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Building on James’ post yesterday, Medvedev’s announcement about putting missiles in Kaliningrad shows that the Russians are quickly becoming their own worst enemy. Why Medvedev would revert to clumsy chest thumping at a time when cooler heads are set to retake Washington is just mind-boggling. I get that this move is great red meat for the Russian street. But does Medvedev really think that turning missile defense into a pissing match with the next U.S. administration will convince Washington to back away from the third site? Come on, comrades, let’s get real here…

A shortish post—partly because I’m shattered from last night but mostly because you have lots of great new material to read from Andreas, Anya and Bob.

As has been hinted at before, BBC news is now reporting that

Russia is to deploy new missiles in a Baltic enclave near Nato member Poland, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev says.

Short-range Iskander missiles in the Kaliningrad region would “neutralise” the planned US anti-missile shield in Poland and the Czech Republic, he said.

According to FAS the Iskander has a range of about 300 km. Its aim, therefore, appears to be “neutralize” missile defense by destroying the interceptors at Słupsk in Poland rather than by evading them in flight as part of a bid to guarantee Russia the second strike capability it already has. The radar in the Czech Republic would appear to be out of range.

But, is Russia’s plan plausible?

The Iskander is (presumably) the same missile system that appears to have been used against Georgia. This is a conventionally-amed missile and I wonder whether it can defeat the silo-based interceptors that the US is planning to deploy. Obviously, it would be relatively easy for Russia to install a nuclear warhead but I haven’t heard about plans to do that. Have any readers?

In any event, it is, of course, much more of a political statement than a military one and I strongly doubt it’s a coincidence that this announcement came at the same time as the US Presidential election.

Apparently, Poland gets a PAC-3 battery and US personnel as a tripwire, er defensive measure in exchange for hosting the European midcourse interceptor site:

A senior Pentagon official described an unusual part of this quid pro quo: an American Patriot battery would be moved from Germany to Poland, where it would be operated by a crew of about 100 American military personnel members. The expenses would be shared by both nations. American troops would join the Polish military, at least temporarily, at the front lines — facing east toward Russia.

Russia has long opposed the deal, saying the United States was violating post-cold-war agreements not to base its troops in former Soviet bloc states and devising a Trojan Horse system designed to counter Russia’s nuclear arsenal, not an attack by Iran or another adversary.

I still think Congress should cut the funding for the European site. I don’t mind moving NATO’s air defense east, particularly as long as the Russian armed forces are sitting in NATO aspirants. (Can we man it with contractors?)

But my question is this, why does Poland need PAC-3 when you have Tomasz Majewski?

Update: Representative Ellen Tauscher put out a press release that captures my reaction exactly:

Congresswoman
Ellen O. Tauscher
10TH District – California

Tauscher on Proposed U.S – Poland Missile Defense Pact

Washington DC – In response to news that The U.S. and Poland reached a deal on Thursday to place an American missile defense base on Polish territory, Rep. Ellen Tauscher, Chairman of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, released the following statement.

“Russian military aggression against any of our allies justly causes great concern, and should be seen as a threat to stability in the region. But we must be careful not to confuse our response to this provocation with our efforts to establish a cooperative U.S. – NATO missile defense architecture.

The missile defense interceptors that would be located in Poland are not designed to protect against Russian missile threats, but a long-range threat from Iran that has not yet emerged. The U.S. has properly characterized Russia’s belligerent rhetoric about the proposed deployment – which would create no discernable threat to Russian capabilities —- as misguided. Any linking now of the proposed interceptors with recent Russian actions will only undermine months and months of U.S. assurances that there is no relationship.

I am also concerned that the agreement announced yesterday appears to give Poland a security relationship over and above what Poland currently enjoys as a member of NATO with the existing Article Five responsibilities among all members. The U.S. commitment to our NATO allies via Article Five is as serious a commitment as our nation makes. We need to be sure the proposed agreement with Poland does not imply that there is something better than our Article Five commitment; devaluing our commitments to other NATO allies.”

I take our commitment to NATO Article Five very seriously, and I am concerned that expediting this agreement, if it is understood as a reaction to Russian actions – could serve to ratify suspicions about our and NATO’s commitment to Article Five.”

By the way, did you know the OED lists four spellings for “discernible”?

The Russian newspaper Izvestia reported Monday that Russian bombers capable of carrying nuclear weapons could be deployed to Cuba in response to U.S. plans to install a missile defense system in Eastern Europe.

The source was an unnamed senior Russian air force official. According to the WaPo’s Peter Finn, the Russian Defense Ministry declined comment, but did not deny it either. Finn notes that Izvestia is one of the Kremlin’s preferred forums for strategic leaks.

Russia’s not going to deploy nuclear-capable bombers to Cuba. But this episode shows just how muddled (anyone?) the U.S.-Russia relationship has become. In a relationship this complex and multifaceted, there are bound to be major differences on certain issues; this is totally natural. These differences are usually manageable if the parties view the relationship in non-zero sum terms and leaders in each country set priorities for the relationship in order to minimize the friction and maximize the respective gains from cooperation.

Neither of these principles holds much sway in the U.S.-Russian relationship today. The Bush administration’s withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty announced in late 2001 set the stage for an increasingly acrimonious and at times hostile relationship between the two former military adversaries. Vladimir Putin, who has clamped down on freedoms at home and exploited Russia’s newfound clout in global energy markets to bully its neighbors, deserves plenty of blame for the fallout.

But Bush administration policies ranging from the 2003 invasion of Iraq to its current efforts to establish a missile defense beachhead in Eastern Europe have fed the impression in Russia that the United States is not an enlightened superpower, but an imperialistic one that seeks power and influence at Russia’s expense. This is toxic and pushes the relationship in a zero-sum direction.

Moreover, the Bush administration has proven utterly inept at setting priorities. In foreign policy generally, decisions in one discrete policy sphere almost always constrain or enable policy options in other spheres. This is especially true in U.S.-Russian relations.

For instance, it’s really hard to push the Russians into supporting tougher sanctions against Iran when your administration is building missile defense installations on their front doorstep. Something’s gotta give, and a functioning policy planning process would identify and appropriately weigh these trade-offs so that the United States gets the most out of its relationship with Moscow—and vice versa.

Let’s hope the next U.S. administration fares better.

MDA really does need to get its story straight. In November 2007, Rear Admiral Alan B. Hicks, Program Director for Aegis, gave a presentation at the George C. Marshall Institute indicating six Aegis ships armed with the SM-3 Block IB interceptor would be needed to defend NATO.

But replace that interceptor with the upgraded SM-3 Block IIA interceptor that’s in the hopper for delivery by 2016, says Adm. Hicks, and just two Aegis ships are required to provide nearly gapless coverage of Europe. Check it out:

As Jeffrey points out, MDA head Obering told a radically different story just months earlier:

It will require 10 Aegis ships on station with SM-3 Block IIA interceptors to provide 40 to 60% coverage of Europe (central Europe would not be protected). To provide this persistent partial coverage, it would require four rotations for a total of 40 ships dedicated to the European defense.

First forty, then two, now apparently four ships? And 40-60% coverage to nearly complete coverage? I mean, really. Rep Ellen Tauscher (D-CA), chair of the House Armed Services Strategic Forces Subcommittee, said it best:

MDA is an agency that needs some adult supervision.

I asked Marc Schanz, journo-buddy of mine, to send along his impressions of Obering’s briefing the other day. I thought I would get some wry observations. Instead, I got a serious piece of defense journalism.

Anyway, apparently Obering freaked when asked about Russia — must be the Ibogaine.

I was under the impression that Lt. Gen. Henry “Trey” Obering’s briefing to Pentagon reporters on Tuesday was his “outbrief” – since the Army’s Maj. Gen. Patrick O’Reilly, Obering’s deputy commander at MDA, is slated to take over when Obering goes on “terminal leave” in November. (Obering doesn’t retire until January.)

The outbrief will wait for another day. MDA is taking advantage of current events a bit – with the recent signing of an agreement with the Czech Republic and the Iranian missile tests earlier this month. Early in the brief, Obering cited Defense Intelligence Agency analysis stating Iran is working on an extended range version of the Shahab-3 and a new 2,000 kilometer medium range ballistic missile, dubbed the Ashura. In light of an invigorated Iranian missile effort, Obering indicated the MDA is moving on from focusing its efforts on a North Korean threat to the Iran threat — and the need to expand protection for deployed forces and allies in Europe from it.

Obering sidestepped questions about Iran’s exact present capabilities, refusing to confirm that the country fired a 2,000 kilometer missile earlier this month or back in February – saying only that the Iranians have stated publicly they had tested such a weapon. He argued there is “good evidence” the Iranians are developing longer-range missiles and anticipating the capability in the near future, Obering stated. He noted that US intelligence says that as soon as 2015 the Iranians could have an ICBM-class missile that could reach across the Atlantic – and that some of this capability could be gained through research obstensibly dedicated to a civilian space launch program.

Theater missile defense for European allies from the Iranian threat is a priority for MDA, Obering said, touting the NATO endorsement in the Bucharest summit this past April and the recent agreement with the Czech Republic on a future radar site. When asked about the Russians’ objections to the effort, he insisted that most of the objections raised stem from misunderstanding. “Russia’s primary concern was that we were exaggerating the Iranian threat and thereforce these sites in Europe must be directed at them,” he said. He emphasized that the presence of 10 kinetic interceptors in Poland could not do anything against the thousands of warheads the Russians have deployed.

The Russians, on their part have said publicly they would work to develop capabilities to counter any radar development in the Czech Republic.

Obering clearly has lost some patience with the matter, and had some pretty blunt comments for the Russians. “I won’t speculate on what the Russian motivation is. In fact, what I would ask you to do is to ask them, because frankly, I think it is… incumbent on them to justify those,” he said. “There is absolutely no justification in our eyes for some of their statements and some of their concern about these sites.” Obering reiterated that the interceptors are kinetic, don’t carry warheads and that any effort to turn them into missiles would be “imminently evident” to a casual observer.

“I think it’s time that world turns and asks the Russians to justify their position on why are they are acting, in our case, in such an unjustified way,” he added.

When not berating the Russians, a good bulk of the brief was dedicated to defending MDA’s track record – particularly in flight testing – since 2001.

The 2010 program objective memorandum is right around the corner, you know.

Thirty-five of 43 hit-to-kill intercepts have been successful since then, Obering said – arguing that the few failures were not a result of design flaws. “A component broke, or this particular component… had a malfunction that we had to replace. We have not had any major showstoppers in our overall program.”

Obering touted the five of five successful tests with the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense program and the 13 of 15 tests with Aegis (arguably the most mature portion of the MDA portfolio) and six of nine tests with the long-range Ground-Based Midcourse Defense Program. Of course, he did a little expectation-lowering at the same time – announcing the delay of a planned interceptor test scheduled for July 18 due to a faulty testing component in the interceptor — a data card that records flight data and telemetry that was bad across the test fleet. A flight is planned for Friday, only now no interceptor will be used due to the danger of losing the test data – a prospect that is unappealing for a test that could cost upwards of $80 million. The full test has been pushed back until December, with Friday’s launch planned as a simulated intercept of a target missile.

While admitting that programs such as the Multiple Kill Vehicle and the Airborne laser are still eight to ten years from being operational, Obering touted the expansion of MDA’s activities since 2004 — pointing out that the agency plans to have a total of 30 interceptors by the end of the year for the long-range systems fielded between Alaska and California. As of today, 15 of the Navy’s Aegis destroyers are capable of launching the Standard Missile -3 interceptor (the marquee player in February’s satellite shootdown), with 30 of the missiles delivered to the Navy to perform the post-boost intercept mission.

“Now, one thing to remind you is that none of this existed just four years ago,” Obering said, adding a little rhetorical bear hug for the legislative branch. “We were able to do this in that time frame because of the special authorities and the special flexibilities we were given, both by the department and by the Congress.”

With the program objective memorandum for FY 2010 currently under construction, it remains to be seen whether the Congress – or a new administration – will extend the agency more rope, particularly on its less mature efforts.

-MVS

Gosh, I am going to miss ol’ Trey Obering when he retires in January. Ok, no I won’t.

He gave an outbrief today that, I hear, was nothing of the sort — just the same tired hat-in-hand for MDA routine. We smuggled a little spy in, so there will be more on that front later.

But I just noticed the other day that General Obering has changed his tune on how many Aegis ships would be needed to defend NATO from an Iranian ballistic missile attack.

See, when he wanted all the missile defense dough to go to that unworkable site in Poland, he told Representative Tauscher that her alternative proposal to use Aegis cruisers to defend NATO against Iranian missile attacks would require 40 ships and cost $17 billion to stand-up (and another $600 million per year to operate.)

You may recall that I expressed some doubt about the claim that 40 ships were necessary:

[MDA Director General Trey] Obering was obviously aware of the proposal, because his prepared statement included a long dismissal of the mobile systems that asserted the Navy would need 40 Aegis ships to defend Europe:

[snip]

When I read this, I thought 40?

As in FOUR ZERO? Is this like the biblical 40? As in “We don’t know how many, because we only have eyes for ground-based midcourse”?

The Aegis defended area or footprint is supposed to be much, much bigger than Obering’s remarks would suggest.

I talked a little about different burnout velocities and radar performance, suggesting that a straight analysis might reduce “the number of ships required by an order of magnitude from forty to four” and “make the mobile option much, much more attractive.”

Well, well, well. Then General Obering went to RUSI with this chart showing … wait for it … significant coverage of Europe with just four Aegis cruisers.

Oh sure, you might want a THAAD battery here or there and maybe a ship or two as reserve. But you clearly don’t need 40 ships to cover our NATO allies and other European partners.

Here is a hint, don’t tell Congress one thing and a British thinktank, even a friendly one, something else.

In February 2007, Gazeta Wyborcza reported that four sites were under consideration for the US interceptor site in Poland: Zegrze Pomorskie, Debrzno, and Slupsk-Redzikowo.

Since then, Redzikowo — a now defunct Polish airbase — has been looking like the place. At least that is what the Polish press claims. Oh, and MDA released this slide, which puts a notional interceptor site, oh, right about where Redzikowo is located. Click on the image for a GoogleEarth (.kmz) file, though there isn’t much to see.

Now, Allen Thomson sends along a note pointing to this article about Polish Defense Minister Aleksander Szczyglo meeting Slupsk governor Slawomir Ziemianowicz on Thursday to discuss the possibility of his region hosting a U.S. missile defense site.

So, we’ve got our candidate. Now, how do the locals feel about it?

The press coverage of local reaction to the missile shield is spectacular. The US press goes with a simplistic “The Czechs don’t want missile defense, but the Poles do …” Judy Dempsey in the International Herald Tribune reports that “public opinion, at least in the areas considered as possible sites for the 10 interceptors, is strongly behind the United States. For the locals, it is about jobs, not the environment.”

Reuters’ Barbara Sladkowska does better, but the prize goes to PAP, the Polish news agency.

PAP has a balanced story about local reaction (full text in the comments) with some, uh, local color:

Redzikowo (Pomorskie), lying only four kilometres from the centre of Slupsk, was brought into the centre of attention by Zycie Warszawy, which reported just before US Assistant Secretary of State John Rood’s visit to Poland that the Americans want to build their anti-missile installations precisely here. That report was repeated by other media sources, and journalists began to arrive in Redzikowo. Some residents are already fed up. Beer-sipping youths curtly told one television crew to “get the f… out of our neighbourhood.”

Oi.

In the last few days, Presidents Bush and Putin were meeting, talking about their wives, fishing and playing with dogs. Oh, but there is more:

As a gift, Bush gave Putin a Segway transporter, and he reportedly gave it a try. The former president and first lady own three Segways and regularly zip around their sprawling property on them.

A sign at the entrance to Walker’s Point reads: “Caution. President on Segway. Slow Down.”

There just has to be a photo of this Putin on Segway moment. If you find it, serious brownie points.

On missile defense, the theme at Kennebunkport seems to be anything but Europe. Putin offered to upgrade the Azerbaijan radar or even built a new one in Russia. Just as long as the US gives up this interceptors in Europe business. Bush said, hey Vladmir, good idea, but I still want Poland and Czech Republic.

(Maybe it’s just me, but does anyone else notice how both Presidents really make a point of calling each other by their first names? Damn, just look at what great buddies we are!)

So in general, news out of the weekend getaway sounds like more of the same. I don’t think anyone expected anything groundbreaking anyway. Apart from the Segway news, there was this Joint Statement by U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Sergey Lavrov. At 102 words this statement really clears things up for those of us who have been wondering as to what will happen after START. Russia and the U.S. agree on the “development of a post-START arrangement to provide continuity and predictability regarding strategic offensive forces.” The word “verified” feels missing from that sentence.

I want to follow up on a few issues on President Putin’s Gabala radar proposal. First, U.S. and Russia are currently talking about rather different conceptions of the plan, and second, both high level Russian officials and the press are gearing up for the plan to be rejected.

My Plan, Your Plan

Russia intends the proposal to be instead of missile defense deployments in Poland and the Czech Republic. Putin’s proposal, officials say, make the U.S. plans in Europe unnecessary. The U.S. however is talking about the Gabala radar as in addition to the currently planned interceptor and radar sites.

(I’ve also heard some questions about whether Azerbaijan itself is approving of this use of a radar on its territory. As far as I’ve read, they are game. Also, Putin did tell the G8 that he agreed on the proposal with Azerbaijan’s president. Somehow I doubt Azerbaijan would contradict that.)

Chief of the Russian Army’s General Staff General Baluevsky said yesterday (more here in Russian) that if the U.S. does not give a direct answer to Putin’s proposal by the start of the meeting in Kennebunkport (July 1-2), Russia will know that Washington has made its choice to reject the proposal. Russian press called it an ultimatum, but it kind of seems like they just wanted to use the “U” word. “Yeah, we’ll like totally know what’s up if you don’t say anything!” Umm, ok.

Current reports on Russia’s possible response are along the lines of pre-G8 summit missile pointing. Baluevsky noted the “Iskander missile and other systems.” (Iskander has a declared range which is within INF limits, but its actual maximum range may exceed that.)

What about INF?

However, what I am keeping an eye out for is whether threat to withdraw from the INF treaty starts to come up again. Russian officials talked up a storm about INF withdrawal a few months ago, calling it an asymmetric response to the U.S. Now the response appears to focus on existing missiles and where they are targeted.

What happened to the INF threats? At least two possibilities: 1) Russia noticed that the U.S. did not seem to care about their INF withdrawal while targeting missile talk gets everyone all riled up, or 2) there is a sense that Russia itself may have something to lose from INF withdrawal (eg. they have enough trouble with developing the currently planned missiles, so maybe opening competition with the U.S. on more is not the best plan), while existing missiles can threaten Europe too.

Russia did successful test the Bulava missile on Thursday. The last failed test was in December.