This post is from May 2018. Facts and links may have changed since. See more from that month

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Crippling the Open Skies Treaty Punishes Allies and the US, Not Russia

Quote of the week:

“No problem can be solved from the same level of consciousness that created it.” – Albert Einstein

Thanks to the reporting of Steve Liewer of the Omaha World-Herald, we have learned about the latest effort by House Armed Services Chairman Mac Thornberry to drive a stake into the heart of the Open Skies Treaty. Liewer reports that Thornberry has struck funding in the Fiscal Year 2019 Defense Authorization Act for two replacement Open Skies aircraft and upgraded sensors because Moscow is misbehaving.

This is an odd way to punish the Kremlin since Open Skies cooperative monitoring flights help the United States and its friends and allies, not Russia. Open Skies missions allow U.S. aircrews to provide ride-sharing opportunities with countries that feel threatened by Vladimir Putin’s revanchist tendencies.

Because Russia is misbehaving, the United States should be doing more to strengthen ties with those threatened by Putin’s actions. This is hard enough to do with the two existing Open Skies aircraft, which were built in 1961 and which suffer from frequent mechanical breakdowns. If they are not replaced – a budget item of $222 million – the United States will eventually become a bystander rather than the leading force behind the Open Skies Treaty. Kudos go to the Trump administration and Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis for requesting funds for new Open Skies aircraft — something the Obama administration failed to do.

The Treaty’s benefits have changed over time because it has proven to be extraordinarily adaptable to changed circumstances in Europe and Russia. The George H.W. Bush administration initially took flak for seeking the Open Skies Treaty because the United States possessed far better means of collecting information by utilizing satellites. This critique was misguided because other state parties – especially newly independent states of the former Soviet Union and countries unburdened by the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact – did not have ready access to satellite data. What these countries needed, far more than imagery, was reassurance. Open Skies flights provided an opportunity for states finding their footing to develop patterns of cooperation with the United States — and with each other.

As Putin began to push back against NATO expansion and the color revolutions around his periphery, Open Skies flights became even more important, allowing the United States to demonstrate in tangible ways its interest in assisting friends and allies needing to keep tabs on Russia. This is increasingly hard to do because of mechanical difficulties with the two aging Open Skies aircraft. Steve offers one telling detail in his reporting:

“In March 2016, a U.S. flight over Russia had to be canceled after the OC-135 developed electrical problems on the ground in Khabarovsk, leaving the Offutt-based crew stranded,” according to a document obtained by The World-Herald. “The crew obtained a waiver to fly out of the country two days later with its most critical generator disabled. Shortly after takeoff, a fire started in the jet’s pressurization system, filling the aircraft cabin with dense smoke. Wearing oxygen masks, the crew extinguished the fire and cleared the smoke. The pilot declared an emergency and continued the flight without power or radio in the rear cabin. The pilot had to fly over a mountain range before landing safely.”

Chairman Thornberry’s mark of the Defense Authorization Bill cites selective Russian adherence to the Treaty as his primary justification for withholding funds for new aircraft and sensors. The Kremlin has restricted flight plans by Open Skies aircraft over sensitive locations – sites like Kaliningrad that can be closely monitored by other means. In response, the United States has placed restrictions on the Kremlin’s Open Skies missions. This tit-for-tat approach is warranted, but Thornberry finds it insufficient. He would withhold funding for new U.S. aircraft and sensors “until such time as the President (or the Secretary of State) is able to certify that the President has imposed treaty violations responses and legal countermeasures.” But that’s not all. Among the demands Thornberry lists before new Open Skies aircraft can be procured are:

“the extradition of Russian citizens involved in undertaking unlawful activities against the United States incident to the 2016 Presidential election, it has withdrawn from Crimea and ceased support to Russian proxies in Eastern Ukraine, and has ceased all military and financial support for any state that uses or has used against its civilian population any agent or substance banned by the Chemical Weapons Convention.”

All of these are worthy objectives, warranting countermeasures. None appear achievable anytime soon. In the meantime, sound U.S. national security strategy mandates continued ride-sharing with friends and allies over Russian territory – especially after the fissures created by President Trump’s exit from the Iran nuclear deal and his intention to impose secondary sanctions on friends and allies in Europe that continue to hold up their end of the deal.

The Open Skies Treaty permits up to 42 over-flights of Russia by state parties. Ideally, the United States would execute its entire quota of sixteen Open Skies missions over Russian territory in the company of friends and allies, but this isn’t possible with aging aircraft. Of the sixteen over-flights planned for 2017, according to the State Department, two were to be shared with Ukraine, two with Canada, one with the Czech Republic, one with Denmark, one with Germany, one with France, two with Italy, one with Norway, one with Romania, one with Sweden, one with Turkey, one with Great Britain, one with both Canada and Hungary, and one flight over the territory of Ukraine shared with Canada.

Of the sixteen over-flights planned for 2017, thirteen were flown. This number will almost certainly be reduced in 2018 as mechanical problems mount. Who loses when U.S. Open Skies flights are grounded? Certainly not Russia. The biggest losers are the United States and its friends and allies that are justifiably wary of Russian behavior. So why punish the home team while letting the Kremlin off the hook?

Michael Krepon

Writing on ACW 2009–2022

Michael Krepon is the co-founder of the Stimson Center and the author of Winning and Losing the Nuclear Peace: The Rise, Demise, and Revival of Arms Control. He was given a lifetime achievement award for non-governmental work to reduce nuclear dangers by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in 2015. He has worked in the executive and legislative branches of the U.S. Government, and taught as a professor of practice at the University of Virginia.

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