the sort of like, let's say that the opening of his book talks about the proliferation of technology outside of the US and the Russians to be able to do this stuff from the engines to guidance. And we now have so many examples of this is that the is like, yes, that future has come true. You know, and it's just something that we, you know, he was really ahead of the curve in looking at this thing.

And these things cause a lot of problems for things that we are plussing up now, like missile defenses and stuff like that.

Jeffrey 28:03

Yeah, I have been reflecting on this a little bit. And I recall Dennis saying something like, you know, somebody asked him, you know, why hasn't the era of cruise missile proliferation changed? That he predicted happened. And I recall him sort of like explaining that it was like well underway and kicking off all these cruise missile programs, you know, and it just it is so interesting to me that people don't really haven't really integrated that knowledge.

You know, like when I got in the field in the early 90s, right after the Gulf War, like the U.S. had conventionally armed cruise missiles. And that was really it. I mean, the Soviets had... Nuclear-armed cruise missiles, but they hadn't really, you know, hadn't really transformed their cruise missile inventory in the same way. And, you know, since then, you know, obviously the Russians have lots of cruise missiles.

The, you know, the British and the French share a cruise missile that they freaking exported to a bunch of countries. Russia has exported cruise missiles to a bunch of countries. India, Pakistan, Taiwan, South Korea, I mean, China, like, Everybody has cruise missiles now. And on the one hand, there is this enormous reality that Dennis predicted. But on the other hand, like there is, as far as I can tell, very little attention given to cruise missile defense.

I mean, I know they changed the name of the ballistic missile defense organization to the Missile Defense Agency, but it's still fundamentally ballistic missile focused.

Aaron 29:47

And it's just crazy to me. Well, they're challenging, right? In some respects, the ballistic missile...

Jeffrey 29:54

When did not actually being able to make the system work ever stop NDA? Just put a homing beacon on it, maybe a self-destruct button. It'll be fine. Well, you know what the happy note is?

Aaron 30:10

Do you know what the happy note is? I actually have a good happy note. If we do invest in more cruise missile defense... We have the potential for more incidents of the blimp going rogue. This is true.

Jeffrey 30:26

Oh, poor listeners. What Aaron is talking about is our beloved Jay Lenz, which is somehow both a totally sensible proposal. Yeah, it's very sensible. I mean, as a policy matter, I completely support suspending... A sensor package on an aerostat to provide persistent surveillance of low flying threats. It was a wonderful, wonderful idea. It was also a sensor package on a blimp that had all of the things that could possibly go wrong go wrong, including breaking loose from its tether.

Crash landing somewhere in Pennsylvania. And then I would, did the sheriff think it was a UFO or something? Well, did somebody have to shoot it down? He like shotgunned the blimp. I don't, I don't, maybe it's because it was dragging because it was, it was still, you know, partially inflated. Maybe that's why he shotgunned the blimp. But I just, I'm so torn because that program is so smart.

You know, it's like, it's like that line In Spinal Tap, you know, there's a fine line between clever and stupid. But we do need persistent surveillance against low-flying threats. I mean, I mock, but we really, truly do need this.

Aaron 31:53

You just need to make sure that the tether is over-engineered. Yeah, yeah, I know.

Jeffrey 32:01

You need to invest in the right bolts and concrete, right? Or J-lens. Or J-lens. It was a good idea.

Aaron 32:07

It was a good idea. It went down in flames and then was shotgunned by a sheriff. It's just like a country-western song. Yeah. Okay, well, we've gone rogue. Like Jay Lenz. Rogue like Jay Lenz. And if you want, you know where they would have been able to ID where Jay Lenz went down without having to Google? I do.

Because we may have gotten it wrong. We may have gotten it wrong, but we're going off the cuff here. Would have been our Slack channel because they can geolocate anything. And if you want to be able to get involved in this community, the community of communities, the non sort of passive listener, the active listener, you head on over to patreon.com slash ACW podcast.

$3 if you're a student, $5 if you're not. You join the community of excellence, which is our Slack channel and the J-List catchers.

Jeffrey 33:03

I think they're better than our podcast, Aaron. They certainly do. Yeah, probably.

Aaron 33:10

Yeah. And they get written up in the Washington Post and The Economist. So that could be you for less than a cappuccino a month. And that is it. So thanks, everybody, for listening.