North Korea’s Next Nukes

Jeffrey Lewis 0:01

We'll ride the bus. You are listening to the Arms Control Wonk podcast, a podcast on arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation. I'm Jeffrey Lewis, the founding publisher of the Arms Control Wonk blog and a professor at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey.

Scott LaFoy 0:22

And I am Scott LaFoy, program manager for national security and intelligence at Exeter Federal Solutions. How are you doing, Jeffrey?

Jeffrey 0:30

I am doing fantastic. The fact that we have you on, Scott, does tell us what we're going to talk about. Because I know you like a party. I love a parade. Ain't no party like a workers' party party.

Scott 0:44

Because a workers' party party is absolutely mandatory.

Jeffrey 0:48

Yes, so we have had a bunch of North Korea stuff starting to stack up. Kim Jong-un gave a very long speech. I'm not sure if he actually delivered the full speech. He purports to have outlining a bunch of goals for North Korea, but most interestingly for us, goals for the development of their nuclear and strategic missile programs.

There was a parade in which North Korea showed us a bunch of new stuff. And Dave Schmerler, a.k.a. Geolocation Jesus and I, have a new analysis out looking at some satellite pictures that got picked up by the Washington Post. So it's a busy, busy time in North Korea.

Scott 1:32

Yeah, they're not letting us rest for one bit. This is a 13,000 word summary of Kim Jong-un's speech. So shall we start there?

Jeffrey 1:44

Oh boy. The way that I think about this speech is there are four sections, only two of which we care about if we care about nuclear weapons. The first section talks about all the things they've done since the last Workers' Party Congress. And then the second section talks about all the things they are going to do. Honestly, looking back at the things they said they've done, there's a bunch of new shit we didn't know about.

Indeed.

Scott 2:13

There's a bunch of weird little hints here, too. Some of which I think the only other place I've seen was Ankit Panda's new book, Nuclear Propulsion. So what was new to you?

Jeffrey 2:24

Okay, so the things that jumped out to me were a couple of things. I mean, some of it we knew, but it was kind of interesting to see it just put on the table. Like, you know, Kim Jong-un talked about mass producing certain missiles over the past couple of years, and they said like, oh, we mass produce certain missiles, right?

So there's a little bit of just box checking. You know, they brag about conducting an ICBM test. The big things that I did not realize that they did One is development of a nuclear-powered submarine, which we should totally talk about. We thought it was a possibility, but to hear them say that they are almost done with the development process is pretty surprising.

The second thing is the claim that they successfully developed an intermediate-range nuclear-armed cruise missile. Mm-hmm. And then I would say the third thing is the overt reference to the warhead control system on the Hwasong-15. Which I'm not exactly sure what that means. We can talk about that. But that was kind of interesting.

Scott 3:36

And I know folks are making much a muck about the little excitement grenades they peppered in there as well because they indicated that they're working on hypersonic glide vehicles. As well as long-range unmanned or uncrewed reconnaissance satellites and ISR platforms. They're hitting all the good buzzwords, so much so that I assume the US government may be contracting with them soon.

Jeffrey 4:04

Yeah. Ah, man, the hyper hype. Well, so let's talk about those things maybe in that order. I mean, I think the first place to start is with the the nuclear powered submarine. Listeners may remember that we have had a friend of the pod, Joe Dempsey, on a number of times. And one of the big debates that we have had as a community is at Shinpo, at the shipyard at Shinpo, there's a pretty big building that's used for making submarines.

And in that building, Kim Jong-un looked at a Romeo-class submarine that was being modified. And we had no idea what that was for. And I think we, from looking at the text of the speech, and Ankit Panda has made this point, it looks like they were just modifying that for conventional weapons missions.

Scott 4:55

But on that visit, they would only show us half that building.

Jeffrey 4:59

They refused to show us the other side. Even though it was quite large enough to have two submarines in it. And it struck us as really unusual. They didn't want to show us the other half. And there was a bunch of other evidence that suggested that, like, maybe there was a bigger submarine getting built next to it.

At one point, some 10-meter diameter steel rings that might be hull segments showed up at Shinpo. And so we have had this debate about whether the modified Romeo is the next ballistic missile submarine or whether there is yet another submarine under development. And the announcement that they're making a nuclear-propelled submarine for presumably strategic missions, to me at least, that pushes us in the direction of saying, well, that's why they're the big hull segments, and that's probably why they only showed us half the building, and I don't know how far along they are, but wow, fun.

Scott 5:53

Yeah, and they indicate in the, at least in the Workers' Party Congress announcement, that they're in something that they're calling the design phase, I believe, the tail end of that. And in Ankit Panda's book, Kim Jong-un and the Bomb, Ankit's the first person, as far as I'm aware, that has referenced a nuclear propulsion program in North Korea.

Mentions it very briefly, I think it's only one line, and it's listed as a program office with a specific program number as something that they were investigating but likely discontinued, but the status was actually unknown. Those are the only two sort of hard data points we have on that. And it's fascinating. We need to do another submarine episode with Joe Dempsey, I feel like, to talk about why that's hard to build.

It's an immensely expensive program. The seas are already super hostile to North Korea. That's going to be an uphill climb. But there's absolutely the space for that sort of experimentation to occur within Shinpo, like you say.

Jeffrey 6:54

And I think, I mean, I should be clear. I am not saying that we know for sure that there was a nuclear-powered submarine sitting next to Kim Jong-un. Oh, right. I only mean that there was a bunch of stuff at Shinpo we couldn't account for. And the question is, was there more than the Romeo? And given that they are bragging about working on the design and development of a nuclear-powered submarine, I think there's more than a Romeo.

And so I don't know if that means the next thing is a really big diesel to be followed by the nuclear-powered submarine, whether they've built the nuclear submarine's hull and they're just still working out the propulsion. I don't know. But it is one of those really interesting open source challenges where sometimes we get hints that there's more than we know, and we don't necessarily know what we don't know, but we can clearly see the signals that it's a little bit deeper there.

Scott 7:41

Indeed.

Jeffrey 7:42

I feel like that was almost a pun.

Scott 7:45

Oh, ha, deeper there. The other pun would be that it's got to be a Juliet class if it's being built next to the Romeo. Oh, terrible.

Jeffrey 7:54

The other thing that is really interesting is the flat assertion that in the period under discussion, North Korea completed the development of ultra-modern tactical nuclear weapons, including an intermediate-range cruise missile with the most powerful warheads in the world. Now, this is another one of those things where we had had a hint, but we didn't quite pick up on it.

At least I didn't pick up on it as maybe aggressively as we should. In the parade... In October. And in the parade again in January, North Korea paraded some canisterized missiles that many people initially assumed were surface-to-air missiles, even though they paraded them separately from the other surface-to-air missiles.

Scott 8:42

Yep, they look like Russian S-400s, is why.

Jeffrey 8:47

And they were pretty long. Yep. The canisters were pretty long, and I went back and listened, and I have to give the Oryx folks in Ankit huge props. When those things rolled in front of them in the parade... They were like, ah, I guess those are SAMs, but boy, those are really long. I don't know. Those are too long to be any SAM we've seen.

Like, they could immediately tell something was up. But I don't think any of us were willing to make that jump to, oh my God, new intermediate range cruise missile, even though... You know, North Korea had done enough on cruise missiles that I have a brief I give on North Korea's capabilities. And I do have a whole section on cruise missiles because I figured that's the other shoe that was waiting to drop.

Well, now it's dropped. They say they've done it. And we think that thing we see in the parade might be it.

Scott 9:37

Indeed, which would mean that they're looking at deploying a couple dozen of these, or at least a dozen of these as well in the meantime. But yeah, I had not identified those either as someone who's not good at cruise missiles or SAMs.

Jeffrey 9:53

Well, let me say, this again is one of those challenges with North Korea where when they develop something is not necessarily when they show us that thing. Correct. And in the case of this cruise missile, they showed us it without telling us what it was, and we didn't want to see it, so we didn't see it, or we were being cautious and we didn't want to over-interpret things.

But it's not until they actually say the word intermediate-range cruise missiles that we were like, oh yeah, that's why that canister was with the missiles, not the SAMs.

Scott 10:21

Indeed. And I'm always worried that they are filling the gaps in our podcasts with what we want to hear. But that went a different, interesting direction. And we should note that the way that this was covered in the English and KCNA was that these intermediate range cruise missiles are ultra modern tactical weapons. But that they also call them having the most powerful conventional warheads in the world in a real feat of poorly formatted sentences, making them real confusing as to what their purposes are.

Jeffrey 10:52

Yeah, and the last thing for me was this reference to an improved warhead control system, which is allegedly deployed on the, they call it the Global Strike Rocket, which is the, well, we don't know what it's called. Chungus Humongus, the Hwasong XX. The big liquid propellant missile that they paraded in October. And to me, that's just interesting because I think that's a reference to a PBV, a post-boost vehicle.

That's what I think that is.

Scott 11:28

Listeners should go back to that episode where we discussed this new type gigantic rocket on an 11-axis self-propelled launcher. To, to go into sort of the, the details on what we think on that, because it's a real weird system. It's got the shape and the shroud that it could be housing either a post-boost vehicle, some sort of bus, or something a little less sophisticated. And also, I know that we have a latent FOBS discussion kind of happening in the background in terms of what that magic control system could be.

Jeffrey 12:02

Yeah, just for me, it's important because if you go back to our episode where we said, look, this thing, the only real reason to make this thing this big would be to put multiple warheads on it. And, you know, you don't have to have a PBV to do that, but... You know, you would prefer if you can.

And it's really not like the North Koreans to just settle for for, you know, doing it the lame way like they do seem to match these capabilities. So we speculated there was a PBV under there. And I think that phrase improved warhead control system.

Scott 12:39

Suggests precisely that, so, and that's pretty interesting. And going back to that episode, and, and the idea of parading at different times than completing, at a minimum, I think that's an aspirational signal that even if there's not a PVB physically under that shroud, we should be looking for that in the near future. I have some, some, yeah, personal concerns about their, like, space operations and their ability to pull that off, but I think they're gonna try regardless..

Jeffrey 13:06

Yeah, I mean, the way I look at these parades and these speeches is that they are signals of North Korea's aspirations. And sometimes North Korea makes things that don't work. But it doesn't mean they didn't make them, and it doesn't mean that they're not going to keep working until they get one that works. And so if North Korea says it has a warhead control system...

I think it does. You know, it may not be a very good one. Maybe when they actually put it on the Hwasong XX, it'll look different than the thing we saw in the parade. You know, there's no parades. Parades like kisses are not contracts.

Scott 13:45

There's a gray space between what they are visually presenting us, what they are presenting us in text, and what they will eventually present space with.

Jeffrey 13:52

But they made it absolutely clear that they're going to multiple warheads. And I think this is a clearest indication yet that those warheads will ride the bus. So you want to talk about the hypersonic system.

Scott 14:05

You know, I don't know if want is the right term, but I do feel obligated to talk about the hypersonic system. And I have no doubt in my mind that if someone anger tweets us, this is going to be the thing that makes people angry. Because hypersonics are, you know, the hot right now in all of U.S. defense contracting.

That's the big thing in Russia. We had a whole episode talking about the ones in China that are happening. That's that's where the money is and that's where the hotness is. Which of course means that, A, it's going to generate a lot of attention in US defense circles, and B, it's going to generate a lot of pushback because hypersonics, not to create additional work for myself on the editing side, are f***ing expensive as hell to research and to test and to build.

Jeffrey 14:52

And by hypersonics, what we're really talking about is not the hypersonic part, but the glider part.

Scott 14:58

The glider part, exactly, which implies for... Listeners, a hypersonic glider implies either the ability to radically simulate fluid controls, well, and the ability to test things in a hypersonic wind chamber, which is a very large structure that's very specific, and there's only a few known hypersonic tunnels in the world. It creates a real interesting problem in terms of support infrastructure and identifying those, but the DPRK says that they are only...

Let me get the exact phrasing in English that they are...

Jeffrey 15:36

They have finished the research into the development of warheads of different combat missions, including hypersonic gliding flight warheads. And they're saying that for the next system, they're going to develop and introduce the hypersonic gliding flight warheads.

Scott 15:50

Exactly. They are making...

Jeffrey 15:51

In a short period. Oh, yes. So we're going to see this bad boy.

Scott 15:54

And they emphasize they're making preparations for their test manufacture was the other bit. They're really emphasizing short timelines in this speech. One of the big themes in the speech was that if it wasn't for the past, the plan of the last five years, that this was a 20 to 30 year development cycle for nuclear modernization that they accomplished in four years.

So they're on that.

Jeffrey 16:18

After wasting 30 years on the front end. I mean, you know, I'm glad we're just dating this to mid-Kim Jong-un, but yeah. Let me say this about the hypersonic system before we, you know, have an explicit discussion about what comes next, but You know, the idea of a ballistic missile with a warhead that glides is at some level not that interesting.

I mean, the Pershing 2 did this. And so, you know, I think if North Korea had come and said, hey, that thing you did with the Pershing 2 that's like a little easier now because computers are fancier and metallurgy is a little bit better, like we're going to try something like that. I don't think that's that crazy.

I mean, we've already seen scuds with the little fins on the reentry vehicles. And so, you know... Hypersonic gliding, I think, here can mean a range of things from avant-garde, you know, some kind of long-range strategic fancy-pants glider, to, you know, the Pershing 2 and an analog like that.

Scott 17:31

I'd be curious as well, going back to the Iskander lookalikes that we've seen. We know that the U.S., I think, Indo-PACOM reported a couple years ago that they saw an SRBM test that involved a pull-up maneuver. I think a quasi-ballistic missile or pull-up maneuver and an expanded definition of a hypersonic glider, that may be also what you're looking at.

I think they've got some wiggle room, but they chose to phrase it in the most incendiary way they could to sound fancy, I think.

Jeffrey 18:02

So I think that brings us pretty neatly into this question of what comes next, because, you know, the speech is divided into sort of what they have done and what comes next. And obviously some of the things they've done clearly indicate things that would come next. So, you know, finishing the nuclear powered submarine, testing and deploying the hypersonic glider.

But there's some other stuff, you know, one of which is and I'll just read it. Push ahead with the work of developing intercontinental ballistic rocket with the use of underwater or ground solid fuel engine as planned.

Scott 18:39

If only someone could have predicted this, Jeffrey, how would we know?

Jeffrey 18:42

If only someone had spent the last 18 months sending the same Google Doc to everyone in the field saying they're working on a solid propellant ICBM and then being politely patted on the head. So... Let me say, for those of you listeners, we haven't really talked about it too much. About a year and a half ago, maybe even two years ago, we did a little research where we looked at two things.

One is we started measuring North Korean missiles and we realized that the Pukguksong series is a little bit wider than we think or have previously thought. And then we asked the question of how quickly did the U.S. and the Soviet Union proceed to testing a solid propellant ICBM after developing a large diameter Pukguksong-sized missile? And the answer was two to three years.

And, you know, the Pukuk Song 2 was 2017. So we were like, by 2020, 2021, they should be in a position to do it. And now Kim is saying we're almost in a position to do it.

Scott 19:45

And not to get in on the action, I wrote a similar thing for NK News, I think, five years ago, but not precise, not as precise. It was from Pukuk Song size motor to full flight test of first solid ICBM of any size. And it was... Lengthier, but would account for a ground test by basically 2021-2023 era should be when their first ground test would be.

So, you know, different approaches, different parameters. So they're going to do it. Yeah, we're going to get it any day now, assuming they have not already done a ground test that went unreported, which I increasingly have concerns about data integrity vis-a-vis unreported tests.

Jeffrey 20:26

Yeah. And especially for listeners, you know, the solid propellant test set up at Magoonpo, there is a horizontal test stand where we sometimes see the burn scars. But there is also a vertical test stand where you could flip the thing up. And unless you have the right satellite in the right spot at the right moment, you're not necessarily going to see that motor burn.

Scott 20:46

And even if you do have the right satellite, you may not want to report that because the some satellites that would see that the brightest are not necessarily the satellites that we get to hear from very often, unfortunately.

Jeffrey 20:59

Yes, yes, that's correct. Different conversation. And to be honest, we don't even know that they're doing it at Magoon Poke, you know. So, yeah, we're going to, if not see a test, I think it won't be long before we see a mock-up of a solid propellant ICBM.

Scott 21:18

Indeed. And this is going into the parade a little. We've started to see that they are... At the point where they're casting engines that are starting to be in the correct size classes. Not to rehash too much of the October parade, because I feel like the Pukguksong-5 that was paraded looks a whole lot like a Pukguksong-4 plus 1, not to be too reductive, but most of the things we said in October about the solid SLBM paraded then I think still, in my opinion at least, still hold for the one paraded this time.

We're getting real close.

Jeffrey 21:51

Yeah, well, we can just go ahead and talk about the parade. We haven't talked about everything in the speech, but it's a long speech, and there's a lot.

Scott 21:59

It's 39 pages in Microsoft Word. I feel so bad for the NK News folks who essentially did not sleep for a week covering this event.

Jeffrey 22:07

Yeah, so that's the Workers' Party Congress, where there's a whole bunch of developments, but then they cap the Congress with a parade, and... At least for me, the parade helps us start to make sense of some of the things we were told in the Workers' Party Congress. So at least for me, the big takeaway is, and we can choose to focus on stuff, but...

A new Pukuk Song, this time the 5, which to me really looks like the Pukuk Song 4, which I honestly thought looked like a kind of short version of the Pukuk Song 3, but, like, whatever. The point is, loving some SLBMs. Yep. Regardless of whether any, maybe some of the old ones don't ever get deployed, but, like, the point is there's, like, a lot of iteration there, which means it's a high-priority program.

Saw our possible intermediate-range cruise missile again in its canisters. Yep. And for me, the biggest takeaway from the parade, which kicks back to the speech, is another short or medium range solid propellant missile that is not the KN-24 or the KN-25.

Scott 23:16

They're killing me with these, Jeffrey. You know how much I hate these like dual canister SRBMs that you can just pop on the back of a Hilux basically at this point. And they keep inventing new creative Hiluxes. Like, they keep doing this.

Jeffrey 23:32

Yeah, I've got an idea, Scott.

Scott 23:34

Is it going to be a good idea or is this going to make me sad?

Jeffrey 23:37

It's going to make you sad. I mean, we haven't finished measuring it, but I think it's like a little longer now. No. So I think it's, you know, you know, like, I mean, don't forget, right? You remember back in the day China did the DF-11 and the DF-15?

Scott 23:57

I, mm-hmm. There's a DF-12 in there, too, somewhere.

Jeffrey 24:02

Well, you know, there are. But I mean, the point is there were the two new solid propellant missiles that they did in the 90s. And then they started iterating on that. Right and and and i suspect that this thing is a little bit bigger and it represents kind of getting into that df 15 16 17 booster space okay i don't i don't i don't think it's quite that big but i mean like you know it's you know it's not chinese it's longer it's it's thinner and longer and you know so there's there's that if you look back at the worker party congress There are all these references to the development of ultra-modern tactical nuclear weapons.

And this is just me complaining endlessly. Another paper I wrote that nobody liked. So... I think the reason we are seeing so many short-range and medium-range solid propellant missiles plus submarines plus the intermediate-range cruise missile is... They are doing the Pakistan thing. They are going... They are arming themselves to, on the first day of a war, try to stop an invasion by using large numbers of nuclear weapons against U.S. forces in South Korea and Japan.

And we have focused on the ICBMs because they directly threaten us in our houses. But the existence of that ICBM force, and I think this comes through much more clearly now in the Workers' Party Congress, is to enable... The use of tactical nuclear weapons at a theater level because they have some escalation control.

Scott 25:44

Consistent with statements they have made for years, consistent with statements declassified from South Korea, from the National Archives and whatnot, that one of the most important things for the KPA in general, it realistically threatened to nip it in the bud. But in the event of an actual hot shooting war, prevent reinforcement, Negatively impact theater assets, basically, and try to bottle up South Korea and then try and successfully repeat, but successfully a downward invasion, if necessary.

Jeffrey 26:18

Yeah. So I wrote this up in a little memo that I tossed over the transom to some friendly voices who I thought, you know, might someday in a position to make the world a better place. And it basically said, like, look, you think the ICBM thing is bad, right? But it is time to live with the fact that they have deterrence because what will come next will be a huge investment in tactical nuclear weapons.

And honestly, because they are battlefield weapons, they really need to test those things. And if we can stop them from testing and developing a large tactical nuclear weapons capability, even if that means leaving in place that basic deterrent, like convincing them to settle for a reliable deterrent is like way better than letting them make this shift to like whatever the North Korean version of, you know, the pentamic freaking army was.

Scott 27:08

Which also means, you know, that in like 10 years when you get proven to be right, you're going to have people proposing an INF treaty for Korea and we're all going to collectively lose our minds about it. Yeah. Like we're getting a repeat of we're going to need a conventional forces in Korea treaty. We're going to need an ABM treaty and then we're going to need an INF treaty.

Jeffrey 27:26

So, you know, the way I look at it is they didn't show us the big ICBM at the end of this parade. They showed us the new short or medium range solid propellant missile. I think that's a clear signal. That's not them being nice. That's not them saying like, oh, don't think about our ICBMs. Because they actually, I mean, if you watch the parade, you know, they had that covered thing where the orchestra was sitting.

There was like a tent. They put the orchestra in a tent because they had live orchestration. They literally, as the orchestra hits the crescendo, they go into the orchestra tent and are filming out. And so you've got the conductor doing like the crazy stuff while the new solid propellant missiles are rolling by. Like they intended the, hi guys, welcome to our tactical nuclear force as the message of that parade.

And I think we're like not, we just... You know, I mean, I wrote a whole freaking novel to try to get people to get their heads around this. We are not catching on to the role that they see nuclear weapons playing in their defense because it involves nuking the shit out of us. And like, that's just hard for us to accept.

Scott 28:39

People forget, I feel like this is generalizing. People forget that deterrence is not a game played between friends.

Jeffrey 28:47

But it is, as someone said in the deal, a choice we make together. I don't know, what caught your eye from the parade? For me, it was that ending.

Scott 28:57

So the ending definitely caught my eye in the parade. That was concerning because they obviously were showing something off. Again, you said it's longer, but it's very slight. So the concerning thing for me was I saw that and I went, I can't tell the difference between that offhand because this is a two-piece SRBM set. Those look all the same to me.

I'm really concerned that they're highlighting this and I don't understand why. That immediately set off red flags of, We've already seen these. Why, why parade, why parade new ones? So that, that set off something. I feel a little disappointed that I, that the SLBM, this big Pukuk Song 5 chunky thing because we've been predicting it didn't like yellow flag at best because that, that future to me is accepted.

We're there. We're just like the parades are catching up with what We predict probably already exists. The other thing that stood out to me pretty significantly was they are really big fans of that Long artillery shot where they put like 50,000 tubes of MRLS on the camera at once. I feel like that message is unambiguous what that means.

Cause it's not just a pretty shot. That's a deterrence shot. I know, and I will never not find it funny when people joke about that. The the desert camo fits the Korean gear so well and what that could possibly imply for whether or not that's supposed to be a local system. So versus a system for export.

Jeffrey 30:29

Yeah, you know, I, I, boy, it's a lot of systems. You do wonder, it, you know, it used to be that the North Koreans had exported everything they ever built, and now they've built a whole bunch of new stuff. Do we assume they're just not going to export that, or the exports are lagging, or I'm good? Because I gotta tell you, these solid propellant missiles, I mean, like.

Sure, you might like the Chinese ones, you might like the Iranian ones, but the North Korean ones look nice too.

Scott 31:00

That sweet discount solid fuel too. I imagine they're going to come at a cheap price. I think one of the concerns is going to be whether or not we see this show up in places like Syria once they can afford to import. I'd be curious. This is not something we talk about a ton, but I know we talk a lot about how that thing looks a lot like an Iskander, that they have a missile that looks like the Russian Iskander.

I'm really curious if at some point they're going to offer operations and maintenance services on Russian SRBMs sold abroad. Be like an aftermarket end user agreement violating service well they already they already are that for the sky exactly like they they are currently scuds are not serviced essentially by the russians because the russians actually charge reasonable fees for them so i think people who still have tochkas and have escanders are going to find that there is a discount solid fuel maintenance and operations team in in play who can repour your tochkas they can make new ones And no one will ever have to know, because they're not going to sell you the tells.

Yeah, that's right. You know what the biggest thing that caught my eye was, though, in this parade?

Jeffrey 32:09

By the way, you said they'll never sell you the tells, and just to spite us, they'll f***ing sell someone the tells.

Scott 32:15

There's just going to be an 11-axle tell showing up doing logging activities somewhere in the Middle East. Like, it's going to be the middle of the desert in Iran, and they're going to have one of those, and I'm just going to lose it. Ugh. Number one thing in the parade, though, they threw the flag out like China does at its parades.

I know, that's your thing, man. I love it.

Jeffrey 32:37

So... Just to kind of bring us back together here, you know, we've got this really long speech where there's this list of things that they've done and things that they plan to do. We have got this parade that fills in some of the details and helps signal, you know, it's one thing when they say, like, we've developed it.

It's another thing when you actually see the physical system, right, in the parade, so the parade helps us. You know, they've told us what they want to do. They've shown us what they want to do. And now at least Dave Schmerler and I have a little inkling of the stuff that they are actually going to do. And it's not everything they're doing.

It's just one thing we noticed. A big development was that not only have we seen two untested variants of the Pukuk song, plus this claim of doing an underwater ICBM, which would be like the six or whatever, but For years, North Korea has had a towed underwater launch platform, a TULP, a launch barge. For more than two years, that thing has sat in the water unused at Nampo.

And for the first time in two years, because we watch this thing every freaking day, for the first time they pulled it out of the water and it's sitting up on a dry fitting dock, which presumably means it's getting an overhaul so that they can start launching from it.

Scott 33:57

And for listeners, in case you don't remember your tulp, this is basically a barge you tow behind a regular ship, not a submarine, but it contains a submarine ballistic submarine launched ballistic missile launch tube. So instead of launching it from a submarine, which can explode and be very expensive, you just put it on a barge.

Jeffrey 34:13

Which the North Koreans learned the hard way. Yep. Probably.

Scott 34:16

Reportedly. Indeed. They have one of these on the East Coast. It's also a big thing we watch at Shimpo Shipyard. But this is the first, this is the only West Coast submarine launch platform that anyone, to my knowledge, is aware of out there, which would indicate the establishment of a West Coast launch site for submarine-launched ballistic missiles.

Jeffrey, why would you want to launch from the West Coast of Korea as opposed to the East Coast of North Korea?

Jeffrey 34:44

For the same reason you launch your ICBMs from the western part of the country rather than the eastern part, which is there's more room for them to fly. You're still going to have to loft them. But you don't have to loft them quite as much because you can fly over the country and then out into the East Sea of Japan.

That's what I'm going with.

Scott 35:08

Just taking the middle ground there. And that's, again, North Korea, while it has flown missiles over Japan in previous years, that always does generate a pretty intense international response. It's not preferred, and it is, frankly, riskier in terms of fallout. We have seen... That's the wrong word. We have seen North Korean missiles go astray and kill civilians in North Korea.

And so, you know, lofting your missile over a... Another country is very risky. So what you do is for anyone who has been listening since 2017, you shoot your missile higher into space, way higher into space than it would normally go. And it screams through the atmosphere at a way higher speed, way higher temperature. But it goes a much shorter distance.

So imagine taking a missile that's meant to go 1,000 miles and firing it only 200 miles horizontally, and the rest of that energy is going vertically. So you still learn a lot about your missile, but you're not necessarily overflying sensitive countries.

Jeffrey 36:16

And it's not like Kim Jong-un won't do that, but he saves that flying over Japan for when he's really pissed.

Scott 36:22

That's a special occasion thing. If they did it all the time, it wouldn't be special.

Jeffrey 36:28

It's like what Kurt Campbell once told me about the Inn at Little Washington. He loved it, but it was a special occasion restaurant for him, right? So I would say Flying Missiles Over Japan is Kim Jong-un's Inn at Little Washington. Of course, that was 20 years ago Kurt said that. He's vastly wealthier now, so... He might be at the Inn at Little Washington a little more frequently these days, I don't know.

Scott 36:55

Maybe not these days. Oh, yeah, what am I thinking? Maybe some days soon, fingers crossed, but... Yeah, yeah, yeah.

Jeffrey 37:04

Well, he's saving up the money. ... So yeah, so that actually was kind of, it was a fun experience for us because we had been staring at this barge, which was first detected I think in 2017 on the fitting out dock when it showed up, Joe Bermudez saw it. And then they put it next to a pier or a quay, depending on how you think the thing is oriented.

And they finished the fitting out and then dropped it in this boat basin and just left it there for two years. And I, I am not kidding you. Like I actually was at a, I was at planet and they had this big they have this big touchscreen with all their satellite imagery on it that you can just kind of like, you know, play, play with.

And like literally just walking by, I stopped and I like went to Nampo and checked out that the most recent sky sat from that day because we were looking at the thing every freaking day. And in November, for the first time, it moved. And it took us a while to get a nice clean shot, which Maxar took of the launch barge sitting on the fitting out dock.

Scott 38:15

It's a small barge and it is a North Korea. Normal caveat has atrocious weather and makes satellite imagery very frustrating to get, especially for coastal regions.

Jeffrey 38:26

Yeah, we were pretty sure it had moved, but it was just cloudy, cloudy, cloudy. And then we got a couple of pictures that were just grainy, grainy, grainy. And I mean, the thing is like 20 meters long, so it's not small, but it is, it is kind of rusty brown and it's sitting on some rusty brown ground.

And, you know, even like flipping it to the near infrared didn't help. And it just, it took a while for us to get like a nice, pretty shot. So, and I will say about this, You know, clearly they're overhauling it so they can use it. That doesn't mean that there's going to be a test tomorrow. Like, I don't know how long it's going to take them to overhaul it.

It doesn't mean that's the thing they're going to test next because they got the other barge at Shinpo. They could do a Bukkuk Song 4 tomorrow from Shinpo using that barge. But for me, it's a really nice way of knowing because, you know, it's one thing for Kim to say something. It's another thing for Kim to show us something in a parade.

It is an entirely other thing to see people showing up for work, making tangible progress toward a test.

Scott 39:25

Yes, it sets the foundation for it. It would be like if we saw the, you know, folks pulling out earthworks from the nuclear site again. That doesn't mean they're about to test, but it does mean they can. They've set the foundation for a test now.

Jeffrey 39:42

Yeah. So, I mean, it is also this theme that I have come back to over and over again, which is because this is a kind of new way of knowing, it's hard because on the one hand, we want to report what we see. But indicators are just that. They're indicators. You know, I mean, they could complete the fitting out and like they did in 2017, decide like, ah, diplomacy is going.

So fitting out's done. Let's talk. And if talks break down, then, you know, we'll launch again. And it seems like they waited long enough. They wanted to fit it out again. But, you know, maybe Biden will come in and, you know, I don't think it's very likely, but, you know, maybe they start talking again. And I would say really clearly, you know, We have this moratoria in place, which Pompeo keeps taking credit for.

Kim has renounced that, both of the moratoria. We see steps toward violating the moratoria. And all of that should not distract us from the fact that if Biden can get Kim back into it, that would be worth doing. Because... Their whole idea is to shift to this large tactical nuclear capability, which is going to be a freaking nightmare.

So on the one hand, we're saying like, look, we're running out of runway here. But on the other hand, like, so apply the freaking brakes before we get to this world that we don't want to be in.

Scott 41:03

Every test puts us farther away from where we want to be. Yeah.

Jeffrey 41:11

So happy 2021. The tulp, a harbinger of good cheer.

Scott 41:17

Only good things can come off that barge. Yeah, you know, fireworks. Well, I think that wraps it up for today. So, Jeffrey, thank you very much. Thank you for having me on again. It's been, I think the last time I was here was the last North Korean military parade. So I'm happy to be here. We missed you.

So, if you would like to support the pod and help us keep the lights on in these dire and turbulent times, you can head over to patreon.com slash acwpodcast and kick us $5 a month if you are a regular human being and $3 a month if you are an academic student human being with a .edu type email address and you can get access to our Slack channel where you can exchange documents, ideas, and Pictures, jokes, and memes putting lasers over Kim Jong-un's eyes with other hobbyists, wonks, and interested peoples of the field like ourselves.

Again, that URL is patreon.com slash acwpodcast and we hope to see you in the Slack channel soon. And I may edit this part out. And we've got a secret project I need to record a little bit more of very soon that's coming down the pipeline that I think people will be very excited about. I'm game. We got to do it this week, I think.

So again, Jeffrey, thank you very much. And thank you for listening.