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CIA Director General Michael Hayden stuck to the size estimate of the Al Kibar yesterday, comparing it to Yongbyon:

“In the course of a year after they got full up, they would have produced enough plutonium for one or two weapons,” Hayden told reporters after a speech.

The reactor was of a “similar size and technology” to North Korea’s Yongbyon reactor, Hayden said, disputing speculation it was smaller than the Korean facility.

“We would estimate that the production rate there would be about the same as Yongbyon, which is about enough plutonium for one or two weapons per year,” he said.

(via Total Wonkerr)

The CIA estimates that Yongbyon produces “about 6 kg per year” of plutonium. (I think it is a stretch to call that one “or two” weapons per year but whatever.)

So, the IC must really think it is the same size.

A couple of summary points about the How Big Was Al Kibar post:

• The ratio of entry points for the fuel and control rods is 61:97. Extrapolating capacity from the number of entry points is not straightforward, but capacity if the entry points imply a proportional number of fuel and control rods, the reactor could be significantly smaller than Yongbyon.

• On the other hand, the core could still be the same size, of course, just with fewer entry points. I took a quick look at the collapsed concrete containment vessel and came up with like 10 meters — a little tight for a Yongbyon-sized pressure vessel (884 centimeters), but not clearly impossible. That estimate could easily be off by 1 or 2 meters.

This is all very interesting. Thoughts?

Comment [36]

I just love my job. I am like a kid in a candy store with all these photos of Al Kibar. A couple of things don’t add up just yet. Not saying they won’t eventually, but I am trying to work through the evidence with some rigor.

Despite early press reports that the fuel channels atop the Al Kibar reactor core were identical to Yongbyon, I and others — including Geoff Forden, Cheryl Rofer and Richard Wendland — see some pretty significant differences that suggest Al Kibar might have been quite a bit smaller than its North Korean cousin.

To be clear, I don’t doubt that Al Kibar was a reactor and, although I think the evidence of North Korean involvement is less impressive than early press reports suggested, that’s my working hypothesis too.

But I don’t understand the claim that Al Kibar is a copy of Yongbyon in the strict sense — in particular, I don’t understand how the IC concluded that Al Kibar is the same size as Yongbyon.

Are the Fuel Channels Identical, Similar or Dissimilar?

Early reports suggested that the Al Kibar reactor had virtually identical configuration and number of channels to lower fuel rods into the core as at Yongbyon. Robin Wright wrote in the Washington Post:

Sources familiar with the video say it also shows that the Syrian reactor core’s design is the same as that of the North Korean reactor at Yongbyon, including a virtually identical configuration and number of holes for fuel rods. It shows “remarkable resemblances inside and out to Yongbyon,” a U.S. intelligence official said. A nuclear weapons specialist called the video “very, very damning.”

The actual claim during the video was much more careful — that there were similarities in the configuration and in the size and capacity of the reactor.

This photograph shows the top of the reactor vessel in the reactor hall before concrete was poured around the vertical control rod and refueling tubes. Note the similar arrangement of vertical tube openings in the top of the Syrian reactor on the left and North Korea’s Yongbyon plutonium production reactor on the right. We assess the Syrian reactor was similar in size and capacity to this North Korean reactor.

In fact, the number and configuration of fuel channels are different in some ways. Cheryl Rofer, over at Whirled View has been sifting through the images with care and meticulous attention and noticed that Al Kibar has only about 60 percent of the number of fuel channels as Yongbyon. Richard Wendland made a similar observation in a comment on the blog. Then Geoff Forden sent me a note stating:

I’ve been counting fuel tubes and it appears to me that the Syrian reactor is considerably smaller than the North Korean reactor.

The’ve got a point.

Take another look at the image of the fuel channels and count them.

One can see quite clearly that the reactor at Al Kibar had 52 56 fuel channels in a 4-6-8-8-8-8-6-4 configuration like this (my arithmetic is especially poor on Sundays):

(There are a few onsies here and there, maybe for control rods, but that doesn’t dramatically alter the picture.)

That’s the same arrangement in the computer model released by the IC, so it seems quite plausible that no additional channels were to be installed. Here is a screen capture:

Yongbyon has considerably more fuel channels — 97, configured in 5-7-9-11-11-11-11-11-9-7-5. Like this:

If you model the core of a reactor as a sphere, the volume (and hence capacity) of Al Kibar would be about one-fifth that of Yongbyon — sixty percent cubed.

The implication of a smaller reactor is smaller plutonium production — roughly, while Yongbyon could produce 5-7 kg of plutonium per year, Al Kibar could only produce about 1 kilogram of plutonium per year.

That’s still not good, but it also invites comparison’s to the fuss over Algeria’s reactor, which was resolved with safeguards not airstrikes.

On the other hand, maybe there are design differences in the size of the channels or the rods that we aren’t taking into account. But it doesn’t seem to be a copy of Yongbyon, in the strict sense.

Whiskey Tango Foxtrot?

The possibility that Al Kibar is smaller might explain why the “copy” of Yongbyon doesn’t have a secondary cooling tower as Yongbyon does (although, to be clear, Yale Simkin and others caclulate that Syria could river-cool even a Yongbyon-sized reactor without unreasonable pumping requirements or boiling fish).

A smaller reactor would also require less natural uranium fuel — something that might matter if one plans extract uranium from phosphates.

Finally, a smaller reactor would also, presumably, reduce the design throughput for whatever reprocessing facility the Syrians intended to build or have squirreled away. That question — what about the reprocessing facilities — is a big one that I suspect we will be talking about a lot in the coming weeks.

But for now I just want to know if the IC really judges that Al Kibar was going to be exactly the same size as Yongbyon and, if so, on what basis was that judgment made given the different number of fuel channels?

I mean that as an honest question.

Comment [62]

From a reader.

Update: Since the full text is now online at the DNI website, I have moved the full text to the comments.

Comment [33]

First off, the Syrian video is now public:

Online Videos by Veoh.com

Second, I have one more question to add to Jeffrey’s list: “why now?”

This has been bugging me for the last 24 hours.

Prima facie it makes no sense. The US administration commits to a deal with the North Koreans under which the DPRK is not (yet) required to declare its assistance to Syria (if indeed it occurred). So, why encourage opposition to the deal within the US by showing evidence of said assistance?

I can see three possible reasons (not mutually exclusive), none of which I find entirely satisfactory:

1. Elements within the US administration opposed to the deal have convinced the President that this evidence ought to be shown, in an effort to wreck the deal. I have a slightly hard time believing this because it seems Chris Hill has achieved buy-in for the deal at the very highest levels. But, presumably there is still some strong opposition and such a messy bureaucratic compromise would hardly be unprecedented.

2. The release of the evidence was aimed at increasing pressure on Syria. On balance, I still think this is a bigger part of the reason than others seem to. However, it’s not clear to me what has prompted US desires to pressure the Syrians.

3. The US has been itching to release this evidence all along (see points 1 and 2 above for possible reasons) but hasn’t been able to because it would compromise the source (from Israeli intelligence?) who obtained it. If that source has now been ‘secured’ then the barrier to presenting the evidence would have been lifted. Again, this is also possible but still feels unsatisfactory as an explanation.

“Why now?” still seems like a very interesting question.

Comment [31]

Robin Wright at the Washington Post and David Sanger at the New York Times are reporting that CIA Director Michael Hayden and other intelligence officials will brief the House and Senate Intelligence, Armed Services and Foreign Relations committees on the Box-on-the-Eurphrates.

The centerpiece of the briefing is a video [presentation showing two still photographs of] a reactor core inside similar to the North Korean reactor at Yongbyon.

Well, finally, some evidence.

• David Sanger reports that it contains “what appears to be the construction of a reactor vessel inside the building that Israel later destroyed.”

• Robin Wright reports that “shows that the Syrian reactor core’s design is the same as that of the North Korean reactor at Yongbyon, including a virtually identical configuration and number of holes for fuel rods.”

Above are two images of the top of the Yongbyon reactor core (both from the IAEA, the color one via ISIS). I can imagine that a [picture] showing that would cause some consternation. If the Administration makes the Syria video public, we can do a little comparison.

Assuming the provenance, interpretation and timing are all square, I would think the presumption now shifts to “it was a reactor” — which is not to say that hitting it was a sensible foreign policy decision or that the Six Party process should stall.

Martha Raddatz gets credit, in retrospect, for her story saying that Israel had photographs. I was skeptical and some of the details were certainly wrong in retrospect, but the main point seems more solid today.

I confess I am a little surprised. An agent inside with a video camera is a littler more 24 or Alias than typical clandestine operations. I am not sure how or why the Syrians let a video camera into the facility in the first place.

***

There are still tons of unanswered questions, but I suspect folks will ask those in the Congressional briefings:

• Who took the [pictures], when and why? How did the Israelis get a copy?

• Where are the fuel fabrication and reprocessing facilities? I would be surprised if Syria would be willing to depend on foreign fuel and, even more, on foreign reprocessing services.

• Why weren’t Administration officials willing to call it a reactor, even off-the-record?

Update: As you can see from the changes to the post (clearly marked, of course), apparently what we have are two still photographs inside the BOE.

Comment [66]

David Albright and Jackie Shirer have a really excellent op-ed in the Washington Post arguing that North Korea has significantly met its commitments to disable its plutonium production facilities and declare past nuclear activities. (For recent blog posts on disablement and the declaration, see Its All About (Water) Chemistry and NORKs Miss Deadline, Slow Disablement)

In particular, Albright and Shire coin an apt phrase to describe North Korea’s uranium enrichment program (UEP): “a footnote in the context of its plutonium production.”

On the subject of apt phrases, Albright and Shire also indirectly pay homage to Arms Control Wonk.com, referring to the suspect Syrian facility near Dayr Al Zwar as the “box in the desert”:

As for the “box in the desert” that Israel bombed in September, it is gone now and whatever has replaced it is almost certainly not a reactor.

Regular readers will remember that I coined the phrase Box on the Euphrates to allow myself and readers to refer to the facility without prejudging its purpose.

My inclination is to be flattered that they adopted the terminology, although certain correspondents suggest I ought to be miffed at their having avoided using the original formulation and, therefore, direct acknowledgment.

I recognize, however, the possibility of potential improvements. Although I think “on the Euphrates” is a more accurate description of the box’s location, the acronym “BID” has certain advantages. For example, we could could refer to the study of the characteristics and purposes of the facility — heretofore known as “boxology” — as “BID-ness” as in “Taking Care of BID-ness.” It’s a tough call.

What say you, loyal readers?

Comment [6]

The Monopoly House on Euphrates Ave. is about 15 meters tall, or at least that is what one reader working from the angle of the sun calculates.

Check out that and other good stuff in the comments.

Comment [1]

Readers have asked me what I think of this story by Bill Broad on Syria’s decision to reconstruct a building on the foundations of the the “Box-on-the-Euphrates.”

It has a vaulted roof now, so it looks rather like a Monopoly-House-on-the-Euphrates. (MHE?)

I think Andy — aka the Nonpartisan Pundit — hit the nail on the head in the comment section when he cautioned those concluding the bulldozing of the site was suspicious about jumping to conclusions:

To be fair, let’s consider the possibility that Syria intended to rebuild this building, whatever it was. Would they not “scrape” and flatten the area to place a new foundation on?

Additionally, the two other structures in the facility, including the alleged pump-house, remain. It seems to me if Syria wanted to hide all evidence of a reactor, it would dismantle these as well. Of course that may be the intent, but something the Syrians have not yet accomplished.

Hopefully ISIS will buy future imagery of this site to monitor progress to see what happens.

There has been a certain tendency on the part of the “nuclear reactor” crowd to interpret all actions in light of that assumption (Syria must be destroying the evidence!) rather than consider alternative possibilities of the sort that Andy raised.

I still prefer the hypothesis that it is Bashar al-Assad’s naked swimming pool.

Update: ISIS does have an image.

Comment [48]

If you aren’t reading the comments on my last few Syria posts, you are missing some great contributions by readers including:

• John Hogan has used satellite images to pin down the construction date of the “Box-on-the-Euphrates” to between 26 May 2001 and 8 September 2002 (a 67-week interval).

• Andrew Foland, MTC and Anon all found additional pictures of the area that suggest a ground truth image of the site wouldn’t be too difficult to acquire. (The German transliteration, Halabiye, seems to produce the best images.) MTC, using his pretty amazing language skills, found a picture from a Japanese tourist (duh!) that, had the tourist turned 90 degrees, might have looked right up the Wadi-with-the-Box.

• Yale Simkin estimated the height of the Box-on-the-Euphrates at 24 meters, while conversing with Allen Thomson on the capacity of the pump station.

There are other solid contributions — these just struck my fancy. The debates are as technical, funny and polite as any in Washington, if not more so. I am truly honored (and a little terrified) to have such an amazing readership.

Thanks, folks.

Comment [15]

Is the Box-on-the-Euphrates in a remote place?

Details like that might seem insignificant, but they are not. Often, it seems to me, intelligence judgments are supported by informal bits of “color” or what you might call the gouge — circumstantial details that aren’t part of any official briefing, but appear in loose talk to bolster a judgment. Recall the “viewing stand” that North Korea never built, but nonetheless contributed to a false alarm about North Korean nuclear testing in Spring 2005.

One detail in the Box-on-the-Euphrates story that seems to lend credence to the “nuclear reactor” hypothesis is that the site is remote, and therefore suspicious. Here is how Martha Raddatz at ABC put it:

The official said the suspected nuclear facility was approximately 100 miles from the Iraqi border, deep in the desert along the Euphrates River. It was a place, the official said, “where no one would ever go unless you had a reason to go there.”

But the claim the the location is remote is, itself, an exaggeration.

The Box-on-the-Eurphrates is a little more than a mile from a well-known tourist site, the ruins of Halabiya (or Halabiyya or Halabiyah), which the Syrian Ministry of Tourism website describes as “forward-defence lines against Persian invasions.”

Lots of people, actually, do go there — or at least pretty damn close.

And, as you can see from the photograph at the top of this post, they take pictures. This is a picture, looking up the Euphrates at the canyon in which nestled the box-on-the-Euphrates. Although the reactor would be out of view from this spot, the pumping station would be quite visible as well as quite a bit of the comings and goings at the site.

There are lots of pictures like this, actually. Sylvie Bletry, an archeologist, has some lovely shots of the site, as do other vacationers. You can even organize a rafting expedition down the Euphrates.

Hmmm, that seems like a good use of my grant money.

This picture was taken from a bridge less than a mile from the reactor. Had the photographer turned 180 degrees, she would have been less than a mile from the pumping station, which would have been in plain view.

All of this is to say that when someone tells you the site is remote, he has already made up his mind about the purpose and is attempting to persuade. The ruins are quite obvious in the imagery and any analyst looking at the photos must have wondered about that strange site. (I did and looked around one afternoon until a couple of colleagues beat me to it, e-mailing me the name.)

It seems to me one can say many things in favor of the reactor hypothesis, but location is not one of them.

Comment [25]