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Part Two of a two-part series on the 2010 Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community. See Part One.

Well, it’s been a long, snowbound weekend here in the Nation’s Capital and its general vicinity. There’s not much to do while waiting for the Super Bowl commercials — assuming that your home has power this fine evening — so why don’t we take a few minutes to consider the views of the U.S. Intelligence Community on North Korea’s military capabilities?

According to the IC’s Annual Threat Assessment, the North Koreans now have three kinds of weapons: those that no longer work, those that they may or may not have built, and those that they may or may not be working on anymore.

Let’s start with the first sort.

The Conventional Arsenal, Such As It May Be

The ATA contains what must be the toughest assessment on record of the combat readiness of the Korean People’s Army (KPA):

The KPA’s capabilities are limited by an aging weapons inventory, low production of military combat systems, deteriorating physical condition of soldiers, reduced training, and increasing diversion of the military to infrastructure support. Inflexible leadership, corruption, low morale, obsolescent weapons, a weak logistical system, and problems with command and control also constrain the KPA capabilities and readiness.

It’s been said that North Korea has long had the practical equivalent of a nuclear bomb in the form of massed artillery in range of Seoul. But how much of a threat can such a decrepit force pose? Certainly, it doesn’t sound like it could put up much of a fight, which brings us to the next point:

Because the conventional military capabilities gap between North and South Korea [never mind the U.S.! —JP] has become so overwhelmingly great and prospects for reversal of this gap so remote, Pyongyang relies on its nuclear program to deter external attacks on the state and to its regime. Although there are other reasons for the North to pursue its nuclear program, redressing conventional weaknesses is a major factor and one that Kim and his likely successors will not easily dismiss.

Because, as everyone knows, you don’t bring a knife to a gunfight. The implication? That North Korea is unlikely to move too far down the path of nuclear disarmament while it perceives any serious external threat.

But just how far has North Korea moved down the path of nuclear armament?

Which Brings Us To The Nukes

Let’s start with some definition of terms. On page 14, the ATA says:

The North’s October 2006 nuclear test was consistent with our longstanding assessment that it had produced a nuclear device, although we judge the test itself to have been a partial failure based on its less-than-one-kiloton TNT equivalent yield. The North’s probable nuclear test in May 2009 supports its claim that it has been seeking to develop weapons, and with a yield of roughly a few kilotons TNT equivalent, was apparently more successful than the 2006 test. We judge North Korea has tested two nuclear devices, and while we do not know whether the North has produced nuclear weapons, we assess it has the capability to do so.

There are a couple of dichotomies worth examining here.

First, nuclear test vs. probable nuclear test. The difference is radionuclides. In October 2006, ODNI announced that they were found:

Analysis of air samples collected on October 11, 2006 detected radioactive debris which confirms that North Korea conducted an underground nuclear explosion in the vicinity of P’unggye on October 9, 2006. The explosion yield was less than a kiloton.

In June 2009, as discussed previously here and here, the ODNI press release said nothing on this point:

The U.S. Intelligence Community assesses that North Korea probably conducted an underground nuclear explosion in the vicinity of P’unggye on May 25, 2009. The explosion yield was approximately a few kilotons. Analysis of the event continues.

The association of the word “probable” or “probably” with the second test can be traced directly to the silence on radionuclides.

Second, nuclear device vs. nuclear weapon. A device can go “bang” in a test shaft, but a weapon is something built for combat, implying that it would reliably achieve the expected yield, fits within a suitable casing, has a fuze, and so forth. The ATA says that North Korea is now able to make weapons, a possibility discussed recently here. But the text does not make clear whether the IC judges that these weapons could be mated to a suitable delivery system.

Dept. of Revisions and Ambiguities

There are two nagging little spots in the discussion of North Korea’s nuclear R&D. In one place, the IC appears to have tweaked a previous assessment — not a problem in itself, certainly! — but isn’t calling attention to the change. In the other place, it’s unclear whether or not the IC is adhering to a previous judgment. These estimates have a way of shifting around on you, if you don’t watch them carefully.

The first point is the reference to the IC’s “longstanding assessment that [North Korea] had produced a nuclear device,” as opposed to a nuclear weapon. As Jonathan Pollack of the U.S. Naval War College* observed in his memorable 2003 article on the demise of the US-DPRK Agreed Framework, IC assessments during the early years of the George W. Bush administration did claim that North Korea was in possession of nuclear weapons. Previous assessments didn’t go quite so far. For the details, see pages 12 and 13 — I’ll put the excerpt in the comments.

(*Around here, we call him “Pollack the Elder.”)

The ATA’s discussion of North Korean uranium enrichment activity is somewhat vague. Mostly, it’s consistent with the readings of North Korea’s declarations that you could find here and here, and shrugs, “The exact intent of these announcements is unclear, and they do not speak definitively to the technical status of the uranium enrichment program.” Quite so.

So much for the open sources. Does other intelligence shed any light on whether North Korea is actually making any headway on enrichment? The ATA makes reference only to the past:

The Intelligence Community continues to assess with high confidence North Korea has pursued a uranium enrichment capability in the past, which we assess was for weapons.

It’s silent on the matter of what North Korea is up to now up to. Joe DeTrani, DNI’s mission manager for North Korea, made a bit of a stir back in March 2007, when he signalled a lack of strong consensus on whether meaningful work continued:

The intelligence in 2002… made possible a high confidence judgment about North Korea’s efforts to acquire a uranium enrichment capability. The Intelligence Community had then, and continues to have, high confidence in its assessment that North Korea has pursued that capability.

We have continued to assess efforts by North Korea since 2002. All Intelligence Community agencies have at least moderate confidence that North Korea’s past efforts to acquire a uranium enrichment capability continue today.

[Update: To avoid confusion, I’ve expanded the quote above.]

An August 2007 IC report (quoted here) put the pieces together like so:

We continue to assess with high confidence that North Korea has pursued efforts to acquire a uranium enrichment capability, which we assess is intended for nuclear weapons. All Intelligence Community agencies judge with at least moderate confidence that this past effort continues. The degree of progress towards producing enriched uranium remains unknown, however.

The February 2008 ATA contained a streamlined version of the statement above. The February 2009 ATA put a different spin on the lack of consensus:

The IC continues to assess North Korea has pursued a uranium enrichment capability in the past. Some in the Intelligence Community have increasing concerns that North Korea has an ongoing covert uranium enrichment program.

So, as you can see, the latest ATA returns to the language of the August 2007 report about the past, but leaves us hanging on the question of the present.

OK, then. You’ve read enough blogs for awhile — go back to shoveling snow, or to shoveling nachos while the Saints pound the Colts in the fleeting moments between commercials in sunny Miami.

Comment [4]

Funny thing about the Bomb: you can’t eat it.

Going by what the North Korean government has said of late, they’re not exactly beating their swords into ploughshares or their spears into pruning hooks. But, we are told, national security goals have made way for economic goals, and a third nuclear test should not be expected.

Dismissive remarks about further nuclear testing have now appeared at least twice in reports about a major industrial achievement. On December 19, 2009, KCNA, the official news service, reported a visit by Kim Jong Il to the Songjin Steel Complex, a.k.a. Songgang, home to a new “Juche-based” method of iron and steel production. After inspecting the facilities, KJI was pleased:

The workers of Songgang completed the steel-making method based on Juche iron by their own efforts and with their own technology, shattering conservatism and mysticism about technology, he noted, adding that this is a historic event of special mention in the development of metallurgical industry and a victory greater than the third successful nuclear test.

On December 25, KCNA reported the visit of a delegation from the steel complex to Pyongyang, where they were greeted with “a joint congratulatory message” from the Powers That Be — the Central Committee of the Korean Workers Party and the National Defense Commission of the DPRK. It concluded:

The above-said spectacular success represents a great victory of the immortal Juche idea and a great demonstration of the national power more striking than the conduct of the third nuclear test.

(Emphasis added in both quotes.)

These statements, attributed to the highest levels, are internal propaganda. That’s what KCNA is for, mostly, and outside of North Korea, who could possibly care about local developments in ferrous metallurgy? It’s hard to avoid the impression that the regime is trying to set public expectations: Don’t stay up waiting all night for more big bangs, folks.

The tougher question is, why? Not knowing won’t stop me from guessing.

A Shift in Priorities

First, we could take Pyongyang at face value.

The January 1, 2010 joint New Year editorial of three North Korean newspapers was titled, “Bring About a Radical Turn in the People’s Standard of Living by Accelerating the Development of Light Industry and Agriculture Once Again This Year That Marks the 65th Anniversary of the Founding of the Workers’ Party of Korea.” (It reads better in the original, for all I know.) The KCNA excerpt describes the past year as one of “dramatic change” and the start of “a decisive turn in the Korean revolution and the building of a thriving nation,” a time of “great revolutionary upsurge” marked by technological and industrial achievements, nay, triumphs — foremost among them the second satellite launch, the second nuclear test, the production of Juche steel, and the “attainment of the cutting edge of CNC technology." The rest of the achievements are purely economic.

The coming year, too, will be “a year of general offensive, when all-Party and nationwide efforts should be concentrated on improving the people’s standard of living on the basis of the laudable victory and achievements of the great revolutionary upsurge.”

So, based on what the government is telling its people, military achievements will take a backseat to economic ones, meaning no nuclear tests to muddy the narrative. Given the new restrictions on open-air markets and the “currency reform” that destroyed virtually all private savings in North Korea in 2009, this prospect must make the average citizen shudder with dread — there’s every reason to expect the further reconsolidation of the command economy.

[Update | Feb. 2. On reflection, the announced shift is away from both military and heavy-industrial priorities, and towards production of food and consumer goods. See the comments for further elaboration.]

Not Necessary or Not Worth It

Second, North Korea may judge its second nuclear test to have been a success, obviating the need for additional testing. They may believe that the second test shows they have a working weapon in the neighborhood of 4 kt yield — what they apparently told the Chinese they were aiming for back in October 2006, before their first test fizzled.

This scenario would fit well with a view of the first test shared by a number of close observers (see: So, Like, Why Didn’t It Work?, October 10, 2006; NORK Nuke Missile?, November 3, 2006).

Third, as Paul Kerr pointed out in these webpages around the same time, the shock value from this sort of thing starts to wear off quickly (see: More Norky Goodness, October 9, 2006). It just may not be worth it, next to how much it would piss off the Chinese, not to mention the further expenditure of limited plutonium stocks (a concern that led many experts to doubt that North Korea would test in 2009).

Not a Good Time

Fourth, let’s recall that the Norks are making nice. Foreign Ministry statements on January 11, 2010 (“DPRK Proposes to Start of Peace Talks”) and January 18 (“DPRK on Reasonable Way for Sept. 19 Joint Statement”) call for replacing the Korean War Armistice Agreement with a peace treaty — Pyongyang’s new condition for denuclearization, or returning to talks on denuclearization, depending on how you read it. A third nuclear test would complicate the charm offensive.

(Incidentally, the latter statement mentions the demolition of the Yongbyon cooling tower in 2008, which I take as an indicator that they’re unlikely to rebuild it while the nice-making persists.)

So take your pick: for some, all, or maybe none of the above reasons, North Korea is letting the man (and traffic lady) on the street know that there are no immediate plans to test again.

Bonus!

As a reward for reading this far — if you skipped down here, scroll right back up, mister! — here’s the video of Steven Bosworth’s January 19, 2010 appearance on the Colbert Report, in which the envoy to North Korea explains why the peace treaty condition isn’t going to fly. No, there’s no astounding impression of an atmospheric nuclear test, but Colbert does manage to leave Bosworth speechless at the end.

Bonus bonus!

You must have been wondering, Hey, just how often does “reasonable” appear in daily KCNA items, anyway?

The answer, according to the invaluable search engine at NK News, is 1,163 times since KCNA went online in January 1996. Which is more than I’d expected, but still two fewer times than “nuclear war,” 88 fewer than “destruction,” 650 fewer than “aggressor,” and 987 fewer than “reactionaries.” Now you know.

Comment [11]

[Maybe you had to be there.]

After a day-long stopover in Seoul, U.S. special envoy Stephen Bosworth is now in Pyongyang for the first time in his official capacity. It’s a three-day trip, so it looks pretty serious. Is there much chance that he’ll win North Korea’s reaffirmation of the denuclearization commitments it accepted in September 2005 and thereafter? Hard to say. It may be a step forward, at least.

In sizing up how substantive this trip is, though, the one obvious thing to watch for is who meets with Bosworth. That’s the standard by which these visits — official or private — are generally measured: by the amount of face time that one’s interlocutors are presumed to get with Kim Jong Il.

If the most senior official he sees is Li Gun, Director-General of the North American Affairs Bureau of the Foreign Ministry, it would not be a good sign. Li visited New York recently, so meeting at the same level would not imply much progress on the “seriousness” scale.

By way of illustration, there have been a number of private visits lately by U.S. experts. Jack Pritchard’s group late last month apparently went no higher than Li, and here’s how he summed it up: “We carried no messages to the North Koreans from the US Government. We did not receive any specific messages.” Not very exciting, but on the other hand, Pritchard may have added as many as two Air Koryo air sickness bags to his personal collection.

Better than this would be meetings with Vice Foreign Minister Kim Gye Gwan, probably the most senior North Korean official who meets with foreign envoys with much regularity. If memory serves, Kim usually (always?) represented North Korea in the Six-Party Talks.

Better still would be Senior Vice Foreign Minister Kang Sok Ju, who has played the leading role in North Korean nuclear diplomacy over the years. Kang is widely remembered here for a remark during a fateful meeting in October 2002 that the American side interpreted as an admission of the intention to seek nuclear weapons. But his presence really ought to be considered a mark of seriousness.

Best of all, of course, would be Dear Leader.

Bosworth alluded to this hierarchy of is-it-worth-my-time back in March in an interview with Glenn Kessler of the Washington Post:

“I will not be the day-to-day representative in the six-party negotiations,” Bosworth said, adding that he will focus more on broader policy issues, including bilateral negotiations with North Korea. “Ideally one would like to meet with the leader,” Kim Jong Il, he said. “I would like to reach higher in the foreign ministry than we have been able to.”

On that latter point, at least, he should be good to go. The Nelson Report claims that Bosworth has received “informal” assurances that he’ll be seeing Kang. And the South Korean press has been reporting an upcoming Bosworth-Kang meeting for about a month now — more or less since the Li Gun visit to New York, come to think of it. Whether those assurances were a condition for making the trip, I don’t know, but I wouldn’t be surprised. Let’s see now if they are fulfilled, and where the meetings lead.

Update | Dec. 10. As expected, Bosworth met with Kang. As for what was achieved, we can let the man speak for himself.

Update | Dec. 13. Here’s the official English translation of the North Korean account of the trip:

At the meeting and talks both sides had a long exhaustive and candid discussion on wide-ranging issues including the conclusion of a peace agreement, the normalization of the bilateral relations, economic and energy assistance and the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

Through working and frank discussion the two sides deepened the mutual understanding, narrowed their differences and found not a few common points. They also reached a series of common understandings of the need to resume the six-party talks and the importance of implementing the September 19 Joint Statement.

Both sides agreed to continue to cooperate with each other in the future to narrow down the remaining differences.

The substance remains obscure, so the tone is the message. Not a “brigandish” in sight.

Comment [4]

Lost in the hubbub over North Korea’s claim to have completed reprocessing of its remaining spent fuel rods is one small point: this isn’t news. It’s a reminder only.

Here’s what the KCNA news service has just stated:

In this period, the DPRK restarted the reprocessing facilities and successfully completed the reprocessing of 8,000 spent fuel rods by the end of August as part of the measure taken to restore the nuclear facilities in Nyongbyon to their original state which had been disabled under the agreement reached by the six parties.

[snip]

Noticeable successes have been made in turning the extracted plutonium weapon-grade for the purpose of bolstering up the nuclear deterrent in the DPRK.

Notice that part about the “end of August”? Well, back in early September, North Korea’s UN ambassador delivered a statement that included the following:

Reprocessing of spent fuel rods is at its final phase and extracted plutonium is being weaponized.

Forgive my tone of impatience. But this wasn’t so very long ago, was it?

Before anyone asks, I have no idea whether North Korea’s claims in these matters are accurate.

Comment [3]

A close-up view of the decommissioned Tokai Power Station — Japan’s first power reactor

The usual answer to that question is the one that the North Koreans have supplied: gas-cooled, graphite-moderated reactors can be operated without enriched uranium or heavy water, and are therefore ideal for a country with limited or no ability to get these things. They’re ideal “starter reactors.”

(The North Koreans originally said they were intent on producing electricity, of course, not plutonium.)

Thus, the DPRK set out to build a trio of gas-graphite reactors at Yongbyon and Taechon in the 1980s. Of these, only the 5 MWe reactor at Yongbyon — usually described as an indigenous copy of the UK’s Calder Hall design — was completed.

But maybe there’s another answer as well.

One of the more striking things about the Yongbyon reactor is how little it actually resembles a Calder Hall, at least on the outside. The basic technologies are the same, but the buildings themselves are not. Let’s start with the overhead views from Google Earth.

Here’s one of the surviving Calder Hall structures at the Sellafield site in the UK. It’s roughly cross-shaped, about 88 m at its longest. There are four scaffold-like structures at the corners. Update: These are the heat exchangers. The tall central structure flanked by two stacks holds the reactor vessel. Its footprint is about 20 × 40 m.

And here, of course, is the Yongbyon reactor. It’s a squarish, multi-tiered structure, about 53 × 60 m. It features a tall central structure measuring about 24 × 33 m and a single stack, offset to one side.

And now for something you probably haven’t seen before.

This is the Tokai Power Station in Ibaraki Prefecture, Japan. It was the country’s first power reactor, operational from 1965 to 1998. It’s a modified Calder Hall, designed and built by General Electric Corp. (UK) to suit Japan’s seismic conditions. Until Yongbyon was built, in fact, Tokai was the only gas-graphite power reactor outside of Europe.

It’s a multi-tiered structure, about 51 × 67 m. It features a tall central structure measuring about 26 × 47 m and a single stack, offset to one side.

Update: All of the above images are oriented with the north at the top. I don’t know what to read, if anything, into the apparently identical orientation of the Tokai and Yongbyon reactors.

Obviously, this reactor, which had 166 MW electrical output, is no dead ringer for Yongbyon. But it’s much closer than the original Calder Hall type. Have a look at this ground truth comparison, with views of Tokai on the top, Yongbyon on the bottom left, and Calder Hall on the bottom right:

Even the park-like settings are similar.

Construction at Tokai began in 1960. Japan’s acquisition of a reactor suitable for making both electricity and plutonium, just as North Korea’s own nuclear research program was getting underway, would not have gone unnoticed in Pyongyang. So it would not be surprising if Yongbyon was modeled on Tokai, even though it was built 20 years later.

For comparison, recall the striking resemblance between North Korea’s first artificial satellite, Kwangmyongsong-1, allegedly launched in 1998, and China’s Dongfanghong-1, actually launched in 1970.

Think of it as a statement of sorts, a declaration of national equality.

Update. I plan to add some further discussion of North Korea’s motives for building reactors in the 1980s. Watch this space.

Comment [12]

Last week’s letter of the Permanent Representative of the DPRK to the UN Security Council President — see the KCNA translation — has stirred up a lot of excitement for what it says about uranium enrichment, or, to be precise, for what it doesn’t say about uranium enrichment.

The statement doesn’t mention nuclear weapons in connection with uranium enrichment.

It doesn’t mention highly enriched uranium.

It doesn’t mention vacuum centrifuges or an enrichment plant.

It says, “Experimental uranium enrichment has successfully been conducted to enter into completion phase.”

Whatever exactly that means, it doesn’t come as a bolt from the blue. Let’s review.

Four Statements, Not One

This statement is actually part of a series. On April 14, in its big kiss-off message responding to the Security Council Presidential Statement of April 13, the DPRK Foreign Ministry stated that “there is no need any more to have the six-party talks,” and added in that connection that the DPRK

will positively examine the construction of its light water reactor power plant in order to round off the structure of the Juche-based nuclear power industry.

On April 29, it was further announced that

the DPRK will make a decision to build a light water reactor power plant and start the technological development for ensuring self-production of nuclear fuel as its first process without delay.

On June 13, in response to UNSC Resolution 1874, it was further announced that

The process of uranium enrichment will be commenced.

Pursuant to the decision to build its own light-water reactor, enough success has been made in developing uranium enrichment technology to provide nuclear fuel to allow the experimental procedure.

This announcement kicked off a furor in the media, which unfortunately involved many inaccuracies.

So, here we are again with the September 4 statement:

Experimental uranium enrichment has successfully been conducted to enter into completion phase.

This doesn’t mention fuel for a LWR, but is a sequel to the June 13 statement, which does. With that context in mind, one could consider the reference to enrichment in the September 4 statement ambiguous at most, in contrast to the explicitly military nature of claims about the reprocessing of plutonium.

Fortunately, the news coverage has stayed closer to the text this time around (although not everywhere). Some expert commentary has been misleading. Call it sympathy for the devil, but reading comprehension seems to suffer in the vicinity of North Korean statements, which have a certain inkblot quality: prior beliefs are projected onto them quite freely.

Four Observations

A fresh reading of the four statements — April 14, April 29, June 13, and September 4 — reveals a few things.

First, whereas plutonium separation is described in terms of self-defense, deterrence, and “weaponization,” no overt military themes are present in the account of uranium enrichment.

Second, if the pace of enrichment work seems unrealistically rapid, the claims of progress also are modest, not going beyond the experimental, depending on how one reads the latest statement.

Third, no specific claims are made about the enrichment technology in question.

Fourth, there has been no opportunity to verify any of the claims about enrichment so far.

The bottom line: As of 2009, North Korea is finally claiming to be working on uranium enrichment. But their claims are limited, vague, and lack any overt connection to military applications. And they haven’t shown us anything to back up these claims just yet.

Resources for Wonks

Those wishing to delve further may want to have a look at these items:

At the Bulletin, Hui Zhang reviewed what’s known about North Korea’s acquisition efforts related to vacuum centrifuge technology (see: Assessing North Korea’s uranium enrichment capabilities, 18 June 2009).

Here at ACW, Geoff Forden produced a rough estimate of the cost of an enrichment plant based on Pakistan’s first generation of vacuum centrifuges (see: What Does Natanz Cost?, 27 June 2009).

Over at TotalWonKerr, I discussed the possible significance of the previous three North Korean statements about uranium enrichment (see: About That Enrichment Program, 6 July 2009).

Comment [6]

The Republic of Korea (ROK) aborted today’s launch of the KSLV-1 at T minus seven minutes. The crystal-clear blue skies shown in the picture, with the only cloud present being the venting of LOX boil-off, seem to indicate that it was not weather that caused the abort. Instead, it could be either a technical or a political problem. Not enough has been announced for us to discuss technical problems, though that is obviously a possibility with a new rocket. So let’s discuss the political angle.

As the New York Times notes in its article on the aborted launch, the DPRK has been agitating against the launch. Obviously, the North’s national pride would be hurt if the ROK succeeded in launching a satellite the first time it tried after three successive DPRK failures. It has responded in an interesting way by tweeting (oh, dear, once again I am reminded that North Korea is more technologically hip than I am) that it is closely watching to see if the same sanctions are applied to South Korea as were applied to the North. Of course, the South Korean rocket development program was never banned the way the North’s was.

But the real reason the ROK canceled the flight might have just as much to do with the dead as the living. It appears that the DPRK is sending an official representative to the funeral of the late ROK president Kim Dae-jung. Postponing a space launch to some time in the indefinite future seems like a small price to pay for a possible new opening with the North.

Comment [12]

Jon Herskovitz of Reuers penned an odd little news analysis the other day suggesting that North Korea might start from scratch on its bomb program, shifting from the well-developed infrastructure for producing plutonium at Yongbyon to an Iran-like centrifuge program.

This is nuts.

The entire article hangs on the following speculation by an unnamed South Korean intelligence source:

“It makes little sense to restore an obsolete (plutonium-based) nuclear complex. What makes much more sense is for them to work on the highly enriched uranium (HEU) programme,” said a well-informed South Korean government source, who declined to be named.

Oh, I see. Well, if he’s well-informed …

Herskovitz tries this little hypothesis out on Dan Pinkston, David Albright and Sig Hecker — all of whom reach the opposite conclusion.

Pinkston: “North Korea is quite a way off from doing either” option of restarting the Pu program or making HEU.

David Albright : “I wouldn’t conclude [Yongbyon] is being abandoned…”

Sig Hecker: “It would make much more sense to restart the … reactor.”

Wow, great scoop there.

Is North Korea Restarting the Yongbyon Complex?

Herskovitz entire article is a sort of conspiratorial way to explain the curious fact that North Korea doesn’t seem to reversing the disablement steps (such as rebuilding the cooling tower at Yongbyon). “North Korea seems in no rush,” Herskovitz explains, “to restore its old plutonium-producing plant.”

Now this is a little strange.

To begin with, North Korea, in all probability, is reprocessing plutonium as we speak, adding bombs to its arsenal. (In mid-May, despite increased activity at Yongbyon, press reports suggested the IC had not detected any krypton gas, which would result from reprocessing the spent fuel. Hui Zhang wrote an interesting article arguing that it wouldn’t be surprising to miss to some of the signs. See: Is North Korea’s reprocessing facility operating?, July 23, 2009).

It would be nice to get an official confirmation from the US intelligence community, one way or the other, but given that the North Koreans say they are reprocessing — and for technical reasons doesn’t want to leave the fuel rods in the pond too long — I believe them.

So, this is really a question about whether North Korea why hasn’t North Korea begun to undo the several disablement steps agreed to under the Six Party Agreement — steps that would probably take about a year to reverse. These are things like rebuilding the cooling tower at Yongbyon that we all enjoyed watching get blow down — some readers had a better seat than others, I understand.

Competing Explanations

Not surprisingly, there are competing explanations for why North Korea is taking so long — although I don’t see what the big rush would be, since North Korea has lots of plutonium now and needs to restart the facility to finish a new load of fuel.

But for those who think North Korea is moving at something less than the optimal pace toward restart, I hear two explanations. These explanations that just happen to correspond to the policy preferences of the people involved.

One interpretation, offered by the “well-informed” ROK source is that if the North Koreans aren’t up to no good at Yongbyon, they must be up to no good somewhere else. This is the same logic that sent us on the wild goose chase for a secret reactor Kumchang-ri and a production program for HEU — neither of which turned out to exist.

The other view, of course, is the North Koreans may be chilling out as part of bargaining with the United States. That is the view expressed by David Albright, who wrote in an email to Herskovitz that:

For example, [North Korea] may be holding back in case negotiations restart,” he added, referring to the now-frozen talks with the United States, China, Japan, South Korea and Japan.

It is worth keeping this in mind when evaluating claims made by the “well-informed” South Korean source — the claim that North Korea is starting a secret centrifuge program probably derives from an assumption, not evidence.

Comment [2]

In its present state of economic weakness, North Korea is very easy to underestimate. But just because its regime is unspeakable, its people are malnourished, and its electrical grid barely operates, that doesn’t mean that North Korea lacks for skilled personnel who care about their work—perhaps including the negotiators who managed to get Bill Clinton to waive his usual appearance fee.

The presence of a certain pool of talent is apparent in the DPRK’s can-do approach to science, mechanical engineering and mathematics, to say nothing of the Yongbyon nuclear complex, which, judging by its unheated buildings, does its work on a shoestring, yet not without some pride.

So what can North Korea do when it comes to making Nodong MRBMs? The U.S. government has given a few indications in public statements on the matter.

The Rumsfeld Commission, which had access to every kind of intelligence, concluded the following, back in 1998:

There is ample evidence that North Korea has created a sizable missile production infrastructure, and therefore it is highly likely that considerable numbers of No Dongs have been produced.

In 2004, the Iraq Survey Group reported that Iraq had negotiated with North Korea in 2000 for “technology transfer” for 1,300-km surface-to-surface missiles, which is to say, Nodongs:

The North Korean Chang Kwang Technology Group was identified as the technology supplier and the prime technical mediator for the North Korean side. After an exchange of several communiqués, the representatives from both countries agreed to a list of specific subjects that would be discussed at the meetings, including technology transfer for SSMs with a range of 1,300 km, coastal protection missiles with a range of 300 km, and the possibility of North Korean technical experts working inside Iraq.

More recently, Ambassador Kenneth Brill, the head of the National Counterproliferation Center, took the occasion of a public speech to shed light on what the IC believes about the DPRK missile-industrial complex:

An open source center (OSC) report made inferences about the scope and structure of North Korea’s missile program by connecting patterns and terminology in Pyongyang’s official portrayal of the program with sporadic but specific DPRK media references. Correlating Pyongyang’s portrayal of its space and missile program with other technical information suggests that North Korea’s industries have the capacity to produce avionics, airframe parts, propulsion systems, rocket propellant, aerospace ground equipment, launch facilities, and command and control software for the country’s missile program.

After the failures of their IRBM and ICBM test launches, it’s tempting to dismiss the North Koreans as having overreached. And maybe they have. But considering the rest of the story, they have managed to attain some milestones short of that.

So, in conclusion, let’s not to be too quick to dismiss what they can do.

Yesterday: Why So Few Nodong Tests?

Previously: What Is North Korea Capable Of?

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From KCNA:

Bill Clinton Arrives Here
Pyongyang, August 4 (KCNA) — Bill Clinton, former president of the United States, and his party arrived here Tuesday by air.

They were greeted by Yang Hyong Sop, vice-president of the Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly, and Kim Kye Gwan, vice-minister of Foreign Affairs.

A little girl presented a bouquet to Bill Clinton.

What is it about North Korean leaders at death’s door and ex-Presidents?

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