Mysterious Explosions in Iran

Aaron Stein 0:05

You are listening to the Arms Control Wonk and the Middle East Brief podcast. This is a crossover podcast that I am bringing to you because I am the host of both shows. My name is Aaron Stein. I am the director of research at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. Jeffrey and Anne, my co-hosts on the Arms Control Wonk podcast, where I am sure at this time of night in California, either having a nice cocktail or a And is probably baking.

And for my colleagues at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, we have tomorrow off. This is Thursday, April 4th, July 4th, and I can guarantee you most of them are probably enjoying a nice cocktail. I am recording a podcast with Fabian Hinz. Fabian, welcome to the show.

Fabian Hinz 0:46

Thank you so much.

Aaron 0:49

Remind me, what do you do at CNS again? I forgot what your exact title is.

Fabian 0:52

I'm a research associate.

Aaron 0:54

Yeah, so the reason I wanted to have you on both shows is because... Well, basically, there's a lot of stuff that's been going on in Iran. It's been blasting around my Twitter. And whenever there is something that happens in Iran, particularly when it comes to explosions and missile bases and Iran's main enrichment facility, I click over to you and direct people to you.

So let's just start right there. A couple of days ago, we had an explosion and then we were off and running. So why don't you just take it from there?

Fabian 1:25

Yeah, so a couple of days ago, we had an explosion that was pretty spectacular. It happened at nighttime, basically lit up this whole sky over Tehran. And pretty soon, the Iranians were saying that some industrial gas tanks had exploded in the general public area of Palachin, which, of course, we all know is like a large military industrial complex in Iran where explosives get produced that had a minor role, or perhaps not so minor role, in the pre-2003 nuclear weapons program.

But once we got satellite pictures, we could confirm that it actually happened in a different area, in the Khujir area of eastern Tehran, a mountainous area where most of Iran's missile industries are actually located. So that was quite revealing and quite interesting.

Aaron 2:08

Yeah, and I remember, you know, as this was happening, you know, A group of us talking about it privately, and it became quite clear pretty quickly that the explosion was at least near this missile base. It obviously made me think of previous explosions at Iranian missile bases, and we were waiting for pictures to come out. So what did the pictures reveal once we got some satellite imagery overhead?

Fabian 2:39

So I was really curious to see whether this is speed Gane 2.0, because we all remember the 2011 explosion that completely wiped out an Iranian missile development site, killed basically the founder of Iran's missile program. Once we got the pictures, we saw it was actually indeed at one of the facilities within that large complex, but the damage was much more limited.

So talking about the location, if you look at Hojir, it's all sub-organizations of the Aerospace Industries Organization, which of course is subject to the control of the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics, and is the prime producer of Iranian ballistic missiles, among other things. And we all know the sheikh, so Shahid Hamad Industrial Group, which does liquid propellant ballistic missiles, Shahid Bokerri Industrial Group, which does solar propellant ballistic missiles, and they all have various facilities associated with missile productions in there.

Now that we knew the exact location of the explosion, we could see it was at a standalone facility having its own perimeter. So it actually appeared to be gas tanks, and the Iranians released a short video of the site of the explosion showing nothing more than a few gas tanks. And that actually seemed to be correct, but was within the standalone facility, which was right next to a missile production facility.

So that was quite interesting. Would you say they got pretty lucky there? It's difficult to know. I mean, the whole area is protected pretty well against explosions. I mean, you have lots of berms, the whole area is mountainous, so it looks like a pretty safe facility, at least when compared to other Iranian ballistic missile bases that have blown up in the past that didn't have protective equipment.

And it was still a bit away from the main production building, so I would say they were a bit lucky, but probably also... The explosion was very spectacular, but simply not large enough to really cause a disaster. But perhaps not, you never know.

Aaron 4:34

Yeah, which brings us to the explosion today, which, you know... It's much more eyebrow-raising. And so when I started DMing you in the morning, the morning East Coast times, you would inform me that you had been up all night and that you needed to sleep before we could do this podcast, which suited me well because I had to do a whole bunch of stuff.

So why don't you walk us through why you were up all night and give the listeners a background of what exactly just happened?

Fabian 5:00

So, first you had some news about an incident or potentially a fire at one of Iran's nuclear sites, the Natanz enrichment site, which of course is Iran's largest nuclear enrichment site and one of the most controversial nuclear sites in Iran. And of course, in the beginning, we didn't know what actually happened. We had very few clues as to that.

And the first clue that there actually was something major happening came in the form of the NASA fire maps, where you could see that actually a fire had taken place, some sort of fire or explosion at one of the locations within the Natanz perimeter. And then the Iranians did a very unusual step. So the Iranian Atomic Energy Organization...

Released a picture of the site damaged. And the Iranians very quickly said, you know, it's just a hangar, just a shed in the process of construction, not much happening there. But that picture showed enough detail to geolocate it. It's a very particular building within the Natanz complex. And that building has previously been identified as Iran's new centrifuge assembly workshop inside Natanz.

And that is quite something, because if you have some storage area where, let's say, they're doing a welding job and something burns down, that's That's one thing, but if you see a building that looks like very damaged and shows sign of an explosion happening and not just a fire, and that is the new centrifuge assembly workshop, that's quite significant, I would say.

Then, of course, to make everything even more murky, the BBC Farsi service reported that they had received a statement before any news of an incident at the Tansbrook by a group calling itself the Cheetahs of the Homeland. Who was claiming responsibility for an attack against Natanz, against an assembly site, that's the way they called it at Natanz.

And they were saying that they're a group of dissidents within the Iranian security establishment trying to do acts of sabotage. And that, of course, is a very new development that we haven't really seen before in Iran, these kind of statements.

Aaron 7:00

Yeah, I mean when I saw that, it immediately brought to mind about whether or not this was some sort of front group for like the Mojadine Al-Khalk, sort of the NCRI that kind of kicked it all off in like August 2002 because they were probably like an entity to launder state intelligence through about undeclared nuclear facilities, one of which was a centrifuge production facility, albeit not this one.

You know, what do you make of that? I mean, it's kind of hard to, like, parse out and figure out, but clearly when you see some of these ground truth pictures, and maybe you can talk about how you went through and found those, or, I mean, they eventually started popping up all over Twitter to where I found them.

There's significant damage there, right?

Fabian 7:44

So the group itself, it's I mean, you see some sort of signs of erosions within the Iranian security establishment a little recently, but still it seems so implausible because, I mean, put yourself into the shoes of like a guy working inside the Iranian security establishment, having the capabilities of blowing something up like that. You will get killed for that.

If they catch you, they will kill you for that. You will get executed. So why would you do that to sabotage a nuclear facility? It doesn't really make that much sense to me. If you're really willing to escalate that much to hurt the Islamic Republic, if you're taking that risk, you could take completely different risks and do other stuff.

So that doesn't really make sense to me. I was also thinking of the MEK and the way it laundered information. So to me, it looks a bit like a front organization. But then the question is like, why would we suddenly have that? So I would have to go back. But like, as far as I can remember, when you had like Stuxnet and the assassination of Iranian nuclear scientists, which kind of surprisingly have been forgotten quite a bit in the West.

I don't think there was ever like a claim of responsibility by any group, but I would have to check again. So that's pretty interesting.

Aaron 8:59

No, I mean the other thing that made me think about was sort of the wave of assassinations, both that are typically linked back and associated with the Israelis. I initially began to think like are we at the precipice because of some of the restrictions within the JCPOA are starting to come off. I mean we saw Secretary Pompeo – or on the precipice of coming off.

We saw Secretary Pompeo sort of make his case that the arms embargo shouldn't come off and I don't – I'm not holding my breath that he's going to be successful in that. But you know, we're sort of staring down, I believe we're only a couple of years away, you know, from when some of the The restrictions on enrichment begin to fall away, and I'm wondering if there's a state actor behind this who is looking to either send a message to the Iranians that we're watching you and be trying to put a dent in their program.

Fabian 9:51

Yeah, I was also thinking a lot about these early 2010 years. I mean, if you look back, you had some sort of American maximum wage. Pressure campaign back then. You had a nuclear program by Iran that didn't have the kind of limits later imposed by the JCPOA. And both are parallels to today's situation. So it's kind of make sense that we would see that sort of kinetic sabotage component emerge again as a way to slow the program.

And I think like taking out a workshop for the assembly of advanced centrifuges and the calibration and their balancing, et cetera, et cetera, That's quite a good way to slow down a very very sensitive part of Iran's nuclear program, I guess.

Aaron 10:32

Yeah, I mean, maybe you could talk a little bit about what it is that they were assembling there. Because if I'm remembering correctly, and do correctly if I'm wrong, is that this was for more of the advanced centrifuges that they have been testing. So these advanced centrifuges are sort of more efficient, just to be simplistic about it, than the older generation, which they typically use now and that are mandated by the JCPOA.

And so that you can enrich more efficiently with less amount of centrifuges so you can enrich more material more quickly, if I can just be simplistic about it.

Fabian 11:05

Yeah, definitely. So this is a revenue facility. They started building it already a while ago, but it only became operational, I think, two years ago or something like that. And it's intended for more advanced centrifuges. But I think Jeffrey has pointed out quite a bit on the Arms Control Long podcast, and other people have pointed out that the research and development of new centrifuges is something that is qualitatively quite different from other Iranian steps when it comes to the JCPOA provisions, because you can always ship An excess of enriched uranium outside of the country, you can blend down, you can uninstall centrifuges, etc.

But once you've done the research and the development of an advanced centrifuge, and once you have made it a much more efficient centrifuge running smoothly, that's something that is knowledge that you can't really reverse. So to me, it makes a lot of sense that you would target this kind of capability.

Aaron 12:00

It kind of goes hand in hand with the carbon fiber stuff that you and Jeffrey are working on with their missile program. I mean one of the things to do is to make these centrifuges lighter and carbon fiber comes into that as well. Yeah, I mean and maybe – I know that you've been tracking this. For listeners who are not as well immersed in this, just the facility that was destroyed, I mean they – the Iranians – Basically showed it off, I want to say, like two years ago.

Did that make your job sort of with the OSINT slew thing easier because you had a picture to begin with? And how did that factor into all of it?

Fabian 12:36

So it's quite interesting if you look at how you could do that. So the first thing that I did was the fire satellite imagery. And that kind of indicated at what part of the facility something happened. And then I was sleuthing around the facility, and ISIS had identified that building in particular as the new centrifuge workshop, just using a timer.

Using Iranian announcements about when it was finished, et cetera, et cetera. And then the Iranians themselves released a video inside the facility, which mostly showed the inside of the facility, showed a short view of the entrance, but not... Enough to geolocate it but Iranian media actually also released two other images of the entrance that has a very very particular and unique shape and that you could match the satellite pictures to say okay that's really a centrifuge workshop and the picture of the damaged building was pretty easy to geolocate because of a very characteristic shape of an administrative building in the background the The kind of shape of the building itself, lightning pole, like lamp posts and everything.

So the classic tools of geolocation, if you put all of that together, you can have a really high confidence that this is actually the centrifuge workshop.

Aaron 13:55

And, you know, because you were quoted in the New York Times about this. And one of the things that was interesting that caught my attention in that piece is that like a lot of Iranian nuclear facilities, a lot of it is built on the ground, you know, sort of to insulate it or at least sort of provide some modicum of protection from, you know, ostensible American ground airstrikes against it.

Is there any sense based upon what you're looking at about how much of the facility was actually destroyed? Was it just this top level? I mean as far as I can tell, we don't know. But I do know that they did send some top level people like immediately over there. So clearly it was a serious thing, not something minor.

Yeah.

Fabian 14:36

So if you look at the damage itself, it looks pretty serious, and there are signs of an explosion, and you would probably have, like, centralized ventilation systems and everything that could get damaged. So it did look pretty serious. How far the damage was in terms of equipment inside, that is, of course, difficult to know. How long it will take them to rebuild that thing is difficult to know.

I would agree, it's interesting that they build it overground in the first place, I guess... My guess is that once Natanz was exposed and you had the threat of airstrikes, perhaps it didn't make much of a difference, because the stuff at Natanz is of course buried, but not buried as deeply as, let's say, Foldo. So perhaps it was just a more efficient way, because in the end it wouldn't protect against an airstrike anyway to put it underground at Natanz.

Aaron 15:18

Yeah, and I think we should, I mean, just reiterate to listeners, like, this isn't, I mean, Natanz is a relatively large site, I mean, like, relatively. So this was just one building within it. This wasn't in the main enrichment hall. I think we should say that, right?

Fabian 15:32

Yeah, that's true, that's true. Yeah, I mean, go ahead. It's also interesting because the statement of the group said that they deliberately targeted a building overground so that the Iranians wouldn't be able to deny what happened. Which I found quite interesting.

Aaron 15:49

That is interesting. I mean, this group is something that I'm hesitant to even talk about because I just never heard of it. That doesn't mean that it doesn't exist. That doesn't mean that they aren't true. But let's say that my skepticism meter... The Middle East Brief isn't as R-rated as the Arms Control Walk podcast, so I won't swear.

But my skepticism meter is... Pretty high on the sort of validity of of this group that claimed responsibility, although I do take BBC Farsi quite seriously. Like, like their journalists are top notch and they are a very reputable outlet. So clearly something would happen, you know, something said, somebody sent it to them.

Fabian 16:30

I mean, I have strong doubts that this is, like, this rogue inside group doing all this stuff, but, like, even if it's just a cutout for, like, let's say another intelligence service or the MEK or the MEK and an intelligence service, the fact that they put that inside... The statement is pretty interesting because if you think of sabotage, you can always see sabotage in two ways.

The one is actually to cause damage in order to slow down or even destroy programs. The other one is psychological. And you can, of course, mix both of them. And I would have a feeling that like doing sabotage that might be less efficient than like... In terms of slowing down Iran's nuclear program, then blowing up centrifuges, but one that can't be denied has a certain psychological component to it.

So that's something I find quite interesting to think about.

Aaron 17:20

Yeah, and I mean even just the act of smuggling an explosive into this place is something not to be overlooked. I mean that's not easy. So like clearly somebody did their homework here. I do wonder why they chose – I mean it's an unanswerable question, but why did they choose this facility? Like why this? I mean maybe it was one that had less site security because it really is just sort of a – It's kind of a workshop, you know, I mean, well, it's not really a workshop, but it's kind of an assembly area for centrifuges.

It's it doesn't there's no enrichment going on in there as much as we can tell. And so it maybe has less security. I don't know. But like.

Fabian 18:03

It's very much inside the security zone of Natanz within the double perimeter, so getting explosives and the right amount of explosives inside it must have been really, really difficult. So I would say it is pretty interesting. Why did they choose this one? I think the research and development angle and the new centrifuges, that's definitely one reason. If you think about it in the technical terms, if you want to slow down the program...

And Iran's capability to potentially break out one day at a secret site or something. I mean, like slowing down the research and development of advanced centrifuges is something you would really want to do. But on the other hand, striking at the heart of Iran's most important nuclear site in a way that is non-deniable. And actually produces imagery.

I mean, if you have 5,000 centrifuges blowing up and you don't have any imagery, the psychological impact is still kind of minor. That's not the way the modern media environment works. So from a psychological point of view, I think it's also a very well-chosen target, if you want so.

Aaron 19:01

Is there anything I'm leaving out that I should ask you about that I'm forgetting about?

Fabian 19:05

Let me think. No, not really. That's everything I can think of right now. I mean, the really interesting question is whether we're going to see other mysterious explosions happening at other sites.

Aaron 19:15

Yeah, I mean, that's the open question. I mean, I do say I'm not – I think the first explosion, the one at the Shig, the one at the missile facility, I do sort of think that that was an accident. Look, you can never be certain, but I do think that that one was an accident. The one at Natanz I clearly do not think is an accident.

But, you know, you never know.

Fabian 19:38

I mean, at first when I saw the explosion at Spik or the Hoxha area, I was thinking it's probably an accident because, you know, accidents at missile factories happen quite a bit, like even in countries with like a long history of missile development and high safety standards, they happen often. And the other thing is we just don't know like Iran's economic crisis, how has it affected standard maintenance and everything.

There wasn't that much damage. So I thought it was an accident, but I'm a little less sure by now because it's just such a coincidence to have like these two things and in a very short period of time. And again, with Stig, it's like Hojir, it's, The explosion didn't do much damage, but I mean, it was spectacular.

So if you want to have it like with a more psychological effect of the whole sabotage thing, it would still make sense to do something like that, I would guess. Another aspect that we perhaps could mention is the lack of apparent, like we can't really confirm it, lack of casualties of both attacks. That's something I find quite interesting.

Aaron 20:38

Yeah, I mean, because again, the bidionnaire, I mean, for listeners, you know, there was a very large explosion in a very sort of eccentrically run missile facility out in the desert. Yes. You know, where they didn't take as many safety precautions as you saw, you know, sort of at the place. Yeah. They didn't take a lot of safety precautions and the man in charge of it has lost his head because of it, although he is dead.

So, you know, it's hard to compare that.

Fabian 21:12

The assassination of Iranian nuclear scientists, I mean, it sounds horrible, but if you want to slow down the program, like destroying the human expertise would actually make a lot of sense. But apparently we haven't seen that. I mean, the Iranians could also be just lying. Perhaps some people died in Natan's accident. It would make sense if you want to avoid major escalation to do it in a way that not a lot of people get killed or like no people get killed at all.

So perhaps that's like one of the factors behind it. But I'm not sure at this point.

Aaron 21:42

Yeah, I mean, I agree. And at some point we delve into speculation, which we're not exactly sure. I think what we can confidently say is that you have done the all-nighter, if you will. I am long past all-nighters. Actually, that was an exception.

Fabian 22:00

I haven't done it in a while. I feel pretty bad right now.

Aaron 22:04

Yeah.

Fabian 22:06

I mean, one other thing one could be mentioning is it's interesting to see how the Islamic Republic's officials dealt with both cases, because... They clearly can't deny those things anymore, especially with the Khujir explosion, because it was visible all over Tehran, so now they're having the strategy of not flatly denying things, but just playing them down. So the first statement about Khujir was, yeah, it was a gas explosion, not related to the military side, in the general area of Porjin, and apparently, if you're old-fashioned, you can also call that part of Khujir the general area of Porjin, even though it's quite far away from the actual current Porjin side.

And in Natanz they were very adamant that it's just like a hangar where nothing really happened which is a bit ridiculous because you actually have the video of the guy saying that in front of the building right now and you can see quite advanced ventilation equipment in the background so apparently it's not just some storage shaft but I would say even this kind of new strategy doesn't work anymore in today's world like it's now only a question of a few hours Probably until we get satellite pictures confirming, finally confirming the location of the explosion at Natanz or the fire at Natanz.

So they adapted their strategy, but still it's not really working these days.

Aaron 23:27

Yeah, and if I had to guess, if Jeffrey was leading this podcast, he would sort of take this, because I know that he's interested in the assassination campaigns and how it's more difficult to hide them now, but how you wouldn't want to hide them right now, how you can publicize it using open source, and how that may explain the early tip-off to the BBC Farsi.

But I am speaking for Jeffrey, and one should never speak for Jeffrey. He has his own mind. So I think with that, Fabian, as always, this has been illuminating and fun. Thanks for coming on. I know it's about dinner time on the West Coast. It's 9.30 over here on the East Coast. So it's definitely time for me to sign off.

So thanks, Fabian, for coming on. Thanks, everybody, for listening. Thank you so much. It was great. And thanks to the Crossover Podcast, both to the Arms Control Wong Podcast and to the Middle East Brief.