In my forthcoming book, one of the little nagging questions I couldn’t answer was why the DF-31 solid-fueled ICBM (IRBM, harumph) was taking so damn long. I said: “In 1996, NAIC predicted CSS‐X‐10 (DF‐31) deployment ‘about the turn of the century.’ Since the missile remains to be deployed, the program may be under‐funded or experiencing technical problems.”
The Robot Economist, observing that the failed ASAT tests used a DF-31 derived launcher unlike the successful test, comes down pretty convincingly in favor of the latter:
There were apparently three failed tests prior to this one using the unproven Kaitouzhe-1 space launch vehicle as the kill vehicle. The many of the key components for the Kaitouzhe are based on the new road-mobile DF-31 ICBM, which has had its share of problems, including some failed test launches back in 2002.
The Chinese decision to abandon newer Kaitouzhe design in favor of the twenty year-old DF-21 looks like a significant vote of no confidence in the DF-31 to me.
I wasn’t aware that the booster for the previous tests had been unsuccessful, but if Robot Economist is right … that explains why the DF-31 remains to be deployed.
In Minimum Means of Reprisal, I mentioned in passing some of the potential problems observed by the U.S. intelligence community in China’s pursuit of a mobile ICBM:
The CSS‐X‐10 (DF‐31) reportedly incorporates many advanced technologies similar to current generation Russian missiles: upgraded mobility for the transporter‐erector‐launcher, advanced materials for the booster and payload, use of penetration aids such as decoys or chaff, and an improved solid propellant. These technologies were “presenting Chinese designers with substantial challenges.”
[Citing: Chinese ICBM Capability Steadily Increasing, NAIC-1030-098B-96 (Washington, DC: National Air Intelligence Center, November 1996) republished in Bill Gertz, Betrayal: How the Clinton Administration Undermined American Security (Washington, DC: Regenry Publishing, 1999), p. 253]
Jeff,
I’m disappointed you actually cite that fraud Gertz in your book!
[To be fair, I was citing a classified document, the full text of which he published and DOD confirmed. But I am sorry. JGL]
Last year, mostly to kill time, I extracted the DF-31 deployment/ IOC projections from the five DOD annual reports to Congress on PRC military power.
Since they most recently said 2006 for the basic DF-31, it will be interesting to see what the 2007 report says.
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ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2006
By 2010, China’s strategic nuclear forces will likely comprise a combination of enhanced silo-based CSS-4 ICBMs; CSS-3 ICBMs; CSS-5 MRBMs; solid-fueled, road-mobile mobile DF-31 (IOC in 2006) and DF-31A ICBMs (IOC 2007); and sea-based JL-1 and JL-2s SLBMs (IOC 2007-10).
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ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS The Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2005
China’s future strategic force will likely comprise enhanced silo-based CSS-4 ICBMs (currently deployed), solid-fueled, road-mobile DF-31 (initial operational capability 2005-06) and DF-31A ICBMs (IOC 2007-09), and sea-based JL-2 SLBMs (IOC 2008-10).
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FY04 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON PRC MILITARY POWER Pursuant to the FY2000 National Defense Authorization Act ANNUAL REPORT ON THE MILITARY POWER OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
Development of the DF-31 ICBM is progressing, and deployment should begin later this decade. China also is developing two follow-on extended-range versions of the DF-31: a solid-propellant, mobile ICBM and a solid-propellant submarine- launched ballistic missile, the JL-2, which will be deployed on a new ballistic missile submarine by decade’s end.
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28 July 2003 Report to Congress Pursuant to the FY2000 National Defense Authorization Act ANNUAL REPORT ON THE MILITARY POWER OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
Development of the DF-31 is progressing and deployment should begin later this decade. China also is developing two follow-on extended range versions of the DF-31: a solid-propellant, road-mobile ICBM and a solid-propellant SLBM.Deployment of these two missiles should begin by mid-to-late-decade.
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Report to Congress [2002] Pursuant to the FY2000 National Defense Authorization Act
Development of the DF-31 is progressing and deployment should begin before mid-decade. China also is developing two follow-on extended range versions of the DF-31: a solid-propellant, mobile ICBM and a solid-propellant submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM). Deployment of these two DF-31 follow-ons should begin by mid-to-late-decade.
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Dr. J – You raise a good point. I spent some time this evening looking into the matter of the January 2002 missile test and posted the results so far on my blog.
http://roboteconomist.blogspot.com/2007/01/df-31s-spotty-record.html
How can the Robot Economist know which booster was used on the failed tests, if in fact there were failed tests? Is there anything in publicly available sources of information about the ASAT test or tests that the Robot Economist, or anyone else, can use to substantiate this claim?
The only problem with this basically accurate assessment is that the DF-31 is operational with one brigade. If the road mobile launcher isn’t working, the fixed launcher does. Second Artillery has 4 brigades of ICBMs (8 each although last I heard they were still working up the last pair of DF-31) – one of these is entirely a DF-31 unit (International Institute of Strategic Studies data)
I disagree with the IISS and blogged about that disagreement a while back.
The bottom line is that IISS seems to refer to two uncorroborated press reports — neither of which actually says the missile is deployed.
Moreover, the US intelligence community continues to list the missile as not deployed — at least as of this summer — although indicates that deployment is imminent.
Glad to have you as a reader, BTW
Gregory – I am only going on what I’ve seen in publicly available reporting and analysis. I found the Kaituozhe-1 claim on Globalsecurity.org:
“CNN’s Jamie McIntyre reported on 17 January 2007 that this successful test followed three earlier unsuccessful attempts. These prior attempts had not been previously reported in public. This would be generally consistent with the flight history of the small commercial satellite launch vehicle, called KT-1 (Kaituozhe-1), based on the solid rocket motors of the DF-31 ICBM. This system has consistently failed to place satellites into orbit, a flight profile consistent with a direct ascent ASAT test.”
http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/world/china/asat.htm
Here’s their launch log. Note the three recorded KT-1 launches:
http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/world/china/log.htm
Globalsecurity.org is a semi-reliable source of information, so I willing to go with their hypothesis for now.
As for my analysis, I was merely thinking out loud about a possible connection between the GS.org claim and the DF-31’s continuously delayed deployment. Looking back at the language used in my post, I could have caveated the speculative nature of my ideas more thoroughly. My apologies.
Robot Economist – Every indication we can find in the Chinese open source literature suggests the KT program is a commercial, not a military, initiative. One author actually cites lack of military interest in the KT as an obstacle to the increased funding needed for faster development. If you would like the Chinese docs send me an email and I would be happy to forward them to you.
In general, I find speculation on questions like this causes more harm than good, especially when stated in terms that do not make clear the sources and limits of one’s information, as you do in your comment, which I greatly appreciate. Thanks.
Looking closely at the largest KT-1 pre-launch image at the following site:
http://www.sinodefence.com/strategic/launchvehicle/kt1.asp
it appears to me that the KT-1 first stage is smaller in diameter than the soldiers guarding it are tall. That would make it substantially less than 2 meters in diameter, unless China was using some unusually tall soldiers for this duty! The apparent diameter is consistent with a DF-21 first stage rather the the previously assumed DF-31 first stage. I’m starting to think that KT-1 (with a DF-21 first stage) might be a good candidate for China’s ASAT missile after all.