KCN-eh? October’s other North Korea Developments

Andrea Berger 0:06

You're listening to the Arms Control Walk podcast, the leading podcast on arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation. My name is Andrea Berger, and I'm a Senior Research Associate at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey. And I'm delighted to welcome back Ramon Pacheco-Pardo, who's the Korea Foundation Free University of Brussels Korea Chair. We're recording today at King's College London, where Ramon is also a reader.

So we're really thrilled to have you back. Thanks for being with us.

Ramon Pacheco-Pardo 0:33

Thanks for having me.

Andrea 0:35

So I brought Ramon in today and had him back not only because he's got great insights across the Korean Peninsula security situation generally, but also because Ramon has particularly excellent insights into the dynamics between the EU and Korea. And we had a lot of those this month in the form of a Moon Jae-in visit to Europe with some meetings with the EU, but also individual countries.

So we're going to hear a little bit about that. We're also going to talk today through some of the other major stories from October, namely Pompeo going to Pyongyang, some of the incidents, the maybe diplomatic slip ups that happened between South Korea and the U.S., And some of the stories you may have missed, including some really good news stories.

So we'll get to that in a moment. But maybe, Ramona, if I can start by getting your thoughts on Pompeo's visit to Pyongyang, which kind of opened up the month and followed on closely from late September's interaction between Moon Jae-in and Kim Jong-un. Here we saw... Going to Pyongyang and unlike his previous visit, actually meeting with Kim Jong-un and spending a little bit of time talking about the denuclearization issue.

What was your take on some of the differences between previous high-level interactions with North Korea and particularly whether what Pompeo might have been going to achieve was indeed achieved? What are your kind of high-level thoughts on that interaction?

Ramon 2:11

I think we compared to previous visits, definitely more positive. As you said, he met with Kim Jong-un. They had lengthy discussions. They also had lunch together, apparently. So very positive in this sense. I would say that they probably were expecting a bit more. Some people say maybe we'll have the date of the next Trump-Kim summit announced. Maybe we'll have an announcement that a declaration by the North Koreans is going to be issued sometime soon, but there was none of this.

So I think it was more positive than previous ones, but I think it was lacking the substance that maybe some of us were expecting. And I think what is interesting about this is that Pompeo himself seems to be quite positive. Now he has been able to derail because obviously he has to deal with Saudi Arabia as well.

But North Korea is the one place where the U.S. or himself can actually be close to being able to claim diplomatic success. And you don't see that happen in the Middle East, for example, or with Russia or even with China right now.

Andrea 3:09

That's very true. I was reading some of the reports that came out after his visit, which suggested that there was kind of two main pillars, I guess, to the ask from Pompeo. Which was on the one hand, this potential forthcoming summit with Donald Trump, which sounds now, I guess, like it's moving into 2019, whereas at least before, I think some people thought it would be possible we'd see another meeting yet this year.

And there doesn't seem to have been anything concrete that came out of that. Pompeo, he was in Tokyo just before And he was saying he hoped to have at least broad agreement on a location and a time. And that may have happened. We just don't know about it. But it sounds like we're shifting into 2019. And the second thing it sounds like he was asking for was a declaration of North Korea's nuclear arsenals.

I'm sure that includes facilities, material and other things. But It definitely sounds like they didn't get that and got rebuffed quite strongly, and some of the reporting even indicated that the US had then asked for a partial declaration and didn't get that either. That's kind of interesting to me, just how much... Seems to be emphasized in terms of having this particular form of next step in the discussion between the U.S. and North Korea that so much is focusing on this idea of a declaration by the North Koreans to enable other things to start happening.

And And we'll have to see where that goes. It, you know, that's a strategy that's maybe useful, but also, you know, indicates the US would put more into a voluntary declaration than other things. And I'm not convinced that's the right way to go, but sounds like where we're heading.

Ramon 5:07

I agree. I mean, I think it's quite interesting because we started the process with the U.S. basically saying we need the declaration to happen as soon as possible by the end of the Trump, first Trump term, if possible. And we need the full declaration as soon as possible. And I think we're moving into sequencing. North Korea is very clearly asking for a peace declaration, but also for sanctions relief.

My hunch is that this is the sticking point, that North Korea doesn't want to give away the declaration without having some sanctions relief or something to show for it. And I would say they're in a strong position in the sense that they can keep on waiting, you know, and it is the US actually that wants to get this kind of administration that wants to get the diplomatic success.

And this seems to be the main sticking point. I also think that From the perspective of the North Koreans, once you have the declaration, and if you look at the summit between both Koreas in September, where they talk about the possibility of having, if not inspections, but having international experts in North Korea, or if the dismantlement process of the nuclear program kicks on, then you would have this...

The U.S. could go to North Korea and say, well, we have the declaration. We have to start dismantling the program. Do you have to agree with the South Koreans that some sort of inspections, you are happy with them? Therefore, we should have American inspectors or international inspectors on the ground from day one. And I'm not sure the North Koreans actually want that.

They're not there yet. Yeah. You said better than me, probably. Yes, you were more clear than me. Yeah, I don't think I don't think they want it. But the U.S. could conceivably could ask for it because it's actually in declaration between both Koreas from September. So it's something that North Korea has agreed to. It's not something that the U.S. is demanding that North Koreans haven't given away yet.

Andrea 7:02

Yeah, there is a big risk in in as the first big thing asking for this declaration, because I think both There is a distinct potential that the North Koreans would seek to not give you a full and or completely honest declaration. We've seen that with North Korea in the past. And if that's the case and the other side realizes it, you have the potential that...

Within the administration then use that as the justification to torpedo everything. So if you know that's the risk, this is why I sort of... Well, maybe it's to test the waters, right? And precisely because you have these individuals internally who think the North Koreans are just not being serious here, that this is the way to go to test that proposition.

So it's possible that that's why the U.S. is focusing on that, but... You know, there is a big risk to it in terms of the longer sustainability of a more feasible phased process, which I agree with you seems to be one of the other things to have come out of the summit was a movement away from this idea that it's grand bargain or nothing to some sort of sequence staged approach to the nuclear question with North Korea.

And I suspect you'd find many people in the policy community who would think that's perfectly reasonable.

Ramon 8:27

Yes, I mean, not only reasonable. I think from the beginning, when the day of the grand bargain came to the fore, and even before the first Trump-Kim summit, they were talking about this grand bargain, of course. Nothing came out of it in this direction. But... Experts and even within the administration that were saying, well, unless we have sequencing, this is not going to happen because North Korea has little reason really to dismantle its nuclear program in a couple of years and then see what happens, right?

So in a sense, I think they have moved to something which is more realistic. Having said that, I think That there is also more criticism of the fact that the U.S. is asking for full denuclearization, as it should, but few think that this is actually on the table, at least right now. Who knows in 15, 20 years?

But right now it's clearly not on the table from the North Koreans, right? And I wonder if this is the reason why the U.S. is actually insisting on the declaration. Say, well, you know, we have the declaration of all the facilities, all the... Systems, etc, etc. So yes, the nuclearisation will take time, but we have an end goal, which is basically to tick the boxes in this declaration and make sure that nothing is left by the end of the process.

And I also wonder if this idea of the declaration is to have something in Britain that is more substantial than we have seen between the US and North Korea so far, because I mean, what we saw in July. Sorry, in June after the summit, we can all agree it was very little of substance there. Even if there's a second Trump-Kim summit, I think no one is expecting a 10, 20 pages long detailed document.

So at least having the declaration is something that, you know, the U.S. or Pompeo in this case or Trump can actually take to Congress or can take to public opinion. We have a detailed document provided by the North Koreans. On the North Korean side, I mean, I agree with you, we cannot trust the North Koreans on this because they have cheated in the past.

But I think even if they gave a true, full declaration, we wouldn't trust them. So I'm sure this is also on the back of their heads, actually. For good reason, we wouldn't trust them. It's on the back of their heads, you know. They're not going to believe us, so maybe we can delay the process as much as possible or obtain something in return.

Then at least we have something to show for it.

Andrea 10:44

But also... The North Koreans do and have for some time relied in part on selective opacity and selective transparency for what they think is a deterrent effect. And and so if you then demand up front that they are transparent. Fully transparent with you about what they have and where they have it, you know, that's not going to be, from their perspective, something that allows them to keep that deterrent capability in the way that they've approached it in the past.

So why we think that's realistic up front, I'm not entirely sure, but... Yeah. I just don't think we're going to get it. Yeah.

Ramon 11:29

But that's the point. I mean, I think many experts, many people in the administration believe that it is not realistic to ask right up front. But having said that, with the U.S. insisting on it, I think they cannot really back down and say... They have already backed down on, for example, they have moved towards sequencing, right? And they have already backed down, for example, on the timing.

I mean, the latest... Talk from Trump or Twitter, I don't remember if it was a Twitter, he made one of his speeches saying, well, it doesn't really matter when this happens as long as it happens, right? So in a sense, the US is backing down from some core issues. When we started the process, these were core issues central to the process from the US perspective.

So I wonder if they say, well, this is something you can really back down because then the criticism is going to be even louder. And as you said, those within the administration who don't want this process to follow will say, well, this is not serious, why don't we move on and, you know, just... Forget about North Korea and maybe even go back to maximum pressure because this process is going nowhere.

Andrea 12:24

Yeah, this is interesting as well. One of the things I've kind of observed in the last month in terms of North Korean rhetoric is how much stronger the ask for sanctions relief has gotten. And not only sanctions relief as part of a negotiated process, but sanctions relief up front to demonstrate goodwill to continue to sit at the table.

And if... If that emphasis has shifted in that direction, maybe even slightly away from a peace deal or declaration, then it suggests we're getting to a space where there's a much stronger expectation on the North Korean part that anything they trade away in the nuclear sphere is going to have to come with some sanctions relief and That has not been the American talking point until now.

And as a matter of fact, it's been the precise opposite, right? That no sanction goes until the whole of North Korea's nuclear program is gone. So we'll see where the U.S. is willing to take its position that it will retain sanctions. The maximum pressure campaign until North Korea's fully, finally verified denuclearization, where there is a tension between those two things, both as you try to roll back and as you try to scale up to some extent.

And where is that point going to come in the negotiating context with North Korea will be interesting to watch.

Ramon 13:58

Yeah, I think this touches on something we often don't discuss, which is North Korean domestic politics. And Kim Jong-un, he has promised a better future for his people. He has said we are moving fully into the economic reform component of the Beijing line. If you look at Nodong Sinmun, you know, showing pictures of Singapore, for example, saying how developed is South Korea compared to North Korea, which actually I can't recall in decades actually following that.

Of during the past few decades of Nolan Seymour them talking so glossy definitely about South Korea but even of a country such as such as Singapore and I think unless there's sanctions relief not tomorrow but at least in the next year or two some sanctions relief and Kim Jong-un can go to his people and also obviously within the regime and say look I have something in return It might also become difficult to say, well, I'm delivering, right?

We don't know how the regime, how different people in the regime actually think, but it is true that what I find interesting meeting with North Koreans, the rhetoric or message from last year to this year has actually changed, right? And this year is more about where we need to start this process. And last year, the message was we'll never give up nuclear weapons.

Another message is, well, we would be willing To trade nuclear weapons, not to become a more normal country, because they wouldn't say that, but, you know, to have a more open economy or more economic engagement with other countries, including the U.S., actually.

Andrea 15:18

Yeah. So top level from, top line from Pompeo's meeting in Pyongyang, possibly another Trump-Kim summit coming down early next year. Any predictions on place?

Ramon 15:35

Well, I mean, they have said now after the 1st of January. I think January, February seems feasible, maybe more February than January. I mean, it is true, and that's one of the discussions we can touch on this later on, that we're having in Europe, actually, is about the potential location. It is true that there are three, four places that are thinking or they are preparing, actually, to host the summit, potentially, in Europe.

Okay, so potentially in Europe. Well, definitely Vienna, Helsinki and Stockholm are definitely preparing themselves for the possibility of hosting the summit in the not too distant future. They missed out on the previous one, all of them. And they're definitely preparing themselves for this. So I think it should be January. If I had to bet, I would say more February.

Actually, January is too close after the midterms, New Year, etc., etc.,

Andrea 16:30

And then the other key takeaway being that we seem to be moving in the direction of a more phased or sequenced approach to North Korean disarmament rather than the all or nothing black or white kind of situation the US started out with. And they're focusing a lot on the. The idea of a voluntary declaration from North Korea and are at least for the moment hitting a wall.

Yes. Maybe that wall shrinks or we get around it some other way. But yeah, for the moment, it seems where we are. All right. Let's talk a little bit about, actually, while we're on the note of the US policy, there was a little bit of a hiccup in South Korean-US relations when the South Korean foreign minister said earlier in the month that Seoul was contemplating lifting some of the sanctions that had been introduced against North Korea in 2010 for their sinking of The Cheonan.

And this was then met with a response from Donald Trump when he got asked by the press about the comment. And he said something to the effect of South Korea won't do anything without our approval. And this, I think, caused some rumblings amongst the South Korean population about what The relationship between South Korea and the U.S. was and whether that was a healthy way for the U.S. to be thinking about its alliance partnerships.

What were your what was your take on that? Was that an an overreading of the situation in terms, you know, was this a was it made by the press to be a bigger spat than it was? Or is this actually that's something that really niggled at the population and the way that was being described?

Ramon 18:20

I don't think so. I think it's one of those cases where there was no exaggeration to speak of. I mean, when Foreign Minister Kang made her remarks, conservative parties in South Korea reacted and said, well, you know, we haven't investigated Cheonan sinking. Not that we haven't investigated, but North Korea has an apology for the Cheonan sinking, so we shouldn't even think about the sanctions.

Then Trump came out and he basically said what you said. He said South Korea won't do anything without our approval. I think that's the word. And then suddenly you see the South Korean press and conservative press and South Korean conservative parties aligning with government saying, well, we're actually independent from the U.S., we're a sovereign country. So I think that it is clear that it has rattled some feathers in South Korea.

In South Korea, I would also say that this is the thinking of the South Korean government. So this wasn't the foremost thinking allowed. I mean, there was a debate even within the Blue House as to whether this message should have come from somebody else, maybe one of the advisors to the president. For example, Moon Jong-un has been more willing.

To present a position that is much more pro-engagement than even the current government has, right? So there was some discussions in the Blue House. Maybe this message had come from somebody else. But I think if you look at South Korea after the last summit and the way relations are going, they know this is the next step. The next step is economic engagement because you can have all the cultural and sports engagements that you want.

Military confidence building measures are very important as well. But clearly what North Korea wants is sanctions relief, right? And South Korea has its own autonomous sanctions. So I think this is the line of thinking of the South Korean government. The foreign minister floated the idea to say, well, this is what the South Korean government actually wants to do.

And then there was this backlash coming from President Trump, also from the US in general, talking about the split. In the alliance. But I think this issue is going to come up again, especially if or when Kim Jong-un visits South Korea, because there's all the discussion this will happen before the end of the year, human meat with Putin, there might be a second summit.

Well, what's the next thing you can do? You can keep on having more meetings, but at some point probably you have to discuss, you have to start with sanctions relief. Having said that, I mean, if you look at the sanctions per se, for example, all these cultural exchanges that were happening, well, in theory, they fall under the sanctions regime.

All these talks that have been made about potential business deals, well, under the sanctions regime, South Korean businesses are not allowed to even look into this in theory, or at least to proceed with this type of business. But now South Korea is pressing for it. I don't know to what extent South Korean sanctions, I'm talking about European, American or UN sanctions, to what extent South Korean sanctions actually do matter because the South Korean government will just issue waiver after waiver if necessary.

And I don't see the National Assembly in South Korea, if they decide to actually remove sanctions, stopping this. I don't see that happening, to be honest.

Andrea 21:31

Yeah, it's interesting to look at how different the US and South Korea are in terms of the direction that they're going with their domestic sanctions on North Korea. Because on the one hand, as you say, you have South Korea very much thinking about how to waive or ease those to facilitate more of the types of interaction that they want to have with North Korea, whether that's You know, infrastructure projects or businesses or cultural exchanges or what have you.

And then on the other hand, as we'll get to actually later, you have the US stepping up in some ways in a qualitatively different fashion, their own national sanctions on North Korea and and really pushing forward on some of those elements to not only to show that they're still watching what's happening in terms of illicit activity, But that they're not letting go of the maximum pressure campaign anytime soon.

So, you know, these two capitals seem to be heading in quite different directions in terms of the message and the concrete approach that they're taking. And, you know, that kind of collided in terms of this loudspeaker diplomacy in early October. Yeah. We should note as well that the South Koreans did end up walking back Foreign Minister Kang's comments by saying that Seoul was not seriously considering rolling back the 2010 sanctions, not least because those were put in place for an incident that North Korea has not apologized for.

And therefore, you know, until they do that, you can't consider taking them away.

Ramon 23:09

Yeah, they have. I agree with that. Having said that, the message from Sol is very clear now. They're talking about the steps towards denuclearization. They're not talking about denuclearization anymore, right? They're saying we need a serious process or significant steps towards denuclearization, right? Which is a... Is a political issue right what does significant mean you can define it any way you want right and President Moon actually his message was well North Korea has already taken significant steps right and the international community told him well we don't agree with you But now this means that the next step by North Korea, whatever it is, who knows, maybe they present a declaration and South Korea might go again and say, oh, this is significant, we have the declaration.

So we come back to the meaning of significant, actually, because I think... The debate in South Korea right now is not about sanctions relief after denuclearization, quite clearly. It's about when do we start the sanctions relief process. And that's what South Korean diplomacy is actually pressing in different corners of the globe. They're pressing for sanctions relief at some point throughout the denuclearization process.

Andrea 24:16

Yeah, it's interesting that you mention actually how do you define significant in this context, because I was reading a New York Times story today, and they were using as a yardstick what President Clinton and Bush had accomplished with North Korea in terms of getting concessions from the North. And their assessment was that what Trump has gotten the North Koreans to concede is more significant than that.

And that that assumes that actually, you know, North Korea has done that because of Trump and that it's, you know, Trump's skillful diplomacy has resulted in it. We can debate that. But it just, you know, is that the right yardstick? You know, North Korea's WMD programs were at a very different place back then. Than they are now, so is it still as significant if you consider the relative shape of their program, you know, compared to the 90s, early 2000s?

Ramon 25:18

And I think this is a very important point. I mean, my answer would be not as simple as that. I mean, Bush and Clinton could compare. It was before the first nuclear test in 2006 when both processes actually took place. But right now, North Korea has a nuclear program. And de facto, we have accepted North Korea as a nuclear...

Nuclear power and Kim Jong-un is meeting here and there with different leaders which in theory shouldn't be happen if you look at the sanctions regime for example so what we see here is that these comparisons with previous administrations I don't think they hold in the same way that we cannot compare with Iran or with Libya that's a completely different situation and geographically they are very different as well so we have to come up with a new playbook what is significant And right now, I think the international community agrees.

And I would agree with this point. I mean, there haven't been significant steps. They would have been significant definitely in the 1990s and early 2000s, what North Korea has done already. But right now, knowing that they have, well, we don't know how many, but they have several dozens, probably nuclear warheads, they're not significant at all, right? I guess, but that's only my guess, the discussion is within the US is that at least we need to have some nuclear warhead, you know, maybe move to Tennessee or somewhere else, remove from North Korea so we can look at the technology, for example.

Andrea 26:41

Hashtag not going to happen. Yeah.

Ramon 26:43

I agree with you, but having said that, I mean, if you look at the thinking within the U.S., but also within Europe, is that this at some point might start happening, right? I mean, we are preparing ourselves for this to happen. I agree with you that, I mean, why would North Korea do that? Again, maybe in 15, 20 years, completely different North Korea.

Andrea 27:02

Yeah, I agree.

Ramon 27:03

Could happen, but right now...

Andrea 27:03

Interesting scenario, maybe.

Ramon 27:04

Exactly, right? But right now, I completely agree with you. But I mean, that's the interesting thing that you talk to diplomats. From different governments and they're preparing for it. And we might talk a little bit about this later on, but I mean, President Macron in France has said very clearly, you know, we're stand ready here to use our technical expertise, et cetera, et cetera.

Meaning we are thinking that this might actually happen, right?

Andrea 27:28

Actually that's a good point for us to segue into talking about Moon Jae-in's visit to Europe give us the overview of where he went and who he talked to and why you think he did that now

Ramon 27:40

Well, I found it very interesting because with the chair we followed the whole preparations and trip, right? And there was a lot of emphasis on the meeting with the Pope because of the obviously diplomatic component of the potential trip from the Pope to North Korea, Pope Francis.

Andrea 27:57

Just maybe to pause there for those who haven't Followed the story. The North Koreans expressed their openness to having a visit from the Pope to Pyongyang at some point in the not-too-distant future. Moon Jae-in then went to the Vatican and met with the Pope and, you know, tried to take, I think, this idea a little further forward.

So that's just what we're referring to when we're talking about this, what might have been quite unexpected aspect to the discussion.

Ramon 28:27

I mean, and the... And the Pope actually said, you know, if I receive an invitation, he would be willing to accept, which basically is a way of saying yes, right? But for me, that wasn't the main or the most important issue of Moon's trip to Europe. I mean, he first went to France. Which normally is one of two EU member states without diplomatic relations with North Korea and normally is portrayed as a hardliner.

I don't fully agree with this, but it is true that you could argue as a nuclear power permanent member of the UN Security Council and a member state not having diplomatic relations with North Korea, it could potentially have a more important role to play than other European countries. So, very clearly Moon wanted France and then when he went to Italy and then when he went to Brussels for the EU-Korea summit, very clearly he wanted a commitment from the European Union.

That there would be sanctions relief and a move away from CBID. On the first point, there was some success because the EU actually moved towards sequencing, very clearly actually. President Macron, in his press conference after the meeting with Moon, he actually said, you know, we'll consider sanctions relief as we move forward with this process. And until September, the position of the European Union was the Iranian model.

First you denuclearize and then we carry on with the sanctions relief.

Andrea 30:04

Yeah, I actually get the sense, and I'd be interested whether you think the same, from speaking with European officials that many, you know, even throughout the last year, and probably if you'd asked them in 2017 as well, would have said face sanctions relief is the most realistic approach. Pathway forward. And actually that a phase, and this comes back to the point about what they think the road looks like on the disarmament front, they don't think that's, you know, just a one straight shot to full CVID.

And therefore, you know, I think there is already that openness to scaling some sanctions back in exchange for some good behavior by But the question is, what, when, how sustained does North Korea's good behavior have to be for that sanctions relief to come? This was one of actually coming to your point about Iran. That sequencing question was really interesting.

Yeah. And, and especially how, you know, the question of how do you manage the maintenance of some sanctions on a country and still having those be effective while lifting others and ensuring that the country gets some benefit for that lifting approach, you know, this would be, I think, 1000 times harder, actually, North Korean context. But shows you that European officials are thinking about it.

So I wasn't surprised when Macron gave that sort of indication. And indeed, I think if you asked around more widely, you'd probably hear the same. That that line that Federica Mogherini had a few months ago where she basically just straightforwardly echoed the U.S. position, which is that not a single sanction will go until CVID ends. You know, that is just that it's an echoing of the US approach, but I didn't get the sense that it had much in the way of, you know, genuine intellectual support in the European community.

Ramon 32:00

But that's the interesting thing, that it is true that if you talk to European officials in private, I mean, for months they have been saying, well, obviously that's not going to happen, right? Sanctions are only after CBID. But that was the official line, right? Yes, it was. And the fact that the official line has changed, has clearly changed, I think is significant.

Because if we look at the European Union, we can get now into CBID. It is a slow process until an official position is changed, but when it's changed, the EU keeps the line, right? So, the point about CBID, as the European Union, actually, Macron himself, but then in Brussels, President Moon was told, was, well, this comes from the UN sanctions regime, and the UN sanctions regime talks about CBID, therefore, the European Union is going to simply apply the UN sanctions regime, and that's the...

Andrea 32:47

It's a very rules-based approach, right?

Ramon 32:49

Exactly, it's very rules-based, right? And... And that's the interesting thing, that the Iranian line or the sanctions relief only after denuclearization is what the Europeans agreed to, right? And now we have agreed to move to something different, which is sequencing. And this takes me to CBID. I mean, the official lines tell CBID, but what I also find interesting, again, it was Macron who said it, but then in Brussels, I know for a fact that President Moon was told this, you know, if the United Nations changes...

Its wording, then we're happy to change. So we are not attached to CBID. As Europeans, we're attached to it because the United Nations, actually because the rule of law, the United Nations is actually telling the international community this is what we should, what we should do. So there is a degree of realism that I think wasn't achieved only thanks to President Moon's visit, but He helped actually to, or his visit helped to see the European in a particular direction.

Another interesting bit is about CBID. I don't see France or the UK, the two permanent members of the UN Security Council here in Europe, staunchly defending CBID. If there is a move, I don't see any move, but if there is a move in a few months towards not having CBID as part of the sanctions regime, or there is some change in wording, They're not going to stall the process.

So this can be considered to an extent a diplomatic victory for Moon, for the South Korean diplomats.

Andrea 34:22

It strikes me that it's potentially not a You know, a total Moon Jae-in driven success on that front. I think you're right that he's a part of it. But also, surely, if the U.S. was not there yet at all or was not even looking like it might move towards a phased approach, I suspect that You wouldn't have seen that same flexible kind of language on the European side.

If actually out of that Pompeo visit, it had very much still looked like the US was CVID or nothing, then it would have been a lot harder for European leaders to speak up and say the type of thing that they did. Do you broadly agree with that?

Ramon 35:02

I agree with the fact that the European Union is looking closely at the US because it doesn't want to have one other problem with the US. It's enough with trade and NATO and all these other things, and Iran very clearly, so it doesn't want to create another diplomatic problem. And we haven't mentioned yet that the same time as Moon was in Europe, Special Representative Bigun actually came to Europe as well.

He went to Paris and he went to Brussels. So the two key places that Moon was... It's like the wedding crusher. Anyways, to an extent it was an issue in Europe that he came precisely this week, which was the big Europe-Asia week. There were many summits taking place with Korea, with ASEAN, the ASEM summit President Moon was visiting.

I think he should have waited a week, because it was a little bit too obvious, and it is true that he wasn't as well received as he would have if he had come afterwards. Having said that, European officials... Who met with him, they sensed that he wants Europe more involved. And this includes hosting meetings, Track 2, Track 1.5 meetings.

But they also got a sense that, yes, there is some flexibility involved. On the part of the US. The official message that Begum brought was still sanctions relief, you know, if they happen it will be in the distant future, you know, we have to have the denuclearization process, maybe even full denuclearization, but I know for a fact that European officials sense that Actually the line behind closed doors is not exactly like that, and there is some degree of flexibility, or there is some realism in the position from the US.

There is one other issue that we haven't discussed yet, that it is true that the European Union seems to be following closely the US line, but there are also many European officials, and you can talk to them in Seoul, but also in Brussels, who after the US withdrew from the Iranian nuclear deal, They sense two things. A, an opportunity for the European Union.

They say, well, let's make this a multilateral agreement with North Korea. Because, look, if the U.S. withdraws in the future or North Korea withdraws in the future, you know, at least the European Union can try to help maintain the deal in place, you know, for a future administration to change a tack in the case of the U.S.

But B, and I think it's quite important as well, some member states are saying, well, you know what, if the U.S. doesn't support us with Iran... We can officially support the U.S. on North Korea, but when it comes, for example, to sanctions implementation, there are some states that say, well, why should we bother with this? This is time-consuming, human resource-consuming.

In 2017, the European Union was pressing third parties in Southeast Asia, for example, to impose sanctions. And there is very little willingness to do that right now, after what happened with Iran, actually.

Andrea 37:56

Yeah, I was actually going to ask you this. Yeah. Why did we not see more in the way of a joint statement out of the Moon-EU meeting? Was part of this actually because Europe felt that it had to get a bit back if it was going to make a big joint statement? Was it hoping for something more from South Korea that it didn't receive?

What was the dynamic there?

Ramon 38:19

I mean, if you look at when it started to be discussed back in September, there was a discussion already ongoing between both governments after the summer break. And South Korea didn't want CBID in the official joint statement. The European Union wanted CBID. Sorry, not the European Union, some EU member states, like the big three, for example, were pressing for CBID to win the statement.

And at some point, two other items came onto the agenda, one of them Iran and the second one Ukraine.

Andrea 38:50

As in the EU was asking for South Korea to make strong statements in support of the JCPOA, the Iran nuclear deal, and condemning Russia for actions in Ukraine.

Ramon 39:01

Exactly. And there was a little bit more flexibility on Ukraine, maybe not in Russia, but something more general about respect for international law, again, very important for the European Union, but GCPOA was key for the European Union. So once it was clear that the European Union was not going to give up on CBID unless a GCPOA was there, plus Ukraine...

And it was clear that South Korea wasn't willing to support both of them, especially because they didn't want to antagonize the US and Russia, which are both key for the North Korean nuclear process. Then there was no point in having an agreement. So... Having said that, even the week when Moon was visiting Europe, so the summit took place on Friday and from the previous Saturday, Sunday, Moon was in Europe, there were discussions ongoing.

And even a couple of days before the summit itself, there were still discussions ongoing, you know, can we reach an agreement? And it turned out that it wasn't the case, so they decided not to go with a joint statement. Now Talking Town is, well, when we have the next summit, which should be next year, they should become annual summits again, are we going to have a joint statement?

And the discussion right now is, well, you know, if the starting point is going to be the same, then let's not bother with this. If there is some progress on the nuclear issue in North Korea, Then maybe South Korea becomes a little bit more willing not to condemn Russia and not to openly support the CPOA, but make an statement, for example, about the rule of international law or international agreements in the case of Ukraine and Iran, which is not directly...

Andrea 40:40

Some middle ground fudge language. Yes, it is.

Ramon 40:42

Right. But right now we are not there. I mean, you started asking, is it a big deal that we don't have a joint statement? It is a big deal. It's the first time that this doesn't happen. But this actually tells you that this joint statement actually matter more than the previous ones where they could agree because there wasn't much to discuss.

There was no ongoing process with North Korea.

Andrea 41:01

So, you know, the previous is more substantively at stake this time.

Ramon 41:04

Yeah, exactly.

Andrea 41:05

Yeah, there really is. So maybe let's talk about some good news. We don't get, you know, a huge amount of good news from what I acknowledge to be probably a naturally skeptical WMD policy community. But we definitely had some good news with North Korea this month in the form of the implementation of some of the aspects of the Pyongyang Declaration and agreement, namely the military components.

So there was plans to engage in demining of some of the border areas. That was completed this month and I think ahead of schedule, they went out of their way to say.

Ramon 41:46

Very Korean pali pali, very quickly. Yeah.

Andrea 41:50

Juche speed. And then we also saw the effort to start removing guard posts and some of the other sort of weaponized aspects of that joint area. Other things I missed there in the good news pile, I think for the most part we agree that that's a really positive, albeit modest, step forward in the inter-Korean dialogue process that's yielding some tangible results.

And I think there's ambitions, as you'll know better than I will, to have that joint security area become a more free-flowing territory than it has traditionally been.

Ramon 42:37

Yes, I mean, I think all positive. I mean, if we start with the demining process, what I find interesting is that when South Korea started in early October and we had the reports, there were no reports on whether North Korea was carrying out its part of the agreement or not. And there was some skepticism saying, well, North Koreans have agreed to this, but in the past they have agreed to so many things and then they haven't fulfilled them.

So I think that the mining process per se is very positive, but also the fact that North Korea is actually carrying on Coming through with the agreement that it actually agreed on, which wasn't a given. And, you know, for the first two, three days, all these reports in South Korean media, well, are the North Koreans doing this?

And even the South Korean government and the military were saying we're fulfilling our part of the agreement, but they were saying nothing about the North Koreans. So I think that's quite positive. Also, this has led to some body remains from the Korean War having found. So there was Park Ji-kwon, who is... A South Korean soldier who died in the last few months of the confrontation in 1953, and his sisters actually are still alive, so at least his body remains, you know, will be given to the sisters, at least at this personal...

Level there is also this positive aspect and obviously sometimes we forget about it but there was a war there and there are many people who never recovered the bodies of their families so at least they can get some closure on this confidence building seems to be moving and I found very interesting yes as you said a few days ago there was this announcement from the South Korean government saying well we hope that visitors to the JSA will be able to move freely Around the USA and anyone who has visited, you know, I mean, this is very closely guarded.

Sometimes, actually, you cannot visit, right? When the tensions are higher, everything is very strictly controlled. You always find... I mean, I always find... Fun to an extent is that you're on the South Korean side and tell you don't wave to the North Koreans because then they might shoot you, you know, like, well, okay, so, you know, these things and you always get these messages, right?

So the fact that you can actually move around, yes, it's a small, maybe, confidence-building measure, but I think psychological is different, actually, as well. Even for the soldiers posted there, I mean... When you visit, you realize it is a tense situation for them. I mean, they have been shootings, for example. I mean, they're having people trying to escape from the North Korean side, from the South Korean side.

So I think this is positive. I find interesting that there was some criticism in the beginning, I'll do it from the more conservative perspective. Spectrum of South Korean society about these confidence building measures. But this has died out. I mean, I think most people agree, you know, if we can reduce tensions, I mean, South Korea has conscriptions.

People are thinking, well, if my son doesn't have to do conscription, they say in the future, right? Or this is reduced. Even again, at the personal level, people think differently when it affects them personally, right? Instead of this being an abstract thing of, well, you know, a professional army, so we don't really Have to worry about them because conscription is a big issue in South Korea.

So I think confidence building is going to continue, but now we're talking about bigger steps, for example, in the sea, right? We're talking about bigger steps like the removal of post, which is happening. But I don't know to what extent you have the full support of South Korean society unless North Korea does more for all these more important steps.

Andrea 46:13

Yeah, the North Koreans also mentioned, as I think to the South Korean press, that there was... Continued military talks, even just before the weekend. So we're recording on Monday, the 29th of October. So, you know, just towards the end of the month that there was continuing discussions. So I think that's really great and have for a very long time supported a sustained interaction between At the military-to-military level for crisis management and mitigation purposes.

There's been some interesting commentary. Actually, Toby Dalton from the Carnegie Endowment wrote an interesting piece, I think, in War on the Rocks about some of the potential downsides of the military agreement that was reached, namely in terms of transparency and certain aspects of verifiability if you can't use, let's say, drone platforms or that sort of thing under the terms of the agreement.

So... Those are bits that I think we need to chew over a little more. But broadly, I think, you know, there is a sense that the direction, at least on the military to military front, is positive, you know, even though we're doing these very small step things. I should also say everyone should get very excited to see the North Korean Peace Pavilion on the north side of Seoul.

The line there in the Joint Security Area, because having been to it, they have some fantastic rainbow lighting on the inside. So your sort of guide runs in ahead of you and like turns on all the rainbow lights so you can have some atmosphere when you're looking across to the south. So everyone can look forward to that. great. I don't know if the look forward is the term we're looking for here, but it's an experience. No, it was certainly an experience.

The last story we kind of wanted to cover today was about the US sanctioning and indictment of a Singaporean national and some of the companies he's affiliated with. And, you know, the US has been doing quite a bit recently in terms of new sanctions designations and... Specifically on North Korea, targeting companies overseas that either are assisting North Korean business or indeed are North Korean controlled themselves.

And there's been a drumbeat of those again, starting kind of in the July period. So it's not totally out of character in that context. But this one was really interesting because Of not only the background story on this singaporean fellow but also just the way the u.s went about about targeting this individual so he's now the subject of a lovely fbi most wanted poster there's been an indictment unsealed on him and this fellow tan we beng Has also been sanctioned.

So they basically went for the full whammy here of U.S. actions. And the background story to this is that this guy and his companies, I believe, actually in mid-2017 sued the FBI. And I haven't seen a lot of the papers reporting on this dimension of it. But the case was really interesting because basically, as far as I understand, the FBI and Treasury sent a notice to some of the banks asking for information on particular companies or individuals or whatnot.

Not because they were sanctioned, but presumably because they were the subject of an ongoing internal investigation. Now, it sounds like what some of the banks did is determined that actually, just in the process of receiving that request from the authorities, that there was therefore reason for them to treat those Clients with high risk and so some of the banks I think froze assets or in other ways tried to scale back their relationship with this Singaporean fellow and his companies and so He went, lawyered up, and sued the FBI for $24 million for including him on a so-called gray list.

The case was eventually dismissed or withdrawn by the Singaporean fellow because OFAC, the Office of Foreign Assets Control, or the FBI, I can't remember which, sent out a notice to the bank saying, these guys aren't actually sanctioned, so you don't actually have to treat them like sanctioned parties. But now, fast forward one year, he is sanctioned and there's a wanted poster and the FBI has made very clear they're keen for him to be extradited to face justice in the United States.

And they will work with foreign partners to make that happen.

Ramon 51:19

And yes, I mean, this is a very interesting case. I think also, not only because of what you have said, but the response from Tan Wee Beng, that he has gone out, given an interview to BBC. He said, look, I'm not hiding, I'm here in Singapore. It should be said that in Singapore, money laundering There's an agreement with the U.S., a declaration agreement with the U.S. Money laundering is not covered by the agreement.

So Singapore is a good place to be right now.

Andrea 51:44

Yeah, the wanted poster describes him as being at large. And he was like, no, I'm not at large. I'm here.

Ramon 51:49

I'm here, yes. And if you look at Singaporean media, for example, the Straight Times or Channels News Asia, for example, they have reports on him. He has spoken to them as well. I mean, he's described as a playboy with his Ferrari, yellow Ferrari. I saw that. So it's not like he's hiding, it's not like he's running away from the country or that he's saying, please, he's not logging up as you were saying, don't come for me, right?

I mean, he's actually saying the opposite. He's saying, look, I'm here, this is not true. The two companies, not only him having sanction, I mean they're run by me. This guy has also been, was named actually entrepreneur of the year in 2011. So we're not talking about some dodgy character who has been involved in money laundering before and some of the illicit activities. And he might have been, but he's not your archetypical what do you mean to be a money laundering right and doing this in the, in, in the dark. That's why I find it so, so interesting. I mean what I also find Interesting, one other aspect, this is what you said, the change from 2017 to 2018, right?

2017, FBI itself said, well, mistake, nothing else to do here. 2018, a few months later, well, actually, there is a case here.

Andrea 53:05

And it could be just that they had to get evidence in place to take certain actions. And those have to be quite robust, especially if you're planning on having the guy in court at some stage and everything has to hold up there. It's also worth noting that the money laundering charges, there's a certain way that money laundering is written into the law in the US.

So, for example, on export control cases with Iran, if... You were processing payments in a way that was seeking to evade financial controls. So let's say you were breaking down a payment into chunks of less than $10,000. That's money laundering under U.S. law, and you can be charged there. But it sounds like this guy was cooperating and specifically taking direction from North Korean banks and representatives.

And so, you know, that all has to be proved. This is all just alleged at this stage. But if that's true, then, you know, he has been in breach of U.S. law in several ways, especially if that flowed, if that touched U.S. dollars and flowed through the U.S. financial system, then it's U.S. jurisdiction as well. So there's there's that dynamic to it.

But I think what the U.S. may be trying to achieve, at least in part from this approach, is to literally make this guy the poster boy for what happens if you partner with North Korea in business. So, you know, North Korea does rely on a whole lot of foreign facilitators to engage in everything from coal trading to IT companies to weapons trading, right?

Yeah. And those people, if you're going to disrupt North Korean networks in any sort of systematic fashion or even a partial fashion, you've got to start to persuade the guys in the middle that it's too risky to touch North Korean business. And even if you're not in the U.S. and you don't have a lot of business with the U.S., the long arm of the U.S. law can still come after you.

And so... You know, I think this is partly a demonstration case. And it follows shortly on the heels of cases where the U.S. has targeted specific individuals involved in cyber actions, North Korean individuals involved in cyber actions. So there's a certain movement towards an individualistic approach, probably to create a wider deterrent effect there. In relation to North Korean business.

So kind of an interesting one, a little bit qualitatively different than the things that the U.S. has done before, which is normally just to stick these guys on a sanctions list.

Ramon 55:36

So, yeah, I mean, I think, yeah, I completely agree with your point about the deterrent component and going after the middle people. Right. But what I find also interesting is that there is very detailed information, right? So they talk about cash payments, for example. So obviously, there has been some, well, obviously, there has been some form of surveillance, right?

So what the FBI is telling Tang Weiwen is we have caught you. Better for you to actually surrender yourself and come here to the US to go on trial. So it's a deterrent component for other people as well. But it's also the fact that I think the message from the U.S. is also, as the process with North Korea moves forward, as long as there are sanctions, they are in place.

We're going to keep on implementing them.

Andrea 56:24

That's very true.

Ramon 56:25

And, well, Treasury has been very open about it. I mean, Treasury Department hasn't said, well, we're going to stop this and we're going to move to the next one. They have said, well, North Korea is one of the key countries we're dealing with and imposing sanctions on entities from Russia, from China. From China, the possibility of imposing sanctions on even South Korean entities.

So it is likely the sanctions regime is there, which I actually find interesting as well, because if we look back in history, when we had the six-party talks, right on the date, 19th of September, when we had the six-party talks agreement, Treasury came out and actually said, well, you know, Banco Delta Asia, now it's on the sanctions list, exactly the same day.

Obviously, the North Koreans think this was pre-planned. The US says no. I mean, these are different branches of government. And, you know, a state works at its own pace. And the same with Treasury. But the deterrent was very clear there, right? The message was very clear. The deterrent to other entities that were still dealing with North Korea, even at the time when the agreement was being implemented.

So I don't think that's going to disappear. I mean, we have to come, unless you have instructions from the very top, right? The president himself saying, you know, stop this. Treasury is just doing its work. Same with FBI. So yes, I agree with you. It's a deterrent component, but it's also the fact that, you know, the sanctions are there.

They have to be implemented. This is just law. What I would find interesting, though, is that If at some point, while the South Korea is already doing this, but the Chinese, the Russians start to put more pressure on the US to say, okay, you know, yes, keep the sanctions at least for the time being, but why don't you forget about implementing them for a while?

You know, going directly to Trump, because that's diplomacy we're seeing at the highest level. And then what Trump might think, actually, we really don't know, right? And I wouldn't be surprised if they would try to go to the top. So at least sanctions implementation, you know, is slowed down or it's not as strict as it is right now.

I'm not saying this is going to happen, but I'm sure this diplomatic process should try to achieve this at some point.

Andrea 58:29

And that's kind of what was happening. I don't know if it was deliberate or not, but that's kind of what was happening around the Singapore summit time. There was a period of a few months kind of between April and July where you didn't really see much action from Treasury. I don't think you saw any, as a matter of fact, I might be wrong, but it was much quieter than the July onwards period that we're seeing now with that regular set of sanctions and Department of Justice actions and a whole bunch of other things.

So, yeah, you're very right to point that out. Ramon, thank you so much for joining me. It's been really great to have you back on the podcast. We'll do it again. And thank you so much to our listeners for tuning in.