Here is the latest IAEA Report by the Director General concerning Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Iran is flat out denying the Green Salt claim:

38. On 5 December 2005, the Secretariat repeated its request for a meeting to discuss information that had been made available to the Secretariat about alleged studies, known as the Green Salt Project, concerning the conversion of uranium dioxide into UF4 (often referred to as “green salt”), as well as tests related to high explosives and the design of a missile re-entry vehicle, all of which could involve nuclear material and which appear to have administrative interconnections. On 16 December 2005, Iran replied that the “issues related to baseless allegations.” Iran agreed on 23 January 2006 to a meeting with the DDG-SG for the clarification of the alleged Green Salt Project, but declined to address the other topics during that meeting. In the course of the meeting, which took place on 27 January 2006, the Agency presented for Iran’s review a copy of a process flow diagram related to bench scale conversion and a number of communications related to the project. Iran reiterated that all national nuclear projects are conducted by the AEOI, that the allegations were baseless and that it would provide further clarifications later.

39. On 26 February 2006, the DDG-SG met with Iranian authorities to discuss the alleged Green Salt Project. Iran repeated that the allegations “are based on false and fabricated documents so they were baseless,” and that neither such a project nor such studies exist or did exist. It stated that all national efforts had been devoted to the UCF project, and that it would not make sense to develop indigenous capabilities to produce UF4 when such technology had already been acquired from abroad. According to information provided earlier by Iran, the company alleged to have been associated with the so-called Green Salt Project had, however, been involved in procurement for UCF and in the design and construction of the Gchine ore processing plant.

The United States is going to look fantastically stupid if the laptop story turns out to be bogus.

One new detail, the process flow that the IAEA showed the Iranians was for “bench-scale” conversion—in other words, the facility was essentially a laboratory with very little capacity.

That answers one of the questions I asked last week: “Why hide a large scale production facility under a mountain if you just plan to truck the UF4 to a different facility some place? Doesn’t exposing shipments to interdiction undermine the security created by burying the facility?”

It isn’t a large-scale production facility.

I still want to know the process for making UF4, particularly the method for removing impurities. That might shed more light on this claim.

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Ever wonder about terms like bench-scale and bread board?

Me, too.

In a research call to the national laboratories, DOE drafted a relatively readable description of various levels of technological maturity that nevertheless unleashed this wonder of the English language:

Technical feasibility should be demonstrated through component bench-scale testing with at least a laboratory bread board of the concept.

Listed as “Technology Maturation Stage 3 – Exploratory Development.”

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On a related note, I finally got my copy of A. Perez, Du concentré d’uranium à l’hexafluorure, Electricité (December 1981) 31-38, detailing operations at France’s Malvesi UF4 plant.

It’s boring, not terribly helpful and in French. Good luck.

Paul Adds:

“Bench Scale”...not so new.

From the 31 January Heinonen report to the BoG:

“the Agency presented for Iran’s review a copy of a process flow diagram related to bench scale conversion and communications related to the project.”

Hippie.