KCN-eh? April’s other North Korea Developments – Part 1

Andrea Berger 0:02

Flonk, first lady of North Korea. You're listening to the Arms Control Wong podcast, the leading podcast on arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation. My name is Andrea Berger, and I'm a senior research associate at the Montgomery Institute of International Studies at Monterey. I have a wonderful guest with me today. I'm joined by Ramon Pacheco-Pardo, who's the Korea Foundation for University of And a senior lecturer here at King's College London.

And if he's not on everyone's circuit when they come to Europe to talk about Korea issues, he should be. Ramon and I have known each other for a few years, and we always have fantastic chats about DPRK and Northeast Asia issues. So happy to have him here again to talk to us. Welcome, Ramon.

Ramon Pacheco-Pardo 0:49

Thank you very much.

Andrea 0:51

So we are splitting the KCNA podcast into two this month because it struck me that we have absolutely loads to talk about. So next week, I'm going to be recording another podcast in Geneva with Antoine Bondaz from FRS. But in the meantime, we've got a whole bunch of things we've got to rattle through. We've got to talk about The Kim Jong-un visit to Beijing.

We've got to talk about Pompeo to Pyongyang. Has anyone else gone anywhere that we need to talk about Abe to Washington? And then we're going to talk a little bit about preparations for the inter-Korean summit and for the U.S. DPRK summit and a bit about Kim Jong-un's recent promises to stop various forms of provocations like nuclear testing and ICBM testing.

So, Lots there. Where should we start?

Ramon 1:48

I think we can start with the visit to China, actually. Kim Jong-un's visit to China. I mean, in a sense, because there was all this discussion about China passing, China becoming secondary to inter-Korean relations and North Korea-US relations. And sadly, we're all surprised to see a train actually crossing the border. There was a speculation about who was in the train and it turned out it was Kim Jong-un, which I think put China, if not at the center of Korean Peninsula first, definitely gave it a seat at the table.

So we have to try to understand what Xi Jinping is trying to achieve. In my view, what Xi Jinping wants is not only the seat at the table, obviously, But now the discussions about even a potential peace treaty, at the very least there is going to be discussions about having a multilateral forum, the potential of easing sanctions on North Korea in exchange for denuclearization, and China wants to be leading the discussion on all these matters.

And I think Xi Jinping actually has changed his position, he has realized he has to be more involved in North Korea at first, and that's what he's trying to achieve.

Andrea 2:53

Do you think he wants to lead the discussion or is it more about him wanting to make sure that the Chinese position is reflected in, in discussions in rooms that, that Xi Jinping is not going to be in? Is it about leadership or is it about just, you know, having the Chinese voice there? Cause the Chinese have also for some time said that, you know, this is a problem that comes from the U S DPRK relationship and the U S and DPRK have the responsibility to fix it, so to speak.

Do you see them changing that or what is this about?

Ramon 3:26

I think they definitely want their voice to be heard, but I also think going back to the 2000s, the Chinese were very proud about how they were leading the process during the Six-Party Talks. It is true that we are not talking about the resumption of Six-Party Talks, and apparently many people have said these are dead, but I don't think that China wants to be secondary at this point in time that could be actually quite historic if there is reconciliation between the US and North Korea.

So I think they want a bit more. Than simply having a seat at the table and having their voice heard. And I say this among other things because what we have seen is now China sending more envoys to North Korea, to South Korea, to the US, China agreeing to a trilateral meeting with Japan and South Korea. So I don't think it's only about...

Having the seat at the table. I also think, I mean, at the end of the day, if we sit down with North Korea to discuss a peace treaty, well, China has to be one of the signatories, right? And I don't think China would be, yeah, China wouldn't be happy just to have a piece of paper shelf out there and they can say, well, we're happy with this, right?

They would want to shape the agreement.

Andrea 4:35

What about for Kim Jong-un? What do you think the meeting and the timing of the meeting signaled? How important, for example, in North Korean leadership politics is it that his first meeting with a foreign head of state or government was going to be with the Chinese? Is that something that So did he basically have to squeeze it in before he started meeting, having other high level summits?

Or was this actually about coordination of policy more than that? Or indeed, you know, a mixture of things?

Ramon 5:06

I think it's a mixture of you say, but I also think that this was the meeting between the top leader of North Korea and the top leader of China, in which the North Korean leader wasn't going to beg to the Chinese for something. They could go from a position of strength. It's not like one of the business that you have with Kim Jong-un, in which they were asking for support, for example, to some sort of policy, maybe even a discussion about the economic reform, if some people...

Think this was going to happen maybe under Kim Jong-il. I think with Kim Jong-un he went and said look I'm having this summit with Trump, with President Trump, I'm having a summit with South Korea so yes I'm visiting you. I don't know if he's squeezing in the visit or not but what I'm going to do here is I'm going to have a discussion from head of state to head of government to head of government and we're going to talk face to face and from a position of strength with the Chinese.

But I also think that If there's going to be any agreement, China is going to be part of the guarantee of the agreement being implemented, right? Regardless of the distrust that there might be between North Korea and China, I know that they are allies, right? They have an alliance that, as far as we know, hasn't been revoked, right?

So China will be part of the implementation of the agreement. So I think that North Korea might be thinking, if not ahead, at least thinking, well, If we have a successful summit with South Korea, if we have a successful summit with the U.S., we need to have the Chinese on board, right? Especially if economic reform is going to be part of the mixture.

So I think that was also important from the perspective of Kim Jong-un.

Andrea 6:39

I completely agree with you on the position of strength thing. And this is actually so interesting because if you assume that's how the North Koreans went into the meeting in China... Then it's definitely going to be part of their thinking about how they go into other meetings, coming at this from a position of strength. And I think we can come back to that when we analyze some of the recent statements and proclamations from Kim Jong-un about making confidence-building measures, if you can call them that, with relation to ICBM and nuclear testing.

I had a few noteworthy details that I thought were worthwhile talking about from the Kim visit to Beijing. You noted a bit about the family members, so maybe talk to me about that one first.

Ramon 7:28

What I find interesting is that his wife actually had a prominent role during the visit. I mean, for me, this shows two things. A, that Kim Jong-un is trying to have a different type of approach to diplomacy from his father and even his grandfather. So his wife, his sister, you know, can be the face of North Korean diplomacy and not only him.

So I think That's more substantial than we think. I mean, obviously, it means that he's trying to present himself as a normal leader, as people say, but also that he's willing to delegate to an extent diplomacy to some other people in a way that you see in other countries, but we haven't seen North Korea basically since the foundation of the country, you could argue.

But secondly, I think that he's trying to soften his image, right? And this is... Very common political trick, all politicians use it. But for the North Koreans is a big step, right? They don't want to show themselves as the absolute leader of the country, a semi-god in the country. They say, well, I'm a family person. Look, my wife is coming with me.

She's smiling at the camera. So this is very popular from what we know in North Korea. And I think that's important that he's trying to To show himself in a different way. We don't know how substantial this will be down the road, especially when it comes to the two summits that we have upcoming. But I think, at least in terms of style, it shows that North Korea wants to present itself in a different way.

Andrea 8:55

Yeah, so Ri Sol Ju was very much playing the first lady role and was, as you say, very prominent. Was there and all the photos and part of that imagery of the meeting. And it did look very much like a The type of summit you would expect with all the kind of media glitz from other countries. I don't know if we have to come up with an acronym for her.

FLOTUS. FLONK. First Lady of North Korea. But yeah, I thought, so in addition to the family members, I thought it was really noteworthy who got wheeled out from both delegations and both countries really brought some big fish in. The North Koreans had Cho Rang-hae there, who's one of, I guess, the few, maybe the only remaining kind of old guard from the predecessor days.

Ramon 9:58

At least in such a high level position, yes.

Andrea 10:01

Yeah, so he's vice chairman of the now DPRK State Affairs Commission, which replaced the National... Defense commission. When was that last year, the year before?

Ramon 10:12

I think a couple of years ago already. No.

Andrea 10:14

Yeah. And, and there were three, if I remember correctly, vice chairman of the workers party central committee that came along also on the Chinese side, you had a whole bunch of high level individuals as well. Interestingly, I thought also. Song Tao, who is the head of the International Liaison Department of the CPC Central Committee, Went to Dandong to get on the train and greet the train at Dandong.

And the North Koreans thanked him profusely for that. So he came along with the delegation as well. In DPRK media, they really highlighted this as having been something that reflects the importance of the visit, right? They came to the border to meet the train. And this was something the North Koreans appreciated. You saw then as well in other parts of DPRK propaganda, Their emphasis on, again, the glitz around the visit, you know, there were 21 motorcycles in the motorcade and like all this sort of stuff, right?

So the message that they wanted to communicate domestically was Kim Jong-un went to China and we had the red carpet rolled out for us. And I thought that was so clear from reading some of those statements that that was what they wanted to drive home.

Ramon 11:34

Yeah, and not only that, I think they tried to drive this message, as you say, but I think actually the Chinese wanted to drive this message as well. They wanted to drive the message of Luke. Yeah, indeed. You are important to us. We're also important for you, obviously. This is obvious. But you are important to us. So we're going to give you the, well, the best treatment we actually can.

As you said, the fact that so many people in high-level positions took the time to meet with the North Korean delegation, considering that China today is a global superpower and they're basic people, and actually they took the time to do this, I think it shows that China is taking this seriously as well. And obviously the North Koreans must be loving this.

Andrea 12:11

Yeah. Okay, so... That's that's Kim to Beijing. What about Pompeo to Pyongyang? Were you surprised to hear that that visit happened over the Easter break?

Ramon 12:23

I was surprised. I mean, I was surprised. Me too. And we have to say, yes, I didn't expect that. Absolutely. And not only that, I mean. You see the message coming out of Washington is that people in Washington were surprised, so people who actually were close to Pompeo actually didn't know about the Mesite, apparently. I mean, this is the highest ever level, the highest level ever Mesite since Madeline Albright actually went to Pyongyang, almost 20 years ago, and it was in 2000, right?

So, I think it shows, A, the seriousness of the Trump administration, because there have been doubts about how serious he is about this. He's just trying to get a diplomatic victory for the midterm elections, for example. You see this discussion in the U.S. And this shows that this is serious, actually. It also shows that the Trump administration thinks that something can be extracted, because the visit has taken place and the summit between Trump and Kim is still going ahead.

I think if the visit had gone wrong, probably would have seen many more doubts, maybe even the Pompeo people planting this in the media, saying, well, the visit didn't go well, so whatever Trump says, you know, we don't think this will lead to anything, and we have seen that this hasn't happened. And he did meet with Kim Jong-un.

Some people say, well, this is not surprising, but you don't know. I mean, you go to North Korea and sometimes you don't get to meet the top leader. And that's what happened to delegations in the past, right? So he went straight to the top, straight to the person who is taking decisions, right? And who is leading the process from North Korea, which I think shows that, yes, the North Koreans are serious themselves.

And this is not only... A propaganda coup, or it's not only a way of showing to the rest of the world, look, we're meeting the Americans, we're at the, at the table now. interestingly, very little has leaked from the VC. They're having some reports today coming out of Japanese media, exactly from Asahi, who was reporting.

Andrea 14:25

Some really granular details, actually, about what supposedly happened in these meetings between Pompeo and Kim Jong-un, including quotes from Kim Jong-un. And I'm a little bit cautious when taking those at face value, just because it's one source. It presumably, to be true, would have had to come from someone who was sat in the room. And now there's this echo chamber happening around that one story.

But it is interesting. Nevertheless, if it does prove to have some accuracy to it, then there's some really interesting details that have been leaked.

Ramon 15:03

Yes, I mean, it's not to dismiss, obviously, what has been published, but I do agree that there is so much detail that unless it comes from someone who was at the table, as you said, how can this information come out? I mean, there was this quote about we have fire in our belly, for example.

Andrea 15:20

Yeah, that Kim Jong-un felt some sort of... You know, relatability to Pompeo because they both had supposedly fire in their belly to get a process of engagement going between the US and DPRK. Yeah, yeah. Which is, you know, a direct quote from Kim Jong-un. It's not something that can easily get leaked to the press, let's put it that way.

Ramon 15:42

Exactly, yes. And I also think that I mean, obviously everyone in U.S. media has been behind this story, right? And the fact that nothing has come out, I don't know, New York Times, Washington Post, Wall Street Journal, that have published many of the scoops actually have been coming out from U.S. media, I find it surprising. So that goes back to the point that we were discussing before, that the fact that so little has leaked out From the visit and you would expect someone who has been there to try to plant some stories in the media at the very least if not some leak taking place you know people having a beer and you hear something for example right or something someone says something that shouldn't have been said in that in that context so I think for me this reinforces the seriousness of the of the situation that the visit was not there to test the waters

Among public opinion. It was to test the water for the Trump administration. What can they extract from the U.S.? I also find interesting that the visit happened... Well, the appointment, as the secretary said, hasn't been ratified yet. So the visit happened during this transition process between intelligence...

Andrea 16:56

I got a lot of questions about this from media. Everyone wanted to know, is this another data point basically in... The campaign of the subordination of State Department under the Trump administration, basically? And is this, you know, intelligence, you know, being given what is ultimately a diplomatic process when they shouldn't have it?

Ramon 17:17

But what is your thought on this, actually?

Andrea 17:20

My feeling is that that's probably an over-reading. I know, you know, there is a lot of evidence that there's been a dismantling of State Department in a downplaying of its role, and I think that's really regrettable. I'm not convinced that this is necessarily a good example of that. We've had in the past the use of intelligence channels to facilitate diplomatic objectives with the DPRK, whether that's a consular issue, getting Americans out of prison, or it's something else.

These channels have been used before. They obviously exist. So there's I guess there's, there's precedent there. Now precedent isn't always significant. What I actually think in this case is probably more significant is just that Trump wanted someone to go that he has confidence in and you know, confidence from Trump is something that is admittedly fleeting, but Pompeo seems to have it right now.

And so it's not in that context, totally surprising that you would have him going to Pyongyang to test the waters for Trump. Trump doesn't want to get egg on his face. Like Obama did with the 2012 leap day deal. So, you know, I'm sure part of Pompeo's discussion in Pyongyang was to say, okay, this whole denuclearization business, is it credible?

I'm going to guess that was one of the things that was discussed because obviously he seems to have come back to Washington and this narrative that the North Koreans are prepared to denuclearize, we can talk about what that means, but the narrative came back with Pompeo So whatever was said in that room in Pyongyang, it must have included something here.

Otherwise, I don't think you would see the White House reiterating this quite so often.

Ramon 19:11

I mean, for me, that must have been the main point of discussion from an American perspective. That's what the U.S. wants. Well, that's what the international community actually wants, the nuclearization of North Korea. So I don't see Pompeo going to North Korea not to have this at the main point of discussion. And I agree with you that if you come back from the visit And the sum is still going ahead, that's because you think denuclearization is on the table, right?

Yes, and later on we can discuss what does this actually mean, but at the very least Pompeo himself, he thinks that denuclearization means what we all think from a human perspective would mean, right? That it's complete CVID, basically, right? Verification of complete denuclearization of the North Korean nuclear arsenal, otherwise there would be no point in having the discussion.

Whether this is going to be offered in the end or not is something we can discuss, but at least there are people in the US administration who think, well, this is at least one of the cards that North Korea is willing to put on the table. And I also think, yes, this wasn't related really to the appointment of Pompeo.

I mean, the visit was secret. It was before he ran into trouble with the appointment process. Apparently now seems it's going to be confirmed, but it was beforehand. So I don't think it was really related to that. It was more to having someone who is on the same line of thought with Trump, who can actually report directly to him and say, look, this is what we were told.

And obviously delivering the message from Trump, because obviously North Koreans will have asked him, OK, what is the US willing to offer? Is it a peace treaty? Is it economicated straight away or after some time? So I think it was a dark channel of communication more than anything.

Andrea 20:53

But it seems like the U.S. is setting up in terms of the broad contours of an agreement is a really grand bargain, if you can call it that. It seems to want denuclearization in China. Whatever form it describes on the day. And, you know, we see now statements coming out from the white house with different definitions. I think the media pushed the white house to define what denuclearization meant.

So, you know, okay, pick the definition on whatever day that you're asking, but it seems to want denuclearization and verifiable denuclearization and is prepared to talk about exchanging something big for it. And so, You know, these, these smaller freeze type arrangements or More interim steps are not things that the White House seems to really have any interest in.

I think it rejects the idea that you can build trust and confidence over time to get you more sustainable progress. It sounds like Trump is of the opinion that, you know, as he sort of talked about on the campaign trail, that you can get in a room with Kim Jong-un, have a hamburger and hash this all out and it'll go well.

I don't know if that's your view as well, but it seems to stand in contrast to what the South Koreans are starting to set up, which is a longer term engagement process that does have a bit more phasing to it and doesn't put denuclearization up front in a deal. Is that correct? Is that your sense as well?

Ramon 22:29

For me, the interesting thing is that South Korea has Moon Jae-in as president, a liberal president who everyone thought, you know, he will come in and first day in office, he's going to offer aid and he's going to ask for family reunions. And I think it's going to be going back to even the year 2000, not even the 2007 with the previous summit.

And he has been very cautious, partly because of... Public opinion at home that there is a distrust of North Korea and he knew very clearly in South Korea, but he's been cautious throughout the whole time and saying, well, we're going to start a process and then we're going to reach an agreement and they're going to be confidence building measures and we'll see what happens, right?

And they usually have a conservative or a republican in power. Nobody will have taken the cautious line, right? Even going back to the Bush years, you know, step-by-step process. And yes, the message is completely the opposite. It's okay, let's reach the grand bargain and forget about everything else. Because what we want is denuclearization, period. We don't want anything else.

That's what I want from North Korea. And what do they want? And let's see what we're going to offer. I'm not saying that the U.S. is going to offer the room all of troops, but for example, you see the message coming from the White House and from the administration is that we're talking about the security of the U.S. That's right, yeah.

Andrea 23:44

And that came out in Pompeo's confirmation hearing a bit as well. It caused alarm amongst some of the strategic policy community in the U.S. when he kept talking about the U.S.-centric nature of Their interest in discussions with the DPRK.

Ramon 23:59

It is, and it seems that this summit is taking place because now North Korea has strike capability in the US mainland, right? Not because of the troops that the US has in Seoul or in Okinawa, for example, never mind Japanese or South Korean nationals, right? I mean, this is happening because the US wants to stop the threat to its mainland, right?

So I think that that's quite interesting in the sense that if that's what you want, then you can have the grand bargain. Say, okay, scrap all these things that is actually threatening the US mainland. And then in return... Maybe not, as I said, the complete removal of troops, so we can scale down our presence in the region.

You know, you want economic aid, you want to be strategic, you want an embassy, you know, here you have your embassy, for example, or at least a liaison office, you know, with a charge of affairs. So I find that interesting, that in a grand bargain, all these things are on the table.

Andrea 24:55

So just back on the US-centric point for a minute, there was an interesting twist with the Abe visit to Washington, because... It did then seem in the immediate aftermath of that visit that the us narrative momentarily changed to also including other weapons of mass destruction for example, in kind of the scope of what was to be discussed between Trump and Kim.

And that sounds like it must've been something that the Japanese insisted upon in order to widen the scope here. And that would have been also because of Regional issues here. A denuclearization deal that leaves short or medium range missiles on the table also means that those missiles can deliver other forms of weapons of mass destruction, right? So it seems logical that one of the US alliance partners in the region would have said, hey, hold on a second.

We've got some enduring concerns in You know, in the arrangement that you're scoping out here, that's going to leave us vulnerable potentially to other continuing WMD threats from North Korea. Please raise these as well. So I don't know, maybe this is shifting now that it's going to be slightly less US centric, or maybe this is just, you know, Trump had some great chocolate cake.

Ingested those requests from Abe for a minute and he'll forget about them again tomorrow. Who knows?

Ramon 26:23

I think to us, I think when it comes to discussion on the day, I think Japanese and South Korean concerns are going to be secondary. That's my hunch. And I say this not only because of, yes, Japan insisting on, please put all these other things on the table. And the US momentarily saying, okay, we'll put this on the table and we'll see in two weeks time, to be honest, I think we'll go back to the previous discussion.

But I also see an interesting twist in South Korea that there was this talk about first we have the inter-Korean summit and then we have the US North Korea summit. And now the Moon government is insisting on a trilateral summit. And I think partly this is because of distrust of what the US might put on the table.

So the bilateral summit would mean that if Trump says, or the US side says, or A, B, and C, South Korea say, well, but, you know, B and C, why don't we tweak it? Because from a South Korean perspective, and I think that's what's happening with Japan as well, that Japan is trying to put all the pressure as possible on the Trump government, actually, to put this on the table.

But I actually think that when it comes to discussion on the day, I think it's going to be really about the US and North Korea. I'm not going to say that Japanese and South Korean concerns are going to be completely dismissed, but if North Korea offers something that is, from an American perspective, sufficient, to what extent South Korean and Japanese concerns are going to be taken into consideration I don't think it's going to be a top issue.

I mean, if you see the statements coming out from officials who have worked under the Obama or Bush administrations, they are the ones that are actually most concerned about their allies. It's not us from Europe who are concerned about this, or it's not the Chinese, for example, expressing their concern about this. It is the people who have been working for a very long period of time on the alliance with South Korea and Japan who think that the alliance might be abandoned.

I mean, we have seen, for example, the discussion about the abduction issue, which is crucial from a Japanese perspective.

Andrea 28:25

The Japanese asked the South Koreans to raise that too, right? So they've been messaging to both South Korea and Washington to raise certain things in their discussions with North Korea.

Ramon 28:34

Yeah, because no one is mentioning this. I mean, no one's discussing this at all.

Andrea 28:38

Yeah. So you did this fabulous piece for War on the Rocks that we'll put in the show notes for this episode. And one of the things that you talk about, I think, is how the meeting that's coming up in the next few days between North and South from the South Korean perspective might be to set up some sort of framework for discussion that the U.S. can fall into as well.

So some sort of roadmap out into the future for the engagement process. They obviously want to have continuing momentum in this engagement process. And you really say that, you know, this is the summit that we need to watch. And it's going to be important for setting the stage for what comes with Trump and Kim. Talk to me a little bit about that, what the South Koreans probably want to get out of this meeting.

Some of the background to maybe the timings as well. Why is this something that Moon Jae-in has been pushing to happen so fast? Give me your sense of that.

Ramon 29:40

I think my view, and I know there are those who disagree, is that from a South Korean perspective, There has been a shift and South Korea should be driving the relationship with North Korea. I wouldn't say at the expense of the alliance with the US, but even if it affects the alliance with the US. So the thinking being that, yes, the alliance with the US obviously is very important.

But at the end of the day, if we want to have better relations with North Korea, let's see what we have to put on the table. Let's see what the North Koreans put on the table. And as I said, if this weakens the alliance with the US, well, so be it. Because at the end of the day, maybe we're not one Korea, but we're the same people, all this rhetoric that you have in South Korea.

I also think that Moon himself, being a liberal who was... Organizing the previous summit in 2007. I think we saw the mistakes from that summit. I mean, firstly, it came basically three months, I think, yeah, three months or a couple of months actually before the elections that were taking place. And the thinking back then from the liberal government was that even if we have a conservative government replacing us, it happened with Immunbag, they will be constrained by this agreement.

And obviously that wasn't the case. The government came and said, you know what, this agreement, it was signed by the Nomokyo administration, liberal, we have nothing to do with it, they changed policy. So I think that Moog is trying to have the summit as early as possible in his administration to say, look, I have four years to implement any agreement.

Andrea 31:15

To give it shelf life, right?

Ramon 31:17

Yes, exactly. And even if in four years' time we have a conservative government, at the very least, if we have four years of engagement, and interestingly, you see how even conservatives in South Korea have not been negative towards the summit, then it will be very difficult to roll everything back. But at the same time, what Moon is doing, and I think that was a mistake from Moon, Previous agreements being reached by liberal governments in South Korea, is that South Korea was seen, and in my view was given too much, with too little in return.

A family reunion here, some joint economic project there, but there wasn't, for example, any sort of guarantee that the North Koreans were going to stop their tests, for example, of an air and mine nuclear test, but even a missile test. We didn't have the hotline that has been set up so if there was even if it was an accident between the North Koreans and South Koreans we didn't know from a South Korean perspective is this an accident or is it the North Koreans you know starting a provocation against the South Koreans I'm talking for example about the Jongpyong shelling it wasn't an accident But now if you have the hotline, if something similar happens, you can say, well, this is someone in the KPA that has gone astray.

This is not North Korean policy, something like that.

Andrea 32:30

Yeah, I think it's actually a really important, positive story that's come out in the last month that that hotline has been set up because it is potentially a hugely important tool for crisis communication. And we shouldn't downplay the importance of that step.

Ramon 32:48

And, and really, you know, how positive that is. So small steps, but important ones. Yes, I mean, and absolutely, and, and I think at that point, I think I tried to make in the piece, I mean, there was this, a really nice cartoon in Chungang Ilbo that saw a car, actually, and you had a Moon Jane driving the car with Kim Jong-un sitting next to him, and then on the backseat you actually had Trump.

Putin and Xi Jinping, and then you had Abe trying to get into the car. I find it quite funny, but I think this actually shows that...

Andrea 33:21

I'm surprised they put Putin in the car.

Ramon 33:23

I was surprised myself. I think this was about a month ago, so maybe now Putin would be not in the car. He would be behind Abe probably now.

Andrea 33:31

Putin's probably, like, having a smoke on the sidewalk or something.

Ramon 33:36

True, actually. But I find it interesting because there is this sense, and Chana Gilbo's case is the less conservative of the conservative newspapers, but it's a conservative newspaper. So what you see now is that even the conservatives are behind Moon, at least to see what happens. Because they see last year the discussion in South Korea was South Korea passing and Trump talking directly to Abe and talking directly to Xi Jinping about South Korean affairs or inter-Korean affairs and now nobody talks about this anymore so I saw this poll on over the weekend 80% of South Koreans would be positive towards a peace treaty for example if it comes on to that and 70-75% are supportive of Moon to a large extent Which is huge.

It's huge. I mean, 70% for any leader in any democracy of support, we don't see it anywhere else, right?

Andrea 34:24

And at a time, we were talking the other day about local elections coming up in South Korea and how actually it's not That common, I guess, that foreign policy plays a role in domestic elections, including in South Korea. But it seems like this really could be a time where actually people are watching that and where any collapse or disaster in this process could have ramifications in the local elections in South Korea, but equally any continued sustained progress May secure positive outcomes for Moon from his perspective in those elections.

Ramon 35:06

Yes, yes. And what is interesting is I think that in the presidential election last year, the North Korea issue was being overplayed because it was to a large extent in South Korea was really about the economics and we want to clean politics. And that was what Moon was talking about. So North Korea was important, but not as important.

And now we're at the risk of doing the opposite, that we might downplay the North Korea issue because these are local elections. But Moon is presenting this as our approach and process that A, has stopped discussion about a potential strike on North Korea. And there was fear among some South Korean quarters last year. Is there going to be a strike on North Korea?

What does this mean for South Korea? Well, we know what it means, right?

Andrea 35:47

Yeah, we could be going to war, right?

Ramon 35:48

Yeah, so he can actually say this time and time again. Look, we're not talking about a bloody no strike anymore. And secondly, there's this perception in South Korea that 10 years of Not conservative government, but the fact that the conservative governments were following a policy of little rapprochement with North Korea has led to nothing, has led to a nuclear North Korea.

So we have to give this a try. And I think that South Korea, the Moon government, or the Liberal Party actually, is going to present this during the elections. The economy, I think, is still going to dominate the elections, but obviously if the summits go well, the two upcoming summits, then they can say, well, where were we last year?

Where are we this year? Please vote for us.

Andrea 36:29

Yeah so in, in terms of, let's talk about the peace treaty for a second, because that's been one that's gotten a lot of kind of media attention when it was raised by the South Koreans this month as, as a potential, well, actually as an objective for the inter-Korean dialogue process, and, and there was some suggestion that actually there could be a push for a peace treaty quite soon.

What did you make of that? Because I think, well, we've always talked about the peace treaty as something that comes as one of the latter chapters in this story after you've built sufficient trust and confidence that smaller scale agreements are going to be durable, that both sides are sticking to their end of the bargain. And that therefore, if you try to change the broader security and relationship between Adversaries in the region that that will be durable too.

And the interesting thing about putting the peace treaty up front is that it's one of those things where you can't Unsign a peace treaty, to put it that way, right? Like, you can unwind the benefits that North Korea might have derived from a peace treaty. But once you sign that peace treaty, the Korean War is over. And it is not realistic to suggest that we're going to declare war on North Korea again in the Unless perhaps John Bolton has his way.

But it's really interesting that front-loading that is there because it's not something that's reversible. Now, maybe that's a good thing, but it also comes with risk.

Ramon 38:12

I think there are two interesting things about this. I mean, if you look at the original statement from Moon, Moon himself didn't talk about a peace treaty. He talked about reconciliation. It was reported by, I think, Moon Hwa Daily, one of the conservative newspapers in South Korea, as a peace treaty. But then the Moon Guard didn't go back and say, no, we didn't say that.

So the Moon Guard said, okay, the peace treaty idea is out there. We said reconciliation. The peace treaty idea is out there. We are not going to say, well, we're talking about reconciliation only. They have allowed the discussion to follow under these parameters, peace treaty. So I think my impression is that Once this idea picked up, the South Korean government wants to test the waters and see what people think about it.

It is true that there have been, I don't think ministers, but they have people in different ministries who have talked about the possibility of peace treaty now, after the ideas out there. So what we see is that, maybe again going back to the point we discussed before, South Koreans seem to be being a bit cautious in the beginning.

This idea by alluding to peace treaty and they have actually gone with the flow. So now what we see is that the latest discussion in South Korea what I saw over the weekend is that again this is not coming directly from the Blue House as far as I know but from people working in the different ministers the Blue House can always say well this is not us this is idea coming from a ministry if it comes down to that is that If we're discussing a peace treaty, let's carry on with this discussion.

Now, if we carry on a discussion about peace treaty, it is not only going to be a discussion, it's not only going to be a document that says this is the end of the Korean War, right? There's also going to be points about what steps do we take to proceed with national reconciliation. That's a discussion you start to see, national reconciliation, which is not the same as inter-Korean reconciliation, right?

Because it assumes that it's a single country. So you see this being Discussed in some of the left-wing media, for example, right? So this could all be part of a peace treaty. So I think this is the first interesting point that the initial discussion came from a conservative newspaper, but the Moon government has gone with it.

Andrea 40:15

And it framed it differently as more of a process that Falls within an umbrella of a peace treaty discussion rather than about immediately signing the peace treaty.

Ramon 40:23

And that's an interesting point, because it goes back to the issue that you just raised. Once you sign the peace treaty, yes, you cannot go after six months and say, oh, why don't we renegotiate the peace treaty? That's right. But if you're having all these different... Well, potentially you could, I guess, but you shouldn't, right? But you have all these parallel discussions or discussions around the peace treaty that eventually could be included in the peace treaty as well, right?

So you don't have a peace treaty that simply says, look, end to hostilities and we're living in peace. But you could have all these things. So you have the peace treaty being signed with all these other measures being implemented at the same time. And I think... That if the inter-Korean summit, the outcome cannot be a treaty, it can be a document, right?

That says whatever parameters for inter-Korean relations. But once you have the treaty, obviously, legally, this should be binding at the very least. And it has taken, it has gone to a different level, a higher level. That's why I think the South Korean government is trying to put all these things in any potential treaty that could be signed once we have the discussion about the treaty itself.

Andrea 41:22

I think it's unlikely that Maybe I'm just too pessimistic, but I think it's unlikely that this meeting is going to result in some kind of treaty that big. I think what we can hope for is maybe some smaller agreements and then a roadmap for continued engagement. And, you know, a genuine commitment, I think, from the South Koreans to stay part of that process and to commit to it at a very high level.

Ramon 41:49

I think that the roadmap is a given, actually, but I wanted to ask you, what do you think is going to be in the roadmap?

Andrea 41:56

I imagine it will involve plans for future meetings at a high level. But I think so we can maybe transition into Kim Jong Un's statement here, because I think that's going to be a part of it. I hope what the South Koreans will do is try to create some supporting structures for some of the things the North Koreans have publicly said they're willing to do.

Cessation of certain types of testing, adding some verifiability to these things would be a really important effort if the South Koreans, you know, try to see that through. Because right now we've got, you know, Commitments being said in words. And as we know, the issue with North Korea is always that you've got to define your terms really well and you've got to verify them really well.

And that applies even with the more modest type of pledges that the North Koreans are making about refraining from nuclear testing or refraining from ICBM testing. What does that mean? What Does it include in those terms and those pledges how to ensure that the North Koreans are doing what they say? So I hope there's a bit of that in there.

That's not necessarily to say that I think that will be there, but I hope it is. And then I think we'll probably see something more specifically on the general inter-Korean relations front. And I'd be interested in your thoughts on that, whether we're likely to see that North Some commitment to family reunions or joint projects or something like that to fill that kind of category of progress as well.

Ramon 43:38

I think that South Korea and North Korea actually, they're setting up the scene for what they're going to call a success. In terms of the level of detail, I think the agreement might not be as detailed as the previous one, which is 2007, which has some four pages, and it had some real detail. They're actually about economic projects, for example, the NLL, for example, so it's a different confidence building measures.

But one of the reasons is because Probably we don't need this level of detail at this stage, A, because we have the phone line, right? And that actually makes a difference. But also because by having the summit in Panmunjom, you open the door for future summits. I mean, we have to remember that this summit is taking place only a couple of months after Kim Jong-un's sister actually went to South Korea.

So this level of... Inter-Korean exchanges at the highest level is unprecedented, really. If you think about that, within two months we have two Kim family members, Kim Jong-un himself and his sister actually meeting with the South Korean president. So in a sense, you don't need An agreement that is binding because you can actually continue to tease out what the agreement might mean and actually in South Korea the discussion now is one of the discussions is about okay this is the first of several summits taking place not only with the presidents but obviously there could be ministers of foreign affairs for example ministers of defense meetings at a very high level and secondly I think that there are constraints on the level of detail right that we can have because we have the U.S.

Andrea 45:19

Especially in an inter-Korean meeting. And yeah, sorry, I didn't want to suggest that Moon Jae-in is going to be able to do this all on his own in a single meeting. That's absolutely not the case. What I hope they do is start a discussion that's focused on getting the North Koreans to turn what I think is a house of cards into something that has a bit more foundation to it.

And that probably starts with actually getting Kim Jong-un to put a more specific denuclearization pledge on paper, which I imagine is something they'll try to do.

Ramon 45:47

In my view, yes, in my view, I agree with this point. This is something we're going to see. And I think that... I mean, it was South Koreans last week, actually, who said Kim Jong-un is willing to put denuclearization on the table. I think they wouldn't have said that without... Having at least a sense that the North Koreans are willing to do so because that's egg on their face.

If Friday, it comes Friday, we have an agreement that doesn't include at least a pledge to denuclearization or not even that. Even if the North Korean media two days later comes out and says, we never said anything about denuclearization. What are South Koreans talking about? Which they could have done. They could have done. So it is similar to when South Koreans came out of the meetings with North Koreans and say, well, they want a summit with Trump.

And in the beginning, There was all this discussion, okay, let's hear this from the North Koreans, where they actually have offered a summit to Trump. And now we know that they have, and Pompeo went there, right? So I think this is a similar process. South Korea saying, well, they're willing to put denuclearization on the table because they know this is something they're willing to.

Now, what is the meaning of denuclearization? Obviously, and that's the big issue. And as you were touching upon, Before, on Friday, we had Kim Jong-un saying, well, we're going to, well, we don't need tests anymore, basically. That's what they said, you know, because we're a nuclear power, right? Oh, yeah. So let's talk about this. Yes. That's basically what they said.

Andrea 47:09

So as background, the North Koreans put out a statement on Friday that proclaimed a few things with relation to the nuclear missile program. So I'll briefly read from the statement because I think it's worth using the exact language here. So Kim Jong-un said that no nuclear test and intermediate range and intercontinental ballistic rocket test fire are necessary for the DPRK now, given that the work for mounting nuclear warheads on ballistic rockets was verified as the whole process of developing nuclear weapons were carried out in a scientific way and in regular sequence.

And the development of delivery and strike means was also made scientifically. He added that the mission of the Northern Nuclear Test Ground has thus come to an end. And that then leads the North Koreans to solemnly declare that the subcritical nuclear test, underground nuclear test, making nuclear weapons smaller and lighter, and the development of the super large nuclear weapon and delivery means have been carried out in order in the course of the campaign for implementing the party's line of simultaneously developing the two fronts, That refers to simultaneous pursuit of nuclear weapons and economic development.

And thus, the work for mounting nuclear warheads on ballistic rockets has been reliably realized. They say they will therefore discontinue nuclear test and intercontinental ballistic rocket test fire from the 21st of April, and they will close the northern nuclear test ground to transparently guarantee the discontinuance of the nuclear test. And then the last little bit that we've got to read out here, it says that the DPRK will join the international desire and efforts for the total halt of the nuclear test.

And the DPRK will never use nuclear weapons nor transfer nuclear weapons or nuclear technology under any circumstance unless there is a nuclear threat against the DPRK. So a couple of pledges there. Shut the northern nuclear test ground. Stop. Here it says ICBM testing, though there's some difference in the statements. So there were two statements. One seems to reference intermediate range as well, and I'm not clear on that.

Participate in what are presumably discussions over the entry into force of the comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty and be responsible and not sell nuclear technology to other people or use nuclear weapons unless provoked. Really interesting statement. But has, I think, a few pieces that we need to unpack. One, it is not a denuclearization pledge. So a lot of people picked this up and said, this is wonderful.

The North Koreans are willing to denuclearize. I think it is a good step that they're exerting or willing to exert restraint in a few areas, but that's not because... That doesn't equate to willingness to denuclearize. Actually, this is all very much framed as... You know, Kim Jong Un came out in November and said, we're done with developing our ICBM force.

He came out in his New Year's speech and said, our strategic nuclear force has been realized thanks to my wonderful efforts. And this is basically just underscoring that. It's saying, I was right. I told you so. We've achieved what we need to achieve on this front. We can stop for a while. We can take the foot off the gas pedal.

So there's that piece that I think is really interesting and kind of contrasts in a way with some of the optimism or high expectations around DPRK willingness to denuclearize. What was your reading of that part?

Ramon 50:51

Well, first of all, my first feeling was we have to remember that Kim has his own domestic audience. So we tend to forget that Kim is not talking only to us or to the U.S. He's also talking to his domestic audience. So I like the point that you make that to his domestic audience, but also the international audience, he's making the point we have nuclear weapons.

Thanks to me. Period. Right. Yeah. I tend to sit on the optimistic side but also maybe for the wrong reasons. I sit on the optimistic side because I think denuclearization is on the table and you could read the statement as meaning that eventually we would be willing to denuclearize but precisely because we are able to develop nuclear weapons.

So unless we get what we want, look you have imposed the toughest sanctions regime ever on North Korea, we are completely isolated. And we have developed our nuclear technology. So if we want to do it in the future, we will. And I think that's something that we have to take into consideration in the sense that even if there's denuclearization, North Korea can always say, you know, this is our side of the bargain.

That's your side of the bargain. If we feel that you are not carrying on with your side of the bargain, we'll go back all the way to what we have done before. And yes, it might be more difficult. There's a verification process. But remember, there were inspectors in North Korea at several points Several points in time over the past years they haven't been for obvious reasons and they have developed the nuclear weapons so it goes back to something we discussed with Xi Jinping that North Korea is talking from a position of strength from its perspective that's why I think you could read this as we're willing to denuclearize even though I can see why some people would say well it doesn't say denuclearization there clearly it doesn't say denuclearization right just on that point though I think the statement is interesting because

Andrea 52:38

They frame their commitment to cease nuclear testing in the context of the DPRK's efforts to promote worldwide disarmament. And And this is something that I've heard several times, right? Because I can't remember which time it was, but somewhere in between 2012 and 2014, in a room in Pyongyang, I asked the question, what do you define as denuclearization?

And at the time, I got an answer back, which had Basically borrowed language from the Obama Nuclear Posture Review and very similar language that was made in the UK actually about its nuclear forces, which was that the DPRK will not denuclearize until there is global disarmament. So basically, as long as there remains nuclear threats out there in the world, the DPRK will retain a strong, secure, reliable nuclear arsenal.

Very similar language, right? That's how it was framed. And they keep framing these commitments here as about being part of global disarmament. And that could just be, you know, convenient language and rhetoric. But I also wonder if the DPRK is actually casting its nuclear arsenal as something that's going to be much harder to negotiate away than we think.

Ramon 54:08

I think that's a very important point, that this is not the first time they raise it, global disarmament. You could argue it's North Korean policy, going back to the foundation of the country, if you may, but as you said, they have said so in recent years. I do think that this is an open statement as well, and it goes back to something I think you were touching upon, or maybe even suggesting, that it could be, okay, we want global disarmament, If we're going to make a concession, which is unilateral disarmament, you might have to offer us more than you were willing to offer us, right?

Andrea 54:41

You have to give us a secure environment.

Ramon 54:44

Yes, a secure environment, whatever that means. And now we can have a discussion about this, that this means the full removal of U.S. troops from South Korea, for example, something like that. Or does it mean a security guarantee that doesn't come only from the U.S.? But, you know, China is part of the security guarantee. South Korea doesn't have to be part of the security guarantee, for example.

So in a sense, there are different partners, different countries that are involved in the security guarantee. So I think that's... That's part of the equation. I mean, I also think, maybe that's also more positive because very similar to you having talked to North Koreans about denuclearization last year and the year before, one of the statements was we're never going to denuclearize.

So now, okay, now we're going to denuclearize if there's global disarmament. So it's a step forward. Maybe next year we go back to we're never going to denuclearize. We don't know. But at least it's a step in the right direction from the perspective of the international community. Made us relatively more positive. I also think that something we haven't, and it's good that you read this point, but something that the media hasn't picked up or discussion hasn't picked up is that North Korea under Kim Jong-un has a dual line and one part of Pyongyang is actually economic development and Kim Jong-un is a leader that a he's not his grandfather he didn't create the country he didn't fought independence against Japan so he needs to have a different way of ensuring his position in power and nuclear weapons is clearly one way of doing so But if you have talks with refugees living in North Korea, they do tell you, look, this is a leader who has no grassroots support.

One way of getting grassroots support can be through economic development, the economic development of the country. North Korea is a changed society as well from 10, 15 years ago or 20 years ago even, right? And in your business you might have seen it as well, actually, that there are more buildings, for example, in the, in the city, right? So, and I think that that's important, and that's a point that I've seen starting to emerge yesterday and today that, please pay attention to this, that he needs economic development, and that gives a bargaining position to those in the international community who are negotiating with.

With North Korea, including the US, because you can point out, look, unless you change your behavior, unless you give up your nuclear weapons, that part of your policy is not going to be realized. I mean, you're going to continue to struggle with your economy. It might improve here and there, but you won't become a new China or even a new Vietnam, because, I mean, there could be a new Vietnam model of reconciliation with the US and then economic support from the US.

And that's, I think, why I'm a little bit more positive. Having said that, it is true that until we have the Inter-Korean Summit and especially the Trump-Kim Summit, we can speculate what the integration means, but we won't know.

Andrea 57:40

Yeah, I agree with you. I mean, I think this is a broadly positive step that gives us something to work with. And we should try really hard to do that, which is why I come back to the importance of Of trying to reinforce some of these commitments with greater verifiability, for example. And I do also think it's quite clever by the DPRK, both for domestic political reasons and international ones.

On the domestic side, I think as you rightly note, this creates political space for Kim Jong-un to do a few things, right? He therefore opens up political space to negotiate on the nuclear weapons missile front without making that look like a big concession, right? It gives him some things, especially in terms of freezes and, and renunciation of testing that he can trade away internationally without making it seem like this whole big campaign in the, in the past few years has, has been for nothing.

So, you know, He gets to retain the DPRK's success on the strategic nuclear front while also having something to talk about internationally. And then it opens up the space for him to shift and put more effort on economic development. But crucially, I think here there's this tension between what we have been trying to do in the West with Policy towards North Korea, which is show North Korea that this two-track simultaneous pursuit of nuclear weapons and economic development is untenable, right?

You can't have your cake and eat it. And what Kim Jong-un has just said with this statement is actually, you know, I can, and I have. And it rejects at its core this idea that there is a limitation to the extent that you can pursue both economic development and nuclear weapons. And I think that's really important to recognize is if we're trying to use things, for example, like sanctions to convince the North Koreans that their whole Kim Jong-un policy, Byung-jin is not tenable, then, you know, They're not taking that and trying to convince the domestic audience otherwise, especially as well.

Ramon 59:53

And I think that's a crucial point that North Korea has been talking about this since Kim Jong-un came to power. It was this dual line. Okay, in the nuclear technology, nuclear weapons, yes, they have been developed. Economically, the situation is better. It is improving. It's moving towards a market economy. But it is a poor country in one of the richest regions in the world.

I mean, Northeast Asia. And you have Japan, China, two of the three biggest economies in the world, South Korea, developed country. And you are poor. I mean, this is astonishing if you think on it from a geopolitical, geoeconomic perspective, right? That you are poor in this region. So I think that if the right cards are offered... Kim Jong-un might be willing to go down that route because that's something he can offer to his own people and I mean we have seen CSIS had this really interesting survey of North Koreans in North Korea it was criticized because they only interviewed a few thousand people but you know many of the people they actually interviewed they said well this nuclear power is great and these nuclear weapons are great but they didn't have to feed my family like every single human being and CSIS was basically telling us, you know, it seems that even at the grassroots level, the nuclear program is not the main issue for people in the country, actually.

And I think that's important to understand as well, that if we come up with this Line to North Korea, say, okay, look, you are going to become the next Vietnam, let's say, not maybe the next China, because it's a very different type of country in terms of size of the economy, et cetera, et cetera. But Vietnam in terms of size is not very different.

It's a country that fought a war with the US. And I mentioned this a couple of times because this idea, going back 10 years ago, I heard this from the State Department, you know, that Vietnam could actually help with North Korean reform. Then this could be a way to go. And I think we're going to see In the next two summits the one with South Korea and the one with the US whether North Korea is serious or not because if North Korea says we want economic development but we don't want denuclearization then we know they're not serious about economic development because that's not on the table but if North Korea says look provide us with a guarantee Then will the guarantee plus all the support that we need, you know, for example, people might not know, but North Korea, for example, because of the sanctions regime, doesn't have access to the World Bank, to the Asian Development Bank, to all these different programs they could have access to to refund their economy.

So if they have access to this, for example, more South Korean support, And they say, we're going to trade the nuclear weapons program for this, then we know they're serious about it. So I think having the summits one after the other is going to be very important in this sense, because we'll know what the North Koreans actually want and how serious they are about economic reform.

Andrea 1:02:38

So because this is arms control wonk, I have to come back and make two really wonky notes about the North Korean statement. The first and... Scott LaFoy and I have been talking about this a whole bunch offline and have found bits of the statement really fascinating. And one of the ones is the explicit mention that it is the northern nuclear test ground of the DPRK that's going to be dismantled.

And it's not totally clear what that means. So most people are assuming that means the Punggye-ri test site in the north of the country. But I'm not clear on whether or not they actually just mean potentially the northern tunnel site of that complex, where a number of the past North Korean nuclear tests have been conducted. And actually, from satellite imagery, some of the analysts that have been looking at that over the last year or so have noted that it seems to be mostly dormant anyways, while work has been going on at the west tunnel site.

So I'm not clear why they were so specific on the Northern Nuclear Test Ground. That'll be interesting to see, and I hope someone tests this in a discussion with the North Koreans to see what exactly they mean. Again, here, right, devil is in the details, and I would really like to have some clarity on what that's about.

And then the other one, and actually, if you read these together, it's important. The other one is that they specifically mention that they have been carrying out subcritical nuclear tests. And that's really cheeky, one, because it could mean that they'll stop the site that is for critical nuclear testing and continue to do their subcritical work. But it also fits into the bit about joining international efforts to halt nuclear testing, which is a reference to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, because As we know from the practices of some Western countries, there's obviously continued subcritical testing there.

The Chinese are super hesitant about that and make known that they do not support that as being something allowable within the treaty. But Western powers do it. The DPRK has just noted that It is going to continue to do it. And so it's kind of an interesting reference there to have explicitly mentioned subcritical nuclear testing.

Ramon 1:05:17

Yeah, I think on your first point, right, about the distinction on the northern test site, I think it goes back to the point about ambiguity, because they haven't defined what it means, right? Because they didn't want to define what it means. So yes, we'll have to pick up on that. I'm sure the South Koreans will test the waters, but I think this is going to go down probably to the Americans.

That's my hunch. Because I don't think with the South Koreans, even if the South Koreans said North Korea means this, they usually want to verify that that's what actually North Korea means, right? That they mean whatever they mean, right? Or whatever the US wants them to do. I also think... On your second point, that what we see here is that they're very cautious with their vocabulary, with the language that they use.

But I also think that they are cautious because they have to, not only necessarily because they want to, but because they have to, because they want to cover themselves in case this goes completely wrong. They resume tests and they say, look, look at our statement. We're not going back on the statement that we made on last Friday, actually.

This is something we said, we never said we were going to stop, right? And that from a North Korean perspective is important because North Koreans, when they have meetings, With other powers, right? And when they have discussions about their nuclear program or anything in general, they always go back to the statements and they're really meticulous, right, in their statements.

We didn't say we're not going to do this. Is this written down anywhere? No, it isn't. That was your interpretation.

Andrea 1:06:54

Yeah, that's right.

Ramon 1:06:55

And I imagine, yes, this is a way of saying, look, if in one year's time this process is halted, there's no engagement whatsoever, they will say, look at our statement. We're not doing anything. It happened with a leap day agreement, actually.

Andrea 1:07:07

Of course, exactly. So that's why, nail down your details, people. Exactly, right? Nail them down. Yeah, I think it's also really interesting that so much of the statement, I think, also is meant to speak to the DPRK's narrative that it is a responsible organization. Nuclear state. And so joining international efforts to halt nuclear testing, refraining or refusing to transfer nuclear technology, the bits about no first use, this is all the DPRK trying to show that it's the type of nuclear state that is quote unquote responsible in the way that we talk about India being a responsible nuclear state, right?

So You know, there is clearly an effort here. And I thought it was particularly noteworthy that the North Koreans said they're going to join the CTBT entry into force push at a time when the US has just come out in a formal policy document saying that it is not going to seek entry into force of the CTBT.

So the Nuclear Posture Review, without much explanation, Took that off the table and said the Trump administration is not going to go down this road. And the DPRK has just come out and said, actually, we're willing to help promote the entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which I think is great, but I have no doubt is partly an effort to contrast itself with the U.S.

Ramon 1:08:38

Yes, but one thing we have to take into consideration is that North Koreans, like everyone, they know Trump at some point will be gone. So they're not going to sign an agreement with the Trump administration, they're going to sign an agreement with the US, right? And hopefully this agreement then will carry on whenever Trump is replaced, you know, after the...

First term or the second term if he's re-elected and I think that's quite important as well that sometimes we forget that the North Koreans because of the nature of the regime they can sign an agreement and say well 10 years later they can go back to this agreement right because they can say well this is what we signed it's the same regime we haven't changed who is in government so we maintain The agreement to the extent that sometimes North Korea still continues to talk about that grid framework, right?

Which is from three administrations before, right? Yeah. I want to show you one thing though. You read the last part and you're an expert on this, which is the proliferation part. And they put it towards the end of the statement, but they put it there, right? We won't have the need to proliferation, which they have said in the past, but I want to have your take on this.

Andrea 1:09:38

They, well, so they specifically said they will not transfer nuclear weapons or nuclear technology So under any circumstances, unless there are nuclear threat and nuclear provocation against the DPRK. And there, I think, unfortunately, they're mangling two pledges. They're mangling the no first use commitment, which is attached to a condition. We will not use nuclear weapons unless we are provoked with nuclear weapons and the pledge not to transfer nuclear technology.

They should have, they should have taken those apart because actually the sentences makes for a really ugly commitment.

Ramon 1:10:14

But yeah,

Andrea 1:10:16

The fact of the matter is they have transferred nuclear technology in the past. They transferred it to Syria. And it is undeniable that that is something they have previously done. There's also no mention here of not transferring ballistic missile technology, which is something that we've been talking about a lot on the podcast recently. But I think broadly, it is a positive thing that they are pledging You know, whether they did in the past or not, that they're pledging now to not transfer that sort of technology.

I think we'll just have to be very vigilant to see that they make good on that and call them out if they don't.

Ramon 1:10:58

But you think this is because the sanctions regime is actually working and interdiction is working or not necessarily? And you think this is because this is... Some people would say this is low-hanging fruit, you know, because if you receive economic aid, then maybe you don't need the funds that you get from your transfer, you know, and again, you can present yourself as a responsible nuclear power or responsible stakeholder if you include ballistic missiles, for example, right?

Or do you think it's because... In a sense, they're saying, well, you know, the sanctions are actually working, the addiction is working. Why don't we offer this?

Andrea 1:11:29

I don't think this has anything to do with the effectiveness of sanctions necessarily. Remember that the North Koreans can also transfer intangible nuclear technology, right? Know-how. And if they can monetize that, there's a chance they will. So... That possibility still exists and is separate from the sanctions and interdictions thing because I don't think we could realistically expect sanctions or interdictions to prevent that from happening if both buyer and seller are determined to make it so.

I do think this is much more about the North Koreans wanting to be seen as a responsible nuclear state. So whether that's just words and they want to convince us of that or whether they're actually not going to sell nuclear technology because if they were ever caught, it would undermine that narrative that they're a responsible nuclear state.

I don't know. I think. We'll have to see, but I'm not sure this has anything to do with sanctions.

Ramon 1:12:25

I buy your responsible stakeholder nuclear power argument, I agree with that. I also think, to be honest, they might be playing to the US by saying, look, you know, you want the security of the US, we're not going to transfer anything to the Middle East where you have... All your military interests and, well, a military presence as well.

I also read along those lines, telling the US, you know what, you don't want proliferation to these states where you actually have Americans being killed, right? So American troops, for example, being killed. Okay, we're not going to just give us something in return. So I think there's also a component there, plus a responsible stakeholder argument.

Andrea 1:13:06

Yeah, could be. We should definitely wrap up there. Not just because we have to leave Antoine and I something to talk about next week, but also just because it's clear that we have had a pretty lengthy discussion talking about some pretty complicated and numerous developments in the last few weeks. So thank you again hugely for taking the time to chat with us.

And I'll turn over to Scott as well to tell us a little bit more about what is happening on the Slack channel.

Jeffrey Lewis 1:13:41

Well, most recently we had a user who led an interesting geolocation sort of mini workshop on the Slack channel. It's the third in his series that he's done. It's very interesting. So if you would like to support the podcast, our research, and come join us in the Slack channel for $5 a month or $3 if you are a student, you can come join us.

And that's at patreon.com slash acwpodcast. Again, that's patreon.com slash acwpodcast. We're about to get our second piece of satellite imagery, which we're going to distribute and go through together as a community this time and is going to be a lot of fun. And with that, thank you for listening.