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Now that the IAEA’s latest Iran and Syria reports have leaked out, the fun begins. The conversations last September in Tehran about the enrichment site at Qom must have been really something. Perhaps they went something like this:

PRESIDENT: You think, you think we want to, want to go this route now? And the—let it hang out, so to speak?

DEAN: Well, it’s, it isn’t really that—

HALDEMAN: It’s a limited hang out.

DEAN: It’s a limited hang out.

EHRLICHMAN: It’s a modified limited hang out.

PRESIDENT: Well, it’s only the questions of the thing hanging out publicly or privately.

All of this is by way of saying that it’s time for Krepon to update the shoebox.

Qom: The Official Version

Here’s how Iran has explained the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP, aka the Qom facility) to the IAEA:

7. In a letter to the Director General dated 21 September 2009, Iran informed the Agency that “Based on (its) sovereign right of safeguarding … sensitive nuclear facilities through various means such as utilization of passive defense systems … (Iran) has decided to construct a new pilot fuel enrichment plant (up to 5% enrichment)”. [snip]

12. Iran explained that the Fordow site had been allocated to the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) in the second half of 2007, and that that was when the construction of FFEP had started. Iran subsequently confirmed that explanation in a letter dated 28 October 2009. In that letter, Iran stated that:

“As a result of the augmentation of the threats of military attacks against Iran, the Islamic Republic of Iran decided to establish contingency centers for various organizations and activities …

“The Natanz Enrichment Plant was among the targets threatened with military attacks. Therefore, the Atomic Energy Organization requested the Passive Defence Organization to allocate one of those aforementioned centers for the purpose of (a) contingency enrichment plant, so that the enrichment activities shall not be suspended in the case of any military attack. In this respect, the Fordow site, being one of those constructed and prepared centers, (was) allocated to the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) in the second half of 2007. The construction of the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant then started. The construction is still ongoing. Thus the plant is not yet ready for operation and it is planned to be operational in 2011.”

The claim that work at FFEP started up in late 2007 connects to the controversy over modified Code 3.1. In March 2007, the Iranian side “suspended” its compliance with early notification rules for the construction of new nuclear facilities. There are only two problems: nobody shares the Iranian view of the legality of unilateral “suspension” of its safeguards undertakings, and nobody believes Iranian claims about the start of construction. On the latter point, the IAEA report states:

13. During the meetings, the Agency informed Iran that it had acquired commercially available satellite imagery of the site indicating that there had been construction at the site between 2002 and 2004, and that construction activities were resumed in 2006 and had continued to date. The Agency also referred to the extensive information given to the Agency by a number of Member States detailing the design of the facility, which was consistent with the design as verified by the Agency during the DIV. The Agency also informed Iran that these Member States alleged that design work on the facility had started in 2006.

Iran now looks ready to wage a losing battle over Qom at the upcoming Board of Governors meeting.

A Crack in Syria’s Stonewall

In the meantime, following the IAEA’s detection of chemically processed (“anthropogenic”) uranium traces at Syria’s Miniature Neutron Source Reactor (MNSR), Syria has acknowledged the possession of previously undeclared uranium supplies:

7. In a meeting held on 2 November 2009 in Vienna, Syria was provided with further detailed information concerning the results of the analysis of the environmental samples from the MNSR. At that meeting, Syria identified other possible sources of the anthropogenic natural uranium particles, including domestically produced yellowcake and small quantities of imported, but previously undeclared, commercial uranyl nitrate. Syria also provided a document to support its explanation for the presence of the uranyl nitrate at the MNSR.

An inspection is scheduled for tomorrow.

Bonus Watergate Transcript Excerpt!

EHRLICHMAN: John says he’s sorry he sent those burglars in there, and that helps a lot.

PRESIDENT: That’s right.

MITCHELL: You are very welcome, sir. (Laughter)

HALDEMAN: Just glad the others didn’t get caught.

For this and more priceless Nixoniana, go here.

Update: ISIS has posted analyses of the Iran and Syria reports.

Comment [43]

One of the unique features of the AlKibar (Dair Alzour) probable-reactor site is that it is located near a (somewhat offbeat) tourist attraction. I even joked that a visit “seems like a good use of my grant money.”

I didn’t expect one of you to actually do it. A reader, on a visit to Syria, took a day trip to Halabiye. He has decided to share his observations and photographs:

As you might know, close to the reactor there is an old Byzantine fortress called Halabiye (Frank Pabian mentioned it in his presentation). Tourists only seldom visit Halabiye, but still some travel-guides mention it, so a visit to the fortress was not too obvious. I tried to see how close I could get to the reactor, in the end I was 1.5 km away. This whole area is really, really far off and lies about 60-70 km away from Deir ez-Zour, which also is seldom visited by tourists. Every Syrian I told I was going to Deir ez-Zour immediately asked why I would want to visit such an ugly “$#&%hole”. After all it is a six hours drive from Damascus and a three hours drive from Palmyra. On holidays lot of Syrians villagers picnic near the fortress. As they apparently had never seen a foreigner before, I quickly became the attraction of the day.

So here my impressions and thoughts on the Al Kibar site:

First let me state, that I think it indeed was a nuclear reactor. I know many people question this and their main argument is that the site is not defended in any way.

This notion is wrong. There are simply no visible defenses. Actually the area is so far off that little defenses are necessary, climbing up the cliffs there is extremely exhausting, difficult and takes a long time. I almost fell twice when climbing up the hill of the castle. Security forces would have plenty of time to thwart any “misguided” hikers. Ten soldiers or so garrisoned inside the canyon and some light barriers would be more than enough to keep away any any intruders.

Additionally I can confirm that the site is defended even if a bit differently than people would expect. There were three men simply hanging around next to the bridge. Our taxi driver offered to take us across the bridge to photograph the castle from the other side (where the reactor is located). Then suddenly those guys approached our driver who told us: “Wait I will do this for you”

They started questioning him with one of them taking out a small book to take notes. When we were going further down the bridge to the other side of the river our always amiable driver asked us aggressively “What do you want there? There is nothing there”. That was the only time he talked to us in such a manner. My friend and I took three pictures on which those suspicious guys are visible — the one tying his shoes was the guy who took out his notebook. They monitored us very closely until we went back to Deir Ez Zour.

In my opinion all of that really makes sense, the Syrians would never be able to stop a concentrated Israeli attack on a pin point target. Hiding it was the only way to go. Of course that was a big gamble, which they lost. Putting an old Russian SAM next to it, which would have been eliminated in a matter of minutes anyway would have been the most stupid thing to do. Constructing a SAM station anywhere is like painting “here is an important installation” in big red letters into the desert for all satellites to see, especially in such a remote region.

The pumping station (above) seems to be somewhat hidden, too. A big earthen wall makes it impossible to see it from the ground. The fortress is situated on a big hill and you can inescapably view the pumping station from the top of it, even if from a distance of two kilometers. I did photograph it, unfortunately the weather was rather misty making the picture a little blurred. I was lucky enough to capture a man standing behind the pumping station, he gives a clear indication of the size of the building. When considering the earthen wall hides the lower part, it also gets clear how tall the building actually is. (Editor’s note: The man is the dark speck to the viewer’s left of the building.)

Another point is the position of the building itself. I photographed a different canyon (above) behind the castle. The canyon where the reactor was located probably looked similar before construction started. Flattening the ground and lying the foundations for such a giant building like an reactor is a major task which simply would not make sense for a normal construction. There is more than enough free, even space right next to the Euphrates only two kilometers down the river (where the cement factory, pictured below,is located)

This is also why the “water treatment” plant is suspicious to me. Why build such a plant kilometers away when there is enough space right next to the river and right next to the main road? Laying kilometers of water pipes in Syria’s hottest region is no fun either. But who knows perhaps the Syrian’s converted this facility into a real water treatment plant later on.

There are some ruins on the other side of the Euphrates (the reactor side) but our driver stated he could not pass the river over that very rickety pontoon bridge. The bridge, despite being partially made of wood, can carry cars, however. I photographed a van crossing it, interestingly with a “Danger” sign on it (below). Apparently it was forbidden only for us.

There seems to be a frequent truck traffic to the cement factory, so steady supply of the reactor using trucks would not be noticeable. In fact, I recall that Frederick Forsyth, in The Fist of God (his novel about Saddam getting the bomb), describes an asphalted road and a steady flow of trucks asthe most pressing problem when concealing a nuclear factory (in The Fist of God, the Iraqis disguise the plant as a car dump).

A lot of people claim the photos from the briefing could have been taken anywhere but the whole atmosphere and colors were just spot on. OK, I know this argument is anything but objective, but the photos of the presentation and my travel pictures correspond rather well (see the screenshot).

Another major claim of skeptics is the lack of support structures. Syria has an history of underground sites. And more important, why should such structures have to be 10m away from the reactor? In the age of fiber optics control stations could be placed kilometers away. Even storage sites could be placed far away, due to the many lorries there transports to the reactor would hardly be noticeable. It again reminded me of Forsythe. In The Fist of God, analysts don’t recognize a nuclear factory as such because its facilities are placed so far apart. I photographed a vast building which looked a little out of place, because of its tower-like structures and sheer size. The inscriptions says “workshop for gypsum and decor”. Of course, it could be just that but still one should not discard the idea the Syrians may have “outsourced” some of the necessary structures to buildings like this one or the alleged water treatment plant.

There seems to be a lot of cooperation with the DPRK in general. In Damascus I once saw a North Korean delegation (above), which I unfortunately could only photograph from behind. I tried to ask a colleague, but he said the subject was not appropriate to discuss.

[Note: I asked “Why did you conclude the Asian men were from the DPRK?” Our reader responded: “The guy in the uniform walked past me very closely. I could see a Kim Il Sung pin, which North Koreans are obliged to wear, on his chest.”]

I hasten to add that I take the photographer at his word; the pictures certainly look accurate.

I made text and image edits where necessary to avoid making trouble for certain people. Which brings me to a very important point:

I want to discourage, in the strongest possible terms, readers from doing anything illegal or that might otherwise endanger yourself, your host or people around you. Many governments have no sense of proportion when it comes to the line between what is innocent behavior in a free society — taking pictures of public events; using your intellect to draw conclusions — and espionage. Recent events in Iran and North Korea demonstrate this too clearly for my taste.

So, please don’t go taking silly risks. We can leave that to the professionals.

Comment [20]

IAEA reports on Iran and Syria.

Have at ‘em.

Comment [7]

The blog-o-sphere is all worked up over an op-ed (in German) by Hans Rühle claiming that Iran funded Syria’s Al Kibar reactor.

Central to Rühle’s stardom is the credence lent to his claims by his former position — he is the “former chief of the planning staff of the German Defense Ministry.” (He is the father of Michael Rühle, a senior NATO official.)

The truth is a little uglier.

First, Ruehle left the German Ministry of Defense in 1988. Whatever “inside” information Rühle had dates back more than two decades. His information about Al Kibar, therefore, is second hand. Second, by “second hand,” I mean plagiarized.

Most of Rühle’s article comes straight from Ronen Bergman’s book The Secret War with Iran, mainly the chapter “Ghost Raid.”

Let’s take a look.

Here is how Ruehle describes the raid against the Al Kibar reactor:

Am Morgen des 6. September 2007 starteten sieben israelische F-15-Jagdbomber nach Norden. Sie flogen entlang der Mittelmeerküste, streiften die Türkei und drangen nach Syrien ein. 50 Kilometer vor dem Ziel feuerten sie 22 Raketen auf die drei identifizierten Objekte innerhalb des Kibar-Komplexes ab. Die Syrer waren völlig überrascht. Als ihre Luftabwehrsysteme einsatzbereit waren, befanden sich die israelischen Flugzeuge längst ausserhalb ihrer Reichweite. Die Mission war erfolgreich, der Reaktor zerstört.

That translates roughly as “On the morning of September 6, 2007 seven Israeli F-15 fighter-bombers started toward the north. They flew along the Mediterranean coast, touched on Turkey and then penetrated Syria. 50 kilometers from the finish, 22 rockets were fired on the three identified objects within the Al Kibar complex The Syrians were quite surprised. By the time their air defense systems were ready for use, the Israeli aircraft were long beyond their reach. The mission was successful, the reactor was destroyed.”

This is almost word-for-word from Bergman’s book:

At 3 a.m. on the morning of Thursday, September 6, seven Israeli air force F-151s took off and headed north over the Mediterranean. … They flew very low along the Mediterranean coast and then over Turkey, before entering Syrian airspace. At a range of 50 kilometers, they launched twenty-two missiles at the three sites within the nuclear complex.

The Syrians were taken completely by surprise. Their air defense systems only detected the firing of the missiles, leaving no time for the sites to be evacuated. A few antiaircraft missiles were dispatched, but only after the planes were long gone. American and Israeli satellites hovering above Syria confirmed that the targets had been destroyed.

There are lots of other examples, like Rühle’s description of Ali-Reza Asgari’s defection and revelation about the Syrian project mirror’s Bergman’s, down to certain phrases: “Iran finanziere ein geheimes Nuklearprojekt von Syrien und Nordkorea” (translate) compared with: “Iran was financing a joint nuclear venture launched by North Korea and Syria.”

Ruehle also lifted Bergman’s description of the commando raid:

Mitte August flogen 12 Mann einer Kommando-Einheit in zwei Helikoptern zum Reaktorgelände al-Kibar, nahmen Bodenproben und fotografierten die Anlage. Die Auswertung ergab eindeutig, dass es sich um einen Reaktor nordkoreanischer Bauart handelte. (translate)

Compare that with

As a result, on a cloudy night in mid-August, twelve men from Israel’s Sayeret Matkal commando unit were flown into Syria in two helicopters. They did not penetrate the site itself, but took soil samples from beyond the vast concrete apron surrounding it. … The results provided clear-cut proof of the joint nuclear project.

There are just too many similarities to ignore.

Rühle’s apparent plagiarism creates a false “confirmation” of Bergman’s account — here is how the at the Associated Press described the report:

Ruehle, who did not identify the sources of his information, regularly publishes and comments on security and nuclear proliferation in different European newspapers and broadcasts, and he has held prominent roles in German and NATO institutions.

One is naturally encouraged to conclude the Rühle’s account is the official Geheimdienst version, filtered through a favorite source.

In the interest of full disclosure, I didn’t discover the plagiarism — Bergman is (rightfully) complaining about it to friends and colleagues. Moreover, I can’t read German — Josh Pollack, and Google Translate, helped out there.

Comment [10]

Here are the latest DG Reports on Iran and Syria

Post first, read later.

Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and 1835 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran, GOV/2009/8

Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Syrian Arab Republic, GOV/2009/9

First, again, I think.

Update: Sorry for the snafu on the links. They are working now.

Comment [37]

The debate continues over Yousry Abushady’s remarkable appearance on Egyptian television.

The interview is notable, as one observer notes, because Abushady “is speaking in his personal capacity, which is soon-to-be retired.” You just don’t see IAEA officials doing television interviews like this.

Although I still have lots of questions about the type and size of the reactor, I continue to think the evidence, on balance, supports the reactor hypothesis.

James noted his skepticism regarding Abushady’s comparsion of the heights of the probable reactor at Al Kibar (Dair Alzour) and the reactor at Yongbyon.

Frank Pabian sends along a careful comparison of photos that makes that skepticism explicit. To read his complete rebuttal to Dr. Abushday, just click on the image, which more accurately shows the relative heights of the building.

Comment [19]

Friend of Wonk, Mark Fitzpatrick, pointed me in the direction of an interview on Egyptian TV with, Yousry Abushady, a section head in the IAEA Department of Safeguards, about the alleged Syrian reactor.

Part 2 can be found here.

Speaking in his “personal capacity”, Abushady disputes that the BoE was a Magnox reactor. In part two, he claims 30-40 errors in the CIA briefing to Congress (If you don’t recall the little movie, here is the video and the text of the press briefing).

Alshady elaborates on only one alleged “error,” however. During the first segment, he claimes that 5MWe reactor at Yongbyon is 50m high and that the BoE is only 10m high. Even assuming that some of the BoE is underground, he says this disparity is too much for the reactors to be of the same type.

So, is this a startling revelation undermining US claims or an IAEA inspector with an anti-US bias going off on one, or even just an honest guy making a mistake?

I am off Italy this afternoon (along with Jeffrey as it happens) so don’t have time to get into this in as much depth as it merits but, off the top, here are my thoughts …

There are two key questions:

1. Is Abushady right about the height of the North Korea reactor?

I cannot find a good independent number for the height of the North Korean reactor. I’m sure it’s out there somewhere so please do comment if you know it.

However, let’s assume that 50m is right. What’s not clear to me is whether Abushady is including the primary stack (if that’s the right term) of the North Korean reactor in this number (and from his picture it looks like he might be). If he is, his comparison is rather disingenuous since the Syrian reactor doesn’t have an equivalent structure so the relevant height for comparison purposes should be the height of roof on the building—considerably less than 50m.

2. Is Abushady right about the height of the Syrian reactor?

Well, the first place to look for a discussion of this question is, of course, the comments in this blog!

I don’t have time to revise in detail that outstanding discussion now but a consensus seemed to be emerging in the 15—20m range, i.e. somewhat higher than Abushady says. And remember, you have to add to this however much of the reactor is supposed to be underground.

In summary, my initial, not-too-fully considered reaction is to be skeptical of Abushady. My guess is that he is overestimating the height of Yongbyon (by including the stack) and underestimating the height of the BoE. But, Abushady is, as he says, a guy that knows a lot about the North Korean reactor so I don’t want to sound too dogmatic.

What I would say, however, is that it is unhelpful to have such analysis coming from an IAEA official in his “personal capacity”. If the IAEA has concerns about this they should be in the official reports not spread in this way.

Finally, if any of you speak Arabic (as I’m sure a number of you do) I would love a sense of how accurate the translation is.

Comment [52]

Frank Pabian sends along a response to the comments on his presentation.

Regarding the comments posted so far regarding my Youtube briefing, first, I would first like to thank all the commenters for their questions and comments on the various aspects of the presentation.

However, I must also say that I’m surprised and sorry to learn the following:

1. That I’ve been labeled a Hawk, and,
2. That due to a small error on my part in verbally describing slide #90, that I would have provided anyone the basis for determining that the credibility of the entire briefing is therefore in doubt. (This is most unfortunate given that the presentation lasted one hour and incorporates over 110+ slides).

Although I have never thought of myself as hawk (given that I consider violence of any kind, either at the individual or national level, to be abhorrent; and given that I have not, and will not, ever advocate unprovoked military action by anyone at any time) perhaps a metaphorical ornithological review is in order. A hawk (or an eagle?) has the ability to see far off and focus in on what is important, in this case the developments that suggest a growing threat of nuclear weapons proliferation. If one chooses to ignore or dismiss such information, I don’t think that he or she should be considered a dove, but rather an ostrich (or a pigeon?).

Regarding the US Executive Oder #13224 labeling the NCRI as a terrorist group…It was made in December 2002. However, that in no way inhibited the IAEA from following up on NCRI leads long after that (and there should be no doubt that the IAEA achieved much success as a result). So, as Josh later said, it is a non sequitur as to whether NCRI information has any value or not, or whether or not it is worthy of follow-up by anyone concerned with international security.

(The proof is in the pudding, regardless of who made it)

Regarding Rwendland’s other comment that takes issue with my slide #90 showing the various examples of Magnox reactors. I would like to respond by saying that the slide #90 was correct as originally created and as viewed standing alone, as it was only meant to provide examples of how knowledgeable bloggers (i.e, on ArmsControlWonk) were correct in drawing attention to known Magnox reactors as a basis for comparison with Al Kibar long BEFORE the ODNI audiovisual presentation in April 2008. I did nonetheless mis-speak in saying that that central image was a cutaway model of a Calder Hall reactor when it was in fact (as Rwendland accurately points out) a view of the much larger, but still Magnox, reactor at Oldbury (and I’m actually not aware of such views being available with respect to the Calder Hall reactors). As a result, and in order to avoid any similar confusion in the future, I have now updated that slide as enclosed. Rwendland is also correct to point out that the heat exchangers in the Oldbury design are internal as opposed to external at both Calder Hall and Yongbyon (and al-Kibar)… this can be seen on either side of the core in the Oldbury cut-away model. Rwendland is also correct to point out that the Oldbury reactors employ a pre-stressed concrete pressure vessel as opposed to steel containment vessel used at Calder Hall (and evidently at Yongbyon, and as was shown by the ODNI in the ground photos of Al Kibar).

I’ve included two additional slides that show both reactor types as they now appear on Google Earth. However, please note that the four cooling towers (one for each of four Calder Hall reactors) visible in the Google Earth image, have since been demolished by controlled demolition (akin to the one at Yongbyon) and the reactors decommissioned as of last year.

Both of the Oldbury Magnox power reactors were similarly slated for decommissioning this year, but that was recently postponed as the Oldbury #2 reactor will continue to provide electricity through at least 2009.

These slides also provide refutation to [the] questioning the authenticity of the ground image of a Calder Hall reactor in Slide #90. A quick comparison with the overhead view on Google Earth shows that it was indeed a ground view of Calder Hall (Reactor #2).

Again, thanks to all who have commented (and have yet to comment), as I see this is the beauty and true value of Blogs and Wikis…They provide a forum in which to correct, clarify, and elucidate on myriad topics in a way not otherwise possible, with the end result being that everyone is better informed.

Cheers,
Frank

Comment [13]

In a talk at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Frank Pabian makes really amazing use of GoogleEarth and SketchUp. (There are also a couple of references to the blog, for which I am grateful.)

You can also watch the Q&A:

Comment [9]

There is a storm brewing over in Vienna about whether the IAEA should cease technical cooperation with Syria on account of the latter’s suspected nuclear programme.

The IAEA Director General weighed in on Monday. According to Reuters

IAEA Director Mohamed ElBaradei urged governors to approve the aid project, saying there was no legal basis for curbing Syria’s IAEA membership rights based on unverified accusations.

“There are claims against Syria, which we’re looking at. There were claims against Iraq, which were proven bonkers (mad), and after, the result was a terrible war,” he said in remarks to the closed gathering relayed to Reuters.

…

“So we have to be very careful when we talk about an investigation,” ElBaradei said. “Even people who are not a lawyer would know that people and countries are innocent until proven guilty. And we continue to act on that basis.”

Let me say first off that, on a personal level, I entirely agree with suspending technical cooperation with Syria. Ceasing to assist Syria to develop a nuclear power programme is an entirely appropriate and proportionate step given the very strong evidence that Syria built a clandestine reactor—in fact, in my opinion, it would be “bonkers” not to take this step.

But, putting my personal feelings aside, is ElBaradei right about the lack of a legal basis for stopping technical cooperation?

Article 19 of Syria’s Comprehensive Safeguards agreement states that

If the Board, upon examination of relevant information reported to it by the Director General, finds that the Agency is not able to verify that there has been no diversion of nuclear material required to be safeguarded under this Agreement to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, it may make the reports provided for in paragraph C of Article XII of the Statute of the Agency (hereinafter referred to as “the Statute”) and may also take, where applicable, the other measures provided for in that paragraph. In taking such action the Board shall take account of the degree of assurance provided by the safeguards measures that have been applied and shall afford Syria every reasonable opportunity to furnish the Board with any necessary reassurance.

Note the way this article is phrased. The IAEA is required to make a finding of non-compliance if it is unable to verify the non-diversion of nuclear material. It does not have to prove there has been a diversion; it only needs to be unable to prove that there hasn’t been one. So, ElBaradei is quite wrong when he says that states are innocent until proven guilty. Fair or not, Syria signed up to a system that works the other way around.

Given the evidence in GOV/2008/60, there seems little doubt that the IAEA cannot verify the non-diversion of nuclear material in Syria. Moreover, it has given Syria “every reasonable opportunity to furnish the Board with any necessary reassurance”. Syria has recently said it will allow no more inspections.

So, there seems to me little doubt that the Board already has legal right (if not the obligation) to find Syria in non-compliance. If that is done, article XII.C of the Statute comes into play:

The Board shall call upon the recipient State or States to remedy forthwith any non-compliance which it finds to have occurred. The Board shall report the non-compliance to all members and to the Security Council and General Assembly of the United Nations. In the event of failure of the recipient State or States to take fully corrective action within a reasonable time, the Board may take one or both of the following measures: direct curtailment or suspension of assistance being provided by the Agency…

The article manifestly gives the IAEA the right to suspend technical cooperation. I would argue that it could do this right away since it has already given Syria “reasonable time” to take “fully corrective actions” but I am sure that others would argue this article means that Syria must be given some more time after it is found in non-compliance. In any event, even if the IAEA can’t suspend technical cooperation right now, it should be able to do so in the near future, if it finds Syria in non-compliance now.

There, however, is the rub. My reading of the law is that the IAEA can only suspend technical cooperation after finding Syria in non-compliance. As much as I think such a finding would be legally justified (and entirely deserved), it seems like a non-starter right now. And because of that it also seems to me that the legal basis for denying Syria technical cooperation is shaky—even if the reasons are totally different from those implied by the Director General.

Comment [33]