This episode is from January 2020. Facts and links may have changed since. See more from that month

Episode20 min

Iran’s Fifth Step

0:00 / 19:57

The ACW crew discusses the JCPOA…again. Iran has announced its 5th step away from the JCPOA. The trio discusses what that means, what it doesn’t mean, and where we go from here. 

And, for your ease of reference, Iran’s Five Steps:

  1. May 2019: No longer limit stockpiles of LEU or heavy water
  2. July 2019: No longer limit uranium enrichment to 3.67%
  3. September 2019: Abandoned all limits on R&D for new centrifuges 
  4. November 2019: Resume uranium enrichment at Fordow, resulting in a podcast.
  5. January 2020: Abandon limits on number of centrifuges. 

 

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Transcript

Transcribed automatically: it certainly contains errors. It’s pretty good, just not perfect. We provide it here because, for accessibility, it’s better than nothing.

Aaron Stein 0:01

Hi listeners, just a disclaimer. This episode was recorded prior to the Iranian missile raids against U.S. air bases on January 7th. This episode only covers the Iranian nuclear issues and their fifth step in regards to the JCPOA. The missile raids had not occurred at the time of recording and will be covered in an episode that is being recorded soon.

Thank you.

Jeffrey Lewis 0:28

You are listening to the Arms Control Wonk podcast, a podcast on arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation. I'm Jeffrey Lewis, a professor at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey and the founding publisher of the Arms Control Wonk weblog.

Aaron 0:43

And I'm Aaron Stein, director of the Middle East Program at the Foreign Policy Research Institute.

Anne Pellegrino 0:48

And I am Anne Pellegrino, a research associate at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies. And I am on the road in a disgusting D.C. right now.

Jeffrey 0:59

Is it sleet? Rain? Tell us about the horror show that is our old stomping grounds.

Anne 1:05

It is rain, but apparently it will turn to sleet and then snow. So the federal government is shut down. So that means that after we record this, I get to go home and put on my PJs.

Jeffrey 1:20

I am just delighted that we are canceling the war with Iran on account of snow.

Aaron 1:26

Hello, listeners. Second disclaimer. Whoops. As we're ready to finish the conflict, to quote the Secretary of Defense, the federal government is ready to wind down because of about half an inch of snow. So let's do this thing.

Jeffrey 1:43

Jeffrey? You have... We got some JCPOA news. Yes. And we still have our bad sound quality because we haven't figured out this new era of Mac operating systems. I am outraged. I am outraged by the headline, particularly the headlines in the New York Times falsely indicating that Iran has withdrawn from the JCPOA. It has not, although things are not looking great.

Anne 2:10

So... Yeah, seven days into 2020 and this year is already garbage. But basically, we're at it.

Jeffrey 2:18

You know what Ankit Panda said that was so depressing? He was counting down the days and he was like, you know, you might think you only have 360 days left, but actually it's a leap year. There are 361 left. That was the most soul-crushing thing I'd ever heard, that there was one more day in 2020.

Aaron 2:36

Yeah, I hadn't seen that tweet, so thank you for that. Thank you, Ankit.

Anne 2:42

Sorry to cut you off, Anne. No, it's fine. It's fine.

Aaron 2:46

Let's talk about what Iran actually did, because I saw that headline flash across my Twitter feed, and I said, oh, no. And then when I dug into it, I was like, oh, wait, that headline is really poorly written because they haven't withdrawn from the JCPOA.

Anne 3:01

So I have Zarif's tweet up that should help clarify.

Aaron 3:06

Okay, go for it.

Anne 3:07

Read it. So Iran has taken the fifth and final remedial step under paragraph 36 of the JCPOA. There will no longer be any restriction on number of centrifuges. And then he says, this step is within the JCPOA and all five steps are reversible upon effective implementation of reciprocal obligations. Iran's full cooperation with the IAEA will continue.

Jeffrey 3:37

So the part that I can't get over is the Iranians have made this so simple by numbering each of the steps. You know, it's like a little bulleted list with numbers. And even then, the dips at The New York Times can't get it straight. So, yeah, there are five steps. I happily have them written down that Iran has taken over the course of 2019, walking back their commitments under the JCPOA in response to the U.S. reimposition of sanctions.

They are in May 2019. They announced that they would no longer limit their stockpiles of LEU or heavy water. In July of 2019, step two, they would no longer limit enrichment to 3.67 percent. In September of 2019, step three, Iran abandoned all limits on new centrifuge R&D. November 2019, step four, we had a podcast about this, right?

November 13th, Iran's four steps. Yep. Iran resumed uranium enrichment at Fordow. And now the fifth step, January 2020, abandoning the limits on the number of centrifuges. So there are no technical limits here. That Iran is abiding by at the moment, or at least they don't feel bound to abide by. They aren't necessarily breaching every single thing. But they remain in the JCPOA.

They continue to cooperate with the IAEA. They are, of course, a member of the NPT, which means that they are not asserting the right to have a nuclear weapon yet, although we may get there. It's 361 more days. Right. Well, from when Ankit made that joke, mercifully, we're... We're getting there. And they are willing to come back into compliance with each of these provisions if the U.S. comes back into compliance and lifts the sanctions.

Aaron 5:24

It seems really straightforward to me.

Jeffrey 5:29

But not so straightforward if you're the Trump administration.

Anne 5:32

No. And I we should just kind of like. Address the elephant in the room even if just briefly because the timing of when he put out this tweet came after the Soleimani assassination and so I think it's important to note that this step was coming and is I don't think in any way related to the Soleimani assassination but there are those who think that this is

Jeffrey 6:05

A result of that, and is one way that they are responding. And I think that that's not true. Yes, there are people who have never read David Hume, who have never thought deeply about causation, and they believe that any two events that happen close in in close proximity in time, there must be a causal relationship. It's very upsetting to the lapsed epistemologist sitting here.

Aaron 6:31

I think what we should say, though, is, you know, I got questions about this, too. So people were like, so what does it actually mean? Because people were concerned that this was the first step towards, you know, we have to use the word breakout for that they would consider nuclear weapons. Just, you know, maybe just reiterate how elements of the inspection protocols that are in the JCPOA may still be in force, even with the limits by which that they are, the limits that were Delineated and defined in the JCPOA.

Iran has now, as you read, the five different points gone through and said it won't abide by those.

Jeffrey 7:08

Right. Well, we're people who thought breakout was a really stupid measure, right? And Aaron and I, and you're not necessarily implicated in our hostility. But Aaron and I, Aaron, I'm just going to go ahead and speak for you. I mean, we always thought that breakout was a dumb thing and that the real value of the agreement Was or were the provisions for enhanced monitoring.

And at least so far, those provisions remain in place. And so even, you know, basically what the Trump administration has succeeded in doing is moving forward the sunset that they used to complain about so vociferously up into the present day.

Aaron 7:49

Right.

Jeffrey 7:50

But leaving in place, at least for the moment, all of the all of the monitoring. So, you know, we're still in a better place than we were before the deal. And and, you know, at least from my perspective, it seems pretty clear that the Iranians are not exiting the deal, but they are continuing their own version of maximum pressure to try to get Trump to reenter it.

I mean, that seems very clear, despite what some. Some fake experts are quoted as saying.

Aaron 8:22

And we should say if they go through on this, so if you were to put all five of the points together, one of the outcomes of this is that the breakout time is about to go down, right? Yeah. Well, yeah.

Anne 8:35

Which makes David Albright very happy because he can do his little calculations again. I was just going to say that I think it's important to point out that it, yes, he can do his breakout calculations. I think that the breakout time is still very much closer to a year rather than having been drastically reduced to closer to six months.

So I think that, look, I don't think the Trump administration is going to pull its head out of its ass in time to save this. I don't think they want to save it. And, you know, Iran is giving us every option to do so. But, you know, I wonder at what point they are just like, you know what, f*** it.

Jeffrey 9:21

Well, and I will say, I think when they finally do decide to say f*** it, I don't I would be surprised if they would announce that they were saying pocket and if they used the declared facility. So my guess is we won't really know.

Anne 9:35

Yeah.

Jeffrey 9:37

But what they will do is they'll start digging a hole in the ground. And we'll either catch it or we won't. But I don't know. Like I said, if you liked walking away from the – if you like a nuclear-armed North Korea, you're going to love walking away from the JCPOA.

Aaron 9:55

Well, I guess maybe – I mean I would phrase it a little differently. It's like what's step six, right? So where do they go next after this? I mean they've exhausted the one through five points. They're clearly designed to put pressure on the US. I think around that breakout time because that breakout time has assumed so much sort of like political salience.

Oh, they're six months away. They're three months away, whatever the calculation works itself out to. I find that – again, I find that to be irrelevant. But people have ascribed political value to that. But when that breakout time starts to shrink, what becomes next, especially if there's no return by the US into the JCPOA? And by the way, we're not going to return to the JCPOA.

I'm stealing an Ariane Tabata by point here. The JCPOA – It's going to look something like this, right? You know, it's going to try and get like a freeze for freeze. Remember that, Jeffrey? You know, like we'll freeze sanctions for freezing where they are and then they're going to negotiate on things that they can get back in order to return to limits, if you ask me.

But I don't think the Trump administration will do that. So this is a long, roundabout way about saying it's like, what comes next? Do they just leave the JCPOA, stay in the NPT? I mean, what goes on?

Anne 11:18

Mm-hmm. I think a question that I can tack on to that is at what point is IAEA cooperation and our visibility into what Iran's doing, when does that start to become part of these steps? I don't know if that's the next step. I don't necessarily think so. I do not have an answer as to when. You know, as to what the next steps will be, but also when we start to see the erosion of transparency?

Jeffrey 11:51

Yeah, I have that same question. I mean, it's clear that all the steps they took were on the nuclear commitment side. And so that they are, and I think people forget, you know, these are commitments about their civilian nuclear energy program, which is under safeguards. And so they're removing technical restrictions, right? But they're not withdrawing from the NPT.

They're not announcing they're making a bomb right there. They're only, only ending the technical restrictions, but they're like out of technical restrictions to end. So, so they could, I mean, they could actually just take additional, I mean, they won't call them steps anymore, but they could breach other limits, right? So they aren't enriching to 20% at the moment.

They could do that. There are probably things in that vein that, But, you know, I worry about what Anne worries about, which is at some point, do they then start reducing cooperation with the IAEA? I mean, obviously, that's a way to reduce visibility into their activities. But on the other hand, I mean, I think the Iranians have been really smart about the way they've handled this.

You know, they haven't they have made sure that Trump takes all the blame. And and I think if they start cutting off the IAEA, then they might, you know, they're at risk of interrupting their enemy while we're making a mistake.

Anne 13:16

I completely I completely agree. I think they're smart enough to know that they that Iran has the upper hand in this situation and that to reduce transparency and cooperation with IAEA would be to shoot themselves in the foot.

Aaron 13:33

I mean, even for listeners of this podcast, well, maybe not listeners of this podcast, but people who I interact with who have at times listened to this podcast, there's still a misunderstanding of how sanctions work. So they can decrease IAEA visibility while still maintaining basic safeguards. That's my point I'm trying to make. And they could still be under safeguard, but the excess sort of protocols in the JCPOA and maybe even some of the sort of the IAEA safeguards The more robust IEA protocols.

I'm talking about the additional protocol here. They can just go back to a basic safeguards agreement, which is where we were, when was it, from like 2003 to 2011? I can't remember.

Jeffrey 14:12

Just really quickly for listeners, there is the comprehensive safeguards agreement, but there are also subsidiary arrangements which actually implement it. And so Iran has updated its subsidiary arrangements consistently And applied the additional protocol and applied two more steps for, or two more measures for monitoring the production of centrifuges and the milling and mining of uranium. And so they could walk those back, right?

They could say all the volunteer measures about centrifuges and mining and milling are off the table. They could also walk back the additional protocol and they could also do, which is probably not legal, but they've done it before. So they might do it again. They might Revert to their older subsidiary arrangements, all of which would serve to progressively reduce the IAEA's access.

And they would still be under safeguards, right? They wouldn't be in violation of the NPT, which requires you to have a CSA enforced, but they would... I think you definitely would face this challenge of how confident would we be that we would find the next covert Iranian facility. I mean, you know, the U.S. found the first couple, so that was great.

But do we believe that that's a thing the U.S. can do indefinitely, particularly if the IAEA has less and less access?

Aaron 15:32

Right. So, I mean, that was the point I was trying to make here. And so politically, they can compress the breakout time and then they can deny the IAEA access and sort of You know, still remain a member of the MPT. I think it's important to reiterate that they have those tools. But I think as we wrap up here, you know, you know, the Trump administration is not going to use sanctions, right?

Like the Trump administration is just not going to do that.

Jeffrey 15:57

So, you know, I would say after whacking Soleimani, it's I think we're we're yeah. Well, I don't know. Maybe maybe maybe Trump is so desperate for a meeting, but I don't think he's going to get it.

Aaron 16:10

So I don't either. But OK, stranger things have happened. Maybe Trump declares victory. I mean, look, I'm being serious. I mean, who would have thought that, you know, stranger things happen? You know, prediction with Trump is very, very difficult because he's so erratic. But, you know, are we now thrust into a position where we're sort of hoping that the Iranians are the rational actors here while we pursue an irrational policy or is there something in the middle?

Jeffrey 16:38

No, it's definitely what I'm hoping for. I'm very worried. And it's because I'm old. I mean, we're whining about how aggressive the Iranians are being now, which they are. Right. But I'm old enough to remember when they were worse. You know, and so I keep hearing people saying, like, oh, they would never attack one of our bases.

Like, I remember when they attacked one of our bases. Right. You know, they would never kidnap and torture a U.S. official. Like, oh, I remember when they did that and sent the videotapes in. Like, that's in my lifetime. Did you not know that, Anne?

Anne 17:12

No, I knew.

Jeffrey 17:15

You just still don't like hearing it?

Anne 17:17

Yeah. Yeah.

Jeffrey 17:19

I've been difficult all day. For listeners, I've been giving Anna a hard time about a variety of subjects. I'm just a mean person.

Anne 17:29

I don't have a response. I'm sorry.

Jeffrey 17:32

I don't think you should answer that one. No comment. But anyway, my point is that we're hoping the Iranians are going to be reasonable. And it's probably in their interest to be reasonable. But there is no guarantee that there aren't just, you know, real... Like, whatever. People get angry. And they do things out of anger and spite and pride.

Aaron 17:59

And, you know, that's the gasoline that fuels these kinds of fires.

Anne 18:09

Well, so... A happy note.

Jeffrey 18:13

You're not going to have to pay off your student loans?

Anne 18:16

Oh, gosh.

Jeffrey 18:18

Sorry, Marty Piper.

Anne 18:20

I was going to ask if anybody had any New Year's resolutions.

Aaron 18:26

Oh, I now bring my lunch from home. I'm trying to save some money.

Anne 18:32

Oh, good for you. I don't do New Year's resolutions. Oh, okay. Should have known. Should have known. What's yours? You wouldn't ask if you didn't have one. Be kinder to myself. That's a good one.

Aaron 18:48

That is a good one.

Anne 18:49

I know. I know. That's a happy note.

Aaron 18:52

That is a happy note.

Anne 18:53

It is a happy note.

Aaron 18:54

Let's all be to ourselves, even when we don't deserve it.

Anne 18:59

Exactly. Well, you know, we may think we don't deserve it, but yeah, just be kind.

Aaron 19:09

Well, I think that was a happy note as Anne gets to go home, and we're holding her back from trudging out into about a quarter inch or less of snow that shut down the federal government.

Anne 19:18

There is zero snow.

Aaron 19:20

I'm going to go to Pebble Beach for lunch. Well, I'm in Philly, and the snow is expected to start here at 4 o'clock, so I'll be joining everybody pretty soon. It's 219 for listeners. With that, thank you, everybody, for listening. Jeffrey has to jet, so head on over to patreon.com slash acwpodcasts. If you like the show, we're for $3 a month if you're a student or $5 a month if you're a normal person.

You can help support the show and it really helps us out. So with that, thanks everybody for listening and Jeffrey and Ann, thank you. Bye.

The Arms Control Wonk Podcast

Jeffrey Lewis & Aaron Stein

The nuclear weapons, arms control, disarmament and nonproliferation podcast.