New Triad 2: Cambone on the New Triad
posted Wednesday December 14, 2005 under nuclear-weapons by jeffreyI never understood why a “responsive infrastructure” was one of the three legs of the “New Triad.”
Along with offenses and defenses, I always thought Command, Control and Intelligence (C2I) was the more logical candidate. It makes sense on logical grounds—Satellites that gather intelligence and handle communications are similar to missiles that delive nuclear weapons or intercept other missiles, certainly much more so than the conceptual “robust infrastructure.”
It also made sense on grounds of continuity—folks like Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Steve Cambone had long argued for a strategy that placed more emphasis on new strike forces, missile defenses and improved surveillance systems. So relegating C2I to a supporting role seemed … out of character.
During our lunch, Cambone told a story—“out of school” as he described it—about his time as Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy that explained a little.
Apparently Cambone did argue for making C2I, the third leg of the New Triad. He lost out to folks arguing for a “responsive infrastructure,”—“one of the few arguments I lost,” he humbly noted (or something aong those lines). C2I was relegated to a simple sentence noting “This New Triad is bound together by enhanced command and control (C2) and intelligence systems.”
Cambone didn’t, unfortunately, explain why C2I lost out. An interesting data point, none the less.



— peter · Dec 14, 09:07 AM ·
— Jeffrey Lewis · Dec 14, 09:10 AM ·
— BBoy · Dec 14, 09:54 AM ·
— Andrew · Dec 14, 10:50 AM ·
What is your basis for asserting that it would take twenty years to restart pit production? How can you argue that anyone could build a carrier faster than we could and, if so, isn’t that more a sign of a sclerotic and corrupt procurement process than a lack of funding?
— james · Dec 15, 02:44 PM ·
Why C2I lost out. It’s a horizontal enabler, not a primary system. I’ve seen the same thing in the CP discussions.
— J. · Dec 17, 04:08 AM ·
Second, my assertion as to how long it would take to re-establish full pit production capability comes from estimates of how long it would take to build a Modern Pit Facility. You can google the name, or look at a pretty comprehensive article about pit manufacturing [by Jon Medalia at the Congressional Research Service]:
20 years might not be exactly what they estimate, but I was going off memory when I posted. I know an interim pit capability can be established before then, but that would only apply to W88 production.
Third, I do think the procurement process is broken, and that is yet another factor hurting military infrastructure that policy planners would like to see fixed.
— Andrew · Dec 18, 07:59 AM ·
Draft Supplemental Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement on Stockpile Stewardship and Management for a Modern Pit Facility DOE/EIS-0236-S2, May 2003.
Just to be clear: that doesn't mean that I support building the Modern Pit Facility, which I regard as unnecessary. See:
Steve Fetter and Frank von Hippel, "Does the United States Need a New Plutonium-Pit Facility?" Arms Control Today May 2004.
— Jeffrey Lewis · Dec 18, 08:19 AM ·
If we did find the need to rapidly expand our nuclear arsenal, we could restart pit production much more quickly via a law that simply exempted the facility from the EIS process. It’s entirely possible to spend seventeen years building a new pit facility, or twenty years redesigning the the Saturn V, or twenty years reinventing the aircraft carrier but it’s not necessary. It’s more likely to me that our ability to “surge” new weapons production depends more on our overall economic health rather than the number of factories we have turning out weapons at low production rates.
— james williams · Dec 18, 11:08 AM ·