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The answer to that question determines whether or not one supports the Iran-EU3 deal. NPR asked Matt Bunn that very question this morning. (You can listen to they story, “Iran Agrees to Halt Uranium Enrichment, here and Matt’s answer at 3:50 in the story)

Matt’s answer was a good one; though I would have tackled it differently. The answer is “No.” Iran has a large nuclear program, some elements of which are better useful for a military program than a civilian one. Why does Iran have these facilities? One answer, suggested by John Bolton, is that Tehran is “dead set” (i.e. has made a formal decision) to build a nuclear weapon.

From other cases of proliferation, acquiring a nuclear weapon is seldom the only reason—building a nuclear weapon is a large and complex industrial project that requires a coalition of bureaucratic interests. This more complicated reality appears to be operating in Iran; support for the country’s nuclear efforts reflect a variety of scientitfic, political and industrial interests. Negotiations with Europe, which the hardliners opposed, suggest that some elements of that bureacratic coalition might be willing to sell out the nuclear weapons crowd in exchange for access to Western technology.

This is essentially happened in Brazil and Argentina, argues John Redick of the University of Virginia, in a pair of mid-1990s monographs (Nuclear Illusions: Argentina and Brazil, Stimson Center, December 1995 and The Role Of Scientists In South American Nuclear Cooperation, Paulo S. Wrobel, co-author, January 1998).

“Increasingly, scientists, both in and out of government, concluded that continuation of independent nuclear policies would result in permanent denial of advanced technology from the United States and Western Europe,” Redick argues. “While scientists in both nations embraced the need for a national nuclear program, their justification was not based on a military/security rationale. Rather, the nuclear program was supported as important to independent national development and economic advancement.”

Comment

Readers may have noticed references over the past few days to a long-running dispute between the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Brazil over access to a Brazilian facility to enrich uranium, INB Resende.

The dispute centers over whether the inspectors need to actually see the centrifuges in operation or not. The IAEA claims that the inspectors require such access; Brazil worries about the the loss of proprietary information.

The major news story was that Brazil and the IAEA were closing in on a deal. Secretary Powell noted similar disputes in the past had been resolved and expressed confidence that Brazil and the IAEA would “will work it out this time” as well. A source “close to the talks” told Reuters to expect a deal in less than 30 days.

Enter Gary Milhollin at the Wisconsin Project On Nuclear Arms Control. When it comes to press, Milhollin wears the red dress. As Brazil and the IAEA move toward resolution, Milhollin has published an article in Science called “Brazil’s Nuclear Puzzle” that points out the plant could produce enough HEU for 5-6 implosion type warheads. (Science requires a subscription, but The Wisconsin Project has made the article available on its website.)

The Brazilian government promptly issued an angry response. “They can only be the result of misinformation or motivated by shadowy interests,” said the president of Brazil’s National Nuclear Energy Commission, Odair Dias Goncalves, “Both motives are incompatible with the tradition of such a prestigious magazine like Science.”

He may have a point. To say that Milhollin was a major culprit in whipping up hysteria over Saddam’s bomb is an understatement. Milhollin compared Hans Blix to a crab that will scurry sideways … shunning confrontation. All you need to know about Milhollin was captured by the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel (“Arms control in a battle of its own: Retired UW professor doubts weapons checks can control nuclear threats,” April 1, 2003, p.01A):

• “Milhollin is a lawyer, not a scientist. He has an engineering degree, and he gained some technical fluency as an administrative judge for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.”

• “Milhollin’s most important skill may be public relations. He is widely quoted and widely published. He has published four op-ed pieces in the New York Times since 1997, three in the Wall Street Journal since last fall.”

That tells you a lot about Milhollin’s latest missive in Science magazine. Everyone agrees that Resende needs to be safeguarded, particularly in light of Brazil’s nuclear weapons history. Hence, the negotiations.

Ostensibly claiming to be a technical analysis of the capacity of INB Resende, Milhollin’s real argument is political. “If Brazil succeeds in denying the IAEA access to its centrifuges,” Milhollin and a colleague write, “Iran can demand the same treatment. Under the NPT, there is no legal ground for treating the two countries differently.”

Not precisely the analysis for which I read Science. Particularly, since it seems wrong. Milhollin is the lawyer here, but as I understand the situation, Brazil (along with Argentina) has a unique legal arrangement with the IAEA.

Brazil, Argentina, the IAEA, and the ABACC (Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials) signed a quadripartite agreement in December 1991 to allow for full-scope IAEA safeguards of Argentine and Brazilian nuclear installations. That agreement permitted both countries to maintain rights to “technological secrets,” to develop nuclear energy for the propulsion of submarines and established a relationship between the IAEA and the ABACC. Marco A. Marzo and Hugo E. Vicens of ABACC explain that:

The special thing in this agreement is the relationship between ABACC and the Agency. ABACC and the Agency, when applying safeguards activities, shall be guided by the following principles: First, they need to reach independent conclusions. Second, they need to coordinate, to the greatest extent possible, their activities for the optimal implementation of the agreement and to avoid unnecessary duplication. Of course, item A and B are conflicting, because the Agency has to avoid the unnecessary duplication of ABACC activities, but has to reach independent conclusions. This is always very difficult in day-by-day life.

I can’t see a similar precedent for Iran, nor can I imagine that the pages of Science magazine are the appropriate forum for this discussion. But this isn’t really about hunting bears, is it?

Late Update: The IAEA and Brazil reached a deal in November 2004 that “allowed [IAEA inspectors] to view pipes and valves of the centrifuges but [not] other centrifuge components.”

Comment

The Brazilian government has refused to allow IAEA inspectors to examine the Resende uranium enrichment plant near Rio de Janeiro.

"We feel deeply bothered, almost offended, when suspicions are raised about Brazil," a senior Brazilian diplomat told the Washington Post.

Brazilian President Luis Ignacio Lula de Silva, as well as the country/’s Science and Technology Minister, have both been forced in recent years to clarify statements that implied Brazil might restart its nuclear weapons program. I think we could do without the feigned indignation from the senior Brazilian diplomat.

Brazil is arguing that visual inspections are unncessary and may compromise proprietary information. This case is a great argument for a proposal by IAEA Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei to place all enrichment and reprocessing facilities used for civilian purposes under international ownership and control.