By now everyone has seen the latest IAEA Iran report, GOV/2012/23. Among other bits that have drawn attention is paragraph 28, concerning swipe samples taken at the subterranean enrichment facility outside of Qom in mid-February. These samples “showed the presence of particles with enrichment levels of up to 27% U-235,” more than the level that’s supposed to be produced there. That’s highly enriched uranium, in fact.
Iran has told the IAEA that “the production of such particles ‘above the target value’ may happen for technical reasons beyond the operator’s control.” While that answer clearly isn’t too satisfying, is it plausible? Could be. I don’t pretend to know what actually happened that resulted in the presence of 27% enriched HEU where it shouldn’t be. But a set of possibilities that don’t involve an attempt at cheating can be discerned, and one or another of them may be reasonably likely. (Caution: wonkish.)
For starters, hidden in footnote 16 of the same report is a reminder of a previous episode of over-enrichment in Iran. It concerns the main enrichment hall at the Natanz facility, which isn’t supposed to produce more than 5% enriched LEU: “A small number of particles from samples taken in the cascade area continue to be found with enrichment levels of between 5% and 7.4% U-235… the Agency assesses that these results refer to a known technical phenomenon associated with the start-up of centrifuge cascades.”
That’d be the “time transient” described in Houston Wood and Stephanos Tongelidis, “Gas Centrifuge Cascade Study for Maximum Assays During Start-Up,” in Proceedings of the 47th Annual Meeting of the Institute for Nuclear Materials Management (2006). In plain English: UF6 gas is fed into a centrifuge cascade slowly at first. Because the centrifuges are doing their usual work on an smallish volume of gas during this time, that initial volume gets over-enriched. Before very long, though, it gets blended down to the target level by the introduction of the rest of the feed gas into the cascade. Thus the “transient” label.
Reflux Redux
The same phenomenon would occur if the operator slowed the feed rate for any reason at any time, not just at startup. The generic term for the condition of over-enrichment due to slow feed is “reflux.” An ACW commenter also observed back in Oct. 2010 that if Stuxnet accelerated the centrifuges beyond their normal speed, the results would look the same as a slowdown of feed.
Left unanswered is why traces would have escaped the cascade during a reflux episode. Normally, traces exit when opening the cascade, dumping its contents, withdrawing samples from it, or switching out a product container. Why do any of these things during the time transient or any other reflux episode? In that sense, the presence of the HEU traces isn’t quite “beyond the operator’s control,” but it seems to be a matter of carelessness. That’s a little surprising for a facility designed to operate just shy of the politically sensitive HEU threshold. Or perhaps not. As noted above, it’s not the first case of over-enriched uranium traces escaping an Iranian centrifuge cascade.
In this instance, Albright, Stricker, and Walrond of ISIS attribute the over-enrichment to an operator error involving the enlarged cascades at Qom; if the original feed rate used for 15-stage cascades was initially used with the new, 17-stage cascades, it would wind up being too slow, resulting in an “overshoot” of the intended product level. (More centrifuges, more separative work, not enough UF6 gas, basically. Call it reflux by default.) In this scenario, which ISIS considers “likely,” the operators might have discovered their mistake when withdrawing samples, which would have spread the suspect traces. Whoops!
I haven’t done the math, but it makes a certain sense. Then again, Iran started using enlarged, 174-centrifuge cascades to produce “up to 20%” enriched uranium at Qom on Dec. 14, 2011. Would the first suspect traces only have emerged a full two months later, on Feb. 15, 2012? No samples taken, containers switched, etc., before then? What’s more, Iran had already been trying out a few 174-machine cascades at Natanz. You’d think they would have worked out these sorts of issues. I suppose one never knows.
Unfortunately, there are always darker possibilities. Like cross-contamination from another, still-clandestine enrichment plant. But 27% enriched HEU is close enough to the “up to 20%” enriched material expected at Qom that this explanation isn’t exactly one that leaps out and whacks you over the head.
Long story short: don’t panic just yet.
Postscript. By now, this issue may have been overshadowed by the hardening of Iran’s negotiating position. In the best case, it will turn out that nuclear diplomacy is also subject to over-enrichment and time transients. Let’s hope for the best…
Thank you for an excellent analysis.
I would disagree only with the NYTimes’ characterization in the Postscript. Iran basically offered last week to suspend 20% enrichment but it did want some sanctions removed.
The hardening of the position was mostly from the P5+1 side.
Of course, if the Iranians do not get sanctions relief they have little reason to stop enrichment which they need for the TRR.
Unfortunately, I can’t find more than a very minimal summary of Abbasi’s remarks in English from the original source, which I take to be PressTV, so it’s not immediately apparent from here whether or not the NYT story is an adequate representation.
http://www.presstv.ir/detail/2012/05/26/243241/iaea-visit-parchin–pressure/
Caveat lector applies in any case.
What is clear from the IAEA report is that the up-to-20% enrichment is not for refueling TRR. The AEOI has already produced more than needed. Abbasi now claims that continued production — indeed, accelerated production — is for future reactors. Color me skeptical.
Scott Peterson has an fairly unbiased report of what led to the collaspe of the talks — i.e. lack of sanctions relief:
http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2012/0523/Hopes-fade-for-progress-at-Iran-nuclear-talks-in-Baghdad
Cheryl Rofer explains that Iran can make fuel plates and that they are only enriching to 19.75% as much UF6 as is needed — none extra:
http://nucleardiner.com/blogs/?p=519&option=com_wordpress&Itemid=186
Ahem. See paragraph 17 and footnote 20 of the report. Abbasi himself says it’s not for TRR anymore.
OK, I think Cheryl should rephrase her article — you are correct. It is all a bit confusing to non-experts.
Iran appears to be stockpiling extra 20% U…more than it currently needs. Now, according to Scott Peterson, the Iranians were willing to give up enriching to this level, in return for some sanctions’ relief.
If the P5+1 really really wanted 20% enrichment stopped they could have called Iran’s (possible) bluff and end this sorry story. I am confused why they did not get this over with. Every month of delayed and future talks means more and more 20% U in Iran. It seems keeping sanctions on is a bigger issue than resolving the 20% issue(?). There was an OpEd in C.S.M. about this very issue:
http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2012/0525/By-not-lifting-sanctions-West-and-Obama-are-helping-Iran-enrich-uranium
Thanks. We’ll take another look at the IAEA report. This is indeed confusing.
I think that Josh and Nuclear Diner may both be right.
I took my numbers from paragraphs 38 and 49 of the IAEA report, as quoted by my colleague here. That appears to be a description of the 20% uranium that has been produced.
Paragraph 17 and footnote 20 appear to refer to Iran’s intentions, certainly part of what needs to be considered.
I’ll check with my colleague to see what she thinks.
I am taking all public statements from Iranian officials with a grain or more of salt; there have been far too many conflicts between statements by different officials and statements by the same official at different times.
Has Iran produced enough 20% enriched uranium for the Tehran Research Reactor fuel? Not yet – but they are getting closer.
Needed: 120 kgs of 20% enriched uranium for TRR
UF6 with 20% enriched uranium produced to date:
At the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP) = they produced 110.1 kgs
At the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP) they produced 35.5 kgs
Total of 145.5 kgs UF6 produced.
67.5% of the 145.5 kgs of UF6 is uranium. Total amount of enriched uranium produced to-date = 98 kgs out of the 145.5 kgs of UF6.
Needed 22 kgs more of uranium or 32 kgs more of UF6 to meet total of 177.6 kgs of UF6 equal to 120 kgs of enriched uranium.
Therefore they have not yet produced the full amount of UF6 needed to fuel the TRR. (to read the rest about the conversion to the U3O8 go to http://www.nucleardiner.com mythbuster forum)
[The following was added at Susan’s request.]
Follow-on comment:
Earlier we had learned that in 1992 Argentina had provided to Iran 115.8 kgs of uranium but what it wasn’t clear in any of the statements whether this was for one core or more, and if it was 115.8 kgs of uranium or of U3O8-Al fuel. Also we read a more recent statement where the Iranians said they needed 120 kgs of uranium. We reviewed publications by Iranian nuclear engineer Khalafi and Gharib and reviewed the IAEA INFCIRC on the transfer we have come to a new conclusion.
Argentina provided 115.8 kgs of uranium according to the 1990 IAEA INFCIRC97a– the uranium was delivered in “65 standard fuel elements, 12 control elements and 3 instrumented fuel assemblies” – Each core loading consists of 22 fuel elements, therefore 65 fuel elements is roughly 3 core loadings. (http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc97a2.pdf)
According to Khalafi and Gharib the reactor has:
22 fuel elements and 4 control rods.
290.7 gm of U235/fuel element and 214.2 gm of U235 per control rod.
(1999, Calculational tools to conduct experimental optimization in Tehran research reactor, Khalafi and Gharib, annals of Nuclear Energy).
Calcuating it out gives: 6.4 kgs of U235 in the fuel elements and control rods, at 20% enriched this is 32 kgs of uranium in each core loading
Therefore given they have produced 145.5 kgs of UF6 with 20% enriched equal to 98 kgs of uranium – this would imply they have produced approximately 3 times the quantity needed for the TRR reload.
What strikes me in the reporting post-Baghdad is that Iran is litigating its case in public while the P5+1 are not. The proposals by the P5+1 seem to have been spelled out, both in terms of what Iran is asked to do and what it is offered in return. But there’s been very little public comment on the state of play in negotiations.
By contrast, it’s not at all clear what Iran is willing to give or what it wants in return. Some say Iran offered to stop its 20% enrichment. As far as I can tell, despite earlier public hints, the Iranians do not seem to have put this on the table. And aside from a demand for immediate recognition of its right to enrich, it’s not clear what Iran is asking for in its five-point plan. Despite the vagueness of its positions, Iran has embarked on a very public negotiating campaign, belittling the P5+1 proposal as unbalanced. Iran exaggerates the significance of what it is being asked to give up (How big a deal is a reversible halt in enrichment to 20%, when Iran has already produced enough to operate its research reactor for years?) and dismisses what the P5+1 have offered as insignificant.
This suggests at a minimum a huge mismatch between the negotiating strategies of the two sides, the P5+1 seeking private, substantive negotiation of specific proposals while Iran airs its grievances publicly without offering tangible positions. It’s hard to be optimistic about a negotiated resolution when the two sides seem to have such divergent views not just on substantive issues but on the very basic nature of a negotiation.
Anon – with reference to the nature of the negotiations, it seems to me Iran is unwilling to set the floor of the negotiations at airplane spares. They want it to be sanctions relief, and then they’ll negotiate up from that.
I’m not too disheartened by it yet. Congress is a huge obstacle to what the US can offer, but the EU has indicated a willingness to defer sanctions/embargoes, and if the US can offer some relief from the pressure on Iran’s Asian customers then there may be scope to get something working.
@anon
My impression is that Iran has learned from its past mistakes regarding negotiations. The other side (be it the IAEA or P5+1) has often been more public than Iran, and we were continuously told that Iran “was inflexible”, “was not addressing concerns”, “backed off after reaching agreement” etc, without Iran being sufficiently vocal about its own version of affairs.
As a major component of the campaign against Iran’s nuclear program is public relations, I think Iran has just learned that it has to level the PR playing field.
Has there has been similar incidents in other countries which use gas centrifuges to enrich uranium, especially in recent years?
Good question. I don’t know. I haven’t heard of any such incidents, but they might exist. It seems to me that the Iranians’ relative lack of experience and their habit rushing to start enrichment for fundamentally political reasons before even completing a facility — neither FEP at Natanz nor FFEP at Qom are finished — may contribute to unusual operator errors.
Does anyone have any better information?
Do you think the new FLAME virus in Iran may cause similar excursions in enrichment as, possibly, the STUXNET did before>
Worm.Win32.Flame is currently not known to include any process control modules. In other words, it is not known to target centrifuge cascades. However, the analysis of it is still incomplete to the point that the estimates of when it will be complete range in years!
It seems more likely that the Flame worm is intended for industrial espionage and not industrial sabotage. OTOH the large size, complexity and modular structure indicates at least the potential for expanded and extended capabilities, some of which could include sabotage of process controls.
In summary, it’s possible that this newly discovered worm could be involved in the enrichment level excursion, but too early to judge even the probabilities of such involvement.
To deescalate the conflict, what’s necessary on the Iranian side is to be moving away from not toward nuclear weapons capability; for that the main thing necessary is to be reducing not increasing the stock of usable 20 per cent enriched uranium; that is consistent with continued production of 20 per cent enriched, as long as it’s being used up in fuel plate fabrication faster than it’s being produced.
That would be a pretty meager offer by Iran, but it would provide some give on the central issue, which is more than the P5+1 is offering on its side.
@rmd
“that is consistent with continued production of 20 per cent enriched, as long as it’s being used up in fuel plate fabrication faster than it’s being produced.”
As Susan mentioned in her addendum above, Iran has already manufactured 3 times the material needed for a re-load of the TRR. Therefore, this excess material, even if being processed into fuel plates, remains available within Iran to reprocess into UF6 for enrichment to 90%. As Iran does not need the excess material for the TRR, there must be another reason for Iran to continue with this 20% enrichment.
With regard to remanufacturing the fuel into TRR fuel plates, unless the fuel plates are somehow transmuted with a nuclear explosive poison material that is impossible to chemically separate, it seems to me to be a relatively inexpensive process to reclaim the fuel plates into UF6 — much cheaper and faster than enriching LEU feedstock to 20% feedstock (for a breakout to 90%).
To deescalate the conflict, a bargain can be made that removes or dilutes the excess 20% uranium that is not loaded _in_ the TRR; in exchange for lifting of sanctions; and stringent controls on 3 to 5% LEU production. Additionally, safeguards must continue on TRR load through its full lifecycle before, during and after loading into the reactor. This will require a large, careful and active IAEA inspection force.
As this is a rational solution to deescalate the conflict, readily apparent to the P5+1 negotiating team, I suspect this has already been offered to Iran, who may have initially indicated “common ground” only to reject it after a significant time delay.
There is no way in my mind that the western negotiators could have rationally thought “airplane parts” in exchange for 20% enrichment suspension would be taken by the Iranian side (as airplane parts have marginal value). I believe that the airplane parts story is PR from the Iranian side and no more. The time delay serves to strengthen the Iranian position as it moves them closer to breakout capability. Being closer to a breakout capability puts Iran in a position to demand more from the other side.
A similar strategy on the Iranian side seems to be with the Parchin explosives laboratory negotiations. The Iranian side chooses to tempt the IAEA with the possibility of inspections, only to pull out, and then tempt again. In this case the excess time may be used to clean the site, as evidenced by the two demolished buildings this week seen in the ISIS photos.
As George William Herbert points out on this site, Iran may have already completed (several years ago) the R&D for a workable missile deliverable nuclear device. In that case, not withstanding the Fatwa against nuclear weapons by Khameini (which itself might be a delaying tactic and which is contradicted by the evidence of nuclear weapons work prior to 2003 mentioned in the National Intelligence Estimate, and perhaps by more recent evidence that has been recently destroyed at Parchin), Iran may use this time delay to complete a weapon, detonate it, and then announce to the world that it has a nuclear weapon deterrent. For Iran, this is an entirely rational course of action — a working nuclear deterrent is a big win to operate independently of military threats in foreign policy (and to perhaps pose other military threats). Certainly this fits with the rhetoric and perhaps existential fear of the Islamic Republic and its old guard leadership — to operate independently of western threats, influence and control.
This Iranian negotiating strategy (negotiating delays while continuing to enrich) fits the public data as much as any other hypothesis. In my mind it cannot be disproved, and has a significant probability of reflecting the Iranian internal negotiating strategy.
A possible solution would be for the P5+1 to make public, in writing, an offer of a reduction in sanctions for a full suspension of 20% or greater enrichment, a removal of excess 20% materials from Iran, and a stringent safeguards protocol including sufficient inspections to verify there is no further clandestine or open 20% or greater enrichment and no further nuclear weapons development. To do this as may have already been done privately only invites more delay. The offer should be fair, and have a relatively short deadline for acceptance as is (perhaps two weeks). Iran is given the option to accepts it or reject it and no other — no response is considered a rejection. This eliminates the possibility of further (endless) time delay through a counter offer.
Then at least we know where both sides stand. And further plans can be made on that basis, be they much stronger sanctions, a full blockade, “all options”, or even do nothing. I will not make a recommendation as to what the conditional response should be; only that it is in the interest of the P5+1 to end the endless negotiations.
The current ambiguity and endless delay only serves the Iranian strategy. Why play into the Iranian strategy?
For want of a better option, perhaps?
It’s not at all clear to me that it’s in anyone’s interests to discontinue the negotiations. Not only might it be a good idea to continue the negotiations, it might even be a good idea to start them.
anon2:
With regard to remanufacturing the fuel into TRR fuel plates, unless the fuel plates are somehow transmuted with a nuclear explosive poison material that is impossible to chemically separate, it seems to me to be a relatively inexpensive process to reclaim the fuel plates into UF6 — much cheaper and faster than enriching LEU feedstock to 20% feedstock (for a breakout to 90%).
Well I’ve seen it claimed that the uranium in the fuel plates is effectively sequestered. Maybe that was just in relation to the proposal to make them in France; the idea being that the French would somehow poison them.
Of course it was also claimed confidently that Iran wasn’t capable of making its own plates; but I don’t now see anyone contesting its claim that it has, or commenting on the discrepancy.
There is no way in my mind that the western negotiators could have rationally thought “airplane parts” in exchange for 20% enrichment suspension would be taken by the Iranian side (as airplane parts have marginal value). I believe that the airplane parts story is PR from the Iranian side and no more.
But the PR from the US side is not that it was more generous than claimed, but that wasn’t meant to be accepted:
The time delay serves to strengthen the Iranian position as it moves them closer to breakout capability.
Right now, the P5+1 seems to think it serves them:
Similarly:
anon2:
As George William Herbert points out on this site, Iran may have already completed (several years ago) the R&D for a workable missile deliverable nuclear device.
One does see that asserted from time to time, sometimes in even stronger form. Mark Hibbs on this site suggested that Iran’s work “put[s] them on the cusp of nuclear weapons capability” (Engage Iran . . .). Cordesman says it’s “already given [Iran] every component of a weapon except fissile material” (Rethinking our Approach . . .).
I don’t see how they get to that conclusion. The standard western-intelligence-derived story is that in years following 1989, Iran undertook R&D into every aspect of weaponization, then interrupted that work in 2003 in consequence of the U.S. conquest of Iraq (whether because it now feared the U.S. more or because it no longer feared Iraq). What I’ve never seen argued or even specifically asserted is that Iran had satisfactorily completed its development work in any single aspect of weaponization. The fact that there was work to be interruption would suggest that there were still significant issues to be resolved.
One could argue that at the time of interruption, they might have got as far as crude-but-workable, and have been looking to improve on that. But given that they’ve never tested a weapon, it’s hard to see how they could be confident that they had got that far.
Perhaps the alleged events at Parchin are relevant to making such judgments?
joshua:
Perhaps the alleged events at Parchin are relevant to making such judgments?
It’s alleged that Iran attempted to test one component of a weapon. The allegation may or may not be accurate; if it is accurate, the Iranians may or may not have got the test procedure working properly; if they did get it working, the test results may have been positive or negative; if they were positive, it’s still just one component.
Sure it’s relevant, but it doesn’t get you very far.
Implosion + neutron initiation = at least two and maybe more systems.
Here’s a piece weighing in explicitly on the R&D completeness question: Kahl, Dalton and Irvine say that although Iran could produce the requisite fissile material in about four months, given the time required to overcome “remaining technical hurdles associated with weaponization”, “Iran probably has the capability to produce a crude testable nuclear device within about a year of deciding to do so” (Risk and Rivalry: Iran, Israel and the Bomb, p. 9 f.). I don’t see any indication in the piece itself or in the references it cites in this connection, how that estimate was made.
Joshua,
“Not only might it be a good idea to continue the negotiations, it might even be a good idea to start them.”
My premise is that the P5+1 negotiators made a much better offer than was made public and that they did not get a serious response, only a delay. I could be wrong as I am not privy to what was offered.
I agree that if the P5+1 have not put a material and fair offer on the table they should do that. But if they have put a fair offer on the table only to be toyed with, they should make a very fair offer entirely in public so that the public can see what is being rejected, toyed with or delayed.
I cannot believe a rational professional arms control negotiator for the P5+1 would put airplane parts on the table in exchange for a complete suspension of all enrichment. They would know that it is a non-starter before they made the offer, so why do it? This makes no sense at all and I don’t think it happened — it must be propaganda.
I think it is much more likely that the P5+1 put some serious options on the table and they were simply toyed with as part of my Iranian strategy hypothesis.
I might be wrong, but I think the second possibility is much more likely.
The court of international consensus cannot know what is true in the “negotiations” until the P5+1 puts their proposals out in the public. Its time for the P5+1 to make a fair public offer to end this delay.
Not having been present at the talks, I have no firm idea who’s being less reasonable there.
Regardless, opening positions are often maximalist. There will have to be compromises.
Anon2 – “airplane parts” is a euphemism for not much. Or a concoction that doesn’t include sanctions, because there is no negotiation without sanctions on the table.
The P5+1 opening offer was:
– Iran to stop 20% enrichment, ship all its 20% uranium out of the country and stop operations at its underground enrichment plant at Fordow.
– P5+1 provides nuclear fuel plates for the TRR, help with nuclear safety at Iranian reactors and spare parts for Iran’s commercial airliners.
It wasn’t even enough to elicit a counteroffer, which can’t have shocked many. So the P5+1 have to put their hand in their pocket again. Which is fine. Every time they have to do that it makes the next concession look a bit harder, and there’s no rush.
They would know that it is a non-starter before they made the offer, so why do it?
It’s called an ambit claim, also known as “those that don’t ask, don’t get”.
I would love to see some significant sanctions’ relief put on the table in exchange for suspending Iranian 20% enrichment. Due to the legislative text of the US sanctions, however, I have little hope of this — they go way beyond imposing requirements on just nuclear issues:
http://nationalinterest.org/print/commentary/are-sanctions-fatwa-iran-6363
I do have some hope that EU sanctions-to-be may not be imposed as part of a deal. That Hollande is in power in France instead of Sarkozy also makes this a bit more likely.
Unfortunately, US Congress is playing the role of spoiler in these negotiations.
In normal negotiations over some point of conflict, it helps that the facts of the situation remain static. But that is not the case here. Iran can continue to drill its blade deeper into the West’s side every week. By simply continuing to do whatever it is it’s doing. The West has no countervailing option. The sanctions are essentially played out. There are no more sanctions to apply.
The only alternative is to accept Iran offer at any given round of negotiations. But the West cannot do this. Thus Iran’s offers become progressively worse. The West would love to have the positions Iran was open to only 5 years ago.
Therefore it is easy to see the end situation. Iran ends up as far as it can get without triggering overt war as the first stage. And that is being a virtual nuclear power. Just like Japan and Brazil. Of course, once you are a virtual nuclear power, there’s little risk of simply going all the way.
“Between the start of conversion activities on 17 December 2011 and 15 May 2012, Iran has fed into the process 43 kg of
UF6 enriched up to 20% U-235 and produced 14 kg of uranium enriched up to 20% U-235 in the form of U3O8.”
Huge losses in the start up phase, huh ?
Your comment assumes that those figures represent a complete “in-out” scenario. 43kg went in. 14kg came out. Even factoring for conversion equivalency it is clear that something is missing. Perhaps though there is simply just material still tied up in the process line.