Six bucks or not, Andreas Persbo and Mark Hibbs have a must read profile of outgoing IAEA Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists:

The IAEA after ElBaradei. As ElBaradei’s tenure reaches its close, a deep and troubling divide has opened up on the IAEA Board of Governors between advanced nuclear states, including most of the states with nuclear weapons, and developing and non-aligned IAEA member states that make up a majority of the membership. On highly publicized issues such as Iran and Syria, consensus—essential to the demonstration of firm political will by the board—has evaporated. Once, decision making had taken place in a climate of unanimity. But after the IAEA’s confrontation with the United States over Iraq and the Iranian nuclear program, sources say, the willingness of board members to compromise on critical issues has disappeared. A few sources assert that ElBaradei contributed to the loss of board consensus by hammering away on the need for fairness and equity in international nuclear matters—such as the nuclear weapon states responsibility to disarm as called for in the NPT. But most sources—including some former U.S. diplomats—tell us that it was the Bush administration’s unilateral approach to issues that poisoned many board deliberations, not actions taken by ElBaradei. Others blame the lack of boardroom agreement on the failure of member states to adjust to a multipolar world after the Cold War’s superpower standoff ended.

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When the Board of Governors began looking for a successor to ElBaradei last fall, most advanced nuclear states deliberately sought a candidate who would scale back the IAEA’s ambitions, diplomats from these countries tell us. They settled on Yukiya Amano, Japan’s ambassador to the IAEA, a career diplomat not known for taking risks or assuming a high profile. Most nonaligned and developing countries supported Abdul Samad Minty, a South African nuclear diplomat who was intensely opposed by most advanced nuclear members. Unlike previous board elections, the 2009 contest was acrimonious and Amano was elected in June by a mere one-vote majority.

In July, Amano tried to reassure member states that didn’t endorse him that he would heed their interests and that he wouldn’t emphasize the nonproliferation agenda of advanced nuclear countries to the detriment of other states’ development goals. The negative reception by developing states to ElBaradei’s fuel-cycle initiative underscores just how many of these countries have a deepseated fear that additional nonproliferation initiatives are intended to prevent them from enjoying the benefits of nuclear technology. It will be difficult for Amano to restore consensus, but if the IAEA is to fulfill its current mission—to say nothing of additional responsibilities—rebuilding trust on the board must be his top priority.