P1. Hot dogs are better than nothing
P2. Nothing is better than steak.
C. Therefore, hot dogs are better than steak.

Ah, the fallacy of equivocation. The Oxford English Dictionary defines it thus:

The fallacy which is committed when a term has different senses in the different members of a syllogism.

1605 BACON Adv. Learn. II. xiv. §7 The great sophism of all sophisms being equivocation or ambiguity of words and phrase. 1646 SIR T. BROWNE Pseud. Ep. I. iv. 13 The fallacie of Æquivocation and Amphibologie, which conclude from the ambiguity of some one word, or the ambiguous sintaxis of many. 1870 JEVONS Elem. Logic xx. 171.

The Heritage Foundation’s Baker Spring has resorted to Bacon’s great sophism of all sophisms to suggest that a little monograph I wrote for CDI is “detached from reality” and that I live in a “make-believe world.”

In my monograph, I argued that neither the United States nor any other country currently deploys:

  • space-based missile defenses,
  • anti-satellite weapons, or
  • space-based strike capabilities.

I then argued the United States should not deploy such capabilities:

In a world with space weapons, the United States may be better armed, but we may well be less secure.

Baker doesn’t get around to addressing my concerns, which focused on crisis stability scenarios. He does spend a few paragraphs obsessing about the title of the monograph—What if Space Were Weaponized. I reprint Baker’s comments here:

In order to argue against a U.S. national security pol­icy that would prospectively weaponize space, it is essential to assert that space is not yet weaponized and that U.S. defense programs, and only U.S. defense programs, will initiate an arms race in space. Arms control advocates cling tightly to this prospec­tive view. For example, Jeffrey Lewis of the Center for Defense Information authored a publication last year entitled What if Space Were Weaponized?

The problem with this prospective view, of course, is that it is inaccurate. Space is already heavily weap­onized and has been since the dawn of the space age. This occurred with German launches of armed V-2 rockets at Great Britain during World War II.

Today, there are intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles that are armed with the most destructive explosives man has ever invented. These nuclear-armed weapons spend a majority of their flight times in space.

These same ballistic missile weapons systems consist of more than just the missiles themselves. They depend on a variety of battle management, command and control, and early warning elements that are integral parts of the overall weapon system. Many of these assets are space-based.

By way of example, AEGIS weapons systems deployed on Navy surface ships consist of much more than just the standard surface-to-air missiles. The equivalent of the ballistic missile command and control and early warning elements onboard AEGIS class ships have long been defined as parts of the overall AEGIS weapons system. These include the SPY-class radar, target acquisition subsystems, and command and control elements. The same definition is appropriate for ballistic missile weapons systems.

Finally, arms control advocates are particularly concerned about the U.S. deploying anti-satellite systems. Leaving aside the fact that the former Sovi­et Union extensively tested a co-orbital anti-satel­lite system, any state that possesses a nuclear-armed intercontinental ballistic missile has an inherent anti-satellite capability. Again, the fact is that space is already weaponized.

It’s true that I argued that the United States does not (and should not) deploy space-based missile defenses, anti-satellite weapons or space-based strike platforms. It isn’t true that I denied the existence of ICBMs, missile defenses, military satellites and prior ASAT testing. In fact, I suggested the addition of what I called space weapons might add a dangerous element to a deterrent posture that relies heavily what Baker defines as space weapons—ICBMs, missile defenses and military satellites.

Not that someone who read Baker’s paper would know this, because Baker equivocates regarding the meaning of “space weapon,” thereby grossly exaggerating the arguments in my monograph.

I regret that I didn’t title the monograph: What if Space-based Missile Defenses, Antisatellite Weapons and Space-based Strike Platforms Were Deployed or, perhaps, What if Space Were More Weaponized Than It Is Now.

I understand why Baker equivocated. Equivocating helps strengthen a bad argument. Francis Bacon had good reason to call equivocation the “great sophism of all sophisms.” Plus, equivocating is fun. Take this example:

  • Therefore, Baker Spring has a tiny cock.

Purely for illustrative purposes, of course. I did not actually send Baker a pendant. As far as I know, Baker has no cock—tiny or otherwise.

Equivocation has second, less common meaning, that I believe more accurately captures Baker’s discourse on weaponization:

The use of words or expressions that are susceptible of a double signification, with a view to mislead; esp. the expression of a virtual falsehood in the form of a proposition which (in order to satisfy the speaker’s conscience) is verbally true.

Tomorrow we start on Baker’s footnotes. I’ve already documented one instance of utter hackery involving Baker.

Update: Um, scratch that. Baker’s papers don’t appear to have footnotes.