ISIS posted a copy of that letter Iran sent to UN SecGen Ban Ki Moon last week. The letter, entitled The Islamic Republic of Iran’s Proposed Package for Constructive Negotiations, does not mention a suspension of uranium enrichment, a key demand of the P5+1, but it suggests the possibility of intrusive inspections and multinational enrichment on Iranian soil.
The Iranians have dangled these possibilities in the past, and although neither could prevent Tehran from diverting centrifuge technology to a clandestine facility, the added transparency would make it harder. How much so is open to debate.
What really jumped out me, however, was Iran’s proposal for:
An effort to encourage other states to control the export of nuclear material and equipment.
That’s a remarkable statement coming from a country that has decried the existing export control regime as a suppliers’ cartel bent on holding back the economic development of developing countries.
Perhaps some nuance was lost in the translation. (The original Farsi text is included in the .pdf file that ISIS posted). Either that, or Tehran is trying to head-off the regional proliferation consequences of its actions, as its Arab neighbors suddenly acquire interest in nuclear energy.
Speaking of Iran’s neighbors’ sudden interest in obtaining nuclear programs, are you going to comment on the agreement with Saudi Arabia to establish a nuclear program there?
I think it is part of a long term US plan to contain Iran using Saudi Arabia as a proxy.
I shudder at the thought of an alliance with a Wahhabbist state that has been a reliable partner at the top level, but below that, exports Wahhabyyah all over the world.
But then, only Richard Pipes and a few others see a direct line linking Osama Bin Laden and Wahhabism.
Iran’s neighbors are interested in nuclear technology as is the entire rest of the world. Both the Saudi and the Egytian nuclear programs are as old as Iran’s. Is it Iran’s fault that the price of uranium has sky-rocketed, or that 170 new reactors are being built around the world? I think not.
Could be related to Iran’s claim that the Aussies provided “nuclear materials” to Israel.
“Iran accused Australia of supplying nuclear materials to Israel, an allegation that was firmly denied by the Australian Ambassador in a right of reply.”
http://www.acronym.org.uk/npt/08pc06.htm
Everyone and their grandma is going to have a nuclear power soon enough. Just this month UAE signed on with UK and France
I believe Pakistan is helping Algeria also.
Time to sit down and re-craft the NPT, and not just piss in the wind when your enemies want to rightly acquire peaceful nuclear technology….and look the other way when your friends do.
3 points about this package and related issues:
– It was delivered to the Europeans first and then, with almost one week delay to the Russian and Chinese; The official explanation from Iran was that Russian were in political transition and Chinese were busy with the earthquake.
– The addressee of the package and the accompaning letter are almost exclusively Western powers.
– Solana’s trip to Iran to present the “re-modeled” 5+1 package is most likely delayed now: While 3 days ago Mottaki announced the visit, Solana’s representative said today that no date has yet been set.
On the side note, I don’t know from whom the ISIS got the file but the version send to the European should in most probability have an addendum.
I’m amazed that some active readers of this blog seem unable to differentiate between various nuclear programs.
Unless they’re hiding something really big, the Saudis have no nuclear program at all. (OK, they do have… a small cyclotron.) The recent US-Saudi MoU is in fact a technical agreement which does not commit the US to anything in particular, but nevertheless an important one since it commits SA to forego enrichment and reprocessing.
Hass, to compare the Egyptian and Saudi programs, is ludicrous; Egypt has one of the most mature nuclear prorgrams in the region.
FSB, the existence of a Pakistan-Algerian cooperation will be news to many readers (at least to me); a source would be appreciated.
(As per re-crafting the NPT, I’d be happy to read from you the text of a new treaty that would be acceptable to 188 member States. Good luck.)
Andy, I don’t read Farsi, but I interpreted the vague English translation you quoted to mean encouraging NSG states to self-police their technology transfers. It’s an odd suggestion, since Iran has recently offered to share its own nuclear expertise with a number of Arab States.
Andy –
If the 7th paragraph (the one you are refering too) was translated similar to the first one in the “nuclear issue” section, it should have read like this: “An effort to encourage different countries to control the export of nuclear material and equipment”.
This difference in translation, as you have cleverly noticed, is coming almost certainely from a second review of the translation by a political appointee. In my opinion, The most obvious interpretation for it (at least if you are coming from farsi-speaking background) is that, unlike the translation above, it doesn’t have any infinitesimal hint of Iran having diverted any amount of nuclear material in any way.
As far as your title question is concerned, if my memory is correct, the European rejected the idea of Iran being part of NSG. This was around mid 2003, when the European troika didn’t believe Iran will be able to enrich in an industrial scale.
kerbihan – I didn’t mean to “compare” Egypt v Saudi nuclear programmes — only to point out that many countries in the Mideast (including Iran, as with the rest of the world and many other developed and developing countries) have had long-standing interest in nuclear power, that cannot be attributed to Iran nor characterized as a “reaction” to Iran’s nuclear program.
And incidentally, about that non-existent Saudi nuclear program…
Most of the Pakistan nuclear capabilities were financed by Saudis and UAE. That was a pretty well known secret in the intelligence community here, I would even speculate that this was encouraged by the US security institutions.
Too Limited.
You’re being too limited here by trying to analyze the single passage on export of nuclear equipment. Iran’s offer was incredibly wide-ranging. It covered basically every topic imaginable: nuclear, geopolitics, economics, borders, democracy, etc, etc, etc.
There isn’t much of a point trying to itemize such a wide ranging offer. Instead, I take as a whole: In my view Iran is basically offering to trade it’s military nuclear program for:
A seat at the table.
Effectively, Iran wants to be acknowledged as a regional power, and have the US consult with Iran on all decisions on all of these issues. The nuclear program is only a means to an end. This offer is basically Iran saying they will give it away if they acheive their goal: being recognized as a major power that must be consulted on regional developments.
Bill — You’re correct to note that the letter showcases Iran’s desire to have a “seat at the table.” But this is something Tehran has craved, well, for decades. It transcends the current government; the Shah had the same regional pretensions (which, I should note, was a contributing factor to his corrupt regime’s downfall), and a popularly-elected Iranian government would almost certainly share that objective.
I disagree, however, with your suggestion that the letter showcases a willingness on the part of Iran to trade away its nuclear program in exchange for a seat at the table. You’ll notice that Iran didn’t mention a thing about suspending uranium enrichment. That’s because it is off the table as far as Tehran is concerned. What Iran wants is to have its cake (nuclear program + a legitimate seat at the regional table) and eat it too.
The snippet I quoted above is fascinating because it is remarkably status quo oriented, which runs counter to Iran’s typically oppositional posture. This is the tension in Iran’s post-revolution foreign policy: Iran perceives itself as a revolutionary actor aiming to reshape the global order on the one hand, and on the other hand as a natural regional power given its rich civilization and traditional clout. It can’t have it both ways. (Never mind that Iran is a predominantly Persian-Shia country in a mostly Sunni-Arab neighborhood.) It is a fascinating, if incoherent, set of values.
ataune — For the record I was being cheeky with the title. But I won’t say Iran will never join the NSG — few would have guessed in, say, 1980 that China would become a member, or even sign the NPT for that matter. I’m not holding my breath though.
Could it be that they refer to the US-Indian deal?