India’s Prime Minister has released a statement on India’s plan to separate civil and military nuclear facilities.
The “civilian list” will contain less than 2/3 of India’s nuclear power reactors, by MWe:
Therefore our proposed Separation Plan entails identifying in phases, a number of our thermal nuclear reactors as civilian facilities to be placed under IAEA safeguards, amounting to roughly 65% of the total installed thermal nuclear power capacity, by the end of the separation plan. A list of some other DAE facilities may be added to the list of facilities within the civilian domain. The Separation Plan will create a clearly defined civilian domain, where IAEA safeguards apply. On our part, we are committed not to divert any nuclear material intended for the civilian domain from designated civilian use or for export to third countries without safeguards.
Singh also stated that safeguarding India’s prototype fast breeder reactors would be out of the question.
Here is a list of India’s operating reactors.
| Unit | Location | Type | Capacity (MWe) | Date of Commercial Operation |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| TAPS-1 | Tarapur, Maharashtra | BWR | 160 | 28-Oct-1969 |
| TAPS-2 | Tarapur, Maharashtra | BWR | 160 | 28-Oct-1969 |
| RAPS-1 | Rawatbhata, Rajasthan | PHWR | 100 | 16-Dec-1973 |
| RAPS-2 | Rawatbhata, Rajasthan | PHWR | 200 | 01-Apr-1981 |
| MAPS-1 | Kalpakkam, Tamilnadu | PHWR | 170 | 27-Jan-1984 |
| MAPS-2 | Kalpakkam, Tamilnadu | PHWR | 220 | 21-Mar-1986 |
| NAPS-1 | Narora, Uttar Pradesh | PHWR | 220 | 01-Jan-1991 |
| NAPS-2 | Narora, Uttar Pradesh | PHWR | 220 | 01-Jul-1992 |
| KAPS-1 | Kakrapar, Gujarat | PHWR | 220 | 06-May-1993 |
| KAPS-2 | Kakrapar, Gujarat | PHWR | 220 | 01-Sep-1995 |
| KAIGA-1 | Kaiga, Karnataka | PHWR | 220 | 16-Nov-2000 |
| KAIGA-2 | Kaiga, Karnataka | PHWR | 220 | 16-Mar-2000 |
| RAPS-3 | Rawatbhata, Rajasthan | PHWR | 220 | 01-Jun-2000 |
| RAPS-4 | Rawatbhata, Rajasthan | PHWR | 220 | 23-Dec-2000 |
| TAPS-4 | Tarapur, Maharashtra | PHWR | 540 | 12-Sept-2005 |
| Total | … | … | 3310 | … |
The first four reactors (TAPS-1, TAPS-2, RAPS-1 and RAPS-2) are already under IAEA safeguards.
It looks to me that something like five of the nine essentially identical 200 MWe reactors would be added to the list. Singh didn’t offer any explanation regarding how that decision would be made. Only The Indian Express delves into the details of the speech. (The site has amazingly irritating pop-ups capable of defeating my Firefox pop-up blocker).
Nor did Singh indicate whether future reactors would be safeguarded.
| Project | Capacity (MWe) | Scheduled Commercial Operation |
|---|---|---|
| TAPP-3 | 1 X 540 | U3-Jan 07 |
| Kaiga-3 & 4 | 2 X 220 | U3-Mar 07 |
| U4 – Sep 07 | ||
| KK-1 & 2 | 2 X 1000 | U1 – Dec 07 |
| U2 – Dec 08 | ||
| RAPP – 5 & 6 | 2 X 220 | U5 – Aug 07 |
| U6 – Feb 08 |
***
The best part of the internecine warfare between the ruling Congress party and their BJP predecessors has been the debate over which party gets the boquet for “biggest bunch of colonial lackies.”
No, you do. No, you do.
The Congress Party claims the BJP offered to place 70 percent of India’s existing capaicty and all new reactors under full scope safeguards in 2002—something the BJP has denied, grumbling that they only offered a “couple of existing nuclear facilities” for full-scope safeguards.
I missed that offer at the time, although I do note a cryptic 2004 reference in India Today to the BJP-led government’s efforts “to ‘sanitise’ [India’s] weapons programme from the power programme” and that “accession to the Additional Protocol in return for an informal admission into the nuclear club is not inconceivable.”
A question from the uninformed: I gather sixty-five percent is low? Is there any type of estimate of what the maximum they could list is, assuming that they do intend to remain a nuclear weapons state?
I saw a report this morning that the first list India offered contained only two facilities. (Sorry, don’t recall where.) So they’re moving up.
India largely uses the CIRUS and Dhruva research reactors to produce military plutonium — although David Albright reports “suspicions remain that India may have used some of the plutonium produced in its Candu power reactors in its nuclear weapons program.”
India has no reason not to safeguard all the commercial-scale power reactors, unless India wants to increase its plutonium production above, say, 20 kg annually without having to build a new research reactor.
A quibble on terminology – fullscope safeguards are safeguards that apply to the whole of a state (e.g. for a NNWS under INFCIRC/153) – you can’t have “fullscope” safeguards at some subset of the facilities in a state. You can have INFCIRC/66 type safeguards at a subset of the facilities within a state – but that is not described as “fullscope”.
The terminology has moved on and the old “fullscope safeguards” are now conventionally referred to as “comprehensive safeguards”.
Dr. J. wrote:
“India has no reason not to safeguard all the commercial-scale power reactors, unless India wants to increase its plutonium production above, say, 20 kg annually without having to build a new research reactor.”
Short answer is, that’s exactly what they wish to do. That is precisely the difference between vertical and horizontal proliferation. 20 kg is fine for a Saddam Hussein, but to a country like India, expending its resources to pretend to superpowerdom, fissiles are needed by the ton.
The Indians give two reasons: One that the unsafeguarded reactors are needed to breed tritium for boosting and thermonuclear explosives, and two, to provide feedstock for mass breeding of weapon’s plutonium with FBRs.
================
Deccan Herald Feb 24,2006
‘Keep fast breeders out of IAEA’
India should not place its fast breeder reactors…under…safeguards at least until 2020 or 2025, a leading nuclear physicist has said.
Any move to place the fast breeders under IAEA safeguards before that would erode India’s ‘minimum credible deterrence’ (MCD) nuclear doctrine and deny the country an opportunity to emerge as a leading supplier of cheap nuclear energy worldwide, former Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) chairman A Gopalakrishnan said…
Mr Gopalakrishnan, who is widely seen as reflecting the nuclear establishment’s views of the nation, questioned the assumptions in “expert” circles that India has sufficient inventory of plutonium for bombs from the MCD standpoint.
The fact, however, was that a part of the inventory would be required for the 500 MWe prototype fast breeder reactor when it is ready for loading the plutonium fuel in three to four years’ time, he said. More plutonium would be required later and that too would have come from the inventory.
The CYRUS and Dhruva reactors at the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre would hardly be able to replenish the depletion in proportional quantity, he said. Therefore, the replenishment would have to be made by taking out plutonium from the fast breeders at a later stage. (Which will also be laundered to “supergrade” – Yale) That would not be possible if they were brought under IAEA safeguards, he said.
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The Hindu 2006/02/25
“India wants safeguards locked to fuel supply”
..
M.R. Srinivasan, former Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, advocates caution during the ongoing Indo-U.S. nuclear negotiations.
…
In the case of India, fast breeder reactors occupy a very important place. We have a long-term commitment to use thorium. And our breeder reactors have used our own designs and our own unsafeguarded plutonium [as fuel]. So we see no logic in the argument to bring fast breeder reactors under safeguards.
Now when these reactors use safeguarded plutonium from safeguarded enriched uranium or natural uranium, such reactors can be put under safeguards.
(Interviewer’s question):
Will India’s emphasis on putting many facilities under military regime give an impression that our intentions are different?
(Srinivasan): The concern is that attempts are now being made to cap our programme. Now India started weaponisation later than other countries. China has been making fissile material for its weapons programme since the 1960s. Its arsenal is growing. We have relatively modest fissile material for the weapons programme.
…
(Interviewer’s question):
But the U.S. also wants to bring a majority of pressurised heavy water reactors (PHWR) under the safeguards list.
(Srinivasan): We would like to keep a sufficient number of PHWRs in the military list in order to make available sufficient amounts of tritium for weapons application.
================
Last September, the Canadian government signalled it would be following the Bush administration’s lead on nuclear cooperation with India, lifting a moratorium in place since 1998 to pave the way for selling India ‘dual-use technology’ as well as further reactors.
At the time, we were told this by then-Foreign Affairs Minister Pierre Pettigrew: ‘India has separated its civilian and nuclear weapons programs and has put the civilian program under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards, the minister noted’ (Globe & Mail, Sep 27, 2005).
This does not appear to have been the full story.
How meaningful is it to place India’s civilian facilities under IAEA agreement when India’s military nuclear facilities won’t be? Meanwhile, Bush is threatening Iran for ostensibly wanting the same thing? Won’t other nations follow India’s example?
COMPLETE INSANITY! :
==================
India, Pakistan got atomic arms “legitimately”: US By Irwin Arieff
(Reuters)
The U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations John Bolton said on Wednesday the way India and Pakistan had obtained nuclear arms was legitimate, in contrast to Iran which he accused of pursuing atomic weapons in violation of its international undertakings.
While Iran is seeking to conceal development of nuclear weapons under the guise of a legitimate program to generate nuclear power, Bolton said, India and Pakistan “did it legitimately.”
His comments, made in response to an audience question following a speech to a meeting of the World Jewish Congress, appeared to go farther than the administration of President George W. Bush has previously gone in embracing the two nations’ nuclear programs.
They also coincide with a visit by Bush to India in which the United States is offering New Delhi de facto recognition of its nuclear arms program. Bush is due to travel to Pakistan from India.
The United States imposed punitive sanctions on India after it tested a nuclear bomb in 1998. In the same year, the U.N. Security Council unanimously passed a resolution condemning India and Pakistan for their nuclear weapons tests.
Under a deal India and the United States agreed in principle in July 2005, New Delhi would commit itself to certain international nonproliferation standards including putting its civilian nuclear facilities under international inspection.
In return it would gain access to U.S. civilian nuclear technology, including fuel and reactors, that it was denied for 30 years. India’s military facilities would not be subject to inspections under the deal.
At the same time, the U.S. administration is pressing Iran to turn its back on a program to enrich uranium on its own soil, a plan Tehran insists is intended only to produce electric power but which Washington insists aims to develop nuclear bombs.
Bolton noted that neither India nor Pakistan had ever signed the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, intended to contain the spread of atomic arms, while Iran had done so.
“I give them (India and Pakistan) credit at least that what they did was consistent with the obligations they undertook,” Bolton said.
“They never pretended that they had given up the pursuit of nuclear weapons. They never tried to tie what they were doing under a cloak of international legitimacy. They did it openly and they did it legitimately,” he said.
The 1998 Security Council resolution called on India and Pakistan to stop all nuclear development programs immediately and urged other states to stop selling either country equipment that could be used in atomic arms.
==================
Bush and his squad of crazed monkeys need to lay of the hallucinagens
India has promised to permanently put all its present and future ‘civilian’ facilities under IAEA regime. Uranium from these reactors will be sourced from USA, Canada or Russia. Plutonium from these reactors will be returned to the originating country and cannot be diverted to weapons program.
India’s military reactors will not be placed under IAEA inspection regime, and plutonium from these reactors will be used to stockpile nukes. The uranium for these reactors will be India’s. Thus, the availability of uranium ore in India is the natural cap on India’s plutonium stockpile. It is my understanding that India has the option to build an unsafeguarded military reactor in future; however India cannot use foreign sourced reactor technology or uranium for it.
FBRs have not been safeguarded. However, they are atleast 30 years away from becoming a viable technology. FBR will use thorium as fuel and produce U-233 as end product. India’s current nukes are Pu based. If India wants to use U-233 to add more weapons to its stockpile, then they will have to design and test new nukes, something that is extremely unlikely. Theoretically, India can feed the U-233 into its military reactors and produce Pu; but again India would have to develop technology for doing that.
Isn’t ist quite unfortunate for the Bush admin to join India in trampling on the NPT at a time when they are supposedly trying to get Iran to comply?
I believe that this agreement is actually a net plus for nonproliferation. With or without this deal, India’s weapons stock is limited by the mass of indigenous Uranium available in India. Assuming that India were shut of civilian nuclear commerce for the next few decades, Indian leaders would just focus on coal for energy supply, throw money at te DAE to keep the PHWR-breeder-AHWR cycle research going and save up the Uranium for plutnoium and make as many weapons as they feel the need to, based on what China and/or Pakistan do.
With this deal, India faces the same fissile cap but its per year unsafeguarded fissile material stock is limited because it has only 35% of its power reactors to use for non-civil purposes.
If China cooperates and avoids talking down to India or sending hostile signals, an Asian fissile moratorium may be possible within a few years.
For India, its all about being on the table as an equal to the Big Boys.
=========
Motilal wrote:
“Thus, the availability of uranium ore in India is the natural cap on India’s plutonium stockpile.”
Here is India’s Department of Atomic Energy estimate of Uranium reserves:
/////
3.5 Nuclear Energy
As in case of coal, uranium reserves are also given certain categorisation. These are Reasonable Assured Resources (RAR), Estimated Additional Resources-I (EAR-I), Estimated Additional Res-ources-II (EAR-II) and Speculative Resources (SR). Uranium reserves in India pertaining to categories RAR, EAR-I and EAR-II are estimated to be about 95,000 tonnes of metal. Speculative reserves are over and above this quantity and with further exploration, could become available for nuclear power programme. After accounting for various losses including mining (15%), milling (20%) and fabrication (5%), the net uranium available for power generation is about 61,000 tonnes.
/////
Let’s round this to 50,000 tons. Assume 1% of this is converted into plutonium. (This is just a tiny fraction of actually planned production). 500 tons of Plutonium is available, sufficient to create about 100,000 atomic bombs. (!)
======================
======================
Motilal wrote:
“FBRs have not been safeguarded. However, they are atleast 30 years away from becoming a viable technology. FBR will use thorium as fuel and produce U-233 as end product. India’s current nukes are Pu based. If India wants to use U-233 to add more weapons to its stockpile, then they will have to design and test new nukes, something that is extremely unlikely.”
1) The PFBR is not 30 years away, it is 4 years away. And yes it will produce U233, but it will also breed tons of “supergrade” plutonium.
2) India will not need to design and test (with actual fissiles) new nukes in order to use the 1,000’s of tons of U233 it will produce. An implosion assembly used with Pu will work with U233. The US regularly switched cores made up of Pu alone, composite Pu and U235, and pure U235 in the same designs. It also used U233. The yields are different, but can be calculated.
It is to be noted that The US used U235 in the cores even though it critical mass is almost 3 times that of Pu. U233 has a critical mass only a bit larger than Pu and is an even better substitute.
An uranium gun as powerful as Little Boy, made with U233, could weigh less than 150 kilograms and require only non-explosive testing.
======================
yale
I saw that Bolton comment in other places. Using that logic, if Iran formally withdrew from the NPT, using the withdrawl mechanisms of the treaty, it could develop nuclear weapons.
But didn’t the Administration demand sanctions when North Korea withdrew from the treaty? Bottom line is that Bolton and the government he represents has no problem justifying a double standard for its friends and clients. They talk a great deal about moral clarity and such, but that’s a just a smokescreen for the same old game of power politics.
George Perkovich recently stated that this deal was India’s idea because India is running out of uranium ore.
“They don’t have enough sources of uranium to fuel the kind of first-generation nuclear reactors they would need to meet energy requirements for the short term or even the next two decades. So there’s a physical limit because of the fuel. There’s a technological limit because their programs always kind of run behind in terms of the size of its reactors and its general capability.
Now, they’re improving that a lot, but they can’t build enough reactors soon enough to meet the country’s energy targets. So where that leads is that, for a combination of both fuel needs and reactor needs, they’re going to have to turn to international cooperation. Now they have a grand plan that they’ve had since the 1940s, which is to be the only country which relies on a totally different kind of fuel, which is a thorium-based fuel, because India has an abundance of thorium in its sand, in its soil. The problem is that the thorium fuel cycle is always fifty years away.”
This is copied verbatim from his interview with the NYT. He made similar statement to an Indian web portal Rediff.
India first approached Russia for uranium; but Russians refused to be India’s sugar daddy. The only option was to reach a deal with US to open up supply of uranium from the NSG.
India’s started work on their first ‘full scale prototype’ FBR in 2002; and if the French experience with Superphenix is a go by, India is 30 years away from a dependable thorium based FBR. Perkovich puts it at 50.
This is what Perkovich had to say on Rediff in response to question whether India was succumbing to US pressure
“India will always have options. The problem here is that the Indian nuclear establishment has been extremely secretive and did not inform the public (or Parliament) that it was running out of fuel. Also, that the country’s need for electricity cannot be met by the nuclear program, especially if there is not international cooperation. So now there is a sort of crisis and the Indian leadership recognizes it and is trying to address it, but the nuclear establishment wants to avoid having to make hard choices and perhaps to make compromises in order to achieve outside help. This is natural. But the issue is not one of succumbing to outside pressure. It is one of paying to get something in return.”
In response to another question on US pressure:
“The US could leave India alone. It is India that is asking for international rules to be changed, and to receive a great deal of nuclear help. This was India’s idea and proposal, not the United States”.
If you add it all up you reach the follwing conclusion:
1. India is running out or uranium ore, which is why they agreed to this nuclear deal.
2. No foreign uranium for India’s military program.
2. The only way India can get out of this bind is to develop a thorium-fuel cycle that is based on FBRs. That is decades away from being a reality, if it is actually possible.
Yale Simlin wrote:
Let’s round this to 50,000 tons. Assume 1% of this is converted into plutonium. (This is just a tiny fraction of actually planned production). 500 tons of Plutonium is available, sufficient to create about 100,000 atomic bombs. (!)
—————————
If what George Perkovich is saying is true, Indian nuclear scientests have been running a grand scam for the past 50 years ago by grossly overstating India’ uranium ore reserves.
Their sole hope was to get a viable thorium-fuel cycle going before they ran out of uranium… for the last 50 years they have been saying that it will be ready in another 30 years.
And now it is evident that they have failed… these guys are even better than Ken Lay and his pals.
You are mixing apples with oranges. A atomic ENERGY program requires vast amounts of fuel. An atomic WEAPONS program requires a tiny fraction of that amount.
As an example, a single FBR contains more than 2 tons of plutonium. Just a single power plant. Yet this amount of plutonium, sufficient for a single fuel load for a sub-scale powerplant, is more than enough to fuel FIVE HUNDRED atomic bombs.
While India’s indigenous uranium reserves IS inadequate to supply its ridiculously overblown atomic energy dream, it is ALREADY stocked with an entire weapon’s arsenal of fissiles.
After blowing vast amounts of India’s scarce economic resources in a pathetically misguided dream to emulate the developed world’s failed nuclear energy quest, all they will be left with is atomic waste and a threatening stockpile of atomic bombs.
//////////
Civilian and Strategic Nuclear Facilities of India
by Dr. A. Gopalakrishnan (former Chairman of the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board of the Government of India)
January 5, 2006
One of the major objectives of the United States in entering into the Indo-US nuclear co-operation agreement is to bring about an early freezing of the Indian weapon-usable nuclear materials stock at the minimum possible level. India, in turn, obviously wants to retain all the accumulated inventory of such materials, as well as the facilities to produce the additional material we consider essential for a minimum deterrence, out of IAEA safeguards.
….
There is a lack of clarity in the public mind about our indigenous natural uranium resources. It is true that we may not have enough processed natural uranium to fuel the five (5) PHWRs currently under construction, when they are ready for initial fuelling in 2006-2008. But, the highest officials of the AEC now reconfirm the view that we have enough natural uranium ores in the country to fuel 10,000 MWe worth of PHWRs, for their life span of about 40 years. The mismatch between production and consumption of uranium has happened because the government approvals for the PHWRs and their construction have speeded up in the last ten years, while the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) still continued to lag behind in their minerals exploration and uranium mining tasks. While waiting for these activities to pick up momentum in the coming five years, the DAE should go ahead and place under IAEA safeguards the 5 PHWRs now in construction, from their dates of initial fuelling with imported natural uranium, so that there need not be any delay in electricity generation. From the time we enter into this Indo-US nuclear deal, our limited indigenous natural uranium will have to be used judiciously for fuelling the Dhruva & CIRUS reactors to the extent we need additional weapons-grade plutonium, and in the first AHWR developmental unit, while the remaining should be used in the un-safeguarded PHWRs for producing as much reactor-grade plutonium as we can to sustain the operation of the first PFBR.
///////////////////
‘We will shut down CIRUS, shift Apsara reactor’
March 07, 2006 14:45 IST
This is the text of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s statement on the discussion on civil nuclear energy cooperation with the United States and implementation of India’s separation plan, made in Parliament on Tuesday:
‘In my statement on February 27, 2006, I had provided an assurance that this august House will be informed of developments in our discussions with the United States on separation of our civilian and military nuclear facilities. I now inform this august House of developments since my suo motu statement of February 27.
The President of the United States, His Excellency Mr George W Bush visited India between March 1-3, 2006. His visit provided our two countries an opportunity to review progress made in deepening our strategic partnership since the Joint Statement issued during my visit to Washington last July.
Our discussions covered the expansion of our ties in the fields of agriculture, economic and trade cooperation, energy security and clean environment, strengthening innovation and the knowledge economy, issues relating to global safety and security and on deepening democracy. Expanded cooperation in each of these areas will have a significant impact on India’s social and economic development.
I have pleasure in informing the House that during President Bush’s visit, as part of the process of promoting cooperation in civilian nuclear energy, an agreement was reached between India and the United States on a Separation Plan. Accordingly, India will identify and separate its civilian and military nuclear facilities and place its
civilian nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards.
I would like to outline some salient elements of the Separation Plan:
India will identify and offer for IAEA safeguards 14 thermal power reactors between 2006-14. There are 22 thermal power reactors in operation or currently under construction in the country. Fourteen of these will be placed under safeguards by 2014 in a phased manner. This would raise the total installed thermal power capacity in megawatts under safeguards from 19% at present to 65% by 2014. I wish to emphasize that the choice of specific nuclear reactors and the phases in which they would be placed under safeguards is an Indian decision. We are preparing a list of 14 reactors that would be offered for safeguards between 2006-14.
We have conveyed that India will not accept safeguards on the Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor and the Fast Breeder Test Reactor, both located at Kalpakkam. The Fast Breeder Programme is at the research and development stage. This technology will take time to mature and reach an advanced stage of development. We do not wish to place any encumbrances on our Fast Breeder programme, and this has been fully ensured in the
Separation Plan.
India has decided to place under safeguards all future civilian thermal power reactors and civilian breeder reactors, and the Government of India retains the sole right to determine such reactors as civilian. This means that India will not be constrained in any way in building future nuclear facilities, whether civilian or military, as per our
national requirements.
India has decided to permanently shut down the CIRUS reactor, in 2010. The fuel core of the Apsara reactor was purchased from France, and we are prepared to shift it from its present location and make it available for placing under safeguards in 2010. Both CIRUS and Apsara are located at the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre. We have decided to take these steps rather than allow intrusive inspections in a nuclear facility of high national security importance. We are determined that such steps will not hinder ongoing Research and Development.
Reprocessing and enrichment capabilities and other facilities associated with the fuel cycle for our strategic programme have been kept out of the Separation Plan.
One of the major points addressed in the Separation Plan was the need to ensure reliability of fuel supplies, given our unfortunate past experience with regard to interruption in supply of fuel for Tarapur. We have received commitments from the United States for the reliable supply of fuel to India for reactors that will be offered for safeguards. The United States has also reaffirmed its assurance to create the necessary conditions for India to have assured and full access to fuel for such reactors. Under the July 18 Joint Statement, the United States is
committed to seeking agreement from its Congress to amend domestic laws and to work with friends and allies to adjust the practices of the Nuclear Suppliers Group to create the necessary conditions for India to
obtain full access to the international market for nuclear fuel, including reliable, uninterrupted and continual access to fuel supplies from firms in several nations. This has been reflected in the formal understandings reached during the visit and included in the Separation Plan.
To further guard against any disruption of fuel supplies for India, the United States is prepared to take other additional steps, such as:
I) Incorporating assurances regarding fuel supply in a bilateral Indo-US agreement on peaceful uses of nuclear energy which would be negotiated.
II) The United States will join India in seeking to negotiate with the IAEA an India-specific fuel supply agreement.
III) The United States will support an Indian effort to develop a strategic reserve of nuclear fuel to guard against any disruption of supply over the lifetime of India’s reactors.
IV) If despite these arrangements, a disruption of fuel supplies to India occurs, the United States and India would jointly convene a group of friendly supplier countries to include countries such as Russia, France and the United Kingdom to pursue such measures as would restore fuel supply to India.
In light of the above understandings with the United States, an India-specific safeguards agreement will be negotiated between India and the IAEA. In essence, an India-specific safeguards would provide on the one hand safeguards against withdrawal of safeguarded nuclear material from civilian use at any time, and on the other permit India to
take corrective measures to ensure uninterrupted operation of its civilian nuclear reactors in the event of disruption of foreign fuel supplies.
Taking this into account, India will place its civilian nuclear facilities under India-specific safeguards in perpetuity and
negotiate an appropriate safeguards agreement to this end with the IAEA. In terms of Separation plan, there is hence assurance of uninterrupted supply of fuel to reactors that would be placed under safeguards together with India’s right to take corrective measures in the event fuel supplies are interrupted. The House can rest assured that India retains its sovereign right to take all appropriate measures to fully safeguard its interests.
During my suo motu statements on this subject made on July 29, 2005, and on February 27, 2006, I had given a solemn assurance to this august House and through the Honorable members to the country, that the Separation Plan will not adversely effect our country’s national security. I am in a position to assure the members that that this is indeed the case. I might mention:
That the separation plan will not adversely affect our strategic programme. There will be no capping of our strategic programme, and the separation plan ensures adequacy of fissile material and other inputs to meet the current and future requirements of our strategic programme, based on our assessment of the threat scenarios. No constraint has been placed on our right to construct new facilities for strategic purposes. The integrity of our Nuclear Doctrine and our ability to sustain a Minimum Credible Nuclear Deterrent is adequately protected. Our nuclear policy will continue to be guided by the principles of restraint and responsibility.
The Separation Plan does not come in the way of the integrity of our three-stage nuclear programme, including the future use of our thorium reserves. The autonomy of our Research and Development activities in the
nuclear field will remain unaffected. The Fast Breeder Test Reactor and the Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor remain outside safeguards. We have agreed, however, that future civilian thermal power reactors and
civilian Fast Breeder Reactors would be placed under safeguards, but the determination of what is civilian is solely an Indian decision.
As I mentioned in my statement on February 27, the Separation Plan has been very carefully drawn up after an intensive internal consultation process overseen by my office. The Department of Atomic Energy and our
nuclear scientific community have been associated with the preparation of the Separation Plan. The chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission and the principal scientific adviser to the Government of India were actively involved closely at every stage. I am in a position to assure honourable members that we have not permitted information of national security significance to be compromised in any way during the negotiations.
I believe that the significance of the July 18, 2005, statement is the prospect it offers for ending India’s nuclear isolation. It will open up prospects for cooperation not only with the US but with countries like Russia, France and other countries with advanced nuclear capabilities, including those from the NSG. The scope for cooperation in the energy
related research will vastly expand, so will cooperation in nuclear research activities. India will be able to join the international mainstream and occupy its rightful place among the top countries of the nuclear community.
There would be a quantum jump in our energy generating capacity with a consequential impact on our GDP growth. It
also ensures India’s participation as a full partner in cutting edge multilateral scientific effort in the nuclear field such as ITER and Generation IV Initiative.
Sir, successful implementation of the July 18 Joint Statement requires reciprocal actions by the United States as well as India. Steps to be taken by India will be contingent upon actions taken by the US. For our part, we have prepared a Separation Plan that identifies those civilian facilities that we are willing to offer for safeguards. The United States government has accepted this Separation Plan. It now intends to approach the US Congress for amending its laws and the Nuclear Suppliers Group for adapting its Guidelines to enable full civilian cooperation between India and the international community.
At the appropriate stage, India will approach the IAEA to discuss and fashion an India-specific safeguards agreement, which will reflect the unique character of this arrangement. Since such a safeguards agreement is yet to be negotiated
it will be difficult to predict its content, but I can assure the House that we will not accept any provisions that go beyond the parameters of the July 18, 2005, statement and the Separation Plan agreed between India and the United States, on March 2, 2006. We are hopeful that this process will move forward in the coming weeks and months.
I would request honourable members to look at this matter through the larger perspective of energy security. Currently, nuclear energy provides only three per cent of our total energy mix. Rising costs and reliability of imported hydrocarbon supplies constitute a major uncertainty at a time when we are accelerating our growth rate. We must endeavor to expand our capabilities across the entire energy spectrum; from clean coal and coal-bed methane, to gas hydrates and wind and solar power. We are actively seeking international partnerships across the board and are members of many international initiatives dedicated to energy.
Indeed, at the end of my talks with President Bush, we announced Indian participation in two more programmes: the Future-Gen programme for zero emission thermal power plants and the Integrated Ocean Drilling Programme for gas hydrates.
The House will appreciate that the search for an integrated policy with an appropriate mix of energy supplies is central to the achievement of our broader economic or social objectives. Energy is the lifeblood of our economy. Without sufficient and predictable access, our aspirations in the social sector cannot be realized. Inadequate power has a deleterious effect in building a modern infrastructure. It has a direct impact on the optimal usage of increasingly scarce water resources. Power shortage is thus not just a handicap in one sector but a drag on the entire economy.
I believe that the needs of the people of India must become the central agenda for our international cooperation. It is precisely this approach that has guided our growing partnership with the United States. I would, in particular, draw attention to the launching of the Knowledge Initiative in Agriculture with a three-year financial commitment to link our universities and technical institutions and businesses to support agricultural education, research, capacity building, including in the area of biotechnology. Our first Green Revolution benefited in substantial measure from assistance provided by the US. We are hopeful that the Knowledge Initiative on Agriculture will become the harbinger of a second Green Revolution in our country.
Sir, India and the United States have much to gain from this new partnership. This was the main underlying theme of our discussions during the visit of President Bush. The resumption of civilian nuclear energy cooperation would demonstrate that we have entered a new and more positive phase of our ties, so that we can finally put behind us years of troubled relations in the nuclear field. I am confident that this is a worthy objective that will receive the full support of this House.’
Yale Simkin wrote:
“After blowing vast amounts of India’s scarce economic resources in a pathetically misguided dream to emulate the developed world’s failed nuclear energy quest, all they will be left with is atomic waste and a threatening stockpile of atomic bombs.”
Funnily, as we blow “vast” amounts of these “scarce” economic resources, our “pathetically misguided dream” indeed appears to be taking shape. All one has to do is compare the economic and human development indices over the last 10 years….er…15 years now actually. Regarding nuclear waste – absence of solution need not necessarily translate into absence of will as you appear to have conceded. Portions of BARC research available in public domain suggests that they are aware of where they should follow and where they need to break new ground.
In fact, the thorium cycle in civilian domain is one of the decent ways to consume the “threatening stockpile” of atomic weapons.
The concerns expressed are extremely touching but no thanks! We are like this onlee – too bull-headed to listen to the learned and wise telling us what is right for us. Having witnessed DAE’s work from reasonably close quarters I shall choose to listen to the Plato’s ghost within.
Thank you Manne for bringing sanity to this discussion. It is indeed baffling to see some self-appointed keepers of international peace discuss the fate of 1 billion Indians, that too as they sit safely behind the safety of a gigantic nuclear umbrella provided by the US.
There is only one reasonable approach to non-proliferation: lead by example. If US decides to disarm completely, I can assure folks here that India will race the US to the finish line of that noble cause. Since that is not going to happen, the next best approach would be to put a lid on this talk defending the Nuclear Toilet Paper “treaty” which India has never signed.
Motilal quoting India’s PM:
Key Points:
========================
”…We have conveyed that India will not accept safeguards on the Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor and the Fast Breeder Test Reactor”
… India has decided to permanently shut down the CIRUS reactor… The fuel core of the Apsara reactor was purchased from France, and we are prepared to shift it from its present location and make it available for placing under safeguards… We have decided to take these steps rather than allow intrusive inspections in a nuclear facility of high national security importance.
… Reprocessing and enrichment capabilities and other facilities associated with the fuel cycle for our strategic programme have been kept out of the Separation Plan…
…the separation plan will not adversely affect our strategic programme. There will be no capping of our strategic programme… No constraint has been placed on our right to construct new facilities for strategic purposes. The integrity of our Nuclear Doctrine and our ability to sustain a Minimum Credible Nuclear Deterrent is adequately protected.
=========================
The Cirus and Apsara are obligated not to be used for weapons (altho that is exactly what they are) so India is shutting them down or moving them. This agreement thus allows India to engage in unrestricted fissile production, while at the same time, legally able to buy training, spare parts, new technologies, and obtain funding to clandestinely feed their war machine.
/////////////////
Manne wrote:
=====================
“Funnily, as we blow “vast” amounts of these “scarce” economic resources, our “pathetically misguided dream” indeed appears to be taking shape. All one has to do is compare the economic and human development indices over the last 10 years….er…15 years now actually. Regarding nuclear waste – absence of solution need not necessarily translate into absence of will as you appear to have conceded. …
In fact, the thorium cycle in civilian domain is one of the decent ways to consume the “threatening stockpile” of atomic weapons.”
======================
Yes, scarce resources. The per capita GDP of India is $500. The US and Japan for comparison is $38,000 per person.
According to UNICEF:
FIFTY -THREE PERCENT of India’s children are malnourished.
“over a third of the world’s malnourished children live in India”.
—
Let me quote the Energy Information Agency of DOE:
“India’s state electricity boards (SEB’s), which run the power distribution infrastructure and own most current generating capacity, are in very poor financial shape, with many of them technically insolvent.”
Consider India’s electricity Transmission and Distribution (T&D) grid:
————————-
“Press Trust of India
New Delhi, February 23, 2006
India’s electricity transmission and distribution losses at 31.05 per cent during 2004-05 are the highest among neghbouring countries in South Asia, the Rajya Sabha was informed on Thursday (by Power Minister Sushilkumar Shinde).
…
An old and weak infrastructure, overloading of existing lines, inadequate funds with states to invest in up-gradation were the main reasons for technical losses, he said.”
———————-
This means that of India’s 126 gigawatts of electricity capacity, THIRTY-NINE GIGAWATTS go down the rathole.
India’s ENTIRE nuclear capacity is a miniscule 3.6 gigawatts.
If India increased its nuclear capacity TEN times it would still not cover the simple waste.
As to nuclear waste disposal, Disney’s First Law: “Wishing Will Make It True” does not apply.
And as to thorium, the plutonium and U233 produced in India’s 3-tier nuclear scheme will create 1,000s of atomic bombs worth of fissiles.——————————————————-
As to the comments of Alok Niranjan…
I will ignore what appears to be ad hominum slurs and instead quote:
“There is only one reasonable approach to non-proliferation: lead by example.”
and
” put a lid on this talk defending the Nuclear Toilet Paper “treaty” which India has never signed.”
Absolutely! The NPT is possibly the worst treaty evr created (even more than the treaties that helped start WW2). It has spread both latent and actual proliferation around the globe. It is not a farce, it is a tragedy.
yale
The Cirus and Apsara are obligated not to be used for weapons (altho that is exactly what they are) so India is shutting them down or moving them. This agreement thus allows India to engage in unrestricted fissile production, while at the same time, legally able to buy training, spare parts, new technologies, and obtain funding to clandestinely feed their war machine.
Jeez, please get a hold!
India’s “war machine” is currently meant to safeguard India- not jump around taking over the world. India has a NFU pledge to boot & has not engaged in any sort of officially sanctioned proliferation.
Now I know that more nukes dont make anyone happy (I am not!) but as long as India remains in an extremely tough neighbourhood, it has to do what it must to safeguard itself.
The world, including India, is on an orgy of arms aquisitions.
It is tragic that nations that cannot even feed themselves are creating atomic bombs, long-range missiles, submarines, aircraft carriers, etc, etc, ad nauseum.
http://www.designsuite.org/wewerehumans/WWH_ingles.swf
Ok my previous message to Mr Simkin didnt get through to be posted..so here we go again…
“Yes, scarce resources. The per capita GDP of India is $500. The US and Japan for comparison is $38,000 per person.”
This is merely the result of not following the capitalistic economic model as used by the US, nor did India get a Marshall plan to recover from two centuries of British economic mismanagement. However, what is creditable is that despite these hurdles and low resources, plus the limitations of a quasi socialist model, India has pursued and become proficient in several sectors of high technology- from aerospace to nuclear science to information technology. These are what are allowing India to proceed on rapid economic growth right now, with an average of 1% of the Indian population pulled out of poverty over the last 15 years. To use this as anything but a positive example is ridiculous.
Mr Simkin notes:
“According to UNICEF:
FIFTY -THREE PERCENT of India’s children are malnourished.
“over a third of the world’s malnourished children live in India”.
So? Would you care to understand how many people the Indian economy has shifted up since 1991? Approximately 150 Million people. UNICEF’s cause is laudable- but the work being done on the ground is by Indians and the present economic growth, which is providing avenues of employment for all sections of Indian society.
To move these people into the middle class median with a decent standard of living, India needs energy in the form of electricity. All the manufacturing jobs, etc wont run on magic. If anything this supports the expansion and rapid growth of the Indian economy given the needs of India.
Furthermore:
“Consider India’s electricity Transmission and Distribution (T&D) grid:
————————-
“Press Trust of India
New Delhi, February 23, 2006
India’s electricity transmission and distribution losses at 31.05 per cent during 2004-05 are the highest among neghbouring countries in South Asia, the Rajya Sabha was informed on Thursday (by Power Minister Sushilkumar Shinde).
…
An old and weak infrastructure, overloading of existing lines, inadequate funds with states to invest in up-gradation were the main reasons for technical losses, he said.”
———————-”
This is what typifies the errors possible in randomly picking statements about a nation which you are unaware about, and then using them to buttress your flawed arguements.
The T&D losses are high because of India’s Govt’s lack of willpower to crack down upon power theft- which is rampant, given that most of those who indulge in power theft are those with limited incomes. In other words, the Indian Govt subsidizes this inefficiency as a social service. Only now are they exploring ways to eliminate this problem or to seek alternative methods to deal with it.
Furthermore, you cant be serious in suggesting that India can now forgo thinking about new sources of energy because of existing inefficiency. As I noted previously, that electricity is already being used- its not merely conventional T&D loss. So you have an option- either India uses its coal reserve and contributes to nasty environmental pollution on a massive scale, competes with the US and the west for Oil (and that will surely help the US) or it can seek alternative sources of power as well.
Lastly, all your statements are essentially tangential. As long as China and Pakistan have nukes and the will to threaten India (which Pak does repeatedly), it would be ludicrous to assume that India would give up nukes. At least please read up on the Indian program with a non jaundiced eye. India went for an open NWS status because of Pak testing the Nodong missile, which threatened the hitherto safeguarded Indian heartland plus deep south. There was no other option but to come out and openly pursue a deterrent program, given the fact that the NPT or whatever treaty didnt matter two hoots in preventing NKorean proliferation to Pak (Nodong series), Chinese proliferation (Nukes and M11s to Pak) whilst the jihadi insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir was being constantly ramped up. India lives in arguably one of the world’s worst neighbourhoods. Now the US can do its bit to ensure that a vast segment of humanity- at 1 Billion – can continue to strive for shared values or leave them to their own devices, whilst continuing to limit their ability to defend themselves under a misplaced Non proliferation rubric. If that arrangement was good enough to prevent overt transfers from the China- NoKo-Pak nexus, India would never have weaponised, but merely kept a R&D program ticking along as a last option.
this yale guy is attempting to insult 1 billion people … but he gets all worked up and screams “ad hominem” if someone so much as points out the hypocrisy of unfair treaties enforced by world’s bullies.
Um, okay, kids. Time to tone it down a little.
Mr Simkin,
Please eschew the rhetoric.
India’s arms expenditure is the lowest in its neighbourhood at 2.7% of its GDP. This when both China and Pak spend far more as a % of their GDP- the former is getting US Aid to the tune of Billions as well.
So, considering the fact that the Govt of India has resisted pressure to even maintain a 3% figure- which is widely accepted as necessary within India itself. Its clear that where India’s priorities lie.
Now all your emotions are all very well and I do agree that in an ideal world, we wouldnt need arms – but spend it on laudable things like cancer research or AIDs or improving (rather restoring)the environment after what we have done to it…the reality is that when I go to a park or a temple or wherever, I want security. I dont want to be blown up. That security is guaranteed by the Govt. And they do what they must.
Also, before beating up on India- what of the amount the US spends each year on defence? Or China? Why the disproportionate harping on India?
All the best,
Akash
You raise good points, Akash. Unfortunately, the NP Ayatollahs will view it as blasphemy.
How long does the world have to wait until the P-5 get mature enough to discuss nuclear weapons seriouly? This undergraduate approach of “what’s mine is mine and what’s yours is negotiable” is quite tiresome.
Fair Warning: That is the last comment that I will approve with the phrase “Nonproliferation Ayatollah.”
Fair enough. Would you approve “Nonproliferationally Motivated Hypocritical Bigots”?
I think “hypocrite” is probably sufficient.
Yale Simkin says:
The world, including India, is on an orgy of arms aquisitions.
It is tragic that nations that cannot even feed themselves are creating atomic bombs, long-range missiles, submarines, aircraft carriers, etc, etc, ad nauseum.—————-
I am sort of curious. Is Mr. Yale justifying something here? Are nations “who manage to feed themselves” somehow justified in acquiring nukes? What else would explain his comment?
Is war, in Mr. Tale’s view, a necessary outcome of the ability to feed oneself?
It would seem that Mr. Yale Simkin has been soundly defeated—good for the rest of the world.
“It would seem that Mr. Yale Simkin has been soundly defeated—good for the rest of the world.”
????
I just tracked back to this thread while using the archive search while looking for something else.
“Defeated”?? what is this, a gladiatorial contest?
I had bailed out of this thread as soon as it started triggering completely uncalled for tantrums.
This sure is no way for grownups to act.
yale