KCN-eh? April’s other North Korea Developments – Part 2

Andrea Berger 0:05

You're listening to the Arms Control Wong podcast, the leading podcast on arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation. My name is Andrea Berger and I'm a senior research associate at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey. I'm joined today to do a bit of a overview of what happened on Friday at the Inter-Korean Summit by Antoine Bondaz from FRS, the Foundation for Strategic Research in Paris.

And he's also a senior lecturer at Simons Poe. Antoine, thank you for joining me.

Antoine Bondaz 0:37

Good afternoon. Thank you for having me.

Andrea 0:39

Antoine and I have just been in Geneva doing a side event at the NPT Preparatory Committee on the DPRK issue. So we've been talking about this already all afternoon, and I'm really excited to get his thoughts on the podcast as well, because There were so many interesting things to come out of the summit that just happened between Moon Jae-in and Kim Jong-un.

So maybe let's start by talking a little bit about what you found most interesting with the optics and the choreography from the summit. What, from an imagery perspective, surprised you? What didn't?

Antoine 1:15

It was indeed a very symbolic summit between the two leaders, and I think the key issue was the unity of the Korean people. The way Chairman Kim Jong-un was welcomed by the royal guard of the Joseon dynasty, the first poem written in Hangul behind them, While making short declarations. Of course, the menu even of the state dinner, the desserts, of course, heavily criticized by the Japanese because it entailed the Dokdo, Takeshima Island.

I mean, that was actually the most beautiful image, the show of unity of the Korean people. And if you read the declaration, that's actually the first thing they mention, that the South and North Korea will reconnect the blood relation of the people. And that's actually what was, according to me, like the most striking aspect of that summit.

Andrea 2:16

Yeah, a lot of South Koreans seem to have found it to be Quite emotional to see those two leaders connecting in the way that they did. And that's really interesting. You know, we've been joking when it comes to other leadership visits, especially to Washington, about the perils of handholding between leaders. But this was one case where, you know, that did happen between Moon Jae-in and Kim Jong-un.

And it was quite well received, I think, on the whole. And people were really astonished about the extent to which There seemed to be a genuinely positive atmosphere between the two. The whole thing looked very high-level summit-like, right? Like the great summits of the ages, sort of the time that they spent on their own doing long walks around the joint area, et cetera.

It was all very high-level summit visit.

Antoine 3:08

And in terms of pure political communication, it was a very aesthetic summit. It was a beautiful summit. And I'm sure that the South Korean had been working on it for weeks. And it was indeed a very beautiful summit to provide very beautiful videos, images to international medias. Basically to support the declaration. And even though the most important, of course, is the declaration, especially on the peace regime issue, images and videos, once again, are very, very useful to support it.

Andrea 3:41

Yeah, for the North Koreans, it's really important domestically as well. We saw that in how they presented those images afterwards to their own people on the front pages of their newspapers. And in some ways, you see the parallels between The type of image they wanted to convey about Kim's meeting in Beijing and the meeting here with Moon Jae-in, right?

This is all very much reinforcing the perception at home that Kim Jong-un is a leader that is being taken seriously on the international stage by major players on that stage.

Antoine 4:18

So a show of unity and at the same time a very, you said it, emotional meeting. The picture of So-Hoon, the head of the National Intelligence Service of South Korea, the CIA of South Korea, actually crying during the state dinner. That was actually like beautiful images, very beautiful images.

Andrea 4:40

So that's kind of the optical piece. Let's talk a little bit about this statement because people have been pouring over this and microanalyzing it. And I would love your thoughts on what the most interesting points from that statement were from your perspective. I've got a couple of things that I found interesting, but give me your view of what was important, new, and what maybe not so much.

Antoine 5:06

Obviously, there are two main aspects. The first one being the denuclearization, even though it's actually a very short paragraph in the declaration. And then the peace issue, the peace regime issue. What was maybe not expected was actually for the peace regime to be, according to the declaration, implemented before the end of the year. That's actually the very surprising part for the two Koreas actually to commit to sign something before the end of the year.

It's actually a very smart move because it's kind of entrapping China and the US and they are kind of forced now to also discuss it with the two Koreas. It's a very, very smart move. There is maybe one downside. It's that North Korea will get actually a peace treaty before Doing any concrete steps towards denuclearization, and that's something they've been like looking for, willing for decades or years, and and basically that's perfect opportunity for the North Koreans. Today it's so interesting actually when you think about it, because you know we've talked about this a little bit on the podcast before, but with with a peace treaty, the the way that

Andrea 6:14

You know, that the common view of how progress would be made on the Korean peninsula would unfold is that the peace treaty is kind of one of the last chapters in the book, right? And we've basically flipped the book upside down now and said the peace treaty can come up, not only upfront, but quite quickly and, and maybe quicker than many of the nuclear and missile related steps that we want to see from the North.

And that's quite, A big deal and quite unusual, but I think is a really useful indicator of how some of the inertia that previously existed around this issue has gone away. Before you would talk to American officials or those in Japan and South Korea and they say, oh, this is not possible because of this sequencing issue or because we can't possibly Be seen to be saying X and all of that created inertia.

We're throwing so much of that out the window right now. And it, Peace treaty is a good example of a way in which that's happening.

Antoine 7:22

Yeah, we could actually label it under the give peace a try. I mean, basically, we have not tried it before. Why not? I mean, look at the current situation. North Korea has considerably accelerated its nuclear and ballistic programs. The key question is what is left to be done? What can we do that we have not tried before?

We have not tried actually to sign a peace treaty first and then to move on to the nuclearization. At the same time, it's kind of surprising because I remember President Moon Jae-in's speech in Berlin last July 2017, and he said the complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is the agreed demand of the international community, nothing specific about it, but he also said this is the absolute condition for peace.

On the Korean Peninsula. So a few months ago, actually, they connected the two. And the key question and the key maybe objective was to sign the peace treaty. And at the same time, to have a denuclearized peninsula. Now they have actually reversed it. We will start with the peace treaty, with the peace regime, and then see if it's working actually on the denuclearization path.

So I'm not saying this is a bad thing. This is clearly something new that was not tested before. And why not? I mean, once again, give peace a try.

Andrea 8:43

Yeah, there's risks to it. There's... You know, again, the chance that the North Koreans can pocket that peace treaty. And, you know, we could return to a higher level of tension again, where there's, you know, a much diminished chance of progress, but they still have technically a peace treaty and the war is over. And then I think it becomes, you know, just we could go back to being in a similar situation as we've had in the past, where you have that high level of tensions, But it's not formally a state of war.

So you have the characteristics of the previous situation without The legal definition.

Antoine 9:26

And for the DPRK, and especially for Kim Jong-un, it's a win-win-win. You win on the nuclear issue because he presented the nuclear program as complete, which is actually a huge boost in terms of domestic legitimacy. Then he will get the peace treaty, second boost of legitimacy. And the third one is basically if he can reallocate resources from the military to the economy.

And eventually actually fulfill its promises of so-called byongjin line, like simultaneous development of nuclear capacities and economic capacities, and it could be actually the third win if thanks to the peace treaty can reallocate some resources from the military to the economy to boost peoples of living and actually further reinforcing Its own legitimacy. And in terms of, once again, domestic legitimacy, Kim Jong-un and the DPRK as a regime has been actually very successful in the last few years and especially in the last few weeks.

Andrea 10:21

Yeah. And there, you know, I would add other potential wins to that too, right? The fact that he's going to get to Sit across a table and shake hands and have all these glitzy photos with how many leaders? Probably by the end of this year, I would imagine. And some twice if Moon Jae-in goes to Pyongyang, as is promised in the statement.

Yeah, so that's a win for them. But also, even if some of this were to fall apart, particularly around a U.S. DPRK summit, that still is a win for them too, right? Because they get to turn around and say, We tried really hard and we made some of these unilateral commitments that we didn't have to do, the bits about disabling the nuclear test site or refraining from ICBM testing, all of that, we did that, we took this seriously and others just couldn't let go of that hostile policy they've had against us for ages.

Antoine 11:18

Yeah, and in the very, very short term, it's still a win-win situation for everyone. It's, of course, a big win for North Korea. It's a big win for South Korea. It's a big win for the Korean people because you will reduce tensions and maybe restart dialogue and especially cooperation. And it's a big win in the short term, at least for peace.

I mean, a few months ago, we were discussing the scenario of U.S. strikes on North Korea, on a second Korean war. And at least in the coming weeks, maybe not in the coming month, let's hope it, but in the coming weeks, at least we will be focusing on peace on the Korean Peninsula. And that's actually a good thing.

Andrea 11:55

Yeah, I'm completely with you, actually. There's a lot of ways that you can criticize the statement and the engagement initiative generally, but Actually, while I think we should have engagement that's with open eyes and attentive to detail, fundamentally, I think this is a good thing. And I was really heartened to see the focus within the statement on military-to-military talks, on engagement at a variety of different levels between North and South Korea that is focused on the type of discussion that can be used for crisis management or economic Escalation avoidance, if you will, in the event of an accident or a miscommunication.

And those are the types of things that we really were worrying about, you know, only a few months ago. And if we can have a sustained dialogue that allows us to reduce the possibility for that in future, then I think that will have been a really good step in and of itself.

Antoine 12:55

Yeah, along the DMZ and especially in the maritime domain, especially at the Northern Limit Line. I mean, it was actually an issue that was discussed in the October 4th, 2007 Second Inter-Korean Summit declaration, the issue of the so-called West Sea, the Yellow Sea.

Andrea 13:12

Did they use Northern Limit Line, the term in that previous statement?

Antoine 13:16

I don't remember, but at least they discussed the West Sea and the idea of turning it. Into an economic zone, turning it into like a fishing zone for the two Koreas.

Andrea 13:25

Maritime peace zone or something, right?

Antoine 13:27

Indeed, and the so-called Golden Triangle with Hyeju, I think Incheon and Seoul, etc. But the very interesting part is that for the last two or three decades, most of inter-Korean incidents were not actually along the DMZ, but were in that maritime zone. The Channan sinking in 2010, the Yongpyeong shelling in November 2010 also, the 2002 maritime incidents during the World Cup.

There were some incursions more recently, right? So it's actually a very, very good thing if in that West Sea, if along the Northern Limit Line, there is actually an agreement There is less tensions, there is a crisis management mechanism, and if there is, at the end, like a fishing zone for a share, let's say, fishing zone for the two careers.

So it's actually a very, very positive development. And in general, once again, I mean, this is what we discussed during the side events a few hours ago, but there is a cautious optimism. Let's remain optimistic, but let's be cautious about it. But that's indeed a very good development.

Andrea 14:40

Yeah, and I thought it was worth noting that they agreed to use the mention of Northern Limitline, which normally they are completely allergic to and totally hate. So, you know, it seems like there was some give and take on language. Just the names that they refer to either country as in the statement shows that there was a little bit of flexibility that was allowed by both countries in terms of their previous sticking points, if you will.

What did you think of the commitment to establish a liaison office in Kaesong?

Antoine 15:16

I mean, that's indeed and also a very good development. We could have expected actually move further, like to establish maybe a liaison office in both capital, in both Pyongyang and Seoul, if it's in Kaesong is actually like still a good development. Let's see how it will work. Let's see how like a very concrete and pragmatic issues it will be settled.

I think it might be too early to say anything, but it's indeed a very good thing to multiply and to diversify the channel of communication, not to rely anymore only on the secret services and intelligent services on both sides, but to have something a bit more formal. For the Ministry of Unification to take the lead. And it's actually another key issue between the US and the DPRK.

So that the intelligence services, so that the CIA on one side, so that the General Reconnaissance Bureau on the North Korean side are not the only ones to negotiate anymore. Not that they won't be negotiating anymore, but that you add actually some layers of communication, some layers of dialogue, and you bring actually the diplomats back in the game.

And that's actually something that would be very, very positive. It's technically maybe a bit difficult sometimes, but that's actually, I think, the key objective of both Pyongyang and Seoul, and I hope of Pyongyang and Washington in the coming weeks.

Andrea 16:42

Yeah, to, again, build that fabric of interaction, right? Yes. That is... Is more than just a single string. On the liaison office, I was kind of interested to see that they picked Kaesong for it. And I wonder if the motivation on the South Korean end of that decision is to start undoing the poisonous narrative that has emerged around the Kaesong region.

For listeners, as a background, Kaesong is the site of a former joint industrial zone between North and South Korea where South Korean and other foreign companies would invest in the zone and North Korean workers would in effect produce a variety of products there and a certain amount would be paid back to the North Korean regime for their services.

That has been a highly politicized zone for a number of reasons. The North Koreans kind of held it hostage in, was it spring 2013 in that crisis?

Antoine 17:49

Yeah, 2013. It actually lasted until September. That's right.

Andrea 17:53

But also the South Koreans decided under the previous government that the complex had to be more enduringly shut because The funds were being channeled to the nuclear and ballistic missile programs in North Korea.

Antoine 18:12

Which was, in terms of communication, a complete disaster. It was a total disaster. For the Conservatives, it's key to acknowledge that for the previous seven to eight years, they had been, maybe indirectly, but fending The nuclear and ballistic program. I mean, in terms of communication, it was a complete disaster on the conservative side, I mean, back in February 2016.

Andrea 18:32

Oh, I think it was also a hugely politicized assessment, right? How do you know that that money is going to the nuclear missile program? Yes, it fits into that bigger narrative that any North Korean revenue stream is proliferation finance, but, you know, I think it was a A decision probably taken by the Park and Hay administration under some pressure from others who said, hey, why are you pointing fingers at our cooperative Endeavors with the North Koreans, but yet you get to keep Kaesong going.

Antoine 19:00

And they had actually no other cards left in their hand. That's true too. They couldn't do anything. I mean, you had virtually no dialogue anymore, no real cooperation. You only had actually Kaesong left, so they used the Kaesong cards. Maybe they misused it. They would have used it, I think, one day or another, especially due to the UN sanctions.

But the way they used it, at least, In terms of timing and in terms of the way they explained it, was really, really mishandled by the Pagan administration.

Andrea 19:31

Yeah, I agree with you entirely. And so Moon Jae-in, I think as part of his broader engagement approach, has been keen to undo some of that negative narrative around Kaesong. And a great way to start that effort is to put a really quite important and generally positive You know, undeniably positive, I would go so far as to say.

At liaison office in the area.

Antoine 20:00

Yeah, you mentioned Kaesong, and what was also striking during the summit to get back at least with the symbols was that behind them when they shake hands within the peace house was actually Mount Kumgang, the Diamond Mountains. And you may remember, of course, like the touristic inter-Korean complex that was shut down back in 2008. But to open the liaison office in Kaesong and behind them to have the picture and the painting of Mont Kumgang was very, very symbolic and directly referring to the two main inter-Korean cooperation projects back in the 2000s, Kumgang and Kaesong.

Andrea 20:46

Yeah, for sure. Other things on the statement that you found interesting?

Antoine 20:51

Maybe one thing interesting, in the whole statement you have actually only one time, one reference to the word nuclear. So you have one nuclear and I think peace. I mean, you have lots of reference to the word peace. I think more than 12, between 12 and 14. But only one word on nuclear. I mean, one reference on nuclear.

And that's quite interesting. That declaration was all about peace. And I guess the US-DPRK summit will all be about the nuclear issue.

Andrea 21:21

Yeah, that'll definitely be worth watching to see what the difference is in the languages, right? One thing that I had also flagged was some of the phasing of continued engagement going forward. So let's put down a few kind of markers for important points on the timeline. One is that they're apparently going to have some cooperative activities around mutually significant dates.

They flagged August 15th As being a point, I think, was it for family reunions?

Antoine 21:57

Yes, that's actually the end of the Second World War. So it's very symbolic. Once again, Japan, I guess, would not be very pleased. There might be actually some military dialogue in July because it's going to be the 65th anniversary of the armistice. So I think they will use all these very specific and very symbolic dates to orchestrate And symbolically to further actually coordinate the cooperation between the two Koreas.

Andrea 22:28

Yeah. To add two more data points here, then we've got a pledge for Moon Jae-in to go to Pyongyang in the fall time. And supposedly they're all going to work towards a peace treaty by the end of the year. And that timeline, I think especially the ones that are kind of front loaded into the summer, I think will have the effect of Reducing the U.S. potential to blow it all up without having consequences on things that their allies are already invested in, right?

So it shows that the South Koreans are invested in doing cooperative engagement-focused activities already sometime into the future. If the U.S. comes into the next summit meeting and, you know, Spoils the whole broth, then that will obviously not be well received in South Korea and might therefore be a deterrent to it happening in the first place. Fingers crossed.

Antoine 23:34

And if everything goes well, I mean, Moon Jae-in said that he would actually go to Pyongyang in fall 2018, could be actually by the end of September. This year, Chuseok, national holiday for the Korean people, both in the North and the South, will be between September 23rd and 25th. We all remember that last year in October, it was actually in October last year, Moon Jin offered to organize family reunions on Chuseok holidays.

So they might actually do something this year, end of September during Chuseok 2018. Will it be the summit in Pyongyang? Might actually be too early. It will be really like the beginning of fall. But they could organize something very symbolic in terms of inter-Korean cooperation.

Andrea 24:24

I think the scheduling of family reunion-related activities in August, mid-August, is also going to increase the likelihood That South Korea tries to keep military exercises, which happen in August every year, low-key again, like happened in April. Indeed, the joint exercises that have been going on, like you barely heard a peep about them, right? From North, South, anyone.

They acknowledge they're happening, but otherwise said next to nothing. And if there is some skin in the game for engagement activities in August, then I think It's reasonably likely that the same approach is going to be taken to the comms around military exercises between the US and South Korea at that time in the year. I think it's also possible that we'll get some really interesting statements from both North and South Korea at the UN General Assembly.

If Moon is planning to have a meeting in Pyongyang around that time, not impossible that you could have a Kim Jong-un request to speak at the General Assembly. I throw that out there. I don't know if it's possible.

Antoine 25:30

Yeah, I mean, it would be actually quite interesting if you have especially the Kim Jong-un, Donald Trump summit. So let's say beginning of June, you may have a Kim Jong-un, Vladimir Putin summit during summertime. Maybe not a Kim Jong-un, Shinzo Abe summit. I don't really see the interest on the North Korean side. I mean, they have all the interest actually To keep the Japanese sideline for a particular reason.

China actually could be supporting this North Korean initiative. So, yes, I mean, it would be actually very, very interesting to have the chairman of the State Office Commission, Kim Jong-un, to visit New York and to get to the United Nations General Assembly and to make a speech in front of everyone. It would be, like, huge.

Andrea 26:13

So we talked about what North Korea went home and said to its own population and how it presented things in Rodong Shinmun and in national television and all that. But looking at other countries and how they've messaged about this summit, it's pretty noteworthy that South Korean officials pretty quickly came out after and added more detail about things that Kim Jong-un supposedly said over the course of discussions during the day, particularly that North Korea is apparently going to plan on inviting inspectors from other countries and media from other countries to monitor the disablement of their nuclear test site.

And on the last podcast, I'd mused with Ramon Pacheco-Pardo about whether or not when the North said it would disable the northern test ground, whether they meant just the north test tunnel at Punggye-ri or they meant the whole of the Punggye-ri site and Based on what South Korean officials are reporting was said at the meeting, it sounds like they mean the whole of the Punggye-ri site.

Antoine 27:26

Yeah, I think it's the whole site because Kim Jong-un also mentioned that he had actually two additional tunnels he could use.

Andrea 27:35

That's right. So that was apparently the detail that came out.

Antoine 27:38

Yeah, but key question is like, would it be enough to have only American and South Korean observer? Would not it be quite interesting to have actually the CTBTO people? Together so that it's like an international community, it's like a global issue, it's not just a bilateral issue between the US and the DPRK, it's not just an inter-Korean issue, that's really today a global issue, and it would be actually a very good thing for international organization and especially for the CTBTO to have their own experts to also visit Pyongyiri and to monitor what's going on in Pyongyiri site. For those who need to follow our acronym soup, the CTBTO is the Comprehensive

Andrea 28:17

Ban Treaty Organization. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is a treaty that's not yet in force, but which bans critical nuclear testing and depends for its entry into force on the ratification of 40 plus countries. The DPRK is one of them. The U.S., which has not yet ratified the treaty, is another. China and a number of other countries as well.

And so they have a secretariat and a planning organization that's associated with them that does a lot of the groundwork laying for entry into force, but also actively works on already its international monitoring of nuclear testing. And so they've been one of the key sources of information if you've read things about...

Antoine 29:07

Yes, indeed.

Andrea 29:08

Some of the data we're using actually to monitor... We already are using it, even though it's not yet enforced as a treaty. The CTBTO has some excellent experts who I agree would and should be a really important part of any serious effort by the DPRK to render its test site less usable. Now, the nature of those test sites is probably that these steps are fairly quickly reversible.

You can plug a tunnel and unplug a tunnel and there's a gradation of Of reversibility here.

Antoine 29:46

And another key question being like, is there another one? Yeah. Is there only Pyongyang? With like, of course, lots of tunnels in it. But could it be another one?

Andrea 29:58

Well, so I think what, if the South Koreans are reporting the conversation accurately, what this would suggest to me is that North Korea's statement that it made a few weeks ago, pledging to refrain from Further nuclear testing and to disable that site. What that reads to me is that not only is there another test site somewhere else but potentially it's one that they intend to use for subcritical nuclear testing, which is not covered by the comprehensive test ban treaty.

At least that's the argument that some Western countries will, will make. So, yeah, I think, you know Positive on Punggye-ri if we can get greater transparency there. And if this is in any way a sort of durable commitment that the North Koreans are willing to stick to to refrain from critical testing, they are the only country that has done critical nuclear testing in this century.

So if we can get them to stop, that would be wonderful. But, you know, there's a there's a but here, which is they are, I think, making clear to us that they're able to do Stockpile stewardship and arsenal management through other ways.

Antoine 31:15

Yes, and we do need, once again, to keep a very cautious optimism. The freeze of nuclear and ballistic testing, the disablement of Pyongyeli is a very initial step towards denuclearization. And we need, actually, as soon as possible, not only a freeze of the testing, but a freeze of the programs under the supervision of the international community. And then, of course, at the end, the disablement and the dismantlement Of any nuclear and ballistic assets from the DPRK to lead once again to the comprehensive, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization that's called CVID that remained actually the key objective of the international community.

So we are going once again in the right direction but that's a very very initial steps and we need like to Maybe not speed up too fast, but that is to keep walking in that direction. We are facing now the right direction. We need to start walking on that path towards the nuclearization.

Andrea 32:14

Absolutely. So you're a China specialist. What did the Chinese say about the whole summit? What was their readout? Are they, everyone's happy?

Antoine 32:23

I think that for the Chinese, the three main objectives in the Korean Peninsula are stability, then denuclearization, and the third one, dialogue between the two Koreas. Even though, of course, stability is the key objective of the Chinese. And with the third inter-Korean summit, with the recent developments and announcement from the DPRK, I mean, it fits actually the three objectives of the Chinese.

So it's a perfect situation. And you can read in the press, you know, that China feels or has been quite sidelined, etc. People forgetting that Kim Jong-un visited China first. Yeah. First ever trip of Kim Jong-un outside of the country since the end of 2011 when he became the leader of the North Korean regime. We will have actually the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs to visit Pyongyang.

This is, I think, very, very symbolic because, of course, he is not the key guy.

Andrea 33:19

Tell everyone a little bit more about that, because I think sometimes...

Antoine 33:22

Between the two countries, China and the DPRK, the key organ actually is not the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. They're the international departments of the Communist Party of China. These departments are actually in charge of relationships between the Communist Party of China and key communist parties. In the world, be it in Cuba, be it in Vietnam, be it in the DPRK.

And that's why the key actors are people from the international department. It won't be the international department visiting. Actually, the head, Song Tao, visited last November.

Andrea 33:57

He's also the person who picked Kim Jong-un up at Dandong, right?

Antoine 34:00

Yes, indeed. But I think it's mostly a message to the international community. If they wanted to focus mostly on the China-DPRK relation, they would have sent, again, Song Tao. By sending the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs, that's actually a message to the international community that maybe do not really know that he might not be the key guy, but at least symbolically, you have the Chinese diplomacy On the way you have the Chinese diplomacy that is engaging North Korea, that is engaging South Korea, and I guess actually that the China Ministry of Foreign Affairs might visit so a few days after, a few weeks after, and once again that the political message, very important message of the international community That China is committed to improving relations between the two Koreas.

Does it mean that China is the main actor? Maybe not. Actually, I think in the coming weeks, of course, it's going to be the US with the US-TPRK summit. But at least China is clearly showing the international community that Beijing is back in the game and that you cannot do anything without Beijing.

Andrea 35:08

We're not sitting on the bench, basically. Yes. Great. So... Was there anything that people missed in the giant kind of tidal wave of interest over the summit this past week?

Antoine 35:25

There might be something of interest. And if we try to link Iran, North Korea, what is kind of interesting is that the North Korean announcement and declaration have been focusing actually on three issues. Nuclear issue, ballistic issue, and the peace regime, which is stability. And that's actually exactly what Trump is expecting from Iran. Not just the TCPOA to focus on the nuclear issue, but to add actually two even more comprehensive agreements, including ballistic and stability.

And that's actually, in a way, what North Korea is selling to Trump, at least on the political level.

Andrea 36:04

Oh, and Trump bought it, right? Of course. Look at one of the... Three tweets that Trump sent on Friday and it was like the Korean War is over. No, it's not yet, but that shows just how enthusiastic he is for those grand bargain style deals.

Antoine 36:20

The North Koreans are basically offering everything Trump needs in the short term To transform a political coup to accept a summit with Kim Jong-un into a diplomatic success, at least in the short term, and at least on the political level. Will it be a success on the technical level towards the denuclearization? That's another question that is, of course, maybe the most important question.

But at least in the short term, on the political level, I'm quite confident that Trump could get a deal That would be enough for him on the political level to get back to Washington and to sell it to the American public opinion saying, you see, Obama failed to get a deal. He got one, the Lib-Daily Agreement in February 2012.

It was focusing only on the nuclear issue. And to go back to Washington, maybe in June 2018, with a deal with that tridimensional aspect. Nuclear, ballistic, only IRBM and ICBM. That's also a key issue because North Korea is not, Freezing anything in terms of short-range and medium-range that could target actually South Korea and Japan.

Andrea 37:29

And submarine-launched ballistic missiles are a question mark.

Antoine 37:31

And that's a huge issue for Japan and for the Japanese. And the third aspect, stability. And with the peace regime, that's the stability Trump needs actually to sell to the public opinion. So I kind of see a parallel between what Trump is trying to get on Iran and what North Korea is trying to sell

Andrea 37:51

Yeah, I don't think it would actually take that much for Trump to sell what he would claim would be the best deal ever to at least his own voter base, right? His own voter base is already thinking that Trump deserves a Nobel. So I think there's probably a lot, including things that are Fairly far short of the analytical community's expectations over what would be a good deal that he could sell back home, at least to a slice of the American population, claim victory and move on.

Antoine 38:29

Yeah, and in that whole picture, I think that the main problem is for Japan. Japan has been investing, and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has been investing so much on the personal relation with President Trump, and they might feel, middle of June, they have been not only sidelined, But kind of the forgotten actor. If there is no reference in the U.S. DPRK declaration, if there is a declaration, on the abductees issue, which is a key issue for the Japanese.

So these Japanese citizens that were actually abducted by the DPRK back in the 60s, 70s, 80s. That's actually one of the main domestic issues in terms of bilateral relations between Pyongyang and Tokyo. I think Japan will be very, very disappointed

Andrea 39:16

Do we know if the South Koreans actually brought it up? They'd promised to, right?

Antoine 39:20

So President Moon officially said that he brought it up. But there is no reference, of course, in the declaration, in the joint declaration. But I think that for the Japanese, they need, at least from the biggest partner and ally, of course, the U.S., To get something official on the abductees, either to get Trump to say officially during the press conference, if there is a press conference, that he mentioned it, or to have something in the declaration, if, once again, there is a declaration.

Otherwise, it's going to be very, very difficult politically for Japan, and especially for the Japanese government.

Andrea 39:54

Did you catch some of the news about the Australian and Canadian military commitments that are going to be happening in terms of sanctions implementation? Something that flew under the radar, I think, amidst all the...

Antoine 40:08

So they will be actually monitoring?

Andrea 40:11

Yeah, so Australia has said that it's planning to contribute... Maritime surveillance aircraft to forces and allied forces in Northeast Asia. The Canadian. Similarly, they're going to send aircraft and some corresponding personnel over to Japan to monitor DPRK violations of maritime sanctions. And here they mean the ship to ship transfer stuff or trans shipment of prohibited goods. And those guys are going to join.

I think it's three UK vessels that London's planning on sending. I think one's there already, two are en route to help with the same mission. So that stuff's quite interesting. It reinforces the narrative that a lot of the allied countries have, which is we're supportive of this engagement activity, but we're going to keep up the maximum pressure campaign until we see Concrete and durable results from North Korea on its international obligations.

But this is all stuff I think that's coming out of that meeting that happened in Vancouver and then the, what I'm sure were followups to it. So we're starting to see that result in some concrete commitments by allies.

Antoine 41:35

That whole ship-to-ship transfer, etc. Shipment is actually very interesting. The UN panel of experts that published its report back in March Mentioned it of course with some very interesting data and especially from one expert because the South African experts of the UN panel of experts Neil Watts is actually a maritime expert and he has been the one actually working on that issue and that's actually quite interesting and for sure South Korea and Japan Has been investing and monitoring much more than before on that issue.

But it's actually a very, very good thing if the international community at the wall is further committed to it. Because once again, the nuclear issue and the implementation of sanctions is not a regional issue. It's even less a bilateral issue between the US and the DPRK. It's truly like a global issue. And that's actually a very good opportunity for the international community to commit To be credible and to show that it is responsible towards the United Nations Security Council and most, of course, indeed the implementation of sanctions.

Andrea 42:46

Yeah, I agree entirely. Multilateralism on any part of this picture is so, so, so important, whether that's the sanctions implementation side or it's the engagement effort. And so, yes, I'm completely with you on that front. Maybe we'll end it there and I will threaten to bring you back on this podcast at some point in the future to get your thoughts on what I'm sure will be a lot more developments coming up in the next few months.

But Antoine, a huge thank you for joining me. Thank you. Yes, hope to have you back soon. You know what's happening on the Slack channel, and I've seen that there's a whole bunch of discussion as well there over what's been happening with the summit. Tell us about that and how our listeners can contribute on Patreon.

Other voice 43:34

Absolutely. If you'd be interested in supporting the podcast, our research, and joining a Slack channel full of fine people like yourselves, please head over to patreon.com slash acwpodcast, the links in the show notes, and kick us $5 a month or $3 a month if you're a student. That'll get you access to the Slack channel and our undying gratitude.

Again, that's patreon.com slash acwpodcast, and thank you for listening.