North Korea’s Continuing Missile Production

Jeffrey Lewis 0:06

You are listening to the Arms Control Wonk podcast, the leading podcast on arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation. I'm Jeffrey Lewis, the founding publisher of the Arms Control Wonk blog, and a scholar at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey.

Aaron Stein 0:22

And I'm Aaron Stein, a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council's Refugiary Center for the Middle East.

Jeffrey 0:27

Today's episode is brought to you by me, me and my novel, The 2020 Commission Report, which releases on August 7th. It is a story of a diplomatic engagement with North Korea gone wrong. It's garnering great praise. We got a blurb from Bill Perry the other day, Aaron.

Aaron 0:44

I've been watching the reviews on Twitter. Congratulations. They're all very, very positive.

Jeffrey 0:47

Yeah, yeah. It turns out it's not terrible, although the story is terrible because, as I say, it's a diplomatic engagement with North Korea gone wrong. And then the two parties stumble into a nuclear war, which, hey, is looking increasingly like it's going to go in the nonfiction aisle.

Aaron 1:08

Please don't say that. Let's hope for the best, right? Yeah, hope for the best in stockpile water.

Jeffrey 1:14

What the hell, man?

Aaron 1:17

The Washington Post dropped the bombs, didn't they?

Jeffrey 1:21

Yes, they did. I should say, you know, so much of what we're doing is North Korea. So much of what we're getting news coverage for is North Korea. So much of our podcasts are North Korea. We have been doing some really cool stuff with Russia and Iran and other countries. And so we have this much broader portfolio of work on a day-to-day basis.

But Kim Jong-un keeps dragging us back.

Aaron 1:44

Yeah, no, I just think he likes the attention. So maybe he's a fan of the show and just wants to be talked about more and more.

Jeffrey 1:52

Right, so, you know, We'll go through the open source piece of this, but the genesis of the Washington Post's bombshell story, which is kind of exploding a little bit more than I thought it would. I'm always a little bit confused by which stories become huge and which ones don't, but this one looks like it's getting huge, is that North Korea is building one, possibly two ICBMs at the Sanumdong R&D facility north of Pyongyang.

And it's a leak. It's not something we did on the open source side, although we've been monitoring it and we play a role in this story. But it is a leak that there is a U.S. intelligence assessment that states that there are one, possibly two ICBMs under construction. It identifies them specifically as Hwasong-15 ICBMs. And I think Reuters followed with a piece saying that there was a distinctive shipping container that is associated with Hwasong-15 that was seen on site sometime in the past week or so.

Aaron 3:02

Just for clarity, for listeners who maybe don't follow and just drop again, maybe you want to tell them what the Hwasong-15 is.

Jeffrey 3:08

Oh, right, yes. The Hwasong-15 is North Korea's big ICBM. It is the missile that can target anywhere in the United States, including, as I like to point out, Mar-a-Lago.

Aaron 3:19

That's right. And this is the second of the big sort of recent leaks about North Korea that obviously come on, I guess, the relatively recent heels of the Singapore summit and continued nice words out of the administration about progress or lack thereof about... The status and negotiations and their Denuclearization. Is that the word they're still using?

Jeffrey 3:43

Yes. And in fact, you know, I mean, the previous leak was very clearly the result of a new intelligence assessment. And that intelligence assessment, interestingly, Joby Warrick picks up on it in his it's Joby Warrick and Ellen Nakashima who wrote this piece. I talked to Joby on the phone, so I, I, I incorrectly always say Joby, but it's really the two of them.

They pick up on that assessment in their piece. And so they talk about the new thing that they got, which is there is an ICBM or two under construction now. Plus they go back and they have some details about that intelligence report that had not been previously public. And I think it's because the intelligence community had prevailed upon NBC not to publish them.

But I guess the Washington Post decided... It and and and that they were newsworthy. It's that they have internal accounts of North Korean meetings where they discussed various deception proposals, including, and this sounds a little goofy to me which doesn't mean that you know goofy people don't make goofy suggestions. I'm not saying it's not true. It's just we have to recognize it's a bit goofy that they had discussed turning over 20 weapons while keeping the balance.

Aaron 5:03

Yeah you know, Scott and I were talking a little bit off pod about this by the way. Goofy, but like good for them if they have the stones to do that. No, seriously, I mean, I think our last pod was about, we just don't know how long, how much physical material they have because of some of the questions we have about when their original plant came up and running. So maybe 20 is just a fraction. Maybe it's a good amount. We just don't know. but This sort of seems to confirm how we hypothesize or theorize that they would try and wiggle out of some of the commitments that they have made or at least hinted at as part of the Singapore summit.

Wouldn't you say?

Jeffrey 5:43

Well, yeah, you know, I wouldn't use the word wiggle out, because to be fair, the North Koreans have never promised to stop producing nuclear weapons. You know, their public statements have been very clear that they are going to spend this year stockpiling those weapons. And to the extent that they have addressed denuclearization, it's been to Reject the idea that they would just trade weapons for promises and then also to sort of describe denuclearization in the same terms that say Barack Obama did you know? For him, a world without nuclear weapons was an aspiration. I think it's the same thing for Kim. So I don't, I wouldn't Although I do think that the North Koreans are perfectly willing to deceive.

I think most states are when their interests are at stake. I don't think that the fundamental issue here is one of deception. I think it's that North Korea is continuing business as usual. And so, I don't know, I got asked about this today. And, you know, it's not Kim that has the problem with telling the truth. It's Donald Trump.

Aaron 6:49

Yeah, no, I think that's a good way to put it. What I meant by that is that And maybe I'm jumping ahead a little bit here in the story, is that we've sort of seen this, because I think we should talk about what that place is, what it's designed to build, and what that could foretell about the North Korean strategy in addition to what you just laid out, in that they are continuing business as usual.

It is simply the American side that is changing at least rhetoric or policy to fit sort of the proclivities of the commander-in-chief.

Jeffrey 7:23

Right. So, you know, I mean, one thing that we've been sort of trying to clarify for people is so the way that this played out, at least our involvement in it, is the leak went to The Washington Post. And the leak looked, you know, like it's reported. And so, you know, the Post, I think mindful of the experience in Iraq in 2003, and just because Joby, and I'm sure Ellen Nakashima is too, but again, Joby's the one I know, you know, he's a diligent guy.

He called me and said, okay, so... You know, there's this place called Sanumdong. Like, is that a real place? And we sent him a picture of this building, which I have to tell the story about how Dave found this building, which in and of itself is kind of an incredible story that just makes me love Dave. And then, you know, they asked us, like...

I think Joby went and confirmed that, yeah, it was the same building. And then they asked us, like, well... Does that seem plausible to you? And there's a quote in the piece that I think captures it perfectly where an intelligence official says, the North Koreans are still getting up and going to work. Right. Right. And we have looked at 40 images of this facility from Planet in 2018 alone.

And, you know, like, snow never collected on the roof because the electricity was on and it was hot. You know, they had the lights on and the heat. And there were constant vehicle presence at the site. And they're building new buildings right there. So those buildings are probably not production. They're probably like a museum and an administration building given their size and where they're located.

But for us, we saw no change in Sanumdong at all. Over the course, or this facility at Sanumdong, over the course of 2018. And then, you know, it looked exactly the same as it did last year and the year before that, which is to say it's active and expanding.

Aaron 9:27

Yeah, so I mean, just to say that, like, and this is hinted at, this is said directly in the piece, is that the signatures... One assumes are associated with the development or production of missiles, i.e. People going to work, have not changed, you know, despite of all the concurrent diplomatic goings on between the United States and the DPRK.

Jeffrey 9:47

Yeah, that's right. And, you know, like... Not surprising, right? Because although the North Koreans have in one statement used a word that would suggest they would stop ICBM production, we had a big discussion here about what that word actually meant in Korean, whether it meant production or whether it meant development. You know that's not necessarily you know that's not in writing you know that was a thing that like Kim said to Trump and then North Korea sort of repeated in the context of it being a deal that was you know In real jeopardy.

And, you know, the North Koreans said that they were going to take down the test stand at Sohae, which we'll do a different pod on, as a way to verify the end of production. But of course, that doesn't verify the end of production. What that verifies is the end of testing. So, you know, we were not, we were, I mean, we had been watching this facility.

We saw the trucks there all the time. And so, you know, privately we were thinking to ourselves, well, you know, I don't see any evidence that this facility has been shut down. And then when Joby called with his story, which he could have written without us, you know, we were able to say, yeah, I mean, that seems plausible to us.

That is consistent with what we see.

Aaron 11:09

Yeah, and then, you know, we should talk about that a little bit, you know, because they do mention specific... The thing that jumped out at me when I read it is that they were... The definitive mention of the Hwasong-15. And what I was hinting at earlier in my comments is like... Like, in my use of the word wiggle, you know, is are they trying to do something different with the Hwasong-15 to try and maybe circumvent definitions to continue to break out from what I would call more or less a test moratorium?

Or are they actually just continuing to produce the Hwasong-15? And those are questions I just don't have the answers to, and I wonder what you think about that.

Jeffrey 11:47

Well, so on the open source side, we can't tell. You know, we can't tell what's... It could be a space launcher. It could be a Hwasong-15. We've seen the Hwasong-14 built there. So, you know, we don't really have the ability to sift through what sort of missile. I think the Reuters report implied that it wasn't like they had synthetic aperture radar and could, like, estimate the size of the missile inside the building.

It's more that they saw a trailer that they associated with the 15, I guess, as opposed to the 14. We don't, we're kind of trying to stand up a similar analytic capability now that we have a ton of photographs of the site. But I'm, I'm just not in a position to make that, that kind of judgment. So, you know, from our perspective, it kind of doesn't matter because You know, a real agreement for them to stop producing ICBMs would have to result in a verifiable set of constraints on this facility.

And there are no constraints on the facility and it continues to be active. And so, you know, as far as I'm concerned, it's continuing to churn out stuff and I don't really care if they're space launchers or ICBMs. It's up to the Trump administration, if they plan to strike a deal, to strike a deal, have it well-defined, and then put in place whatever kind of verification arrangements one's going to need.

So yeah, I can't say on the open source whether it's a Hwasong-15 or 14 or a Space Launcher. I'm kind of hoping it's going to be a Hwasong-15 painted white, you know, with the NADA logo on the side, which is their Space Launch entity. Right. Because I just want to watch, you know, Kim Jong-un would be like, what?

It's painted white. It says Unha 9 right on the side.

Other voice 13:34

What's your problem? We've literally been advertising the Unha 9 for years now.

Aaron 13:39

Yeah, I don't see what your problem is. It's white. The missiles are green. They want to get into that lucrative, low-cost CubeSat launching market. That's what I think they want to do.

Jeffrey 13:50

Yeah, you guys are always telling us how great Planet is. We want to put up some satellites.

Aaron 13:55

That's right. But if we zoom out, clearly with these leaks, I think you said it right, is that there's a new national intelligence estimate. And the national intelligence estimate is more or less reaffirming, if you're a fan of the show, what we've been talking about for months in sort of the ghoulish subtext of your joke at the outset of this podcast, which is about your book becoming reality.

Jeffrey 14:20

Yeah, I mean, it's... And that's the issue, right?

Aaron 14:23

I mean, it's the mismatch in expectations via public rhetoric on the U.S. side versus what's actually happening in North Korea.

Jeffrey 14:31

Yeah. Well, you know, much like some of my colleagues who have been pointing these things out, and, you know, we do so... As academics, like, I'm tired of being, like, attacked for being, like, against negotiations because I am not against negotiations! Like, it's actually very frustrating because, you know, like, one, it's not my job to make excuses for the North Koreans.

If they're building ICBMs and that's true, I'm gonna say it. Like, I want there to be negotiations, but, like, I'm not gonna, like, I'm not gonna lie about what the North Koreans are doing. In order to make that more palatable. But I think at a broader and deeper level, you know, as I have said from the beginning, I am very worried that the incompetent nature of this diplomatic effort will fail because North Korea is not interested in giving up nuclear weapons.

It's interesting. I am having trouble getting this published as a quote. We'll see if anybody bites. But, like, they want the Israel deal. Like, they want, North Korea wants to keep the bomb, but, like, make a deal with us about, you know, reducing how much they talk about, you know, not doing big tests, not showing it off, you know, basically having gotten to the point where they have this capability, putting it back in the basement, and then us saying, like, fine.

You know, which is not a crazy thing for them to want, because we've already given another country that deal. And to some extent, we've kind of given the same deal to India. I mean, obviously, they're not quite as opaque. But if this proceeds as the administration says, which is that they're not willing to consider an Israel or India-like deal, that they actually are going to insist on denuclearization, then this process is going to collapse.

And I am deathly afraid that when it collapses, not because there was no deal to be had, but because we insisted on the one deal we couldn't get, That then this process is going to get turned over to Bolton. Right? And Bolton is going to say, we tried it your way, and it didn't work, and now we have to try it my way.

And so it's so important to me to make clear that this is not our way. Like, this is not real diplomacy. This is not diplomacy that can succeed. And so when it fails, it does not discredit diplomacy, and it certainly does not make military action a good idea, because it's

Aaron 17:06

Still a dumb fucking idea. Yeah, I mean, just picking up on that diplomatic thread is like, if you want to resolve this issue, and we've talked about it before, but more about the Leap Day deal, and then in some respects about the Iran issue, is like, well, what if it is an SLV? What if they want to paint this thing white and turn it into an SLV?

It'll be a terrible satellite launch vehicle, but is that a diplomatic way out of this? That is something that should be acceptable? Or is that just something that shouldn't be feasible on the table if you're serious about diplomatically solving this from the U.S. side? And should you go the route of trying to get dismantlement with verification?

Jeffrey 17:53

Right. So I think we have to learn to live with their bomb. And the point of any diplomatic engagement is to get them to reduce the role that those weapons play. Not a phrase I love, but it's kind of useful here. You know, like they agreed to stop testing. That's great. They agreed to stop nuclear testing. That's great.

They are taking a break from ICBM flight testing. That's great. I would like to see them agree to stop doing all missile testing. I am not sure how likely that is over the long run. My guess is they will probably want to have a range limit that they can live under, but they'll probably stop publicizing those tests, which might be something worth exploring.

I want a good pledge from them to stop exporting these capabilities. I don't ever want to see another reactor in Syria. I certainly don't want to see ICBM sold. And North Korea is about to shift over to solid-fueled missiles. And so as bad as the Hwasong-15 is, it's going to be replaced by the North Korean equivalent of a Topol or a DF-31.

Like, that's gonna happen. Someday that will happen, and that someday will be quicker than we like. So yeah, I would definitely... You know, it's not like I'm happy that we're cutting the deal now. We should have cut the deal, like, I don't know, five years ago when we were talking about this. But every day you wait, it gets worse because all the leverage is on their side because they can just keep building and developing.

Aaron 19:32

Well, the leaks on the U.S. side would seem to suggest that there's bureaucratic discomfort about the way the diplomatic process is going, you know, and so that there's at least an impetus by some people to put it out there in public to challenge the administration, perhaps, about how it characterizes this. Because so often with the Trump administration, if you sort of strip out the president's tweets, you could sort of get away with this as a veneer of legitimacy.

But when he tweets something about like, North Korea is no longer a nuclear problem for the United States, I'm paraphrasing, is perhaps what drives anxiety about where this thing is going.

Jeffrey 20:09

Yeah, although, you know, it's funny you say you're paraphrasing. I mean, that's pretty damn close to what he said.

Aaron 20:13

I'm just not reading it.

Jeffrey 20:15

Yeah, I mean, you're not really like, it's not like you're dumbing it down.

Aaron 20:19

I'm not dumbing it down. I just don't have the exact quote in front of me, so I am paraphrasing it.

Jeffrey 20:23

If this was my PhD, I'd still have quotations around it. Oh, my God. You're right. You're right. You're right. You know, look, I think from the intelligence community's perspective, they're professionals. Yeah. And their job is to tell the truth to the president, and you now have a president who's not listening. Yeah. And they shouldn't be leaking. But I think at the same time, I...

I understand the frustration with the people who are leaking. I mean, I understand the frustration on the part of the people who are leaking because they're not being listened to. And so, you know, whatever disapproval I have of leaking abstractly, like, I teach a class on decision making and like leaking is a huge part of it. Like leaks happen.

Every president has to deal with leaks. You don't get to whine and moan about leaks. If you're the president, like that's them's the breaks. You, you just deal with it. And so I'm not surprised that people are, are frustrated. I mean, You know, we we should I do want to talk about how Dave found this building because we saw the vehicle traffic, too.

Right. And we just we didn't. I mean, I'm so sick and tired of like, you know, every time we point out something is not what the president says, being like attacked by our so-called friends for, you know, pointing out that, like, yes, they are still building stuff. You know we didn't want to do it unnecessarily but of course once once jobi had the story i mean there was no point in like why not illustrate it so yeah can i tell you this yeah yeah sorry we went off on a tangent that we were supposed to talk about that earlier i mean we went off on a tangent and finished the episode so this is like dessert so head on over to patreon.com you scott So we have seen only a handful of pictures inside this building.

One of those images was of the Unha before it was launched in December 2012. And Dave was going through this video Which showed all of the preparations leading up to the launch. And so it showed the launcher at various stages, including being stacked up. And Dave looks at this one visit that Kim does, where he, like, pats the rocket and walks around it.

And Dave's like, that's not the building at Sohei. Like, we've seen the inside of the building at Sohei. And I look at him like, yeah, you're right. Dave's like, I wonder if that's the production facility. And I'm thinking, well, Chamjin. So Dave looks at Chamjin.

Other voice 23:13

He's like, no, it's not there.

Jeffrey 23:16

And for a long time, we have known that there is an R&D facility at Sanam Dong. That's where the Second Academy of Natural Sciences is. We think this is where Kim Jong-un inspected... We think this is where Kim Jong-un inspected the mock-ups of the Taepodong 1 and 2. This area, it's where the old satellite control center was.

It's the kind of heartland of defense R&D for the North Koreans. And so Dave goes over to Sanumdong to take a look. And he notices that in the last year, because this was, like, 2013, I think he found this. Maybe 14, I don't know. But, you know, like, over the course of 2012, he notices that there's this big building that gets constructed.

And Dave sees the lights, right, on the inside of the building. Not the lights, but they're, like, slits where the, like, light gets through. And they match. And he counts them, and they match. And then he kind of looks at the wall, and the wall has this, like, skeletal frame, which has some kind of unusual fingerprints might be too strong, but very specific, like, there are a certain number of beams, and then there are crossbeam like, X's between two of the beams in certain points.

And so he gets a f***ing construction photo of the skeleton, and it's the same damn building. That's why he's Jesus. Yeah. So Dave succeeds in IDing this building. And what's great is no one knows about this building. And Dave kind of will mention it now and again. He mentions it to CNN at one point, but nobody picks it up.

And early this year, we did a thing with OnKit where we noticed that the snow on the roof was melting because it's a f***ing active site. But for whatever reason, the open source community didn't really pick up on Dave's site. So when the Hwasong-14 got tested and they did that banquet, they put up all these images again of the Hwasong-14 getting ready.

Aaron 25:25

This is the background video, right?

Jeffrey 25:27

Yeah, yeah. You know, they do the big banquet. Yeah, it's playing in the background and they got the Moranbong band. Well, I won't say rocking out, but...

Other voice 25:36

I will. I'll go out on a limb. Getting down. Rocking out.

Jeffrey 25:39

Yeah, whatever. Rocking out. And... And we notice there's a picture inside Sanumdong of a Hwasong-14. And it's the same room. And so, like, you know, it's not surprising. Like, the way that North Korea historically did this is when missiles were still in R&D, they would get built up at Sanumdong, and then I guess they would transfer that production to Chamjin.

Although, like, that's a thing we knew, like, 20 years ago. I'm not, you know, who knows if it's still the same. But, like, we were super psyched to see it. And, you know, I don't want to over-claim this, but if you look at that picture of the Hwasong-14 in Chamjin, there is a goddamn red transporter behind it.

And, you know, like, that's a thing we've seen with other missiles at other tests, that they use these red canisters. Not canisters, Jesus, everybody freaks out when I say canisters, because it's the wrong word. Containers. And I will say, in one of the satellite photographs, we see a red container. I don't think it's quite big enough for a Hwasong-15 first stage, but it might be for an upper stage.

And, you know, it might just be a f***ing shipping container. But it's just kind of cool... That, you know, Dave is able to, like, ID this building, and then we're able to watch, like, all the vehicle traffic come in and out. And then, you know, I mean, like, it's just a red container, but it's the only red container we saw in 40 images.

And, you know, it's bright red, and it stands out. And so I fixated on it for a while. You know, I'm not sure that the red container is the red container, but, you know, you just see this site that is active. You know, there are always vehicles coming and going. There are always shipping containers showing up and then disappearing.

And when you know what they do in that big hall, you realize that it's really only for one thing.

Aaron 27:36

Yeah. And then you get a leak about it in the Washington Post from the National Intelligence Estimate, presumably, that sort of verifies at least some of your findings.

Jeffrey 27:45

I think it's a more recent thing. Because if you read the Post carefully, they say that they saw it in the last week. So I think it was after the estimate came out.

Aaron 27:53

Okay, yeah, but I shouldn't say verify. It reinforces at least some of your conclusions.

Jeffrey 27:56

I think they saw, I mean, my guess is our red container is not the right red container, but my guess is the real red container showed up. Right, yeah. Because we saw a red container on July 7th, and it's, as I say, maybe not big enough, although it's really hard to measure stuff. But, you know, they seem to imply that the actual container had showed up a little earlier than that.

I mean, a little later than that, more recently. So I'm guessing we don't have the same red container, but, like, you know, nonetheless, to see all these shipping containers lined up outside, like, that's stuff coming in for manufacture or stuff going out, you know, in the form of... Rocket steams.

Aaron 28:36

Yeah, and then finally, and this is just to wrap up, and then they let loose with that second tidbit of information about

Jeffrey 28:45

Conversations that they're able to listen to or at least yeah I can't believe they published that I mean you know if you go back and look at the original NBC news story and I I forget who had was it the post had the other version those said there were details that were withheld at the request of the intelligence community and like this is an elaborated version of the story that was told by NBC so you know put two and two together like this is the other shoe

Aaron 29:10

Right. So, one would seem to suggest that they have more information than just imagery.

Jeffrey 29:17

Yeah. You know, I took from the NBC story that there was either signals or human intelligence. And, you know, so I don't know what it is, so I'm just wildly speculating, so I can't get anyone killed. But, like... It was clear that whatever the details were ran some risk of identifying whatever the method was. But not knowing what the method was, I don't know which details matter.

And so maybe the Post found a way around whatever the worst detail was.

Aaron 29:57

I don't know. Well, maybe next time we can actually talk about Russia or Iran or something other than North Korea. What do you think?

Jeffrey 30:07

I would like to leave the North Korea discussions to reviews of my forthcoming novel, The 2020 Commission Report. A bit of speculative fiction about how a diplomatic negotiation with North Korea goes wrong, which actually is mostly out of the book now because it's already gone wrong. And it is fundamentally about... The bad decisions that could be made in Pyongyang, Seoul, and Washington, D.C., that would push us to catastrophe.

And it's not terrible. I'm not willing to brag and say it's good, but, I mean, we have enough reviews now that I guess it's not horrific.

Aaron 30:49

A common theme is darkly comedic, which I would say our podcast is, but I'll probably turn it up a little bit because it's just you.

Jeffrey 30:56

Yeah, there are, I mean, I don't want to spoil it, but there are some darkly comedic moments that I really love.

Other voice 31:02

What involves a statue?

Aaron 31:06

Okay, that's a teaser alert. Buy the book, right?

Jeffrey 31:09

You can pre-order now. You know, we're going to have a nice real estate in Barnes and Nobles on the week of August 7th when it drops.

Other voice 31:17

We're going to be on the new releases table.

Jeffrey 31:19

So if you go to a Barnes & Noble, it's Barnes & Noble singular, right? I think I'd notice they're hawking my book. You can actually see it laid out. I'd love pictures of the thing on the table, like a real author, which I'm not, but it's kind of fun.

Aaron 31:33

Yeah, and make sure to put some of those pictures in the Slack channel.

Other voice 31:35

Oh, that'd be great. We're also going to have an order link is up on the Arms Control Wonk blog, and we'll have a link to that section of the blog in the show notes. So you can just be like two clicks away.

Jeffrey 31:48

And we'll come up with a way for Patreon subscribers to get it signed. I'm thinking about signed plates that we can mail you. So you can just stick them in the book. Because I don't think anybody wants to ship books back and forth. But, I don't know, we'll figure it out. Well, that's a promise. We'll figure it out.

Aaron 32:06

We'll figure it out. That's a promise. Scott, that's your cue.

Other voice 32:09

Yeah. And if you would like to support our research and get access to our Slack channel, you can head over to patreon.com slash ACW podcast. Again, that's patreon.com slash ACW podcast for $5 a month or $3 a month. If you are a student with a dot edu or equivalent email, you can get access to our Slack channel and hang out with our awesome community.

Aaron 32:35

All right. Hey, Aaron. Yes. Thank you for joining me. Always a pleasure. Thank you for listening.