I was going to revisit Natanz in my 14th post on the Wonk, but something more interesting came my way. I could not help noticing that Dan Joyner, a member of the powerful International Law Association, has written a response of sorts to James Acton’s article Iran Violated International Obligations on Qom Facility (Proliferation Analysis, 25 September 2009).
In a nutshell, James argues that subsidiary arrangements in INFCIRC/153-type safeguards agreements are legally binding instruments, in essence contracts between the IAEA and the state. Dan, on the other hand, concludes that subsidiary arrangements may not carry any legal force, that they have a ‘non-binding legal character’.
To be clear, both James and Dan reaches the same conclusion, that Iran’s behaviour is a cause for concern. Dan, however, looks at the problem from a structural perspective, and readily agrees there are worrying consequences for the safeguards system if his interpretation is correct.
I would probably subscribe to the view that subsidiary arrangements are part and parcel of the safeguards agreement itself. Without them, the safeguards agreement would not be meaningful. Their legal force is not explicitly stated, but the safeguards agreement is littered with functional references to its subsidiary arrangements.
For instance, paragraph 32 requires the state to set up certain measures (such as procedures for taking a physical inventory), as specified in the subsidiary arrangements. Paragraph 39 states that “provision should be made for the possibility of an extension or change of the Subsidiary Arrangements by agreement between the Agency and the State without amendment of the Agreement”. In other words, that they can be changed without having to go through the ratification procedure again. In addition, like any other contract, subsidiary agreements enter into force (see paragraph 40).
As an intergovernmental organization, the IAEA has what we lawyers call “legal personality”. This means that it has right to enter into agreement with states or, for that matter, non-state actors. And it has the right, as any sovereign state has, to expect that agreements are kept. The question is whether Iran has kept its agreement with the Agency.
And that is something that is debatable.
I’m not sure I’d describe the International Law Association as “powerful.” I’d give them, at most, “influential among contintental European law professors,” which aren’t exactly a juggernaut of political influence here or in Europe.
Fair enough, but did you know it’s one of the oldest non-governmentals in the world (1873) and that you may say that it was behind the League of Nations (whether that’s a merit is an entirely different discussion).
I agree that the American branch is big, but a bit in disarray.
What really concerns me is that we allow nit picking S.A. code 3.1 by DC experts to nauseam, when it was not fully approved by IRI legislative body. However, it is absolutely OK for some member nations to continue wielding military option for safeguarded sites. Which one is more in conflict with the peaceful spirit of NPT?
One illegality usually does not make another illegality legal. Also, remember that states are toying with the military option because of Iran’s behaviour. It’s not the other way around.
For decades, Iran built nuclear infrastructure without threats of attack. It was when they started to build substantial facilities in secret that others started to worry.
Others “started to worry” long before anyone knew about “substantial facilities built in secret”. At the same time, one can argue that Iran chose to make those facilities secret precisely because others “worried” about them (in a very specific way).
Pavel. You’re right of course. What I meant was that the level of concern in the 1980s and 1990s was significantly lower than in the middle to late 2000s.
“One illegality usually does not make another illegality legal.”
but this so called illegality is in the nature of an alleged contract violation, not a violation of international law. If one party does not honor the terms of the contract, it is in a poor position to dispute the matter.
“Also, remember that states are toying with the military option because of Iran’s behaviour. It’s not the other way around.”
actually I believe it is the other way around but be that as it may. Is military assault the accepted legal resolution to arcane contractual disputes? If someone fails to honor a contract with me, can I shoot him?
the legality of the issue in not really a concern. The issue here is that a certain country refuses to obey with what uncle Sam says… the media has been on such a rampage against Iran that even those who are supposed to be experts and impartial are taking sides. This blog is an example of that, most of the blogs on this site are always critical of Iran and putting the blame on Iran, without even mentioning all the rules that are being broken by the other side.
“For decades, Iran built nuclear infrastructure without threats of attack. It was when they started to build substantial facilities in secret that others started to worry.”
So they should have not been built in secret? just like Iraq’s Oisirk reactor was? I am sure the Israelis and the Americans would not have attacked it? right? It is widely known that a military attack is not going to stop the Iranian program at this juncture, but they don’t stop talking about it… but i am sure if the Americans and the Israelis knew about it at a time when it could be stopped they would not have attacked…..
If we want to talk about who’s behavior started this a person that is really seeking the truth well know that the NPT stopped applying to Iran the day it asked the Germans to complete the Bushehr reactor which was partially paid for or when the French refused to provide uranium to Iran, Uranium that was the property of Iran.
Will one of the experts on this site ever post a blog about how the NPT has been breached by the West with their refusal in the early days of the revolution to share nuclear technology? After all their refusal to give ACCESS to nuclear technology is a breach of the NPT… I am sure Iran didn’t sign the NPT to have no access to nuclear technology while having the IAEA asking them to provide information that NO OTHER country has ever provided to the agency…… what about a blog about how not a single IAEA report has ever indicated that there is a diversion of nuclear material from its stated purposes….. a statement that can be based on facts. But there is plenty of blogs about Iran ‘potentially’ seeking nuclear weapons or that the IAEA can’t be certain that no nuclear weapons activity exists? I wonder if they can say that about any NPT member?
Regarding the above polemics: the two parties to the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement are Iran and the IAEA, not Iran and the NWS.
Unlike Andreas, I am not a lawyer. But Mr. Joyner’s intervention is, to be plain, inexplicable. He just did not read carefully enough. His statement that Subsidiary Arrangements do not enter into force, for example, is contradicted by the provision of the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement stating when and how the Subsidiary Arrangements enter into force (Art. 40). And the entire point of the Subsidiary Arrangements is that they can be modified by agreement, without the full-scale process required to amend the CSA itself — that, too, is what the CSA says (Art. 39). That’s not a bug, it’s a feature.
This is, incidentally, why the Iranian claim that modified code 3.1 required Majlis ratification to enter into force doesn’t hold any water, either. But at least we can point to this Iranian claim as evidence that the AEOI does not share Mr. Joyner’s belief that the Subsidiary Arrangements lack legal force. Or they haven’t thought to make this claim, up to now.
Iran’s CSA is reproduced in INFCIRC/214. You can download it from the IAEA website. Just click the link.
DZ. We do not want to talk “about who’s behavior started this” situation. That’s a meaningless question more suitable for discussion over a drink, or perhaps a knuckle fight. What we want to talk here is whether Iran’s behaviour is lawful, or not.
Everything else is, as we say in the legal business, irrelevant for the question at hand (i.e. the post).
Stay on topic please.
Josh,
Article 40 of the CSA does mention the entry into force of the subsidiary arrangements (SA’s), but as I say in my piece it provides no specification as to how this entry into force is to be accomplished. This is markedly different than the specification provided regarding entry into force of the CSA itself or amendments to it. For a legally binding treaty, one would expect such specification on entry in to force to be provided – even if the specification is that the entry into force is to be accomplished simply by exchange of letters without domestic authorization. This is particularly the case in light of the specification provided for entry into force of the CSA. But no such specification is provided for entry into force of the SA’s
With regard to your point on the easily amendable character of the SA’s, I’m not saying that Iran could not agree to something like the SA’s as a legally binding treaty – even as a legally binding treaty that is amendable by simple exchange of letters without the approval of domestic authorities. There is no
particular form or word choice that is dispositive here. Its all about the intent of the parties. If we were to discover that the SA’s themselves, or the letters that were exchanged, manifest a reciprocal intent to be legally bound, then that’s certainly within the ability of the parties to do so. However, my argument is that looking from a structural perspective of the CSA and the SA’s and the role of each, and looking at the textual evidences in the safeguards agreement, it is not clear that that intent is manifest, at least on Iran’s part.
I think Iran is in fact implicitly arguing the position that I am arguing through their practice and statements. Their practice has been to agree to the SA’s, including new amendments to them, without getting the permission of domestic legislative authorities, as a simple exercise of exchange of letters. They further argue that they are entitled to “revert” to the original Code 3.1 unilaterally, by a simple sending of a letter to the IAEA. To my knowledge they have never argued that they could amend their CSA itself, or the NPT for that matter, unilaterally and/or through simple exchange of letters. I think the difference of approach to the SA’s by Iran shows their understanding that the SA’s are not legally on par with treaties, and are, in fact, nonbinding.
I also think that you can see some other evidences both from the text and the practice of the parties that indicate a nonbinding character of the SA’s. Firstly, the CSA already includes a legal standard for the timing of disclosure of design info on new enrichment facilities. Its in Article 42 and reads: “such information shall be provided as early as possible before nuclear material is introduced into a new facility.” It seems to me that adding another legal standard in the SA’s (i.e. modified code 3.1) which says that such design info should be provided: “as soon as the decision to construct or to authorize construction has been taken, whichever is earlier” would be redundant at best or flatly contradictory at worst. As a matter of legal construction, having these two standards both have legally binding character doesn’t make much sense.
I think the fact that the parties have not disclosed the SA’s or their letters is also probative evidence that the SA’s were intended to comprise implementing guidance between the parties only. That they were not intended to be a formal addition to the transparent treaty law between the parties.
Dan Joyner
Dan. A question: did you consider the legislative powers of the IAEA itself? You know that ‘Certain Expenses’ case provides that the authority may, sometimes, go beyond the letter of the constituting document.
Would your analysis change if you found evidence that the vast majority of parties to the IAEA Statute consider the SAs legally binding (as an integral part of the CSA)?
Andreas,
I read the Certain Expenses case as establishing that the General Assembly of the U.N. has a special and authoritative role in interpreting the terms of the U.N. Charter. This is of course in keeping with VCLT Article 31 and the use of subsequent decisions of the parties regarding the interpretation of a treaty.
The difference in the case of CSA’s and SA’s is that, if the IAEA membership or the IAEA BOG has any such special interpretive role, it would be with regard to the IAEA Statute, to which all of these states are parties. Neither the IAEA nor the member states of the IAEA should, under the Certain Expenses rationale, have any special interpretive authority with regard to CSA’s which are simply bilateral treaties between one state and the IAEA. And again, referencing back to the Certain Expenses case and to the VCLT rules of treaty interpretation, these principles relate to the interpretation of a treaty. They don’t relate to the question of whether an agreement constitutes a treaty in the first place. Those rules are elsewhere in the VCLT, in Articles 11-17 as I state in my JURIST piece, and they focus solely on the intent of the parties and their manifestation of that intent.
While I’m writing, I would like to address the issue of the drafting of the CSA. In my JURIST piece and in my comments in response to Josh above, I have pointed out the structural and textual evidences from the CSA that I think tend to demonstrate that Iran did not intend for the SA’s to be binding. As you and Josh point out, however, Article 40 of the CSA does state that the SA’s will “enter into force.” This can be seen as evidence leading to the opposite conclusion of the legal bindingness of the SA’s. As I’ve said all along, outside observers cannot reach a definitive conclusion on this question because we don’t have access to the SA’s or to the or the 1976, 2003, and 2007 letters exchanged between Iran and the IAEA relative to the Subsidiary Arrangements, as these documents have not been made public by the parties. So all we can do is examine the evidence that is open source.
I think I’m coming to the conclusion, on the basis of what we can analyze, that the CSA with Iran, which of course mirrors other CSA’s, is badly drafted. There are contradictory indications regarding the legal character of the SA’s that are difficult to reconcile. That’s why we really need the primary documents to be released by the parties in order to definitively answer the question on the legality of the Qom disclosure. To me, the preponderance of the textual and structural evidence still leans toward a finding that the SA’s were intended, at least by Iran, to be non-binding.
Dan Joyner
“Everything else is, as we say in the legal business, irrelevant for the question at hand (i.e. the post).”
Andreas, normally that would be true. However, in this case, I disagree. If the law is not applied equally then the law becomes irrelevant. In this context, as a result, the law becomes irrelevant or at best becomes a gaming venue to the Iranians.
Mamdali
Dan/Andreas,
What impact does the fact that a party has the option to withdraw from the NPT as a whole with 3 months notice have on the application of SAs? For example, could it be possible that a party is NOT permitted to withdraw from certain aspects of the SAs, yet ARE permitted to withdraw from the entire NPT?
It seems to me that if Iran were to give 3 months notice of their intention to withdraw from one or more aspects of subsidiary arrangements agreed pursuant to a treaty that has a 3-month withdrawal clause, that could be considered consistent with the treaty.
All states undertake to accept safeguards under article III of the NPT. The safeguards agreements themselves, however, are bilateral agreements between the IAEA and the individual state. It is broadly accepted that INFCIRC/153-type safeguards would lapse when the state withdraws. INFCIRC/66-type agreements would remain.
However, it would not be possible, in my mind, for a state unilaterally to withdraw from safeguards (partially or in full) and still claim to follow its undertaking in Article III.
The situation becomes more complicated if you’re a believer in a ‘minimum safeguards standard’. A state which has agreed to more than this ‘minimum standard’ could then claim to ‘accept safeguards’ despite an unilateral part withdrawal (as long as they do not dip below the minimum standard).
I’m not convinced by the ‘minimum standard’ theory, since NPT parties undertake to accept the IAEA’s ‘safeguards system’ in article III.1. And a system, I would argue, is the sum of all its part.
Here, though, I belong in the minority camp.
Andreas – thanks for reply. I was thinking about Subsidiary Arrangements as opposed to the Safeguards Agreement itself (I can certainly see how withdrawal from the CSA would be untenable).
One imagines at the time of signing the NPT, a prospective Member State has a copy of the CSA and SAs to the CSA, and can see the “system” they are accepting.
As mutual agreement is required to make changes to the system, in the event that one party did not agree to a change, it seems to me that the IAEA would have no choice other than to implement one “system” for a party that does agree, and a different “system” for a party that does not agree.
In either case, wouldn’t the Member State remain in compliance with Article III.1?
Alan,
I actually don’t agree that when a state becomes party to the NPT they agree to accept any particular manifestation of either a CSA or an SA agreement. I do agree with Andreas that all parties to the NPT agree in Article III to accept a CSA with the IAEA which they are then to negotiate with the IAEA. But the terms of that CSA are to be fleshed out in the negotiations. Similarly, the terms of any SA agreement are to be similarly negotiated between the state and the IAEA. Under my view as I’ve expressed it in my JURIST piece, the CSA is a treaty and the SA agreement is not. But even if, arguendo, an SA agreement is a treaty, then we know that there are different manifestations of SA’s out there. Some SA’s include the original code 3.1 language, and others include the modified code 3.1 language. This has led some to say, and I agree, that if Iran is implementing the original code 3.1 term, as many other states do, they cannot by that fact be said to be in violation of their INFCIRC/153 CSA.
Dan Joyner
“The safeguards agreements themselves, however, are bilateral agreements between the IAEA and the individual state.”
I’m no Lawyer, but…
While that may be so, it does not mean Iran is obliged to follow the agreement forever and ever regardless of circumstances. Almost any contract has an unforeseen consequence or “act of God” clause.
If, for example, a massive hurricane destroys my crops, I cannot honor a contract to sell them to you.
By the same token, if several countries threaten to attack Iran’s safeguarded facilities…as was the case in 2007, and still today…then Iran can fall upon an act of God clause. Implicit, even if not written in the contract.
The IAEA has a right to expect Iran’s facilities are available for inspection. But it cannot expect Iran to keep them available for bombardment.
If you disagree, ask yourself; if an attack actually did take place, would Iran still be obligated to these SAs? If not, why is a credible threat any different (legally) from an actual attack?
For those interested in this “timing of disclosure” issue, see the last sentence of Article 39 of Iran’s Safeguards Agreement:
“The Subsidiary Arrangements [which include Code 3.1] may be extended or changed by agreement between the Government of Iran and the Agency without amendment of this Agreement.”
While this begs the important question of HOW the Government of Iran can give its binding approval of such a “change,” nothing in the Safeguards Agreement suggests that this approval can be given by a mere “exchange of letters” between the Agency and Iran’s IAEA representative, as some have argued (e.g. James Acton, at http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=23884).
The only other provision in the Safeguards Agreement which sheds any light on this question is Article 24(b), which governs amendments of the Safeguards Agreement itself: “All amendments shall require the agreement of the Government of Iran and the Agency.”
If one assumes, as seems reasonable and likely, that (A) “agreement of the Government of Iran and the Agency” in Article 24(b) means the same thing as “agreement between the Government of Iran and the Agency” in Article 39; and (B) no one would seriously argue that the Safeguards Agreement itself can be amended upon a mere “exchange of letters” between the Agency and Iran’s IAEA representative, it appears to follow that a “change” to a Subsidiary Arrangement under Article 39 cannot be adopted upon a mere “exchange of letters,” but instead requires approval by the Government of Iran given in the same way that is required for an amendment of the Safeguards Agreement itself under Article 24(b).
Josh writes:
“And the entire point of the Subsidiary Arrangements is that they can be modified by agreement, without the full-scale process required to amend the CSA itself — that, too, is what the CSA says (Art. 39).”
No question that a Subsidiary Arrangement can be changed without amending the Safeguards Agreement itself. It does NOT follow from that, however, that such a change can be approved without the very same approval as is required to amend the Safeguards Agreement itself. As I explained in my earlier post, the language in the second sentence of Article 39 is essentially identical to the language in Article 24(b), the latter dealing with amendments to the Safeguards Agreement itself. Nothing, anywhere in the Safeguards Agreement, suggests that the essentially same language means something different in the two provisions.
EAB,
An exchange of letters is a practice used by the Agency on a relatively regular basis. Let me Google that for you: http://bit.ly/d6JFer. So drop the quotes. And please do a minimum of research before posting.
Also, don’t you think that your condition B in the argument above is, well, slightly subjective?
In addition to false, I might add, since there are a lot of people that argues, as a matter of fact, that SAs do enter into force upon exchange of letters. Including people who actually work at the IAEA’s Department of Legal Affairs. So your assumption is at the very minimum unlikely.
Finally, did you notice that your argument cancels out the articles (like a pair of noise cancelling earphones cancel out sound)? While I think I understand what you’re saying (‘agreement’ is necessary in both cases, right?), your interpretation leads to a situation that is far removed from the paragraphs context, object and purpose. As a lawyer, you’re pushing the boundaries of what’s seen as good method if you engage in that.
Still. I’ll give you the benefit of the doubt. So please do clarify your argument.
Andreas,
“An exchange of letters is a practice used by the Agency on a relatively regular basis. Let me Google that for you: http://bit.ly/d6JFer”
So what? The fact that the Agency uses an “exchange of letters” with other countries, which find this an acceptable practice, doesn’t obligate Iran to agree to the same practice. Wonderful custom, but why do you say it binds Iran?
“Also, don’t you think that your condition B in the argument above is, well, slightly subjective?”
Condition B was my assumption that no one would seriously argue that the Safeguards Agreement itself can be amended by an “exchange of letters.” Your comment suggests that someone indeed could seriously argue that. Do you believe that? I don’t. I doubt you do either, but say so if you do and tell me what makes you think so.
“Finally, did you notice that your argument cancels out the articles (like a pair of noise cancelling earphones cancel out sound)? While I think I understand what you’re saying (‘agreement’ is necessary in both cases, right?), your interpretation leads to a situation that is far removed from the paragraphs context, object and purpose.”
With all due respect, I have no idea what you mean, but will be happy to respond if you clarify. Try to do so without using the words “context, object and purpose.” I suspect we’re both a little too old to pay attention to arguments that grasp at words like that. Just tell me what the agreement says.
Andreas,
“In addition to false, I might add, since there are a lot of people that argues, as a matter of fact, that SAs do enter into force upon exchange of letters. Including people who actually work at the IAEA’s Department of Legal Affairs. So your assumption is at the very minimum unlikely.”
The Safeguard Agreement is an agreement between Iran and the IAEA. I understand that the IAEA’s Department of Legal Affairs agrees with you. I suspect you’d find Iran’s Department of Legal Affairs does not. Are you suggesting that one party to the Safeguard Agreement gets to decide on how it should be interpreted? If so, why are you picking the IAEA rather than Iran?
Josh (and others):
For convenience, here’s the full text of Articles 39 and 40 of Iran’s Safeguards Agreement, though I’m sure you’re familiar with it. Please see my comments below:
SUBSIDIARY ARRANGEMENTS
Article 39
The Government of Iran and the Agency shall make Subsidiary Arrangements which shall specify in detail, to the extent necessary to permit the Agency to fulfil its responsibilities under this Agreement in an effective and efficient manner, how the procedures laid down in this Agreement are to be applied. The Subsidiary Arrangements may be extended or changed by agreement between the Government of Iran and the Agency without amendment of this Agreement.
Article 40
The Subsidiary Arrangements shall enter into force at the same time as, or as soon as possible after, the entry into force of this Agreement. The Government of Iran and the Agency shall make every effort to achieve their entry into force within ninety days of the entry into force of this Agreement; an extension of that period shall require agreement between the Government of Iran and the Agency. The Government of Iran shall provide the Agency promptly with the information required for completing the Subsidiary Arrangements.
EAB COMMENTS: I disagree with Dan Joyner that SAs are non-binding on Iran. The first sentence of Article 39 mandates Iran and the IAEA to make SAs. Though it doesn’t also say explicitly that those SAs will be binding on Iran once made, interpreting that first sentence in any other way makes it difficult (impossible, in my view) to assign any meaning to the second sentence of Article 39. If the IAEA’s approval is required to change an SA, how can it be said that the pre-existing SA is “non-binding”? If it were “non-binding,” after all, why would Iran need the IAEA’s approval to change it? It could simply start ignoring it any time it saw fit to do so, whether the IAEA liked it or not. I don’t think the second sentence of Article 39 can bear that interpretation, and I think it follows from that that an SA adopted under the first sentence of Article 39 indeed is binding on Iran (and the IAEA, of course), unless and until it is changed pursuant to the second sentence of Article 39.
As for WHEN the SAs “enter into force,” I think you and others are attaching too much importance to the first sentence of Article 40. It’s the first sentence of Article 39 that declares Iran’s obligation to enter into SAs, and I think it’s clear (see argument in preceding paragraph) that those SAs become binding on Iran (i.e. “enter into force”) when they’re made. The first sentence of Article 40 (especially with the additional light shed on its meaning by the remainder of Article 40) is intended merely to make clear that the parties are expected to get on the ball and make the necessary SAs promptly so that the SAs can take effect when the Safeguards Agreement itself takes effect, or at least within a short time thereafter. The fact that Article 40 doesn’t say explicitly when the SAs take effect does NOT mean that SAs are non-binding. It merely means that Article 40 is not the place to look to answer the question of whether SAs are binding or not. Article 39 is the place to look for the answer to that question.
Any reason why my comment made yesterday was not posted? did i insult someone?
Here is the argument James Acton made in support of his conclusion that Iran could not “revert” to the original Code 3.1:
“Iran justified its action by saying that the modification to Code 3.1 had not been ratified by the Majlis. The problem with this argument is that, like every other state, Iran did not ask its parliament, the Majlis, to ratify its original Subsidiary Arrangements! To claim that a modification to these arrangements requires ratification is therefore absurd.”
Strong words like “absurd” and exclamation points don’t fill gaps in an argument.
As I’ve explained earlier, the second sentence of Article 39 of the Safeguard Agreement states that the “Government of Iran” must approve a change to a Subsidiary Arrangement (SA), and the first sentence of Article 39 says essentially the same thing with respect to the first SAs adopted by Iran. Acton is arguing that, if Iran’s IAEA representative, a third-level government functionary, sends a letter stating that Iran will agree to some SA change (or to the initial set of SAs), Iran has thereby waived – forever – its right to enforce the second sentence of Article 39, which plainly requires “Government of Iran” approval to change an SA.
Iran is claiming, to the contrary, that it’s bound to a changed SA:
(A) forever, if the Majlis approves it (unless it’s later changed with IAEA approval); or
(B) until further notice if only its IAEA representative has approved it.
It’s true that Iran’s IAEA representative entered into the initial SAs without Majlis approval, and it’s true that he did so again when he approved the new Code 3.1. The very same point can be made about the Safeguards Agreement itself, however. Iran started abiding by it before the Majlis had approved it. If the Majlis had rejected the Safeguards Agreement when it finally took up the matter, I find it difficult to imagine that the IAEA would have said:
“Tough luck, Iran, you’re bound to the Safeguards Agreement whether your Majlis approves or not, because your third-level functionary told us it was OK with him and he’s been acting as if it were. We acknowledge that the Safeguard Agreement says it requires the approval of the “Government of Iran,” but your third-level functionary waived your right to insist on Government of Iran approval.”
Others apparently find that argument stronger than I do, but I’m not sure an impartial judge would agree with them. Nor do I think the argument is any more compelling when applied to this new/old Code 3.1 issue.
If the Majlis had rejected the Safeguards Agreement AND had also insisted on undoing some of the actions taken by its third-level functionary prior to the Majlis’ formal rejection of the Safeguards Agreement (for example, demanding the return of some uranium samples submitted for testing), I would have had no sympathy for Iran on that. But Iran has never suggested it wasn’t bound to new Code 3.1 during the four-year period (February 2003 to March 2007) between its two exchanges-of-letters with the IAEA on the subject. For example, if the Qom facility had been “disclosable” under new Code 3.1 in February 2007 (one month before Iran “reverted” to old Code 3.1), I don’t understand Iran to be arguing now that its March 2007 “reversion” letter would have “undone” that February 2007 disclosure violation. Iran is only saying (continuing with this example) that, if the Qom facility was NOT disclosable in February 2007 under new Code 3.1 but WOULD HAVE BECOME disclosable under new Code 3.1 in, say, April 2007 (one month after Iran “reverted” to old Code 3.1), then Iran did not violate Code 3.1 by not disclosing the Qom facility in April 2007 because it had by then “reverted” to old Code 3.1.
DZ,
Are you sure that you posted a comment yesterday? I went back and checked, and all comments have been moderated. You’re not in the record.
No, you haven’t insulted anyone!
Best,
Andreas
Am I right that Article 80 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties requires that all in-force Treaties be registered with the the Secretariat of the United Nations? So a good test of if subsidiary arrangements are intended to have the character of a treaty is if they are registered?
It’s my first attempt to use http://treaties.un.org/ so I may have this wrong, but searching for IAEA in the database seems to show up some Safeguards Agreements (about 68 – not including Iran), but I cannot find any subsidiary arrangements registered.
Does this support the view that subsidiary arrangements are not treaties?
NB There are some “Protocol additional to the Agreement between X and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards …” – these sound like amendments to Safeguards Agreements, but it is possible these could be subsidiary arrangements – needs checking.
Dan – thanks for your reply; that rather neatly encapsulates the point I was rather oafishly trying to make.
Andreas/EAB,
Wouldn’t you say that Article 39, in combination with Articles 24 and 25 of the Iranian CSA, differentiates, or at least appears to seek to differentiate, between amendments to the Subsidiary Arrangements and amendments to the CSA itself? The purpose would appear to be to allow amendments to Subsidiary Arrangements, unlike the CSA, to NOT need parliamentary ratification.
That would be different I suppose if the SAs specifically required ratification, or if the Iranian constitution specifically required it. On that level, can any agreement be binding on a country WITHOUT being ratified by their government?
Regarding whether or not Iran has breached the agreement and the steps that should follow, in the case of a dispute on interpretation (which this appears to be), the next step is set out in Articles 20-22. These detail a procedure for referring the dispute to arbitration. Has either party sought to take that step?
Everyone,
Thanks for what’s shaping up to be a good debate, with lots of various perspectives. I hope no-one thinks I’m to sharp in my comments. I just want to steer and clarify.
However, I need to attend to quite a few tasks as VERTIC director over the next few days. I’ll moderate, but don’t expect too much in terms of contributions.
I do apologize for that.
Best,
Andreas
P.S. Richard: that’s the Additional Protocols.
Andreas, I thought that my comment was submitted but ill post it again.
Dan, Iran’s interpretation of the agreement which included a ratification by the parliament is evident from the outset in 2003, Khatami is on record stating this. The bbc also states this in their original article published when Iran signed the protocol: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3327065.stm
Doesnt this have some effect on the interpretation of the protocol? I am not a international law expert but in corporate law if one side to an agreement clearly states that the full enforcement of the agreement depends on the board of directors approval then in most cases the agreement is not fully binding until this is done. Since Iran’s interpretation is clear from the outset, shouldn’t the IAEA stated to the Iranians that this is not a case, and that the protocol would be binding from the start?
I was also wondering why there is no posts mentioning the US’s refusal to allow Iran the ability to purchase medical fuel for it Tehran research reactor. this is contrary to the NPT and to the sanctions themselves which specifically states that medical supplies are not part of the sanction regime. This site has to state violations from both sides not just Iran’s
Alan,
Relevant Provisions of Iran’s Safeguards Agreement
Article 24(b): All amendments [of Iran’s Safeguards Agreement] shall require the agreement of the Government of Iran and the Agency.
Article 39: The Government of Iran and the Agency shall make Subsidiary Arrangements which shall specify in detail, to the extent necessary to permit the Agency to fulfil its responsibilities under this Agreement in an effective and efficient manner, how the procedures laid down in this Agreement are to be applied. The Subsidiary Arrangements may be extended or changed by agreement between the Government of Iran and the Agency without amendment of this Agreement.
EAB COMMENTS:
As I noted in an earlier post, the CSA language is essentially identical in Article 24(b), governing amendments to the CSA itself, and the second sentence of Article 39, governing amendments to a Subsidiary Arrangement. Only one word differs (“agreement of the Government of Iran and the Agency” versus “agreement between the Government of Iran and the Agency”), and I doubt anyone would argue that that slight difference distinguishes the meanings of the two phrases. Nothing else in the CSA suggests that the two phrases mean different things. Thus, there is no basis for concluding, from the CSA language alone, that a different form of approval is required for those two types of amendments. Accordingly, if an amendment of the CSA requires Majlis approval (which appears to be agreed by everyone in this debate), so does an amendment of a Subsidiary Arrangement – assuming, again, that we limit ourselves to what appears in the CSA.
Of course, in real life, it made little sense to expect that each Subsidiary Arrangement, and especially each change to a Subsidiary Arrangement, would be submitted by the IAEA representative of a signatory country to that country’s legislature (or to whatever other government body or government official was authorized to give approval on behalf of the signatory country). In recognition of this, the IAEA and the representatives of signatory countries long ago developed a modus operandi under which changes (or even the initial adoption) of Subsidiary Arrangements were approved by an exchange of letters between the IAEA and the IAEA representative of a signatory country, without the formal approval of the signatory country’s government being obtained or even sought. That, for example, is how the initial Iran Subsidiary Arrangements were adopted, and that is how Iran and the IAEA approved the “new” Code 3.1 in 2003.
Let me digress for just a paragraph to repeat a point I made in an earlier post. Assume in this paragraph that there is no dispute as to whether an “exchange of letters” is sufficient to adopt or change a Subsidiary Arrangement; assume here that only a formal approval by the government of the signatory country will suffice. On this assumption, if a Subsidiary Arrangement has been approved by Iran’s Majlis, I think (unlike Dan Joyner, who reaches the same general conclusion as I do, but along a different analytical route) that the Subsidiary Arrangement would unquestionably be binding on Iran. I think the first sentence of Article 39 implies this plainly enough, and that, if one disagrees about that, one must nevertheless acknowledge that any other interpretation of that first sentence would render the second sentence of Article 39 meaningless – a result strongly disfavored whenever a court (or anyone else who follows the guidelines a court would follow) is trying to discern the meaning of a treaty, a statute or a contract. The second sentence of Article 39 requires IAEA approval to change a Subsidiary Arrangement, which obviously implies that a Subsidiary Arrangement cannot be changed without IAEA approval. But, if a Subsidiary Arrangement indeed were non-binding, as Dan Joyner has argued, why would Iran need the IAEA’s approval to change it? It could simply ignore the Subsidiary Arrangement any time it saw fit, regardless of how the IAEA might feel about that, which obviously would make the second sentence of Article 39 utterly meaningless. So, to conclude this paragraph, I think there is no question that, setting aside the “exchange of letters” issue I’ll get back to in the next paragraph, Subsidiary Arrangements made between Iran and the IAEA under the first sentence of Article 39 are binding on Iran unless and until they are changed with the approval of Iran and the IAEA under the second sentence of Article 39.
Now back to the hard part, which is the effect of an “exchange of letters” on a Subsidiary Arrangement. Let me first assume four facts that I do not believe are in dispute.
FIRST, the government of Iran has never expressly agreed to amend or waive the second sentence of Article 39, which reads: “The Subsidiary Arrangements may be extended or changed by agreement between the Government of Iran and the Agency without amendment of this Agreement.”
SECOND, the government of Iran has never expressly informed the IAEA that Iran’s government had granted authority to Iran’s IAEA representative to amend or waive the second sentence of Article 39 on behalf of the government of Iran.
THIRD, Iran’s IAEA representative has never expressly represented to the IAEA that Iran’s government had granted him authority to amend or waive the second sentence of Article 39 on behalf of the government of Iran.
FOURTH, when Iran’s IAEA representative approved new Code 3.1 in 2003, the IAEA did not believe that Iran’s IAEA representative had either obtained or sought formal approval of the new Code 3.1 from the government of Iran, nor had Iran’s IAEA representative informed the IAEA that he intended to seek such formal approval.
If these four assumptions are valid, as I believe they are, then the question boils down to what meaning can fairly be assigned to the approval of new Code 3.1 given by Iran’s IAEA representative in 2003 through an “exchange of letters” with the IAEA. That meaning, I believe, may be found in one of the following “statements” by Iran’s IAEA representative to the IAEA:
ONE: “As you know, I have not been granted authority to amend or waive the second sentence of Article 39 on behalf of the government of Iran and I do not intend to seek such authority or to seek the Iranian government’s formal approval of new Code 3.1. Nevertheless, I hereby approve new Code 3.1 and assure you that Iran will henceforth act accordingly until such time, if ever, as I inform you in writing that I no longer approve of this change, in which case the previous version of Code 3.1 will thereafter be in effect again – unless, before I have withdrawn my approval, the government of Iran has approved new Code 3.1, in which case new Code 3.1 will be binding on Iran as provided in the second sentence of Article 39 unless and until it is changed again with the approval of the government of Iran and the IAEA as provided in that sentence.”
TWO: “As you know, I have not been granted authority to amend or waive the second sentence of Article 39 on behalf of the government of Iran and I do not intend to seek such authority or to seek the Iranian government’s formal approval of new Code 3.1. Nevertheless, I hereby approve new Code 3.1 and waive any right to withdraw my personal approval. I assure you that Iran will henceforth act accordingly until such time, if ever, as I inform you in writing that the government of Iran has formally disapproved of new Code 3.1, in which case the previous version of Code 3.1 will thereafter be in effect again.”
THREE (same as TWO except for added last sentence): “As you know, I have not been granted authority to amend or waive the second sentence of Article 39 on behalf of the government of Iran and I do not intend to seek such authority or to seek the Iranian government’s formal approval of new Code 3.1. Nevertheless, I hereby approve new Code 3.1 and waive any right to withdraw my personal approval. Iran will henceforth act accordingly until such time, if ever, as I inform you in writing that the government of Iran has formally disapproved of new Code 3.1, in which case the previous version of Code 3.1 will thereafter be in effect again. If, however, I have not informed you, within a reasonable period of time hereafter, that the government of Iran has formally disapproved of new Code 3.1, you may thereafter treat my approval of new Code 3.1 as fully equivalent to formal approval by the government of Iran, in which case new Code 3.1 will be binding on Iran as provided in the second sentence of Article 39 unless and until it is changed again with the approval of the government of Iran and the IAEA as provided in that sentence.”
FOUR: “As you know, I have not been granted authority to amend or waive the second sentence of Article 39 on behalf of the government of Iran and I do not intend to seek such authority or to seek the Iranian government’s formal approval of new Code 3.1. Nevertheless, I hereby approve new Code 3.1 and waive any right to withdraw my personal approval. You may treat my approval as fully equivalent to formal approval by the government of Iran and, accordingly, Code 3.1 will henceforth be binding on Iran as provided in the second sentence of Article 39 unless and until it is changed again with the approval of the government of Iran and the IAEA as provided in that sentence.”
Some may understand (and they may be correct) that Iran’s stated position is essentially equivalent to ONE above, but I don’t understand that Iran has ever claimed that (and, if Iran indeed has claimed ONE as its position, it can and should rely instead on TWO, since that fits the facts). I understand Iran’s position is essentially equivalent to TWO: its IAEA representative’s approval of new Code 3.1 was effective unless and until new Code 3.1 was formally disapproved by Iran’s government, which is what occurred in 2007. My understanding is that the IAEA’s position on this is equivalent to FOUR: that the approval of new Code 3.1 by Iran’s IAEA representative was irrevocably binding on Iran the moment it was given. Perhaps, if pressed, the IAEA might rely instead on THREE, thus acknowledging that Iran’s IAEA representative’s approval of new Code 3.1 could have been nullified by a reasonably prompt formal disapproval by Iran’s government, but that, by the time this finally occurred four years later, new Code 3.1 had become irrevocably binding on Iran.
The IAEA might point out that no other country, including Iran prior to this dispute, has argued that its “exchange of letters” approval of a Subsidiary Arrangement change could be revoked. Assuming here that that is true (I don’t know whether it is), however, it could just as easily mean that: (1) no such country (except Iran, in this dispute) has ever desired to retract its approval of a Subsidiary Arrangement change, and so the issue has simply never arisen; or (2) one or more of such countries have desired to retract approval of a Subsidiary Arrangement change but believed, mistakenly, that its “exchange of letters” approval was binding; or (3) one or more of such countries have desired to retract approval of a Subsidiary Arrangement change, believed that its “exchange of letters” approval was not binding (i.e. as Iran believes), but nevertheless decided not to press the issue because doing so might generate too much ill will with the IAEA. Thus, unless the IAEA can point to an example of a country that has actually pressed this same issue, and has had the dispute resolved against it (by someone other than the other party to the country’s safeguards agreement – i.e. the IAEA), I do not believe such an argument by the IAEA would count for much.
I cannot say which version an independent judge would find most reasonable – and reasonable for the IAEA to have relied upon – but I think it would be TWO – what I understand to be Iran’s position.
Andreas,
“I hope no-one thinks I’m too sharp in my comments.”
To be frank, I had thought that.
I’m far from convinced that either Joyner or Acton has seen and considered the model subsidiary arrangement text in their debate. And as long as that’s the case, the debate is based on incomplete information. There’s more of potential relevance to the SAs than Code 3.1.
Here is an interesting piece from an anti war site, i think it explains the position of the Iranians and the Anti war groups decently:
Politicizing the IAEA against Iran
On February 18, 2010 the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) issued its latest report on Iran’s nuclear program. The tone of the latest report, as well as its speculations and unfounded allegations, are in sharp contrast with those in the past issued under the former IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei. The new Director General, Yukiya Amano, has set aside ElBaradei’s cautious approach and measured tone and uses blunt language. But, while the blunt language is not a problem, the fact is that, as the latest report indicates, the IAEA is being transformed from an objective international organization to a politicized one to be used by the United States and its allies to advance their agenda regarding Iran’s uranium enrichment program.
To see the politicized nature of the latest IAEA report on Iran, all one should do is compare it with the last report issued by the Agency right before ElBaradei stepped down in November 2009. The first difference is that, whereas the reports issued by the ElBaradei-led IAEA always tried to stay away from the Resolutions issued by the United Nations Security Council, the new report brings the subject into the report very prominently. Another important difference is that, unlike the ElBaradei-led IAEA, the new report resorts to making unreasonable, and sometimes totally illegal, demands. After reporting in the first 4 pages of the report on the uranium enrichment facility at Natanz and the one under construction in Fordow (near Qom), it states in article 25 of the report that,
As previously indicated to the Board [of Governors], in light of Iran’s refusal to permit the Agency access to the Heavy Water Production Plant [near Arak], the Agency has had to rely on satellite imagery to monitor the status of that plant.
But a heavy water production plant is not covered by Iran’s Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA. In fact, heavy water is not even considered as nuclear material covered by any IAEA Safeguards Agreement. So, why should Iran open its plants to the IAEA when it has no such obligation?
Another dispute between Iran and the IAEA is about modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements General Part of Iran’s Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA, signed in 1974 and ratified in 1976. Code 3.1 of the Arrangements stipulated that Iran must declare to the IAEA the existence of any nuclear facility no later than 180 days before introducing any nuclear materials into the facility. That is why, despite all the rhetoric, the construction of the Natanz uranium enrichment facility without it being declared to the IAEA was perfectly legal.
In 1992, the Board of Governors of the IAEA replaced the original Code 3.1 with the modified Code 3.1, which requires a member state to notify the IAEA, “As soon as the decision to construct or to authorize construction has been taken, whichever is earlier” (emphasis mine). It also developed the Additional Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement that empowers the IAEA with the authority for intrusive inspection of any site in any signatory state.
After the Natanz facility was officially declared to the IAEA in February 2003, Iran agreed on February 26, 2003 to the modified Code 3.1. More precisely, Iran agreed to voluntarily implement the modified Code 3.1 until the Majles [the Iranian parliament] ratifies the modification to the Agreement. But while the Majles refused to ratify the modification to the Safeguards Agreement covering the modified Code 3.1, Iran continued to observe it from February 2003 to March 2007.
But, in February 2007 the Board of Governors of the IAEA sent Iran’s nuclear dossier to the United Nations Security Council. Iran contends that the IAEA had acted illegally, and, therefore, in retaliation, it notified the IAEA on 29 March 2007 that it would no longer voluntarily abide by the modified Code 3.1, and would revert to the original Code 3.1 (that required 180 days notification).
Despite this clear history, the IAEA latest report insists in article 29 that,
In accordance with Article 39 of Iran’s Safeguards Agreement, agreed Subsidiary Arrangements cannot be changed unilaterally; nor is there a mechanism in the Safeguards Agreement for the suspension of a provision agreed to in Subsidiary Arrangements. Therefore, the modified Code 3.1, as agreed to by Iran in 2003, remains in force for Iran.
This statement is correct only if the Majles had ratified the change covering the modified Code 3.1. But, given that it did not, Iran has no obligation toward the modified Code 3.1. No country is obligated to carry out the provisions of any international agreement that it has signed, if the country’s parliament has not ratified the treaty. The United States has signed some international agreements, such as the nuclear test ban treaty, that have not been ratified by the Senate.
In article 31 of the report, the IAEA complains again about the modified Code 3.1: “Both in the case of the Darkhovin facility [a mid-size nuclear reactor that Iran intends to construct] and FFEP [Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant], Iran did not notify the Agency in a timely manner of the decision to construct or to authorize construction of the facilities, as required in the modified Code 3.1….” But, once again, Iran has withdrawn from modified Code 3.1, and has no obligation other than Code 3.1 [that requires only 180 days advanced notification].
In article 40, the report once again makes a political statement against all the relevant international laws:
Previous reports by the Director General have detailed the outstanding issues and the actions required of Iran, including, inter alia, that Iran implement the Additional Protocol…
And again in article 50
The Director General requests Iran to take steps towards the full implementation of its Safeguards Agreement and its other obligations, including the implementation of its Additional Protocol.
These statements are even contrary to what the report says in article 6, where the Agency states that, “Since the last report, the Agency has successfully conducted 4 unannounced inspections at FEP, making a total of 35 such inspections since March 2007.” Such unannounced visits are covered only by the Additional Protocol (AP). So, while Iran is still carrying out this aspect of the AP, the IAEA still complains about it and, at the same time, it considers implementation of the AP an obligation for Iran! What is the truth?
Beginning on December 18, 2003, Iran did begin to carry out the provisions of the AP on a voluntary basis, until the Majles ratifies it. Even the European Union that had negotiated the implementation of the AP by Iran recognized its volunteer nature. Iran continued doing so until October 2005, when it declared to the IAEA that it would no longer abide by the AP. The reason was that the proposal that the European Union had presented to Iran in August 2005, according to which Iran was to receive significant economic concessions and security guarantees, was deemed by Iran to be totally inadequate.
At the same time, angered by the European Union attitude toward Iran, the Majles never ratified the AP. Thus, unlike what the IAEA claim, Iran cannot be required to implement the AP. No sovereign nation has any obligation to sign and implement any international agreement that it does not deem it to be in its national interests.
Articles 42 and 43 of the report have to do with the alleged documents that were supposedly in a laptop that had been purportedly stolen in Iran, taken out of the country, and made available to Western intelligence agencies in Turkey. Most experts have cast doubt on the authenticity of the laptop’s documents. A senior European diplomat was quoted by the New York Times in a Nov. 13, 2005, article as saying, “I can fabricate that data. It looks beautiful, but is open to doubt.” Another European official said, “Yeah, so what? How do you know what you’re shown on a slide is true, given past experience?”
But, the IAEA, led by Olli Heinonen, the IAEA’s deputy Director General of safeguards – a man who has a reputation inconsistent with impartiality and objectivity, continues insisting that Iran explain the document, while also refusing to present Iran with the original document, or check the laptop for its digital chain of custody that would show when the alleged document were up loaded in the laptop.
Then, in article 46 of the report, the IAEA makes the most outrageous statement:
While the Agency continues to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran, Iran has not provided the necessary cooperation to permit the Agency to confirm that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities.
Thus, what the report seems to be implying is that, there are undeclared nuclear materials in Iran, whereas there has never been a shred of evidence that such materials exist.
Finally, the report prominently mentions the Security Council Resolutions against Iran. As I have explained elsewhere, sending Iran’s nuclear dossier to the Security Council, which was the basis for approving resolutions 1737, 1747, 1803, and 1835 against Iran, was completely illegal and against the IAEA Status. Thus, even the legality of the Security Council resolutions is questionable.
Thus, the IAEA is being totally politicized by the U.S. and its allies to advance their agenda against Iran. This is being done while Iran is by and large abiding by its obligations under the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty and its Safeguards Agreement, while the U.S. allies – South Korea, Taiwan, and Egypt – have grossly violated their nuclear obligations. Not only has the IAEA not taken any action against these countries, there is hardly any official IAEA report about their illegal nuclear activities.
http://www.campaigniran.org/casmii/index.php?q=node/9604
any thoughts on its content?
It seems pretty clear that subsidiary arrangements are not treaties, or amendments to treaties, because they seem not to have been registered as such as required by both the Vienna Convention and also the UN Charter, and as per Dan Joyner’s arguments. It seems the subsidiary arrangements are either non-treaty agreements or agreed guidance in interpreting the safeguards agreements.
This leads to an interesting situation wrt to the UN Charter Article 102, which says:
No party to any … international agreement which has not been registered … may invoke that treaty or agreement before any organ of the United Nations.
This seems to imply that the IAEA cannot invoke subsidiary arrangement issues to the UNSC, which is an “organ of the United Nations”.
Nevertheless BAN Ki-moon does invoke the Iranian subsidiary arrangement [para (g)], and revised Code 3.1 issue [para (h)], in his 7 December 2009 letter to the President of the Security Council.
The subsidiary arrangement Code 3.1 issue is also invoked in UNSC Resolution 1803.
Any lawyer care to comment is this is a valid issue for the IAEA?
We’re talking about subsidiary arrangements to an already deposited treaty. Subsidiary. Look it up in the dictionary. As I have explained repeatedly, the subsidiary arrangements form part and parcel of the safeguards agreements, and cannot be read in isolation. They cannot be separated.
The subsidiary arrangements are detailed rules that give effect to an already legally binding instrument. It makes no sense to argue that they are not binding upon the state itself, since removing them makes the comprehensive safeguards agreement itself virtually meaningless. Breaching them makes it impossible for the IAEA to implement safeguards on the territory of the state in question. Breaching them is, in other words, tantamount to breaching safeguards.
I am always suspicious of legal arguments that do not employ the sources defined in the ICJ statute and the methods defined in the VCLT. I am very suspicious of arguments that disregard Occam’s razor. Perhaps that’s just a byproduct of having worked cases for several years, but I doubt it.
The simple interpretation that one can make is that subsidiary arrangements form part of the CSA. And they give meat to the bone. After all, this is very clear in the CSA itself.
Involved interpretations that come to an opposite conclusion are, in my mind, exceptionally unconvincing, and would need to be backed up through an analysis of the preparatory works. I have seen nothing in the arguments presented so far that indicates that anyone has done this, except, of course, the IAEA itself.
This is not domestic law we’re talking about. This is international law. There are different rules of interpretation than in the domestic scene, and there is no burden of proof. The IAEA secretariat is no “party” like a party in a simple divorce case.
It is an organization staffed by international civil servants that serves ALL its member states (including Iran). It’s tasked to provide impartial services to its members. And it does this, in my own humble opinion, very well.
What the IAEA says in terms of interpretation carries a LOT more weight than a IAEA member state’s opinion. Especially the opinion of Iran, which now acts and presents its arguments as a party to a legal conflict. That is why anyone who would want to analyze this objectively attaches more weight to what the secretariat says; and less (but by no means no) weight to what the US or the UK says, and definitely to what Iran says (which seems to have an interest in curtailing IAEA rights on its territory).
Having read through this thread, I sense that we’ve exhausted the discussion, so I will close it after these final words.
I think one thing has come out of this. It would be useful for the IAEA to publish more information on what the subsidiary arrangements say and do not say. Not necessarily what it says about Iran, but in general. This can only benefit the debate, and will not cause any harm to the IAEA membership.
Thanks to everyone for contributing. It’s been a heated, but fun, debate.