Avi Dichter, Israel’s public security minister, said today that the Iran NIE could result in another Yom Kippur War.

Dichter is referring to the surprise 1973 attack on Israel led by Egypt and Syria on Yom Kippur, the most important Jewish holiday. Israel ultimately clobbered the Arab coalition, although not before losing some early battles. The war has had a huge impact on Israeli strategic thinking.

Dichter’s is certainly the harshest criticism of the NIE offered so far by an Israeli official. But it is also extremely interesting for two additional reasons. First, because of its source. Time Magazine once called Dichter, who used to run Shin Bet, Israel’s domestic spy and security service, the Tough Guy Behind Sharon. This dude doesn’t mess around.

Second, and to me most interestingly, the criticism offers a window into how some in the Israeli government believe Iran will behave if (when?) it acquires a nuclear weapons option. Dichter clearly thinks that Iran would be so emboldened that it might launch a war against Israel.

I don’t know how much detail Dichter went into on this provocative claim — all I have to go on so far are news reports. (If someone finds a transcript in English, please let me know!) But Dichter can really only have one threat scenario in mind: nuclear terrorism against Israel.

Think about the means and the ends of an Iranian attack on Israel. No country in the Middle East — including Iran — could hope to take on Israel in a conventional war. They’d get clobbered. And terrorist proxies can fight guerrilla wars, but they can’t exactly threaten the viability of the Israeli state.

Possession of a nuclear weapons option wouldn’t change this. What it would do, however, is give Iran the ability to threaten the existence of Israel. If nuclear terrorism is what Dichter has in mind, then he must think Iran is essentially undeterable, given Israel’s near-certain second strike capability.

I think he’s dead wrong on this — Iran is not about to commit national suicide. The Iran NIE agrees. As Joe Cirincione and I have argued, the Iran NIE’s most important contribution is the notion that Iran’s leaders aren’t suicidal, that they operate according to a cost-benefit calculus.