1.In his speech at yesterdays IAEA Board Meeting Director General El-Baradei noteworthly distanced himself from the language used by the EU-3, when saying: “The Agency continues to monitor installations related to Iran´s enrichment programmes, and has not observed any deviation from Iran´s voluntary suspension of enrichment activities. Iran has continued to conduct uranium conversion activities at its Esfahan facility. The Agency has been verifying this activity, and all UF6 produced so far at this facility remains under Agency containment and surveillance.”
For the EU-3 uranium conversion is part of the uranium enrichment process. Starting conversion caused the EU-3 to suspend talks with Iran in August.
2. Any solution to be found with Iran will require several elements, to include
a) no singularization of the country, e.g. no legally binding commitments no other country had to enter;
b) an answer to Iran’s security dilemma, perceived vice versa Israel and the U.S.; with all likelihood this could only work if bilateral contact with the U.S. were restored;
c) a credible prospect for a future Middle East security concept positively reflecting Iran’s role as a regional power.
I think your previous post demonstrates one of the benefits of the current inspection process. Simply put, when you ask for a lot of documentation on the history of these programs, if a country tries to fudge it, they’ll eventually get caught. This was the same case for the DPRK in the early 90’s and we’re seeing it again in Iran now.
There have been some tougher than usual BOG statements as a result (i.e. – UK), but the question now is if this will have any serious traction in moving the Iranian case forward to the security council, or away from a bomb.
I think you should emphasize that this is not so much a near term threat as a long one. The sheer scale of the planned civilian program would have major geopolitical significance if even partially used for military purposes.
Find a way to make “bombing wont work” sound like something that isn`t about the size of bombs or balls. Preferably without using words like “dispersed”.
In my opinion, one of the strengths of your blog is your insistence that evidence be provided for claims.
A good part of the media seem to have Iran months away from a nuclear-tipped assault on the US.
Without downplaying the threat of nuclear proliferation, you might take an epistemological tack: ‘What do we really know, and how do we really know it?’
Maybe that would help some people to take a deep breath, and think seriously about the next steps to be taken.
Lewis on MSNBC
1.In his speech at yesterdays IAEA Board Meeting Director General El-Baradei noteworthly distanced himself from the language used by the EU-3, when saying: “The Agency continues to monitor installations related to Iran´s enrichment programmes, and has not observed any deviation from Iran´s voluntary suspension of enrichment activities. Iran has continued to conduct uranium conversion activities at its Esfahan facility. The Agency has been verifying this activity, and all UF6 produced so far at this facility remains under Agency containment and surveillance.”
For the EU-3 uranium conversion is part of the uranium enrichment process. Starting conversion caused the EU-3 to suspend talks with Iran in August.
2. Any solution to be found with Iran will require several elements, to include
a) no singularization of the country, e.g. no legally binding commitments no other country had to enter;
b) an answer to Iran’s security dilemma, perceived vice versa Israel and the U.S.; with all likelihood this could only work if bilateral contact with the U.S. were restored;
c) a credible prospect for a future Middle East security concept positively reflecting Iran’s role as a regional power.
I think your previous post demonstrates one of the benefits of the current inspection process. Simply put, when you ask for a lot of documentation on the history of these programs, if a country tries to fudge it, they’ll eventually get caught. This was the same case for the DPRK in the early 90’s and we’re seeing it again in Iran now.
There have been some tougher than usual BOG statements as a result (i.e. – UK), but the question now is if this will have any serious traction in moving the Iranian case forward to the security council, or away from a bomb.
that’s cool.
I think you should emphasize that this is not so much a near term threat as a long one. The sheer scale of the planned civilian program would have major geopolitical significance if even partially used for military purposes.
Tell them “the bombing begins in five minutes.”
That should keep them busy for a while.
Find a way to make “bombing wont work” sound like something that isn`t about the size of bombs or balls. Preferably without using words like “dispersed”.
Maybe you could find something that sounds like “the air force thinks bombing wont work (in the long run)” (http://www.usafa.af.mil/df/inss/OCP/ocp59.pdf)
In my opinion, one of the strengths of your blog is your insistence that evidence be provided for claims.
A good part of the media seem to have Iran months away from a nuclear-tipped assault on the US.
Without downplaying the threat of nuclear proliferation, you might take an epistemological tack: ‘What do we really know, and how do we really know it?’
Maybe that would help some people to take a deep breath, and think seriously about the next steps to be taken.
Anyway, just my thoughts.
Good luck.
Congratulations and well done!